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Abstract 
 
 
While the Australian wartime Prime Minister, John Curtin, has been the subject of 
intensive biographical and historical material, particularly during World War II, very 
few publications have focused on his relationships with journalists.  Certainly, there 
is a distinct absence of a comprehensive study of his mass media strategies that 
would give us a detailed insight into his leadership in a critical period.  Major forces 
converged with the commencement of another global war, the rapid expansion of 
relatively new radio and film industries, along with the appointment as prime 
minister of a skilful Labor communicator, well-known for his passionately anti-
conscription views during World War I. 
 
 This thesis investigates Curtin’s success in persuading the predominantly 
conservative news media to promote his wartime views.  First, it identifies the prime 
minister’s mass media strategies to influence the Canberra Parliamentary Press 
Gallery journalists and their editors to accept his wartime policies and portray them 
positively in the media.  
 
The thesis argues that Curtin revealed a genius for initiating, developing and 
overseeing mass media strategies that made the best use of the latest technology to 
persuade journalists to communicate his government’s policies.  In doing so, he 
extended the Australian public sphere, and his impact on political communications 
remains evident today.  Curtin also bestowed a permanent legacy to benefit the 
parliamentary press gallery, contributing to our understanding of contemporary 
political journalism. 
Curtin’s Circus: The Prime Minister and Canberra News Correspondents, 
1941-1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Curtin speaks with federal press gallery journalists, including Joseph Alexander 
of The Herald (right, with glasses and folded arms), and press secretary, Don 
Rodgers (far right), circa 1945.  Courtesy of the John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library (JCPML acc. no. 00376/2). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
 
This thesis aims to produce the first systematic study of John Curtin’s skills in 
initiating the political uses of the media, journalism and mass communication that 
defined his prime ministerial and war leadership.  For this purpose, the study sets out 
to answer the following research question: how successful was Curtin in persuading 
the predominantly conservative news media to promote his wartime views, and to 
what effect were the strategies that he employed?  Media scholars, such as Henry 
Mayer1 and Neville Petersen,2 refer to the Australian press and radio services as 
being mostly conservative during the era of World War II from 1939 to 1945 
(hereafter the war).  Yet traditional “Left-Right” descriptions of the political party 
system can be inadequate to explain why news media publishers choose to endorse or 
to campaign against a prime minister.3  Historical analyses hitherto have not 
elucidated how Curtin, as an Australian Labor Party (ALP) prime minister,4
                                                            
1 Henry Mayer, The Press in Australia [hereafter The press], Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 
1968, p. 27. 
 was able 
2 Neville Petersen, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, & Politics 1932-1947 [hereafter 
News not views], Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1993, p. 130. 
3 David Charnock and Peter Ellis, “The Structure of the Australian Party System and its 
Strategic Consequences”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 3, November 
2003, pp. 423-427; Franz Oswald, “Soft Balancing Between Friends: Transforming 
Transatlantic Relations”, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 
vol. 14, no. 2, August 2006, pp. 158-159; Rodney Tiffen, News & Power [hereafter News], 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston, 1989. 
The authors’ names will be cited in the same way as they appear in the texts.  Some authors 
used slightly different variations of their names in multiple texts such as: Clem Lloyd and 
C.J. Lloyd; Stephen Brent Mickler and Steve Mickler; Rodney Tiffen and Rod Tiffen. 
Whenever possible, the place of publication has been included in the references of this 
thesis.  Occasionally the place of publication has not been specified in the case of some 
online and print sources. 
4 Throughout this thesis, the term “labour” (using British spelling) has been used to describe 
the broader movement comprising the ALP, unions, Trades and Labour Councils and left 
wing groups such as socialists.  The term ‘Labor’ (using American spelling) is used to refer 
to the Australian Labor Party.  The ALP adopted American spelling for its name from the 
beginning.  See Bobbie Oliver, “Shaping the Nation: John Curtin and Australia” [hereafter 
“Shaping the nation”], John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, 
2001, footnote 2, retrieved on 1 December 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/shapingthenation/essay/footnotes.html>. 
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to generate favourable news and marshal his electoral popularity as a means to 
achieve a mandate to influence the media, a mandate that journalists felt obliged to 
respect.  He won 66.9 per cent of the votes in his electorate of Fremantle, Western 
Australia, in 1943 and the ALP achieved its greatest federal election victory at the 
time.5
 
  This study will refer throughout to Curtin’s journalism strategies as well as 
his use of wider mass media strategies and to a significant extent, these categories 
overlap.  The thesis argues that he displayed a genius for initiating, developing and 
overseeing innovative mass communication strategies that made the best use of the 
latest media technology to persuade journalists to promote his foreign policies and 
military decisions. 
 After working as a labour newspaper editor and writer, Curtin was appointed 
to be the prime minister on 7 October 1941 and retained this position until his 
untimely death on 5 July 1945.  He was born in the Victorian mining town of 
Creswick on 8 January 1885 and, due to his family’s unfortunate financial 
circumstances, he left school by the age of 14 to take jobs as a “printer’s devil”, 
office cleaner, messenger and copy boy for newspapers in Melbourne, Victoria.6  
When he was The Timber Worker editor in Melbourne from 1913 to 1915, journalists 
from the city’s weekly Labor Call viewed him as being one of their local 
movement’s “most brilliant expositors”.7
                                                            
5 See David Black, “Curtin as an Election Leader”, JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 28 
January 2009 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/electionleader/1943/1943_outcome.html>; Lesley 
Carman-Brown, “Parliamentary Power”, JCPML, Bentley, 2004, retrieved on 28 January 
2009 at <
  Later colleagues described him as “a 
rallying point when the fight was hardest, and an inspiration at all times”, when he 
http://john.curtin.edu.au/aspirations/parliament.html>; Bobbie Oliver, Unity is 
Strength: A History of the Australian Labor Party and the Trades and Labor Council in 
Western Australia, 1899-1999 [hereafter Unity is strength], API Network, Bentley, 2003,  
pp. 167-169. 
6 Cited in David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings 
[hereafter In his own words], Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 1; Ron 
Davidson, “John Curtin: From Revolutionary Firebrand to Journalist in Spirit”, JCPML, 
Bentley, 2000, retrieved on 2 May 2008 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/journalist>. 
7 Cited in Black, In his own words, p. 16.  Also see Australian Newspaper History Group, 
Australian Newspaper History Group Newsletter, no. 3, January 2000, p. 7, retrieved on 5 
December 2010 at <espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv/UQ:11342/anjh03.pdf>. 
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was The Westralian Worker editor in Perth, WA, from 1917 to 1928.8  In Perth, he 
was also the Australian Journalists’ Association (AJA) Western Australian District 
Committee president.  Along with writing lead editorials, Curtin had been pursuing 
intermittently a federal parliamentary seat since 1914, when he became the ALP’s 
endorsed candidate for the Victorian seat of Balaclava.  Although he was not elected 
at the time, he succeeded in halving the Liberal Party majority of the previous year.  
After moving to WA, he won the federal electorate of Fremantle in 1928, but was 
defeated in 1931 and returned to journalism.  He won the Fremantle seat back in 
1934 and was elected to be the Labor Party’s national leader the following year.9
 
  
When Curtin began his prime ministership at the age of 56, Australia had been 
fighting for more than two years alongside Great Britain and other Allied nations 
against Nazi Germany and the associated Axis powers.  After he had served in this 
position for about two months, Japan bombed the United States naval base of Pearl 
Harbour, Hawaii, and Curtin delivered a national radio broadcast to make Australia’s 
first declaration of war against another country in December 1941.  Thus the former 
hard-hitting, anti-conscription journalist began developing his use of the mass media 
to enlist support for Australia’s role in global battles until his death, about a month 
before Japan’s surrender. 
This particularity might be expected to have solicited the interest of 
researchers in media and political studies.  Yet there are no previous published 
findings on the specific character of his mass communication strategies to secure the 
support of the self-proclaimed “circus” of senior Canberra Parliamentary Press 
Gallery journalists.  The Herald Canberra wartime bureau head, Joseph Alexander, 
described himself as a member of the “travelling circus which went everywhere with  
  
                                                            
8 (Anon.), “‘The Worker’ Loses Jack Curtin For Movement’s Greater Welfare”, The 
Westralian Worker, Perth, cited in JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00984/243, 21 
December 1928, p. 1. 
9 Black, In his own words, pp. 13, 77-122. 
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Curtin, saw him twice a day and shared his confidence to an extent previously 
unknown in the history of the press in Australia”.10  Certainly, there is a distinct 
absence of a comprehensive study of his mass media strategies that would give us a 
detailed insight into his leadership in a critical period.  This was a period in which 
major forces converged with the commencement of another global war, the rapid 
expansion of relatively new radio and film industries, along with the appointment as 
prime minister of a skilful Labor communicator, well-known for his passionately 
anti-conscription views during World War I.11  Contrary to some scholars’ views that 
the 1940s press gallery was mainly “hostile” and “anti-labour”,12
  
 this thesis argues 
that Curtin gained the respect of many media professionals, particularly news  
                                                            
10 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt, [hereafter “Alexander interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np.  Some authors have 
written of Curtin’s confidential press briefings: Michelle Grattan, “The Prime Minister and 
the Press: A Study in Intimacy” [hereafter “The prime minister and the press”], in David 
Black (ed.), John Curtin’s Legacy: A series of public lectures from the JCPML, JCPML, 
Perth, 2000, pp. 38-48; C.J. Lloyd, Parliament And The Press: The Federal Parliamentary 
Press Gallery 1901-88 [hereafter Parliament and the press], Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton, 1988, pp. 125-157; Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John 
Curtin’s war [hereafter Backroom briefings], National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], 
Canberra, 1997; Lloyd Ross, John Curtin: A Biography [hereafter A Curtin biography], 
Macmillan Publishing Company, South Melbourne, 1977, p. 243; Geoffrey Serle, For 
Australia and Labor: Prime Minister John Curtin [hereafter Australia and Labor], JCPML, 
Bentley, 1998, p. 35. 
11 Other scholars have referred to Curtin’s journalism relations.  Bridget Griffen-Foley, The 
house of Packer: the making of a media empire [hereafter The house of Packer], Allen & 
Unwin, St Leonards, 1999, p. 123; Petersen, News not views, pp. 163-166; R.M. Younger, 
Keith Murdoch: Founder of a media empire [hereafter Keith Murdoch], 
HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2003, pp. 151-152. 
12 Mayer, The press, p. 27; Petersen, News not views, p. 130. 
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correspondents,13 whose oral histories and autobiographies have been largely 
overlooked by previous researchers.14
 
 
In their memoirs, several wartime senior journalists, who identified 
themselves as representing “conservative” and “right-leaning” media companies, 
recalled how they changed their views about Labor and decided to vote for the ALP 
in 1943 because they admired Curtin’s leadership including his use of the media.15
                                                            
13 Australian wartime journalists praised Curtin including: Alexander, “Alexander 
interview”; Theodor Charles Bray, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Bray interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00512, 5 March 1971, transcript np; Frank Chamberlain, 
interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Chamberlain interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00552, August 1972-January 1973, transcript np; John Commins, interviewed by 
Mel Pratt [hereafter “Commins interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01092/1, 22-
26 May 1971, transcript np; Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Cox 
interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01060/1, 6 April 1973, transcript np; Frank 
Davidson, interviewed by Isla Macphail [hereafter “Davidson interview”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00127/1, 24 January 1996. transcript np; Irvine Douglas, interviewed by 
Mel Pratt [hereafter “Douglas interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01061/1, 15-19 
June 1972, transcript np; Peter Ewing, interviewed by Bill Bunbury [hereafter “Ewing 
interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00492/2, 15 December 1999, transcript np; 
Allan Fraser, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Fraser interview”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00550, August 1972–January 1973, transcript np; Edgar George Holt, 
interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Holt interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01059, 23 May 1978, transcript np; Alan D. Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Reid 
interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00501, 4 October 1972 and 28 February 
1973, transcript np; Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography [hereafter 
Strive to be fair], Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 82. 
  
For example, Edgar George Holt remembered that as a young Argus newspaper 
correspondent in 1929, he and “the whole of the Australian Press” were “totally 
committed” to Prime Minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce’s Nationalist Party-Country 
Party coalition government, which was subsequently defeated by the ALP in the 
election of the same year.  Holt said later as The Daily Telegraph chief leader 
(editorial) writer, he became “quite strong as a private citizen, private individual, in 
support of the Labor Party during the period of John Curtin”.  Afterwards Holt joined 
the Liberal Party, serving as its public relations director from 1950 to 1972 and then 
14 In their history books, Clem J. Lloyd and Bob Wurth referred to some of these primary 
sources, but not for the purpose of ascertaining Curtin’s prime ministerial mass media 
strategies.  See Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 125-157; Bob Wurth, Saving Australia: 
Curtin’s secret peace with Japan [hereafter Saving Australia], Lothian Books, South 
Melbourne, 2006, pp. 146, 158-159. 
15 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Holt, “Holt interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, 
pp. 55, 59, 82. 
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as its senior political adviser.16  Holt’s journalism colleague, Joseph Alexander, 
recalled thinking that in 1929, the new Labor Prime Minister, James Scullin, “was 
not the man” to lead the country after his party’s election victory.  Yet he admired 
Curtin as “the greatest” prime minister.17  In his autobiography, Don Whitington 
wrote of his dislike for the harsh working conditions and meagre reporters’ wages at 
the Labor Daily in the 1930s;18 but later as The Daily Telegraph Canberra bureau 
head, he viewed Curtin as “the best Prime Minister Australia had since 
Federation”.19  Even Whitington’s mother “was prepared to vote Labor, [for] the first 
time in her life”.20
 
  These reminiscences suggested that the three journalists had not 
shown any previous allegiance to the ALP, while party political consideration did not 
hinder them from developing close professional relations with Curtin. 
Neither did the political conservatism of the three journalists’ employers, Sir 
Keith Murdoch and Frank Packer,21 disincline them to praise Curtin at times during 
national crises.  For example, Murdoch published a Herald article, praising Curtin’s 
“suave” manner, his “apt” and “correct” quotations, as well as his “graceful” 
sentences, as he was about to be sworn in as the new prime minister on 7 October 
1941.22
 
  Curtin’s prime ministerial predecessor, Arthur Fadden, was the leader of the 
Country Party and had been relying on the United Australia Party (UAP) and two 
independent politicians to retain power.  When the independent members voted with 
the Labor opposition to reject Fadden’s budget on 3 October, he advised the 
Governor-General, Lord Gowrie, that Curtin should be commissioned as the prime  
                                                            
16 Holt, “Holt interview”. 
17 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
18 Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 55, 59. 
19 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 82. 
20 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 84. 
21 Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling and the professionalization of public 
relations: Keith Murdoch, Robert Menzies, and the Liberal Party of Australia” [hereafter 
“Political opinion polling”], Australian Journalism Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2002, p. 43; David 
McKnight, “Book Review: Bridget Griffen-Foley, Sir Frank Packer, The Young Master” 
(Bridget Griffen-Foley), Labour History, no. 82, November 2002, p. 235. 
22 Allan W. Dawes, “Men You Should Know About” [hereafter “Men you should know 
about”], The Herald, Melbourne, cited in Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister's 
Office, [hereafter Scrapbooks], JCPML, Bentley, no. 1, JCPML acc. no. 00297/1, 6 October 
1941. 
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minister.  At the time a Herald writer, Allan W. Dawes, remarked to his readers that: 
It is easier to be friends with John Curtin, I think, than with almost any other 
member of the Federal Parliament … He is a hard reader and an indefatigable 
worker.23
In 1942 Curtin seconded Packer, The Daily Telegraph owner, to be the director of 
personnel of the newly created Allied Works Council, which was responsible for 
carrying out all works required for war purposes by the Allied forces in Australia.  
Packer’s business partner, Edward Granville Theodore, became the director-general 
of the Council.
 
24
 
  Theodore had been the federal Labor treasurer from 1929 to 1930, 
when Curtin was a backbencher in the parliament.  These findings indicated that as 
the prime minister, Curtin’s associations with the media owners were more 
multifaceted than a uniformly “hostile” relationship allows for. 
In fact, some journalists developed strong links to the ALP, the left-wing 
Labor Daily newspaper and unions including the AJA.  Between 1929 and 1940, 
about ten per cent of the Federal Labor MPs had been journalists.  Curtin was not the 
first prime minister to have been a newsman; his ALP predecessor and close friend, 
Scullin, was the editor of the Ballarat Echo.  Also John Christian Watson, the Labor 
Prime Minister for only four months in 1904, had been a newspaper compositor for 
the Australian Star.  Alfred Deakin wrote for London’s Morning Post before 
becoming a non-Labor Prime Minister. 25
                                                            
23 Dawes, “Men you should know about”. 
  When a labour newspaper editor and the 
AJA’s WA district president, Curtin arranged the nation’s first university extension 
classes for journalists.  Conducted by Walter Murdoch, Professor of English and 
Literature at The University of Western Australia, the lecture series in 1919 focused 
on the English language, politics and economic history.  This program resulted in the 
24 Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Packer, Sir Douglas Frank Hewson (1906 – 1974)” [hereafter 
“Frank Packer”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 15, 
2000, pp. 553-556, retrieved on 21 January 2009 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A150644b.htm>; National Archives of Australia 
[hereafter NAA], “Fact sheet 181 – Civil Constructional Corps records held in Perth”, 
Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 25 November 2010 at <http://www.naa.gov.au/about-
us/publications/fact-sheets/fs181.aspx>. 
25 Mayer, The press, p. 190. 
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introduction of a Diploma in Journalism.26  Similar courses were adopted at 
Queensland and Melbourne universities in 1921.27
 
  Of the national leaders, Curtin 
seemed to be one of the most prominent advocates for the professionalisation of 
journalism.   
This thesis argues that Curtin developed mutually beneficial interactions with 
the news media of major democratic Allied nations.  With a crusading zeal, he strove 
to enlist journalists’ support for Australia’s fight against the threats of Axis terrorism, 
fascist aggression and Nazism.28
No country in the world has made a military effort in ratio to men and 
economic resources greater than Australia.  We have suffered great strains 
and great stresses more than any country on the Allied side.
  During his international mission to confer with 
several Allied leaders in 1944, he talked with US correspondents at San Francisco’s 
Fairmont Hotel on 19 April to explain Australia’s struggles.  Curtin declared to the 
reporters: 
29
As he discussed Australia’s “great strains and great stresses”, he seemed to be 
speaking comparatively about the Allied democracies’ military services and national 
populations.  About one out of every seven Australians participated in military 
 
  
                                                            
26 Black, In his own words, p. 1; John Edwards, Curtin’s gift: Reinterpreting Australia’s greatest 
prime minister [hereafter Curtin’s gift], Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005, p. 19; Ross, A Curtin 
biography, p. 77; Clem Lloyd, Profession: Journalist [hereafter Journalist], Hale & 
Iremonger, Sydney, 1985, pp. 165-167. 
27 Lloyd, Journalist, pp. 165-167. 
28 This discussion of Curtin’s wartime leadership has been based on the following sources: 
David Black, “The Art of the Possible: Creating an independent Australian foreign policy 
1941-1945”, JCPML, Bentley, 2004, retrieved on 4 June 2008 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/printessay.html>; Christopher Hubbard, An 
Australian Introduction to International Relations [hereafter International relations], 
Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, 2008, p. 147; Oliver, “Shaping the nation”.  
29 Heather Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man” [hereafter “Diary”] for 19 April 1944, 
JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1944.html>; John Curtin, “Review Of War 
Commitments: Prime Minister’s Statements”, Digest of Decisions and Announcements and 
Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) [hereafter DDA], no. 81, 
19 April 1944, p. 18. 
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service,30 contrasting with approximately one in every ten Britons,31 and about one 
out of every 12 Canadians32 and Americans (see Appendix 1).33  At the San 
Francisco media conference, Curtin spent 90 minutes with news correspondents, 
including press writers, photographers and film teams, estimated to have numbered 
between 41 people and 66 people.34  He “joked easily” with reporters, engaged in an 
“off-the-record” discussion and journalists applauded his answer to a question.  A 
prominent Columbia Broadcasting System commentator, William “Wynter” 
(Winter), was quoted as saying Curtin’s interview “was the most comprehensive ever 
held in San Francisco” because his answers “were the frankest we have ever had”.35
  
  
This observation was supported by the British Consul-General in San Francisco, 
Godfrey  
                                                            
30 See John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Review, May, 1944”, DDA, no. 81, 4 May 1944, p. 30; 
NAA, “Boer War to Vietnam”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 6 June 2010 at 
<http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/defence/conflicts.aspx#section3>; Parliamentary 
Library, “Anzac Day 2010”, Canberra, 1 April 2010, retrieved on 29 May 2010 at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/anzac/stats.htm>. 
31 This figure includes England, Scotland and Wales, but not neutral wartime Ireland.  See 
Joe Hicks and Grahame Allen, “A Century of Change: Trends in UK statistics since 1900”, 
research paper 99/111, House of Commons Library, London, 21 December 2009, pp. 6, 16, 
retrieved on 27 July 2010 at <www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-
111.pdf>. 
32 Statistics Canada, “Estimated population of Canada, 1605 to present”, Ottawa, 2009, 
retrieved on 6 June 2010 at <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/98-187-x/4151287-
eng.htm#table2>; Veteran Affairs Canada, “Canada and the Second World War 1939-1945”, 
Ottawa, 1998, retrieved on 6 June 2010 at <http://www.vac-
acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=history/secondwar/canada2/intro>. 
33 Kenneth Paul O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons, “Introduction: The Home-Front War”, 
in Kenneth Paul O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons (eds), The Home-Front War: World War 
II and American Society, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1995, p. 4; U.S. Census Bureau, 
“Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999”, Washington DC, 28 
June 2000, retrieved on 29 May 2010 at 
<www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt>. 
34 Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political situation: consular reports, 1944” [hereafter 
“Political situation”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00779/13, 28 April 1944, pp. 1-3; 
Theo Moody, “Triumph For Mr Curtin At Press Talk” [hereafter “Triumph for Curtin”], The 
Argus, Melbourne, 21 April 1944, p. 1. 
35 Moody, “Triumph for Curtin”, p. 1.  This Argus article referred to “William Wynter”.  Yet 
the correct spelling was Winter, according to the Los Angeles Times.  See Myrna Oliver, 
“William Winter: Foreign Affairs Commentator”, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, 9 
November 1999, retrieved on 10 June 2010 at 
<http://articles.latimes.com/1999/nov/09/news/mn-31605>. 
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Fisher,36 as well as the reports in The New York Times and The Washington Star.37  
As Curtin talked openly with journalists in an egalitarian manner, they published 
favourable news about his “energy and endurance”38
 
 to defeat the Axis powers. 
Since major wars have “a special place in the news”, creating mass audiences 
and initiating modern reporting techniques,39 political leaders should have a “deep, 
intimate involvement” in the creation of media reports about their nations’ roles in 
global conflicts.40  Curtin developed the use of the relatively new media of direct 
national and international radio broadcasts and wartime newsreels.41  He appointed 
Australia’s first full-time prime ministerial press secretary, Donald (Don) Kilgour 
Rodgers, and, as a result, journalists viewed these new media forms as a major 
source of official news and background information about the nation’s role in the 
war.42
                                                            
36 Curtin’s media conference was praised in a consular report sent by “Consul-General Fisher 
(San Francisco)”.  A 1944 Time magazine report referred to Godfrey Fisher as the British 
Consul-General in San Francisco.  See (Anon.), “Prayer”, Time, New York, 29 May 1944, 
retrieved on 30 November 2010 at 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,850888,00.html>; Great Britain 
Foreign Office, “Political situation”, pp. 1-3. 
  As this thesis argues, Curtin’s ability to work closely with journalists to 
promote his foreign policies provides insights into how contemporary democratic 
governments may manage information needs during sensitive international conflicts.  
37 (Anon.), “Curtin, In Capital, Is Greeted by Hull; Lord Halifax Also Welcomes Australian 
Leader, Here For War Conferences”, The New York Times, New York, 24 April 1944, p. 11; 
(Anon.), “Hail Curtin’s Reception; Australians Are Gratified by U.S. Greeting of Prime 
Minister” [hereafter “Hail Curtin’s reception”], The New York Times, New York, 22 April 
1944, p. 7; Lawrence E. Davies, “Curtin On Coast; To See Roosevelt” [hereafter “Curtin on 
coast”], The New York Times, New York, 20 April 1944, p. 3. 
38 Cited in (Anon.), “Australia: Journey Into the World”, Time, New York, 24 April 1944, 
retrieved on 30 November 2010 at 
<http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19440424,00.html>.  Positive headlines about 
this media conference also appeared in: (Anon.), “Hail Curtin’s reception”, p. 7; Davies, 
“Curtin on coast”, p. 3; Moody, “Triumph for Curtin”, p. 1. 
39 Jeremy Tunstall, Journalists at work [hereafter Journalists], Constable, London, 1971,  
p. 20. 
40 Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A 
Study of News Organizations [hereafter Visualizing deviance], Open University Press, 
Milton Keynes, 1987, p. 39. 
41 For example, (Anon.) “Publicity: Relations with America: Australia Expands”, The 
Canberra Times, Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4; John Curtin, “Relations with America” 
[hereafter “American relations”], DDA, no. 3, JCPML acc. no. 00110/8, 30 October 1941, 
pp. 13-14 (the online page numbers have been cited). 
42 Donald Kilgour Rodgers, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Rodgers interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00497, 29 April 1971, transcript np. 
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Successive Australian prime ministers have sought public support for providing 
direct military assistance in foreign battles to strengthen the nation’s reputation as a 
loyal ally of Britain and the US.  For example, Australia joined Britain’s fight against 
a “communist insurgency” in the Malayan Emergency (1950-1960).43 Australia’s 
support of US-led military interventions includes the Korean War (1950-1953),44 the 
Vietnam War (1962-1975)45 and the more recent coalition operations against 
terrorism in Afghanistan (11 October 2001 to the present)46 and Iraq (16 July 2003 to 
the present).47
 
  This thesis asserts that Curtin’s mass communication strategies 
provide lessons for contemporary democratic leaders, particularly when they are 
using the media to explain their foreign policy goals to public audiences. 
                                                            
43 The Malayan government officially declared the Emergency was over on 31 July 1960, 
although Australia’s military role did not end until 1963.  Seven thousand Australian Army 
personnel enlisted in this conflict (there were not recorded statistics for the nation’s navy and 
air force).  Thirty-nine Australian servicemen were killed in Malaya during this time.  
Australian War Memorial [hereafter AWM], “Australians at war: casualties as a result of 
service with Australian units” [hereafter “Australians at war”], Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 
20 November 2010 at <http://www.awm.gov.au/research/infosheets/war_casualties.asp>; 
AWM, “Malayan Emergency, 1950-60”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 20 November 2010 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/emergency.asp>; Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of 
Australia [hereafter Military history], Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, third 
edition, 2008, p. 208. 
44 In the three years of fighting, 17,164 Australian army, air force and navy personnel 
enlisted in this war.  Of these, 339 Australians were killed.  AWM, “Australians at war”; 
AWM, “Korean War (1950-53)”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 20 November 2010 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/korea.asp>. 
45 Almost 60,000 Australians, including ground troops, air force and navy personnel, served 
in Vietnam; 521 died as a result of the war and over 3,000 were wounded.  AWM, “Vietnam 
War (1962-75)”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 25 November 2010 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/vietnam.asp>. 
46 Australia’s military contribution includes about 1,550 Defence Force personnel, deployed 
in Afghanistan.  According to the Australian War Memorial on 4 March 2011, some 23 
Australians had been killed while serving with the nation’s units in Afghanistan.  Australian 
Government Department of Defence, “Australia’s Commitment In Afghanistan”, Canberra, 
October 2010, retrieved on 20 November 2010 at 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/info/factsheet.htm>; AWM, “Encyclopedia: 
Deaths as a result of service with Australian units”, Canberra, 2011, retrieved on 4 March 
2011 at <http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/war_casualties.asp>. 
47 The Australian Government withdrew 550 troops from southern Iraq in 2008.  About 35 
Australian defence personnel are currently deployed in Iraq.  Two of the nation’s troops died 
during this conflict.  Australian Government Department of Defence, “Iraq troop numbers 
clarified”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 20 November 2010 at 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/defenceblog/2008/0128_0203.htm>; Australian Government 
Department of Defence, “Operation Kruger”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 20 November 
2010 at <http://www.defence.gov.au/op/iraq/index.htm>; AWM, “Australians at war”. 
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Literature review 
This section reviews all of the key literature informing this thesis.  First, I situate the 
study in the field of historical literature about Curtin, particularly pertaining to his 
dealings with press journalists in Australia’s liberal democratic society.  Secondly, I 
discuss the theoretical and conceptual literature on government-media relations that 
inform this thesis.  These theories help to establish a critical framework within which 
to interpret and understand the interactions between Curtin and news organisations in 
the wider historical, political and social contexts of the expanding mass media.  The 
latter part of this section will engage with these theories because they will inform the 
thesis’ analysis of Curtin’s prime ministerial media strategies. 
 
 While Curtin has been the subject of intensive biographical and historical 
material, particularly concerning his wartime leadership,48 very few publications 
have focused on his relationships with journalists, radio broadcasts and film 
strategies.  When the political scientist, Henry Mayer, published his history of 
Australian newspaper journalism in 1964, an academic reviewer commended his 
“immensely valuable contribution” to “a scarcely touched field of serious study”;49 
however, Mayer made only one brief reference to Curtin in his book.50
  
  The history 
of journalism, both in and outside of Australia, remains an under-studied field, 
because, it has been argued, there has been little interest in understanding the ideals,  
                                                            
48 For example, Black, In his own words; David Day, John Curtin: A life [hereafter John 
Curtin], HarperCollinsPublishers, Sydney, 1999; John Edwards, Curtin’s gift; Bobbie 
Oliver, “Fighting Labor’s Battles: Conscription, the Great Depression, and Party Unity” 
[hereafter “Labor’s battles”], JCPML, Bentley, 2010, retrieved on 14 November 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/battles/index.html>; Oliver, “Shaping the nation”; Ross, A Curtin 
biography; Bob Wurth, Saving Australia: Curtin’s secret peace with Japan [hereafter Saving 
Australia], Lothian Books, South Melbourne, 2006. 
49 W.J. Hudson, “Book review” (Henry Mayer), The Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 1, no. 2, September 1965, p. 138. 
50 Mayer, The press, p. 190. 
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practices and mediating influences that shape the news and thus, our perceptions of 
the world.51
 
   
 To understand how Curtin crafted journalism strategies to promote his foreign 
policies, this study uses historical and international relations publications that 
provide insights into the social, political and diplomatic challenges that he faced.  
Some scholars portray him as skilfully forging an improved alliance with the United 
States and leading Australia in an entirely new direction to becoming a fully 
independent nation, a significant shift from British imperial domination.52  Along 
with these texts about his foreign policies, many biographers have credited his 
achievements in defeating persistent Axis Japanese invasion threats to his strong 
political leadership and international relations acumen.53  While David Day and John 
Hirst remark on the historical tradition of elevating Curtin to the status of a hero and 
“the best Prime Minister”, they also note that at the turn of the twenty-first century, 
“a few doubters” have disagreed with his Labor ideology.54
  
  Furthermore, some 
authors have discussed whether the Australian Federal Government accepted too 
readily a subordinate role for the nation’s military forces under the command of US  
                                                            
51 Ann Curthoys, “Introduction: Histories of Journalism”, in Ann Curthoys and Julianne 
Schulz (eds), Journalism: Print, Politics and Popular Culture, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, 1999, pp. 1-7; Bridget Griffen Foley, “In conversation with Bridget Griffen-
Foley”, Global Media Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, 2009, retrieved on 29 December 2010 at 
<http://www.commarts.uws.edu.au/gmjau/2009_3_1_toc.html>; Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and 
Thomas Hanitzsch, “Introduction: On Why and How We Should Do Journalism Studies”, in 
Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (eds), The Handbook of Journalism Studies, 
Routledge, New York and Abingdon, 2009, p. 4. 
52 For example, Black, “The art of the possible”; Hubbard, International relations, p. 147; 
Oliver, “Shaping the nation”. 
53 Alan Chester, John Curtin [hereafter Curtin], Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1943, pp. 
177-184; H.C. Coombes, John Curtin – A Consensus Prime Minister? [hereafter John 
Curtin], The Australian National University, Canberra, 1984, pp. 3-15; Day, John Curtin, pp. 
581-584; Edwards, Curtin’s gift, pp. 157-160; Norman E. Lee, John Curtin: Saviour of 
Australia [hereafter Saviour of Australia], Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 167-
170. 
54 David Day, “Curtin as Hero”, The Sydney Papers, vol. 12, no. 2, autumn 2000 [hereafter 
“Curtin as hero”], pp. 60-67; John Hirst, Looking for Australia [hereafter Australia], Black 
Inc., Melbourne, 2010, pp. 166-167, 197. 
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General Douglas MacArthur, following his arrival at his Melbourne base on 21 
March 1942.55  The new alliance resulted in Australian social upheavals, particularly 
after Curtin succeeded in changing his party’s anti-conscription policy, which he had 
endorsed as a World War I news editor, and then introducing the Defence (Citizen 
Military Forces) Bill in 1943.  Under this legislation, members of Australia’s militia 
could be required to serve in any area of MacArthur’s command in the South West 
Pacific Zone.56  Although the “Curtin halo” effect57 appears in some biographies,58 
other historical and foreign policy texts59
 
 will be used from Chapters 6 to 9 to gain a 
more balanced assessment of how he presented the war, particularly regarding his 
inclusions and deliberate omissions of vital information in his press statements, radio 
broadcasts and newsreel commentaries. 
 Historians, political scientists and biographers briefly refer to Curtin’s press 
and radio interactions; these authors provide a valuable glimpse into his 
communication strategies.  These books include biographies of Australian news 
owners, such as Sir Keith Murdoch60 and Sir Frank Packer,61
  
 as well as histories  
                                                            
55 David Black, “Assessments of the Curtin-MacArthur relationship”, JCPML, Bentley, 
2006, retrieved on 12 May 2008 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/macarthur/assessment1.html>; 
Peter Edwards, “Curtin, MacArthur and ‘the surrender of sovereignty’: a historiographical 
assessment” [hereafter “The surrender of sovereignty”], Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 55, no. 2, 2001, pp.175-185; Peter Edwards, “Remembering 1942: Another look 
at Curtin and MacArthur”, 2002 History Conference – Remembering 1942, Canberra, 2002, 
retrieved on 31 March 2008 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2002/edwards.htm>; Grey, Military history, pp. 
177-178; Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1942-1945, Australia in the War of 
1939-45, Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, series 4, vol. 2, 1970, p. 628; Hirst, Australia, pp. 172, 184, 190; David Horner, 
Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian Defence Policy, 
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2000, p. 142; Peter Stanley, Tarakan: An Australian Tragedy, 
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997, pp. 1-2. 
56 Black, In his own words, pp. 214-218; Bobbie Oliver, Peacemongers: Conscientious 
objectors to military service in Australia, 1911-1945, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, South 
Fremantle, 1997, pp. 84-86, 143-144; Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 166. 
57 Day, “Curtin as hero”, pp. 60-67. 
58 Chester, Curtin; Lee, Saviour of Australia. 
59 For example, Black, In his own words; Grey, A military history; Oliver, Unity is strength; 
Wurth, Saving Australia. 
60 Younger, Keith Murdoch, pp. 151-152. 
61 Griffen-Foley, The house of Packer, p. 123. 
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about the expansion of the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC),62 
commercial radio,63 the Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery64 and the Australian 
Journalists’ Association (AJA).65  For example, Ian Ward and Leslie Finlay Crisp 
have noted Curtin’s early recognition of a shift from local political meetings to radio 
broadcasts in the mid-1930s.66  During the 1943 election campaign, he became the 
first party leader to deliver an election manifesto from Canberra through a radio 
hook-up, as David Black describes.67  Some researchers have produced case-specific 
studies on war reporting and journalism sub-cultures during twentieth-century 
military conflicts; however, they do not specifically focus on Curtin’s skill as a 
media strategist.68  With respect to his press associations, John Edwards and Clem J. 
Lloyd have remarked on his unusually warm relations with Canberra’s senior 
reporters;69 some researchers refer to his occasional disappointments over the anti-
Labor attitudes of Murdoch and Packer.70
                                                            
62 K.S. Inglis, This is the ABC: The Australian Broadcasting Commission 1932-1983 
[hereafter ABC], Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1983, pp. 96, 99, 110-112, 117; 
Neville Petersen, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, & Politics 1932-1947 [hereafter 
News not views], Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1993, pp. 163-166. 
  Lloyd commented that Curtin held twice-
daily, confidential news conferences that he timed to help reporters file news stories 
63 Ian Ward, “The early use of radio for political communication in Australia and Canada: 
John Henry Austral, Mr Sage and the Man from Mars” [hereafter “The early use of radio”], 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, p. 322. 
64 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 125-157. 
65 Lloyd, Journalist, pp. 150, 156, 167, 202, 205, 210, 215, 218, 235. 
66 Ward, “The early use of radio”, p. 322; L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 
1901-1951, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1978, pp. 78, 88.  For his book title, Crisp used the 
British spelling of “Labour”. 
67 Black, In his own words, p. 226. 
68 For example, Rod Kirkpatrick has focused on the impact of the war on the Australian 
provincial press.  See Rod Kirkpatrick, “War and lasting change: The battle for survival on 
the provincial newspaper front”, ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-12, retrieved on 29 
June 2008 at <http://www.ejournalism.au.com/ejournalist/KIRK.PDF>.  Amanda Laugeson 
has examined soldiers’ military magazines during World War I in: Amanda Laugesen, 
“Aussie magazine and the making of digger culture during the Great War”, National Library 
of Australia News, vol.14, no. 2, November 2003, pp. 15-18.  Fay Anderson and Richard 
Trembath have investigated foreign correspondents from the Boer to Gulf Wars.  See Fay 
Anderson and Richard Trembath, “The Greatness and Smallness of Their Story: Australian 
War Correspondents in the Twentieth Century” [hereafter “Australian war correspondents”], 
in S. Nolan (ed.), When Journalism Meets History 2003, Melbourne, RMIT Publishing, 
2004, retrieved on 5 June 2008 at 
<http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=818775115965463;res=E-
LIBRARY>. 
69 Edwards, Curtin’s gift, pp. 19-21; Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 131. 
70 Denis Fitzgerald and Lesley Wallace, “Investigating John Curtin: The Research Papers of 
Tom Fitzgerald”, JCPML, Bentley, 2003, retrieved on 7 May 2008 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/fitzgerald>; Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, p. 44. 
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by their deadlines, including weekends.  In mid-1941, Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies would give a single daily news conference, arranged by his part-time press 
secretary, Claude Charles Dawson.71  Lloyd’s history and Northey’s biographical 
article of Dawson enable comparisons to be made between the Curtin and Menzies 
interviews.  Although historians have remarked on Curtin’s top-secret press 
briefings,72
 
 this thesis is the first study to extend our knowledge of his use of a wide 
range of mass media strategies – including his speeches, press statements, newsreels 
and off-the record interviews – to create positive coverage of his foreign policies. 
 Biographies of Curtin provided important, sometimes succinct, descriptions 
of his private and professional background.  Numerous authors have sympathetically 
portrayed the young John Curtin, from a working-class family in Creswick, Victoria, 
and his rapid ascendancy in his career as a journalist to become a union newspaper 
editor, devoted to reading scholarly books and actively participating in political 
meetings.73  These biographical accounts of his career as a journalist help to explain 
his egalitarian approach as the prime minister,74 when he addressed reporters as his 
colleagues, still wearing his AJA badge on his coat each day.75
  
 
                                                            
71 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 125-126; R. E. Northey, “Dawson, Claude Charles 
(1902 - 1945)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 13, 
1993, pp. 594-595, retrieved on 25 January 2011 at 
<http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A130660b.htm>. 
72 Grattan, “The prime minister and the press”, pp. 125-126; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom 
briefings; Ross, A Curtin biography, p. 243; Geoffrey Serle, For Australia and Labor: Prime 
Minister John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, 1998, p. 35. 
73 For example, Chester, Curtin, pp. 1-44; Ross, A Curtin biography, pp. 1-78; Davidson, 
“John Curtin”. 
74 Black, In his own words, p. 1; Edwards, Curtin’s gift, p. 19; Ross, A Curtin biography, p. 
77; Lloyd, Journalist, pp. 165-167. 
75 Davidson, “John Curtin”. 
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While several historians have analysed Curtin’s strongly worded editorials, 
focusing on his support for the working class and social justice,76 few researchers 
have studied his rhetoric.77  His forceful, sometimes emotive writing seemed 
significant in assisting him to win the federal seat of Fremantle in November 1928 
and eventually ascend to the Labor leadership in 1935.78  As the prime minister, 
Curtin’s oratory style was “dynamic”,79 reflecting “inspiring eloquence”80 and 
having the tone of a “wise teacher”.81  Although several researchers have written of 
wartime Australian journalists’ orientation towards British imperial values,82 some 
scholars describe Curtin’s demands for ABC broadcasters to stop mimicking English 
accents by publicising more local voices on national programs.83
  
 I have researched 
Curtin’s writings, speeches and wartime radio and newsreel broadcasts, to expand 
our understanding of his use of language to communicate his vision of Australia to 
the public. Chapters 6 to 9 assess Curtin’s ability to persuade journalists to reproduce 
his words positively in their news reports, which are now preserved in bound  
                                                            
76 Black, In his own words, pp. 17-47; Davidson, “John Curtin”; Oliver, Peacemongers, p. 
44; Bobbie Oliver, “ ‘Rats’, ‘Scabs’, ‘Soolers’ and ‘Sinn  Feiners’: A Re-assessment of the 
role of the Labour Movement in the Conscription Crisis in Western Australia, 1916-17”, 
Labour History, no. 58, 1990, pp. 61-64; Dianne Sholl, “John Curtin at the Westralian 
Worker 1917-1928”, BA (Hons) thesis, The University of Western Australia, Crawley, 1975. 
77 Black, In his own words, p. 204; James Curran, The Power of Speech: Australian Prime 
Ministers Defining the National Image, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2006, pp. 26-
36; Coombes, John Curtin, p. 6; David Day, “John Joseph Curtin”, in Michelle Grattan (ed.), 
Australian Prime Ministers, New Holland Publishers, Sydney, Auckland, London and Cape 
Town, revised edition, 2008, p. 235; Ross, A Curtin biography, p. 284. 
78 David Black, “Biography of John Curtin”, JCPML, Bentley, 2010, retrieved on 21 
November 2010 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/resources/biography/details.html>. 
79 Ross, A Curtin biography, p. 284; Black, In his own words, p. 204. 
80 Ken Inglis, “Parliamentary Speech”, Papers on Parliament, no. 28, November 1996, p. 53, 
retrieved on 26 November 2010 at <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/pops/index.htm>. 
81 Coombes, John Curtin, p. 6. 
82 Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, “Mapping the British world”, The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, vol. 31, no. 2, 1 May 2003, p. 9; Bridget Griffen-Foley, “The 
Crumbs Are Better Than a Feast Elsewhere: Australian Journalists on Fleet Street”, 
Journalism History, vol. 28, no. 1, spring 2002, p. 35; Neville Meaney, “Britishness and 
Australia: Some reflections”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 31, 
no. 2, 1 May 2003, p. 126; Simon J. Potter, “Strengthening the Bonds of the Commonwealth: 
the Imperial Relations Trust and Australian, New Zealand and Canadian broadcasting 
personnel in Britain, 1946-1952”, Media History, vol. 11, no. 3, December 2005, p. 193. 
83 Inglis, ABC, pp. 96, 99, 110-112, 117; David Pyvis, “When the AIR BEER CEER pushed 
the Aussie twang”, Issues in Educational Research, vol. 3, no. 1, 1993, pp. 4, 8. 
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scrapbooks,84 microfilm collections85 and in digitised archives.86
 
 
Likewise, there is a lack of available publications about Curtin’s newsreel 
commentaries for wartime audiences.  Historical researchers, Niall Brennan87 and 
Neil McDonald,88 have assessed the propaganda values of the innovative Australian 
“eye witness” newsreels of this era.  For example, after the cameraman, Damien 
Parer, filmed Kokoda Front Line! in the Kokoda Track, the documentary team won 
an Academy Award in 1942; this was the first time that an Australian motion picture 
had been so honoured.  The majority of war footage was produced under the 
direction of the Film Division of the Commonwealth Department of Information.89  
According to McDonald, the Kokoda newsreel had an “enormous impact” on 
Australian moviegoers in September 1942, strengthening public support for the 
war.90  Research suggests that to date, David Day has been the only author to discuss 
the influence of Curtin’s film image.  Day refers to an official newsreel screened in 
an outdoor cinema near Darwin, showing an unpretentious Curtin strolling in his 
modest, suburban garden in Cottesloe, Western Australia.  The visual image 
generated spontaneous standing ovations from servicemen in the audience; this was 
evidence that the popular prime minister was “Australia personified” for many 
citizens.91
  
  In Chapter 3, it will be argued that Curtin expanded the nation’s film  
                                                            
84 Scrapbooks, October 1941-July 1945. 
85 This thesis will use newspaper copies of The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald (1941-
1945), held in microfilm at the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library and State Library of 
Western Australia.  Also this study will use the microfilm collections of The West Australian 
issues (1941-1945), lodged at The J S Battye Library of West Australian History. 
86 The Canberra Times and The Argus newspaper issues (1941-1945) have been accessed 
using the digitised archives at the NLA, retrieved on 20 November 2010 at 
<http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper>. 
87 Neil McDonald, “Getting it Right – Damien Parer, Osmar White and Chester Wilmot on 
the Kokoda Track” [hereafter “Getting it right”], The Sydney Papers, vol. 14, no. 2, 2002, 
pp. 96-109. 
88 Niall Brennan, Damien Parer: Cameraman [hereafter Cameraman], Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton, 1994. 
89 Anderson and Trembath, “Australian war correspondents”; McDonald, “Getting it right”, 
pp. 99-109. 
90 McDonald, “Getting it right”, pp. 99-105. 
91 Day, “Curtin as hero”, p. 65. 
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industry to produce more newsreels focusing on Australia for Allied audiences.92  An 
evaluation will be made of his film messages, particularly from Chapters 6 to 9, to 
demonstrate that he set precedents in the prime minister’s use of relatively new 
media to reach wider audiences.93
 
 
Curtin was also able to generate public enthusiasm for the nation’s role in the 
war, leading to his 1943 election victory, because he censored graphic reports about 
Australian casualties and fatalities.  Presiding over a strict censorship regime, he 
appointed the ALP member for Melbourne, Arthur Calwell, to head the Department 
of Information to scrutinise news dispatches.  Historian John Hilvert has detailed the 
government’s censorship to minimise negative news that might hurt national morale 
and alert Axis enemies to secret Allied military manoeuvres.94   Since Curtin was not 
directly involved in the censorship routine, he was able to assert forcefully, “[t]here 
should be no censorship of political opinions”95 because “[t]he free institutions of 
democracies–parliament, press, pulpit, radio, and right of free criticism and public 
speech–are the things for which we are fighting”.96
                                                            
92  See Brennan, Cameraman, pp. 126, 136-137.  The wartime films included: Charles 
Chauvel (director and producer), The Rats of Tobruk (movie), Chamun Productions, 
Australia, 1944; Charles Chauvel (director), Charles Chauvel and Charles Munro 
(producers), The Fighting Rats of Tobruk (movie), America and Canada, 1945; Tom Gurr 
(director), Jack. S. Allan (producer), Jungle Patrol (newsreel), Commonwealth Government 
of Australia, Ministry of Information, Australia, 1944; Ken G. Hall (producer), Kokoda 
Front Line!, (newsreel), The Australian News & Information Bureau, Australia, 1942; Ken 
G. Hall (director and producer), South-west Pacific (newsreel), Cinesound Productions, 
Australia, 1943. 
  Curtin tolerated criticism of 
Labor policies when it did not relate to confidential war battles, according to 
93 For example, Australian Government Department of Information, Cinesound Productions, 
Cinesound Review, Department of Information, Movietone and U.S. Army Signal Corps 
(producers), At The Front: 1939-1945: Australia’s WWII Newsreels (newsreels), JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00441/2, 1939-1945; British Movietone News (producer), 
Newsreels of Curtin, 1942-1945 (newsreels), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 
1942-1945. 
94 John Hilvert, Blue Pencil Warriors: Censorship and Propaganda in World War II 
[hereafter Blue pencil warriors], University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1984, pp. 197-
203. 
95 John Curtin, “Chief Publicity Censor–Prime Minister’s Statement On Action Against 
Newspapers”, Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime 
Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) [hereafter DDA], no. 81, 19 April 1944, p. 44. 
96 John Curtin, “Duty With Press” [hereafter “Duty with press”], DDA, no. 81, 19 April 
1944, p. 46. 
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Hilvert.97  While infrequent arguments erupted between news proprietors and 
government ministers, most notably over Packer’s refusal to censor material in The 
Daily Telegraph in 1944,98 it did not appear to affect Curtin’s popularity among 
voters.  Chapter 5 will examine this episode, as well as the Canberra correspondents’ 
general cooperation with the confidentiality restrictions,99
 
 because institutionalised 
censorship underlay Curtin’s journalism interactions. 
 This study investigates the previously untapped resources of secret diaries, 
private letters and oral histories of leading people in wartime Canberra to ascertain 
Curtin’s mass communication strategies.  Beginning in Chapter 3, this study will 
examine Menzies’ published diary100 and radio transcripts101 to ascertain his views of 
the media and contrast his approach with Curtin’s journalism strategies.  Clem Lloyd 
and Richard Hall have published an annotated collection of the private “off-the-
record” reporters’ notes of Frederick Thomas Smith, the former Canberra political 
news chief of Australian United Press.  Between mid-1942 and 1945, Smith attended 
the prime minister’s confidential news conferences; his top-secret transcripts are 
lodged in the Manuscript Collections, National Library of Australia.102  While 
Smith’s Canberra colleague, E. H. (Harold) Cox of the The Sun News-Pictorial, also 
secretly wrote about the Curtin interviews, research suggests a dearth of published 
findings on this primary source.  Cox commented on the prime ministerial briefings 
in his letters to his employer, Murdoch.103
                                                            
97 Hilvert, Blue pencil warriors, pp. 197-203. 
  Similarly the unpublished diaries of The 
Herald Canberra bureau chief, Joseph Alexander, had yet to be studied as a source of 
98 JCPML, “John Curtin’s Legacy”, Bentley, 2005, retrieved on 10 May 2008 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/legacyex>. 
99 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Holt, “Holt interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 
77. 
100 A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 Diary, 
NLA, Canberra, 1993. 
101 Robert Menzies, radio transcripts, Menzies Virtual Museum, East Melbourne, 1939-1942, 
retrieved on 19 November 2010 at 
<http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/ForgottenCont.html>. 
102 Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings. 
103 Harold Cox, “Typescript reports, 1944-1964” [hereafter “Typescript reports”], NLA, 
Canberra, Manuscript Collections, NLA, MS acc. no. 4554, 1944-1964, transcript np.  
Harold Cox’s notes on Curtin’s interviews were lodged later at the NLA and became 
digitally available on the JCPML website. 
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insight into Curtin’s media policies.104  These diaries – which Alexander donated 
with his other papers to the National Library of Australia (NLA) between 1944 and 
1977, and which at his request, were made available publicly only after his wife 
Catherine’s death in 1983 – were written in scribbled haste.105  He condensed the 
day’s newsworthy events – from “the great tank battles of the Western Desert”106 to 
Wagga Wagga’s wartime economic boom107
It is very roughly written, one day to a page, in my almost unreadable 
handwriting, for my own use and reference.  The day’s doings were recorded 
each evening while the events described were red-hot in my mind.
 – to a single page.  As he recalled: 
108
Moreover, at least 11 journalists discussed their professional relationships with 
Curtin during their oral histories about their careers.
 
109  Many years after the war, 
two other wartime correspondents, Tom Mead110 and Don Whitington,111 published 
autobiographies that included some reminiscences of Curtin’s briefings.  The press 
secretary, Don Rodgers, left an account of the Curtin administration that is lodged at 
the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library.112  I have made the first analysis of these 
14 journalists’ memoirs113
 
 in order to compare Curtin’s public image with his private 
discussions; this analysis is contained in Chapters 6 to 9. 
                                                            
104 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957” [hereafter 
“Papers”], NLA, Canberra, Manuscript Collections, NLA acc. no. MS 2389, 1833-1957, 
transcript np.  Brief excerpts of Alexander’s diary entries about the Pearl Harbour disaster 
were published in: Wurth, Saving Australia, pp. 146, 158-159. 
105 Alexander, “Papers”. 
106 Alexander, “Papers”, 22 November 1941. 
107 Alexander, “Papers”, 10 August 1943. 
108 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
109 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Bray, “Bray interview”; Chamberlain, “Chamberlain 
interview”; Commins, “Commins interview”; Cox, “Cox interview”; Davidson, “Davidson 
interview”; Douglas, “Douglas interview”; Ewing, “Ewing interview”; Fraser, “Fraser 
interview”; Holt, “Holt interview”; Reid, “Reid interview”. 
110 Tom Mead, Breaking The News: The events which changed life in Australia through the 
eyes of a man who worked at the front line of journalism and politics [hereafter Breaking the 
news], Dolphin Books, Sydney, 1998, pp. 50, 58, 68-69. 
111 Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 74-92. 
112 Rodgers, “Rodgers interview”. 
113 The journalists are: Joseph A. Alexander, Theodor Charles Bray, Frank Chamberlain, 
John Commins, Harold Cox, Frank Davidson, Irvine Douglas, Peter Ewing, Allan Fraser, 
Edgar George Holt, Tom Mead, Alan D. Reid, Donald Kilgour Rodgers and Don 
Whitington.  See the preceding four footnotes for specific citations. 
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To ascertain whether Curtin’s associations with the Australian media were 
innovative, studies of his counterparts’ press relations were canvassed.  Similarly to 
Curtin, the Canadian Prime Minister, Dr William Lyon Mackenzie King, was a 
former newspaperman who, during the war, recruited journalists to become his 
government censors.114  Although there is a lack of detailed academic analyses of 
Mackenzie King’s media relations, a number of related studies will inform this 
comparative analysis.  Paul Chantrill demonstrates the utility of a two-country 
comparative analysis of the political systems of Canada and Australia, because such 
a study can be valuable to extend our knowledge of the degree to which each 
country’s federal parliamentary democratic government tolerated the ideal of a free 
press during the war.115  King’s early professional career in journalism and public 
relations has been examined by Henry Stanley Ferns and K.W.L. Hallahan.116  The 
Canadian leader’s initial resistance to conscription has been studied by Frances V. 
Harbour, who has also written of the political pressures he faced and his persuasive 
tactics to win media and public support.117  George Kerr investigates mainstream 
Canadian journalists, their editors and media enthusiasm for the government’s war 
aims.118  A unique analysis of Mackenzie King’s confidential diary notes about John 
Curtin,119 along with his views of the media120 is in Chapter 4.  King’s diaries 
became available to researchers by 1981 and all entries – nearly 30,000 pages and 
more than 7,500,000 words – were published online in 2002.121
                                                            
114 George D. Kerr, “Skirting the Minefield: Press Censorship, Politics and French Canada, 
1940” [hereafter “Press censorship”], Canadian Journal of Communication, vol. 8, no. 2, 
1982, p. 48. 
  As well as giving a 
115 Paul Chantrill, “Social Policy Development in Australia and Canada: Historical and 
Comparative Approaches”, Australian-Canadian Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 1999, pp. 41-58. 
116 Henry Stanley Ferns, The age of Mackenzie King: the rise of the leader, Heinemann, 
London, 1955, pp. 95, 167, 182; K.W.L. Hallahan, “Mackenzie King: Rockefeller’s ‘other’ 
public relations counsellor in Colorado”, Public Relations Review, vol. 29, no. 4, November 
2003, pp. 401-414. 
117 Frances V. Harbour, “Conscription and Socialisation: Four Canadian Ministers”, Armed 
Forces and Society, vol. 15, 1989, pp. 227-247. 
118 Kerr, “Press censorship”, pp. 46-47. 
119 William Lyon Mackenzie King, “The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King” 
[hereafter “Diaries”], Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1944, pp. 433, 457, 561, 564-
565, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html>.  The page numbers were 
cited from the online version and not from the original diary. 
120 For example, King, “Diaries”, 1939, pp. 454, 468, 523. 
121 Library and Archives Canada, “A Real Companion and Friend: The diary of William 
Lyon Mackenzie King”, Ottawa, 2002, retrieved on 9 December 2008 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-131.html>. 
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scholarly framework for the discussion in Chapter 4 about King, this literature will 
provide a historical context in Chapter 8, when evaluating the impact of Curtin’s 
journalism strategies on the Ottawa Press Gallery during his visit to Canada in 1944. 
 
Curtin’s relationship with the media will also be compared with Roosevelt’s 
journalism interactions.  While many scholars have focused on Roosevelt’s regular 
series of radio talks, colloquially known as the “fireside chats”,122 fewer analyses 
have been made of his relationships with reporters and his use of wartime newsreels.  
Historians Steven Casey, Richard W. Steele and Betty Houchin Winfield write of 
Roosevelt’s bi-weekly news conferences (less frequent than Curtin’s), and his 
political constraints due to severe criticisms from some powerful press owners.123  
Diana Martinelli and Jeff Mucciarone examine Roosevelt’s reliance upon his press 
secretary, Stephen T. Early, to speak directly with reporters.124  A study was made of 
Roosevelt’s press conference transcripts,125 the drafting of media releases,126
                                                            
122 For example, Thomas Bonner, Our Recent Past [hereafter Our recent past], Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1963, p. 213; Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. Braden, “Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt” [hereafter “Roosevelt”], in Marie Kathryn Hochmuth (ed.), History and 
Criticism of American Public Address, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, vol. 3, 1958, 
pp. 520, 522; John T. Flynn, Country Squire in the White House, Doubleday, Doran and 
Company Inc., New York, 1940, p. 57; Elvin T. Lim, “The Lion and the Lamb: De-
mythologizing Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘fireside chats’” [hereafter “Fireside chats”], Rhetoric & 
Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 437-464; Arthur S. Link, American Epoch: A History 
of the United States Since the 1890’s [hereafter American epoch], Alfred A. Knopf, New 
York, 1955, p. 383. Link deliberately included “1890’s” in his book title. 
 radio 
123 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American public opinion, and 
the war against Nazi Germany, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2001, pp. 
155, 215; Richard W. Steele, “News of the ‘Good War’: World II News Management”, 
Journalism Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4, winter 1985, pp 707-16, 783; Richard W. Steele, 
“Preparing the Public for War: Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda Agency, 1940-
41,” [hereafter “Propaganda”] The American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 6, October 1970, 
p. 1653; Betty Houchin Winfield, FDR and the News Media, University of Illinois Press, 
Urbana, 1990, p. 2. 
124 Diana Knott Martinelli and Jeff Mucciarone, “New deal public relations: A glimpse into 
FDR press secretary Stephen Early’s work” [hereafter “Stephen Early”], Public Relations 
Review, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2007, pp. 49-57. 
125 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Presidential News Conference: Franklin D. Roosevelt”, in John 
T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds), The American Presidency Project [hereafter American 
presidency project], Santa Barbara, 1941-1945, retrieved on 19 November 2010 at 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences.php>. 
126 For example, Stephen Early, “Draft Of Proposed Release”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00269/3, 22 April 1944, p. 15; Stephen Early to General Watson, JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 22 April 1944, p. 14; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 
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speeches,127 newsreels128 and private cables to Curtin.129  This study extends to an 
examination of the media strategies developed by the two leaders’ wives, Elsie 
Curtin130 and Eleanor Roosevelt.131
 
  The leaders’ private and public communications 
contain information that helps in assessing whether they were successful in 
persuading journalists and media audiences to support their military alliance. 
 Likewise, archival research and scholarly literature informs the evaluation of 
Churchill’s media policies as he and Roosevelt strove to bolster support for their 
“beat Hitler first” strategy while seeking to reassure Australia of their Pacific war  
  
                                                                                                                                                                        
The American presidency project, 6 May 1944; Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00719/1/14, 17 March 1942. 
127 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Audio/Video: Franklin D. Roosevelt”, in Woolley and Peters, 
American presidency project, retrieved on 19 November 2010 at 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/medialist.php?presid=32>; Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
“Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats”, in Woolley and Peters, American presidency 
project, retrieved on 19 November 2010 at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/fireside.php>. 
128 Granada Media (producer) Roosevelt: Men Of Our Time (documentary), JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00813/1, 1990; Universal Studios (producer), Modern History: Franklin D. 
Roosevelt – Six Fireside Chats, 1933-1938, (newsreels), Internet Archive, 1933-1938, 
retrieved on 24 November 2010 at 
<http://www.archive.org/details/WorldHistoryFranklinD.Roosevelt-SixFiresideChats1933-
1938>. 
129 For example, (Anon.) “Roosevelt Opens Direct Wireless Link to Australia”, The 
Washington Post, Washington DC, 26 December 1941, p. 1; Long Breckinridge to Grace 
Tully, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00266/2, 24 December 1941, p. 41; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, “Safe Files – Australia Index”, Hyde Park, box 
2, 1 June 1941-9 June 1942. 
130 (Anon.), “Australian Leader’s Wife Real Person”, Republican, Waterbury, JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/124, 5 May 1944; (Anon.), “Curtin’s Wife Breaks a 
Tradition To See U.S., Britain With Premier”, The New York Times, New York, 4 April 
1944, p. 14; (Anon.), “Impression of U.S.A.: Mrs Curtin Interviewed”, The West Australian, 
Perth, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/119, 28 April 1944; (Anon.), “Mrs. Curtin 
Buys Gloves, No Nylons; Prime Minister’s Wife Compares Shopping Conditions Here and 
in Australia”, The New York Times, New York, 26 April 1944, p. 20; (Anon.), “Mrs Curtin 
Honor Guest At Luncheons”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 12 May 1944, p. 12; 
(Anon.), “Mrs. Curtin to Accompany Husband Here”, The Washington Post, Washington 
DC, 6 April 1944, p. 9; (Anon.), “Mrs Curtin’s Racy Story Of Her Trip”, The Argus, 
Melbourne, 21 July 1944, p. 8; (Anon.), “Not Like Movies”, Valley News, Tarentum, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/127, 6 May 1944; (Anon.), “Shepherdstown 
AAWU Hears Mrs. Curtin and Lady Dixon”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 15 
May 1944, p. 3. 
131 ScreenSound Australia, Mrs Roosevelt’s Visit To Canberra, 1943 (newsreel), JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01049/1, 1943; Scrapbooks, no. 3, JCPML acc. no. 00297/3, 4-5 
September 1943. 
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commitments.132  A number of sources indicate he did not hold daily press 
conferences.133  David Stafford argues that Churchill predominantly relied upon the 
radio to broadcast his powerful oratory and evocations to imperial history.134  K.E. 
Garay examines Churchill’s rhetoric and his love of brevity, clarity and “Basic 
English”.135  A study by Jonathan Sikorsky refers to the power of British newsreels 
to capture the energy of the prime minister’s wartime leadership and increase public 
morale.136  Churchill’s published history of World War II,137 private cables138 and 
newsreel appearances with Curtin139
  
 reveal their attempts to mask tensions by 
promoting their alliance to public audiences.  This thesis evaluates the British, 
Canadian and US leaders’ media messages and confidential communications to gain 
insights into their journalism strategies.  For instance, national and international  
                                                            
132 Advisory War Council, “Discussions with General MacArthur” [hereafter “MacArthur 
discussions”], NAA, Canberra, CA495, A2684, 967, 26 March 1942, pp. 1-2 (the online 
page numbers are pp. 8, 12-13); John Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from 
London”, DDA, no. 81, 8 May 1944, pp. 53-56; Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00719/1/11, 22 March 1942. 
133 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 126; Richard Moss, “Curtain goes up on new £6 
million Churchill museum” [hereafter “Churchill museum”], Culture 24, Brighton, 9 
February 2005, retrieved on 24 November 2010 at 
<http://www.culture24.org.uk/history+%26+heritage/war+%26+conflict/world+war+two/art
26042>; Jackie Storer, “Churchill’s bunker revealed”, BBC News Online, London, 8 April 
2003, retrieved on 12 May 2008 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2929063.stm>; Simon Tait, “A war leader’s 
love affair with the press”, The Times, London, 8 March 2008, p. 80. 
134 David Stafford, Roosevelt and Churchill: men of secrets, Abascus, London, 1999, p. xv. 
135 K.E. Garay, “Empires of the Mind? C.K. Ogden, Winston Churchill and Basic English” 
[hereafter “Empires of the mind”], Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers, vol. 
23, no.1, 1988, retrieved on 12 May 2008 at 
<http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=527>. 
136 Jonathan Sikorsky, “From British Cassandra to American Hero: The Churchill Legend in 
the World War II American Media” [hereafter “Churchill”], Finest Hour, The Churchill 
Centre, no. 108, autumn 2000, retrieved on 12 May 2008 at 
<http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=360>. 
137 Churchill, The second world war, pp. 4-5, 8-9. 
138 For example, Winston Churchill to John Curtin, NAA, Canberra, A816, 52/302/142, 20 
February 1942, p. 285; Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00869/57, 17 July 1943, p. 6; John Curtin to Winston Churchill, NAA, Canberra, A816, 
52/302/142, 22 February 1942, pp. 279-280; John Curtin to Winston Churchill, JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 18 August 1943, p. 29. 
139 British Movietone (producer), “Empire Premiers Assemble”, in Newsreels of Curtin, 
1942-1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 1944. 
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archives reveal the four Allied leaders’ private views of reporters.140  By applying an 
international perspective, it is argued that Curtin enjoyed uniquely close and direct 
relations with the “travelling circus” of Canberra correspondents, who accompanied 
him on confidential prime ministerial trips.141
 
 
Other studies were consulted to assess contemporary journalists’ perceptions 
of Curtin, as well as the influence of his media strategies on his successors’ 
communication policies.  While no previous literature has traced the effects of 
Curtin’s communications systems on modern government-media interactions, a 
number of academic journalism, historical and political science publications will 
inform this assessment.  Lloyd, for example, examines the increasing importance of 
radio to Curtin’s successors, from J.B. (Ben) Chifley to R.J.L. (Bob) Hawke, as well 
as the rising dominance of televised political reporting.142  Robert Crawford assesses 
the role of the media, public relations and advertising in Menzies’ 1949 election 
victory and E.G. (Gough) Whitlam’s successful 1972 campaign.143  Media and 
politics scholars, including Steve Mickler,144 Helen Ester,145 Nick Economou and 
Stephen Tanner,146
                                                            
140 For example, Geoff Burgoyne to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, N/C. acc. no. 009, 27 
March 1942; John Curtin to Geoff Burgoyne, JCPML, Bentley, N/C. acc. no. 010, 20 April 
1942; William Lyon Mackenzie King, “Diaries”, 27 April 1939, p. 454; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, “Messages between Roosevelt & Churchill, August 1943 - February 1944”, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00796/3, 1943-1944. 
 discuss J.W. (John) Howard’s preference for talkback radio 
during his prime ministership.  At the same time, according to Lloyd and Greg Barns, 
141 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
142 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 158-268. 
143 Robert Crawford, “Modernising Menzies, Whitlam, and Australian Elections”, The 
Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3, March 2004, pp. 137-
161. 
144 Steve Mickler, “Talkback Radio, Anti-elitism And Moral Decline: A Fatal Paradox?” 
[hereafter “Talkback radio”], Southern Review: Communication, Politics & Culture, vol. 37, 
no. 3, 2005, pp. 29-34, retrieved on 9 April 2010 at 
<http://search.informit.com.au.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/documentSummary;dn=990068020742
095;res=IELHSS>. 
145 Helen Ester, “The media”, in Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison (eds), Silencing 
Dissent: How the Australian Government is controlling public opinion and stifling debate, 
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2007, pp. 117-118; Helen Ester, “Who’s Been Watching The 
Watchers? Australian Political Journalism” [hereafter “Australian political journalism”], 
ejournalist, vol.1, no. 2, 2001, p. 6, retrieved on 15 May 2010 at 
<ejournalist.com.au/v1n2/ESTER.pdf>. 
146 Nick Economou and Stephen Tanner, Media, Power and Politics, Pearson Education 
Australia, Frenchs Forest, 2008, p. 32. 
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prime ministers have increasingly preferred to communicate in official statements, 
distributed by government media offices.147  With respect to television strategies, 
Frédérick Bastien has examined political leaders’ interviews on current affairs 
programs and talk shows, particularly their attempts to discuss substantive policies in 
ways that will reach wider audiences.148  Gwyneth Howell and Bruce da Silva 
investigate federal politicians’ adoption of online election campaign tactics;149 while 
Geoffrey Craig, Rachel Gibson et al comment on the internet’s “greater potential for 
interactivity” between governments and the governed.150  Although several 
researchers have surveyed the Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery,151
 
 none have 
published findings about journalists’ opinions of Curtin. 
To answer the thesis’ research question, this study will draw upon theoretical 
and conceptual approaches that are derived from media and communication studies.  
More specifically, these theoretical approaches relate to the following topics: the 
notion of the public sphere; the social function of journalists; the state’s role vis-a-vis 
citizens; how political leaders use the news media; the semiotics of governments’ 
visual images and language, and the significance of news values and processes.  The 
concept of the public sphere, a specific domain of national discussion about the 
governance of society, people and things including the government and media, will 
inform this thesis’ investigation of Curtin’s journalism strategies.  Media scholars 
have used the concept of the public sphere to understand the role of journalism in 
                                                            
147 Greg Barns, Selling the Australian Government: Politics And Propaganda From Whitlam 
To Howard, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2005, p. 10; Lloyd, Parliament 
and the press, pp. 176, 244-250. 
148 Frédérick Bastien, “Beyond Sex and Saxophones: Interviewing Practices and Political 
Substance on Televised Talk Shows”, The Canadian Political Science Review, vol. 3, no. 2, 
June 2009, pp. 70-88. 
149 Gwyneth Howell and Bruce Da Silva, “New media, first time voters and the 2007 
Australian federal election”, Public Communication Review, vol. 1, 2010, pp. 27-33. 
150 Geoffrey Craig, The Media, Politics and Public Life, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004, 
pp. 89-90; Rachel K. Gibson, Wainer Lusoli, Andrea Römmele and Stephen J. Ward, 
Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, organisation and participation via new ICTs, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2004, pp. 2-4. 
151 For a short bibliography on some of these surveys, see Helen Ester, “Australian political 
journalism”, pp. 1-7.  Also refer to: John Henningham, “Political Journalists’ Political 
Preferences and Professional Values”, The Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, 
no. 2, 1995, pp. 321-334; Lloyd, Parliament and the press; Julianne Schultz, Reviving the 
Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability, and the Media, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998. 
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social governance.152  While key public sphere theorist, Jürgen Habermas, and other 
scholars from the Frankfurt School of social theory posited the decline of “rational-
critical debate”153 within the public sphere and the rise of a “manipulable” press,154 
some scholars have not been as pessimistic about the media’s ability to engage 
citizens critically in public discussions.155  As I discuss in detail further in the thesis, 
Curtin extended the public sphere by expanding the Australian government’s use of 
popular culture and the media to communicate more openly and frequently with 
journalists and public audiences.156
 
  I did not set out to conduct a study of, and 
produce findings on, the understanding of the Australian public sphere; nonetheless, 
my research has shown that the impact of Curtin’s media and mass communication 
strategies was that he and his government made a major contribution to the extension 
of the Australian public sphere. 
Following the work of Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet 
B.L. Chan, this study considers news media and journalism as a critical process in 
the governance of society.  Journalistic practice is a central agency in the governance 
of a “knowledge”, “administered” or “information” society.  Thus news reporters are 
“information brokers” and “knowledge linkers”, who are engaged in “reproducing 
the knowledge of their sources”.157
                                                            
152 Juho Rahkonen, “Mapping Media and Communication Research” [hereafter “Mapping 
research”], Australian Communication Research Centre, Department of Communication, 
Helsingin Sanomat Foundation, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 2007, p. 58, retrieved on 15 
February 2009 at <
  To evaluate Curtin’s media strategies, this thesis 
http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/crc/ReportAustralia.pdf>. 
153 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society [hereafter The public sphere], MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1989, p. 184.  Similar theorists from the Frankfurt School include: Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Verso, London, 1944, pp. 120-67. 
154 Habermas, The public sphere, p. 185. 
155 For example, James Curran, “Rethinking the media as a public sphere” [hereafter 
“Rethinking the media”], in Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks (eds), Communication and 
Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, pp. 
42-43; John Hartley, Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity, Popular Culture [hereafter 
Popular reality], Arnold, London and New York, 1996, pp. 71, 72, 234; Ian Ward, “The 
Press, Television and the Public Sphere” [hereafter “The public sphere], in Ian Ward (ed.), 
Politics of the media, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1995, p. 14. 
156 For example, Alexander, “Alexander interview”; (Anon.) “Publicity: Relations with 
America: Australia Expands”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4; Curtin, 
“American relations”, pp. 13-14. 
157 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 16; Stephen Brent Mickler, 
Visualising Aboriginality: Image Campaigns and News Routines in the Western Australian 
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will investigate the “mundane milieu”158 in which news stories and commentaries 
were created and circulated to produce “extraordinary public policy campaigns” in 
newspapers, radio programs and newsreels.159  Applying the concept of the 
governmental, and not simply communication function of news in an administered 
society, this study posits that senior Canberra journalists cooperated with Curtin to 
“visualise” and “define” the threat to the nation, principally Axis aggression, in 
Ericson et al’s terms, as a social deviation from moral and ethical principles of 
fairness, justice and decency.160
 
 
Ericson et al’s concept draws upon Michel Foucault’s influential 
understanding of “governmentality”.161  Similarly to Ericson et al, Foucault includes 
journalism as a part of governance.  He defines governmentality as: “The ensemble 
formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power”.162  
Therefore governmentality is constituted of an ensemble of tactics, calculations and 
reflections.  Foucault describes this ensemble as “socially assembled human 
technologies”, involving the media and including the following: “technologies of 
production, which permit us to produce, transform and manipulate things”; 
“technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or 
signification”; and “technologies of power”.163
                                                                                                                                                                        
Media [hereafter Visualising Aboriginality], PhD thesis, Murdoch University, Murdoch, 
1996, pp. 20-21. 
  Following this Foucauldian concept 
of governmentality, this thesis asserts that Curtin viewed journalists as a crucial part 
of his governance as he used tactics, calculations and technologies to communicate 
158 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p 24. 
159 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 1. 
160 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 5; Mickler, Visualising 
Aboriginality, p. 21. 
161 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies In 
Governmentality: With Two Lectures By And An Interview With Michel Foucault [hereafter 
The Foucault effect], The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, p. ix; R. McGreggor 
Cawley and William Chaloupka, “American Governmentality: Michel Foucault and Public 
Administration” [hereafter “American governmentality”], American Behavioral Scientist, 
vol. 41, no. 1, September 1997, pp. 30-31. 
162 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” [hereafter “Governmentality”], in Burchell, Gordon 
and Miller (eds), The Foucault effect, p. 102. 
163 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self”, in L.H. Martin, H. Guttman and P.H. Hutton 
(eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Tavistock Publications, 
London, 1988, p. 18. 
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his foreign policy objectives to public audiences.  This theoretical approach is more 
productive than functional conceptions of the government and the media as separate, 
autonomous entities, such as the view of journalists acting as a “Fourth Estate” to 
monitor independently the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of 
government.164
 
  The work of Foucault, Ericson and other scholars help us to 
understand the relationships of power and consensus between Curtin and the news 
media. 
Since Curtin often appealed to the ideals of liberty, democracy and freedom 
in his radio and newsreel broadcasts,165 the discussion of his governance will also be 
grounded in the work of the political theorist and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin.166  
An understanding of liberty, or freedom, is central to human being and human 
agency in politics, according to Berlin.167  Individual rights, including liberty, 
equality, justice and courage, constitute a “central core” of values shared by all 
people.168  Individuals gain liberty when they are able to choose freely and stand up 
for their convictions.169
                                                            
164 Niall Lucy and Steve Mickler, The War on Democracy: Conservative Opinion in the 
Australian Press, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, 2006, particularly pp. 2-9, 
87, 147-152; Mark Pearson and Camille Galvin, “The Australian Parliament and press 
freedom in an international context”, Pacific Journalism Review, vol. 13, no. 2, 2007, pp. 
139-143; Julianne Schultz (ed.), Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability, and 
the Media, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 1-6; Rod Tiffen, “The press” 
[hereafter “The press”], in Stuart Cunningham and Graeme Turner (eds.), The Media and 
Communication in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, second edition, 2006, p. 97. 
  While Curtin continued the previous federal 
administrations’ censorship policies, he publicly said that his government vetoed 
165 For example, Cinesound Productions and Cinesound Review (producers), Compiled 
speeches of John Curtin, 1941 – 1945 (newsreels) [hereafter Compiled speeches), JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00130/1, 1941-1945; John Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United 
States” [hereafter “US radio broadcast”], DDA, no. 22, 14 March 1942, pp. 9-13. 
166 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty [hereafter Liberty], Oxford University Press, 
London, 1969; Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty 
[hereafter Freedom and its betrayal], ed. Henry Hardy, Chatto & Windus, London, 2002; 
Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays [hereafter The proper 
study of mankind], Chatto & Windus, London, 1997. 
167 William A. Galston, “Moral Pluralism and Liberal Democracy: Isaiah Berlin’s Heterodox 
Liberalism” [hereafter “Moral pluralism”], The Review of Politics, vol. 71, 2009, pp. 85, 88. 
168 Galston, “Moral pluralism”, pp. 96-97. 
169 Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and its betrayal, pp. 103-104; Berlin, “From Hope and Fear Set 
Free”, in The proper study of mankind, p. 109. 
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stories only due to the “overriding consideration of security”.170  In their 
reminiscences, wartime correspondents stated that they generally supported and 
upheld their confidentiality agreements with Curtin to safeguard national security.171  
Occasional media breaches of government censorship are examined later in this 
thesis, particularly in Chapters 5 and 9.172
 
  This thesis argues that while censorship 
underlay Curtin’s media interactions, he based his journalist relationships on values 
of liberty and a respect for individual rights. 
Other related theories on government and the media inform this thesis.  Using 
the political economy approach, this study will examine the historically close links 
between news proprietors and leading politicians.173  To understand Curtin’s media 
interactions, this study considers the wider historical, political economic context of 
the news organisations’ developments by focusing on patterns of media ownership 
and control, the links between these institutions and the government, and the 
production and distribution of information.174  As outlined by Ericson et al, a 
political leader can use the media to be successful in setting news agendas.175
                                                            
170 Cited in John Curtin, “Communiques–Prime Minister’s Statement”, DDA, no. 81, 19 
April 1944, p. 44.  Other sources were: John Curtin, “Duty With Press”, DDA, no. 81, 19 
April 1944, p. 45; John Curtin, “Chief Publicity Censor–Prime Minister’s Statement On 
Action Against Newspapers”, DDA, no. 81, 19 April 1944, pp. 43-44. 
  The 
term, agenda setting, refers to the extent to which journalists, editors and publishers 
prioritise significant news stories to try to influence audiences in “what to think 
171 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Cox, “Cox interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair,  
p. 78. 
172 See Holt, “Holt interview”; Frederick Thomas Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom 
briefings, p. 228. 
173 Griffen-Foley, The house of Packer, p. 123; Scott Fitzgerald, Corporations and Cultural 
Industries: Time Warner, Bertlesmann, and News Corporation [hereafter Corporations and 
cultural industries], PhD thesis, Curtin University of Technology, Bentley, 2008; Petersen, 
News not views, pp. 163-166; John Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy [hereafter 
Mass media], Palgrave, Hampshire and New York, 2001, pp. 10-11; Younger, Keith 
Murdoch, pp. 151-152. 
174 Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries, p. 120; John Sinclair, “The media and 
communications: Theoretical traditions”, in Stuart Cunningham and Graeme Turner (eds), 
The Media and Communications in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002, first 
edition, pp. 24-29. 
175 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, pp. 359-360; Foucault, 
“Governmentality”, pp. 102-103; Foucault, “Technologies of the self”, p. 18. 
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about and what to think”, especially during elections.176  Rodney Tiffen’s insights on 
journalism as a product of professional routines, “institutional demands and 
processes” inform this study as well.177.  According to Tiffen, news is also shaped as 
a “dynamic element in the relations and actions of participants” including politicians 
and reporters.178
 
  This study investigates Curtin’s intimate knowledge and use of 
predictable journalism routines, such as press deadlines, in order to publicise his 
media messages.  Given his background as a labour-oriented news editor, he 
discussed war-related information with the press gallery reporters on a frequent, 
informal basis to build strong professional relations with journalists.  The theories 
pertaining to the political economy, agenda setting and news making approaches help 
to explain how Curtin was able to generate favourable news in the media. 
In evaluating the extent to which Curtin promoted positive stories about his 
administration and minimised negative reports, the theoretical work on “news 
values” by Johan Galtung, Mari Ruge179 and other scholars are brought to bear.  As 
they have demonstrated, journalists share a set of values on the stories that they deem 
to be “newsworthy” and deserving their attention.180
                                                            
176 W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 
2003, p. 6. 
  A highly publicised media 
report has generally fulfilled certain criteria including: it is relevant and clear to the 
news organisation’s audience and will have a high impact on them; it pertains to 
“power elites”, a term that can be defined according to political, economic and 
cultural factors; it contains particularly negative overtones or remarkably good news, 
177 Tiffen, News, p. 3. 
178 Tiffen, News, p. 4. 
179 Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge, “The structure of foreign news: the presentation of the 
Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers” [hereafter “Foreign news”], 
Journal of International Peace Research, vol. 1, 1965, pp. 64-91. 
180 Richard V. Ericson, “How Journalists Visualize Fact”, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 560, November 1998, pp. 83-95; Stuart Hall, 
“The determinations of news photographs” [hereafter “News photographs”], in Stanley 
Cohen and Jock Young (eds), The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the 
Mass Media, Constable and Co, London, 1973, p. 182; Tony Harcup and Deidre O’Neill, 
“What is News? Galtung and Ruge revisited” [hereafter “News”], Journalism Studies, vol. 2, 
no. 2, 2001, pp. 261-2, 265; Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, Sage 
Publications, London, Thousand Oakes and New Delhi, 1994, p. 271; Mickler, Visualising 
Aboriginality, particularly pp. 22-28; Tunstall, Journalists, p. 21. 
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and it promotes strong visual elements.181  These theories will be important when 
analysing Curtin’s ability to persuade news reporters to magnify Australia’s role in 
conflicts and conceal frictions with some Allied leaders, thus accomplishing the 
Foucauldian task of masking national power.182
 
 
 
Methodology  
This study has pursued a multimethod approach to identify the particular aspects of 
Curtin’s strategies pertaining to the news media of his era, principally the 
metropolitan, daily press,183 newsreels,184 also known as “shorts”,185 and radio 
(although many Australians at this time referred to the “wireless”,186 this study will 
use the term, radio).  While the broad theoretical and conceptual approaches to the 
question are derived from media and communication studies, they are combined with 
archival research methods developed in the discipline of history.  As discussed 
earlier, a new examination is made of primary sources, some of which are rarely 
viewed, including the following: Allied prime ministers’ private diaries;187
  
 reporters’  
                                                            
181 Galtung and Ruge, “Foreign news”, pp. 65-71; Harcup and O’Neill, “News”, pp. 262-264. 
182 Teresa Bergman, “Can Patriotism Be Carved In Stone?: A Critical Analysis Of Mt. 
Rushmore’s Orientation Films”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 1, spring 2008, p. 96; 
Michel Foucault, “Film and Popular Memory: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” trans. 
Martin Jordan, Radical Philosophy, vol. 11, 1975, pp. 25, 27. 
183 According to Tiffen, the press was pre-eminent in the sphere of information and enjoyed a 
“social monopoly”.  Tiffen, “The press”, p. 97. 
184 Poppy de Souza, “Road to Kokoda (1942)”, National Film and Sound Archive [hereafter 
NFSA], Acton, 2009, retrieved on 20 June 2009 at 
<http://australianscreen.com.au/titles/road-to-kokoda>; Poppy de Souza, “South-west Pacific 
(1943)”, NFSA, 2009, retrieved on 19 June 2009 at 
<http://australianscreen.com.au/titles/south-west-pacific>. 
185 Alan Osbiston, “Australian Films Overseas”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 18 
July 1944, p. 2. 
186 Carl Bridge, “1932: A Hell of a Year by Gerald Stone” (Gerald Stone), Reviews in 
Australian Studies, vol. 1, no. 9, 2006, pp. 1-2, retrieved on 5 December 2010 at 
<www.nla.gov.au/openpublish/index.php/ras/article/download/416/448>. 
187 This thesis will use the diaries of wartime Canadian Prime Minister, William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, and the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, in early 1941.  See 
King, “Diaries”; A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 
1941 Diary [hereafter Dark and hurrying days], NLA, Canberra, 1993. 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
34 
 
confidential notes;188 private cables written by the Australian, British and US 
leaders;189 and US General Douglas MacArthur’s discussions with the Australian 
Advisory War Council.190
 
  Other research methods include a limited content analysis 
of selected Curtin texts, a semiotic evaluation of his visual messages, a comparative 
press analysis and a survey of current journalists.  Through this multimethod 
approach, this thesis will show that, overall, the media positively portrayed Curtin’s 
groundbreaking foreign policies, and it will provide a detailed analysis of the tactics 
and strategies that he employed to accomplish this. 
 To gauge the persuasiveness of his prime ministerial rhetoric in influencing 
wartime reporters, this study will conduct a limited content analysis of Curtin’s 
keywords in his media and parliamentary addresses.191  More specifically, a selected 
sample of 11 major Curtin addresses will be analysed to identify his key messages 
(see Appendices 2-3).  The Curtin addresses relate to his wartime foreign policies 
and include major radio talks, parliamentary speeches and a widely read newspaper 
editorial.  Curtin gave these 11 addresses from 1941, the first year of his prime 
ministership, until 1944.  During his final months, he was frequently absent from the 
parliament due to illness from November 1944 until his death on 5 July 1945.192
                                                            
188 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957” [hereafter 
“Papers”], NLA, Canberra, Manuscript Collections, NLA acc. no. MS 2389, 1833-1957, 
transcript np; Harold Cox, “Typescript reports, 1944-1964” [hereafter “Typescript reports”], 
NLA, Canberra, Manuscript Collections, NLA, MS acc. no. 4554, 1944-1964, transcript np; 
Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings. 
  
189 For example, Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00869/57, 17 July 1943, p. 6; John Curtin to Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00869/57, 13 August 1943, pp. 22-23; Franklin D. Roosevelt to John Curtin, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, 1 June 1942, retrieved 
on 28 September 2009 at <http://docs.FDRlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/a09a01.html>. 
190 For example, Advisory War Council, “MacArthur discussions”, pp. 1-2. 
191Content analysis coding schedules will be used that have been based on research methods 
described by David L. Altheide and Anders Hansen et al.  See David L. Altheide, Qualitative 
media analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996; pp. 39-41; Anders Hansen, Simon 
Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris Newbold, Mass Communication Research Methods 
[hereafter Mass communication], Macmillan Press, Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire 
London, 1998, p. 117. 
192 See (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Health: Longer Rest Likely”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 4, JCPML acc. no. 00297/4, 14 June 1945; McLaughlin to 
Defence Secretariat, NAA, Canberra, A461, R4/1/12, 6 November 1944, p. 65; Frederick 
Geoffrey Shedden, “Advisory War Council Minutes, Records of Frederick Shedden” 
[hereafter “AWC minutes”], JCPML, Bentley, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 30 
November 1944, p. 1. 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
35 
 
Although research suggested that he was still able to release statements, 
announcements and three radio messages during the early half of 1945, he did not 
give another major broadcast on foreign policy, as he had in 1944.193
 
  Therefore this 
study will focus on the selected 11 texts during significant events of the war.  
Keywords have been coded or classified in accordance with his representation of 
Australia’s role in the global battles and the post-war world.  Some of the keywords 
relate to Curtin’s portrayal of nationhood and the ways in which he referred to 
Australia and “country”.  Also this analysis measures his use of inclusive language 
such as “we”, “us”, “our” and “the people”.  Another area of interest is Curtin’s use 
of ideals about “freedom”, “liberty”, “democracy” and “independence”, his vision of 
the future that included “hope” and a sense of national “unity”.  Other keywords 
pertain to war and defence as well as his government policies relating to the 
economy and jobs.  Furthermore, this study will investigate the ways in which he 
represented the world: his use of “civilisation” terms; his references to Britain, “the 
old country” or “the mother country”, and his depiction of a “new world order” 
involving the US will be examined.  This limited content analysis will identify the 
main ideas that he communicated to audiences, as well as the ways in which he 
attempted to inspire them to share his vision for Australia. 
To measure the simplicity, accessibility and appeal of his words, the Flesch 
Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid grades of these selected 11 Curtin addresses will 
be calculated.  The Flesch readability score spans a hundred-point scale.  A higher 
score indicates the speech includes simple language.  A lower score implies the 
document is more complex.  The standard recommended writing score is 60 to 70.194
                                                            
193 JCPML, “Index to John Curtin’s speeches in the Digest of Decisions and Announcements 
and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister, 1941-1945” [hereafter “Index to John 
Curtin’s speeches”], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01148/1, 2007.  According to this source, 
Curtin released three radio messages in 1945.  The first two broadcasts focused on the “Third 
Victory Loan” and were delivered on 12 March and 22 April.  The other radio talk was a 
recorded message on Empire Day on 24 May. 
  
The other formula, the Flesch-Kincaid score, ranks documents on a school grade 
level.  The recommended Flesch-Kincaid score for most public documents is about 
eight, close to the reading level of “middle-brow” newspapers and suitable for an 
194 Lim, “Fireside chats”, pp. 445-446. 
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eighth-grade student.195  In the early twentieth century, US educators began a 
“democratic project” to measure readability and help more immigrants’ children to 
understand secondary school textbooks.196  Rudolph Flesch first developed his 
readability formula as a doctoral thesis in 1943 at Columbia University’s Teachers 
College in New York City.  As a result of the war, the US government became 
increasingly interested in finding ways to make its reading materials more 
understandable for adults.197  Churchill also sponsored scholarly attempts to devise a 
universal language, “Basic English”, which was to become distinctive for its 
“brevity, clarity, cogency”.198  Although his plan was not fulfilled, Roosevelt 
indicated his interest in “Basic English” to the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.199  
The readability of the selected Curtin addresses will be compared with the 
presidential speeches of Roosevelt, often described by scholars as setting the “gold 
standard for American political oratory”.200  Thus the Flesch and Flesch-Kincaid 
formulas are applied to glean an understanding of whether Curtin’s prime ministerial 
messages were targeted effectively to Australian people, whose average education 
level was about nine years of schooling.201
 
 
Along with ascertaining the readability of the 11 major Curtin addresses, his 
speaking rate will be calculated with the use of the available recorded radio talks 
                                                            
195 Trevor Day, “Twelve Writing Tips for Administrative Staff”, University of Bath, Bath, 
2008, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<www.bath.ac.uk/learningandteaching/resources/TwelveWritingTipsRevisedTD.pdf>. 
196 Louis J. Sirico Jr., “Readability Studies: How Technocentrism Can Compromise Research 
and Legal Determinations” [hereafter “Readability studies”], Villanova University School of 
Law, School of Law Working Paper Series, The Berkeley Electronic Press, Berkeley, paper 
104, 2008, p. 107, retrieved on 8 June 2010 at 
<http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art104>. 
197 Sirico, “Readability studies”, p. 108. 
198 Garay, “Empires of the mind”. 
199 Cited in Garay, “Empires of the mind”, p. 288. 
200 Cited in Lim, “Fireside chats”, p. 438.  This view has been supported in the following: 
Bonner, Our recent past, p. 213; Bradenburg and Braden, “Roosevelt”, pp. 520, 522; Link, 
American epoch, p. 383; Daniel Scroop, “The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. 
Early, America’s First Modern Press Secretary” [hereafter “The making of FDR”], Times 
Higher Education, London, 21 November 2008, retrieved on 10 December 2008 at 
<http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=402574&sectioncode=26>. 
201 S.R. Carver, Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1941 [hereafter 
Year book], Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, no. 34, 1942; 
Jonathan Kelley and M.D.R. Evans, “Trends In Educational Attainment In Australia” 
[hereafter “Educational attainment”], WwA: Worldwide Attitudes, 26 August 1996, pp. 1-8, 
retrieved on 27 September 2009 at <http://www.international-
survey.org/wwa_pub/articles/hst-ed5.htm>. 
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from this selected sample.202  Analysing emphases and oratorical pacing will help to 
evaluate his skill as a media communicator.203  Expert recommendations have varied 
on the optimal pace of public speech, with some scholars advising a languid pace of 
100 words each minute204 while other authors advocate 125 words a minute in a 
formal business setting.205  Curtin has been portrayed as a former “street corner 
speaker”,206 who knew how to make a favourable impression at labour public 
meetings, “where your voice had to hit the back of the hall”.207  He also “understood 
the power of words”, the former Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating, remarked in 
2002.208  According to the social scientist, Ken Inglis, “at necessary moments during 
the war, Curtin could speak with a simple and inspiring eloquence”.209  This 
description resembles Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. Braden’s appraisal of 
Roosevelt’s radio talks as being distinct and clear because of his commonly used 
words, short sentences and his mean rate of speaking that was between 105 words 
and 110 words each minute.210  Another rhetoric scholar, Elvin T. Lim, wrote that 
FDR spoke an average 117 words a minute during his radio “fireside chats”.211
                                                            
202 John Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np; John Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime 
Minister” [hereafter “National broadcast”], DDA, no. 10, 8 December 1941, pp. 19-22; 
Curtin, “US radio broadcast”; pp. 9-13. 
  
Comparing the two leaders’ speaking rates will indicate whether Curtin continued to 
203 The John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library vouched that the speed had not been altered or 
artificially manipulated in the selected sample of radio broadcasts that I accessed from the 
JCPML archives. 
204 Lim, “Fireside chats”, p. 458, endnote 42; Peter Kenny, A Handbook of Public Speaking 
for Scientists & Engineers, IOP Publishing Ltd (Institute of Physics Publishing), London, 
1988, p. 20. 
205 Cynthia J. Pasquale, “Talking at the speed of confound”, The Denver Post, Denver, 29 
June 2006, retrieved on 10 September 2009 at 
<http://www.denverpost.com/ci_3991442?source=rss>; Public Broadcasting Service 
[hereafter PBS], “All About Public Speaking”, Falls Church, 2009, retrieved on 27 
September 2009 at <http://www.pbs.org/standarddeviantstv/transcript_public.html>. 
206 (Anon.), “Street Corner Speaker to Prime Minister”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 1, 4 October 1941. 
207 Ken Inglis, “Parliamentary Speech” [hereafter “Parliamentary speech”], Papers on 
Parliament, no. 28, November 1996, p. 53, retrieved on 26 November 2010 at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/pops/index.htm>. 
208 Paul Keating, “An Australian Vision: Foreign Policy Challenges in the 21st Century”, 
JCPML, Bentley, 2002, retrieved on 26 November 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/events/speeches/keating.html>. 
209 Inglis, “Parliamentary speech”, p. 53. 
210 Bradenburg and Braden, “Roosevelt”, pp. 520, 522. 
211 Lim, “FDR’s fireside chats”, p. 446. 
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be “a very fast speaker”, as he was described in The West Australian in 1916,212
 
 or if 
he adjusted his pace later in his radio broadcasts for mass audiences. 
Curtin amplified his major messages by filming his talks on wartime newsreels.  
The principles of semiotics, “the science of signs”, will be employed to investigate 
how he was portrayed in these visual productions.213  Although Curtin’s wartime 
prime ministerial predecessors, Robert Menzies and Arthur Fadden, had sponsored 
morale-boosting films, archival research revealed little newsreel footage of them 
during this era.214  In contrast, Curtin appeared in a “vast” record of moving images, 
and research suggested they were screened in other Allied countries.215  In applying 
semiotics to these available films, this thesis is concerned with the “signs” that may 
generate meaning about Curtin’s character.  According to semiotic theorists, a sign is 
composed of a “signifier” and the “signified”.  A “signifier”, which may include 
visual images, camera angles, shots, editing techniques or sound, conveys the 
“signified”, the mental impression or the meaning.  With the use of Arthur Asa 
Berger’s semiotic film conventions,216
                                                            
212 Cited in Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 66. 
 it will be ascertained whether the newsreels, 
including the camera shots, angles, commentaries and associated film techniques, 
represented Curtin as a heroic, dynamic and strong leader (see Appendices 4-5).  
This study represents an innovation in applying the analysis of still and moving 
images to the historical case study of Curtin to evaluate the success of his political 
communications during wartime.   
213 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers, Paladin Grafton, London, 1973; 
Arthur Asa Berger, Media Analysis Techniques [hereafter Media], Sage Publications, 
Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi, 1982, p. 14; Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in 
General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris, Open Court, Chicago, 1995; Michel Foucault, 
“Orders of discourse”, trans. Rupert Swyer, Social Science Information, vol. 10, no. 2, April 
1971, pp. 7-30; Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, Mass communication, p. 207; Lucy 
and Mickler, The war on democracy, pp. 21-22, 26. 
214 Carol Fallows, War: Australian Memories in Black and White, Murdoch Books, Sydney, 
2005; NFSA, “Australian Prime Ministers” (fact sheets on Sir Arthur William Fadden and 
Sir Robert Gordon Menzies), Acton, 2008, retrieved on 3 December 2010 at 
<http://www.nfsa.gov.au/the_collection/collection_spotlights/apms>. 
215 NFSA, “Australian Prime Ministers” (fact sheet on John Joseph Curtin – hereafter “Curtin 
fact sheet”), Acton, 2008, retrieved on 3 December 2010 at 
<http://www.nfsa.gov.au/the_collection/collection_spotlights/apms>. 
216 Berger, Media, pp. 38-39; Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, Mass communication, 
p. 207. 
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A second limited content analysis will be conducted to gain an understanding 
of how news journalists covered selected Curtin addresses and related media events.  
Curtin’s addresses were reported in the following day’s newspapers and therefore, an 
analysis will be made of the specific press coverage in the following metropolitan, 
mainstream dailies: The Age in Melbourne, The Canberra Times, The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The West Australian in Perth.  These broadsheets were selected 
because they include more in-depth political reports than the smaller, pictorial 
tabloids.  The content analysis will ascertain the degree of press acceptance of the 11 
Curtin addresses by assessing the extent to which journalists reproduced his 
keywords and messages to public audiences from 1941 to 1944 (see Appendix 6).  
As he was frequently unwell and away from his prime minister’s office in early 
1945, the news coverage of two related events during this year will be examined: his 
return to the parliament on 22 January after an absence of about three months due to 
health reasons; and his death on 5 July.  This analysis will be based on the Pew 
Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism formula that a news article is 
deemed “positive” if two-thirds of the statements appear to support a national 
leader.217  Further, this study will investigate the following critical factors: whether 
Curtin was portrayed as the principal source of the newspaper article; whether he was 
directly quoted in the report extensively; whether he appeared to be setting the news 
agenda or reacting to criticism; whether his keywords were promoted prominently; 
and if this story was “re-reportable” and generated follow-up stories.218
                                                            
217 Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Winning The Media 
Campaign: Methodology”, Journalism.org, Washington DC, 2008, retrieved on 26 
September 2009 at <http://www.journalism.org/node/13314>; PBS (producer), The Online 
NewsHour (television program – transcript), Washington DC, 24 June 2009, retrieved on 26 
September 2009 at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june09/obama_06-
24.html>. 
  Moreover, 
other relevant broadsheet and tabloid editorials or leaders, editorial cartoons, 
photographs, radio coverage and films pertaining to Curtin’s media messages will be 
analysed (see Appendices 3 and 5-7).  The outcome of these analyses is that an 
assessment will be made of the impact of Curtin’s public communications on the 
218 Steve Mickler and Alec McHoul, “Sourcing the Wave: Crime Reporting, Aboriginal 
Youth and The WA Press”, Media International Australia incorporating Culture and Policy, 
no. 86, February 1998, p. 136. 
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press, radio and film teams, who were responsible for relaying and interpreting his 
messages to media audiences. 
 
As discussed earlier, to gain a comparative understanding of the character of Curtin’s 
mass communication skill within the Allied 1940s milieu, this thesis will contrast his 
media strategies with those of three other democratic leaders of the era: Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Mackenzie King.  King’s diaries, for instance, reveal insights on his 
journalist relationships,219 radio broadcasts220 and his opinions of Curtin’s press 
interactions during the Australian prime minister’s visit to Ottawa in 1944.221  
Moreover, Roosevelt’s news interview transcripts show his rapport with 
journalists.222  Similarly Churchill’s private cables to Curtin and Roosevelt convey 
his interest in generating favourable news coverage about his wartime policies.223
This cross-national comparison will extend to an assessment of their film 
strategies
   
224 and censorship.225
 
  Specifically, this method will provide an 
international context to evaluate the closeness of Curtin’s media associations and 
appraise his ability to minimise negative reports and promote positive coverage of 
his war strategies. 
                                                            
219 King, “Diaries”, 27 April 1939, p. 454.  Pages will be cited from the online version and 
not from the original diary pages. 
220 King, “Diaries”, 3 September 1939, pp. 923, 925. 
221 King, “Diaries”, 1 June 1944, p. 565. 
222 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Presidential News Conference: Franklin D. Roosevelt” [hereafter 
“Press conference”], in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds), The American Presidency 
Project [hereafter The American presidency project], Santa Barbara, 1941-1945, retrieved on 
19 November 2010 at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences.php>. 
223 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 16 
August 1943, p. 26; Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Messages between 
Roosevelt & Churchill”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00796/3, August 1943–February 
1944. 
224 Acorn Media (producer), Churchill’s Bodyguard (documentary), 2006; Library and 
Archives Canada, “Mackenzie King on the Airwaves and the Silver Screen”, Ottawa, 2002, 
retrieved on 10 December 2008 at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/king/023011-
1070.09-e.html>; Sikorsky, “Churchill”; Universal Studios (producer), Modern History: 
Franklin D. Roosevelt – Six Fireside Chats, 1933-1938, (newsreels), Internet Archive, 1933-
1938, retrieved on 24 November 2010 at 
<http://www.archive.org/details/WorldHistoryFranklinD.Roosevelt-SixFiresideChats1933-
1938>. 
225 For example, Kerr, “Press censorship”, p. 48; Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 8 December 
1941, transcript np; Charles Edward Lysaght, “Brendan Bracken: ‘The Fantasist Whose 
Dreams Came True’” [hereafter “Bracken”], Finest Hour, The Churchill Centre, no. 113, 
winter 2001-2002, pp. 14-19; Steele, “Propaganda”, p. 1653. 
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Curtin’s public statements will also be contrasted with his private remarks 
through an examination of his confidential discussions on foreign policies.  His 
private views will be revealed by a study of top-secret, official cablegrams,226 
Australian Advisory War Council minutes,227 diary notes,228 letters229 and 
journalists’ transcriptions of his off-the-record briefings.  These sources will be 
valuable for providing insights into Curtin’s media dealings because they were 
written during the war, when the authors did not have the luxury of historical 
reflection.230
 
  Through comparison of Curtin’s private and public comments, this 
study will attempt to ascertain the extent to which he omitted or magnified vital 
information concerning Australia’s wartime role; his ability to use the media to mask 
his occasional foreign policy disagreements with other Allied leaders; and his skill in 
persuading journalists to cooperate with the prevailing censorship system and 
reproduce his main messages pertaining to international relations.  
National public opinion polling began in 1941,231
  
 thus providing data to enable 
an assessment of Curtin’s media messages.  Audiences indicated their support of  
                                                            
226 For example, John Curtin to Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00869/57, 13 August 1943, pp. 22-23; John Curtin to Winston Churchill, NAA, Canberra, 
A816, 52/302/142, 22 February 1942, pp. 279-280. 
227 The Australian Advisory War Council minutes will be examined in the following sources: 
Advisory War Council, “Minutes of Advisory War Council Meetings”, NAA, Canberra, 
series no. A5954, 815/1, 16 June 1943-11 May 1944; Advisory War Council, “Records of 
the Advisory War Council”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00641/1, 1942; Shedden, 
“AWC minutes”, vols 3-4, 7-8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/4-00928/5, 00928/8-00928/9, 6 
August 1941-26 March 1942, 16 June 1943-30 August 1945. 
228 Alexander, “Papers”. 
229 For example, Geoff Burgoyne to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, N/C. acc. no. 009, 27 
March 1942; John Curtin to Geoff Burgoyne, JCPML, Bentley, N/C. acc. no. 010, 20 April 
1942; John Curtin to H.S. Mowell, JCPML, Bentley, Bentley, R. acc. no. 005, 6 April 1942; 
H.S. Mowell to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, R. acc. no. 004, 1 April 1942. 
230 Alexander, “Papers”; Cox, “Typescript reports”; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings. 
231 Michele Levine and Gary Morgan, “The Power of Newspaper Editorial & Advertising” 
[hereafter “Newspaper editorial”], Country Press Association 106th Annual Conference, 
Sydney, 2006, retrieved on 20 June 2009 at <www.roymorgan.com>. 
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Curtin’s leadership in a major 1942 poll232 and during the 1943 election, as well as 
by writing letters233 and listening to broadcasts.  For example, one of his direct, 
international broadcasts was aired by more than 700 US radio stations in 1942 and 
reached listeners in the British Isles, Canada, Europe and South America.234  During 
this era, press owners disseminated information to readers through a predominantly 
one-way form of communication.  Yet the “Letters to the Editor” section was a 
distinctive site, “where the governed are invited to take a governmental posture 
towards society”; this was a semblance of two-way communication between news 
producers and readers.235  At the time, Australian broadsheets and tabloid publishers 
showed differing levels of commitment to letters pages.  During the war, The 
Canberra Times rarely featured readers’ letters236 while Brisbane-based The Courier-
Mail editor, Theodor Bray, spoke of his support for publishing the views of “the little 
man in the street”.237  The journalism scholar, Henry Mayer, expressed reservations 
about assessing such press columns because some ALP supporters might have 
decided not to bother sending a written note because of their “general conviction” 
that a conservative editor did not want to publish their views.238
                                                            
232 Several Roy Morgan Research findings were cited as “Australian Public Opinion Polls” in 
The Courier-Mail on 14 August 1942.  (Anon.), “Mr Curtin’s Job Pleases People”, The 
Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, JCPML acc. no. 00297/2, 14 August 
1942. 
  Therefore, scholars 
should approach the analysis of readers’ letters with caution.  Moreover, perhaps 
because of newsprint rationing, letter pages were not a regular, major feature of the 
233 Reverend Dr A.C. Button, “Australia & Britain”, The Age, Melbourne, 16 March 1942, p. 
2; Mark Talpley, “Tribute From An Elector”, The Age, Melbourne, 11 December 1942, p. 4; 
J.J. Mulligan to The Sydney Morning Herald editor, NAA, Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 237, 31 
December 1942, p. 103; J.J. Mulligan to John Curtin, NAA, Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 237, 
1 January 1943, p. 102. 
234 (Anon.), “Broadcast to Americas”, The Age, Melbourne, 16 March 1942, p. 2; (Anon.), 
“Dr Evatt’s Mission To U.S.A. Not As Medicant, Says Mr. Curtin”, The Canberra Times, 
Canberra, 16 March 1942, p. 1; (Anon.), “Pledge To U.S.A.”, The West Australian, Perth, 16 
March 1942, p. 5; John Curtin, “US radio broadcast”. 
235 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 28. 
236 This statement is based on an examination of the following issues of The Canberra 
Times: 9 December 1941; 29 December 1941; 20 February 1942; 16 March 1942; 9 May 
1942; 11 December 1942; 12 February 1943; 27 July 1943; 15 December 1943; 9 May 1944; 
18 July 1944; 9 May 1945; 6 July 1945.  These issues were selected because they included 
news coverage of major events and addresses pertaining to Curtin. 
237 Bray, “Bray interview”. 
238 Mayer, The press, p. 137. 
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four wartime broadsheets.239
 
  To the degree that relevant wartime readers’ letters and 
recorded opinions were available, they have been included in this study.  
To gain some appreciation of Curtin’s significance for present-day 
government-media communications, this study conducted a survey of 21 
contemporary political journalists.  As part of a questionnaire, each journalist has 
been asked for his or her opinion of Curtin’s legacy for the Australian public and the 
news media profession (see Appendices 8a-8d).  As this survey ascertained, most of 
the respondents knew little about Curtin, implying that his achievements might have 
been largely forgotten in the contemporary media.  Yet a few senior journalists 
praised his “intimate”, bipartisan and equitable relations with the press gallery, his 
foreign policy achievements and his ability to create an atmosphere of national 
unity.240  During telephone interviews, some journalists talked about current political 
practices, such as interactive, question-and-answer interviews241 and off-the-record 
discussions,242 techniques that Curtin initiated (although most respondents did not 
know this).243
 
  This survey, then, provides an indication of Curtin’s media legacy as 
well as the value of his prime ministerial mass communication strategies for modern 
leaders and journalists.  Through the multimethod approach described earlier, 
combining archival research, limited content media analyses, semiotic film analyses, 
questionnaires and interviews, this thesis will build a picture of Curtin’s influence on 
political communications, journalism and the mass media.  
 
                                                            
239 The four broadsheets to be investigated in this limited content analysis are: The Age, The 
Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian. 
240 Michael Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Correspondent A, 
confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010; Editor B, confidential personal 
communication, 24 March 2010; Shane Wright, personal communication, 27 December 
2009; Bob Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009. 
241 Chief of Staff C, confidential personal communication, 23 March 2010; Peter Kennedy, 
personal communication, 18 December 2009; Les Welsh, personal communication, 4 
December 2009. 
242 Malcolm Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010; Peter Kennedy, personal 
communication, 18 December 2009; Glenn Milne, personal communication, 17 November 
2009. 
243 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 77-78. 
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Chapter descriptions 
To gain insights on how Curtin was able to persuade journalists to promote his 
foreign policies, Chapter 2 will situate this thesis in relation to the topic’s academic 
field and outline the theoretical approaches underpinning this study.  While a few 
authors have referred briefly to Curtin’s media interactions,244 I describe in Chapter 2 
the theoretical stance of this thesis, which is to show the interrelation of political 
leaders and news media as governmental processes rather than simply 
communication processes.  Following the work of Ericson et al, the thesis 
understands journalism as critical to the governance of modern, administered 
society.245  To this end, Chapter 2 will elaborate in more detail relevant media and 
cultural theoretical approaches, which have been outlined earlier in this introductory 
chapter, including Habermas’ notion of the public sphere;246 the concept of news in 
an administered society, as outlined by Ericson et al;247 Foucault’s writing on 
“governmentality”;248 Berlin’s liberalism theories;249 the political economy and 
agenda-setting approaches to news analysis;250 Rodney Tiffen’s insights on 
journalistic processes, particularly Australian political reporting;251 as well as the 
influential list developed by Galtung and Ruge about significant news values.252
 
   
These theories inform the analysis of Curtin’s use of mass communication and 
popular culture strategies.  Chapter 2, then, provides the academic conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 begins with an examination of the development of Australia’s main 
metropolitan dailies, particularly the historical conditions that influenced these 
companies and contributed to their political outlooks.  It is argued that many 
                                                            
244 Griffen-Foley, The house of Packer, p. 123; Inglis, ABC, pp. 96, 99, 110-112, 117; Lloyd, 
Parliament and the press, pp. 125-157; Lloyd, Journalist, pp. 150, 156, 167, 202, 205, 210, 
215, 218, 235; Petersen, News not views, pp. 163-166; Ward, “The early use of radio”, p. 
322; Younger, Keith Murdoch, pp. 151-152. 
245 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 16; Foucault, “Governmentality”, 
pp. 87-104. 
246 Habermas, The public sphere. 
247 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance. 
248 Foucault, “Governmentality”, pp. 87-104. 
249 Berlin, Liberty; Freedom and its betrayal; The proper study of mankind. 
250 Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries; Street, Mass media. 
251 Tiffen, News. 
252 Galtung and Ruge, “Foreign news”, pp. 64-91. 
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prominent media professionals, including Sir Keith Murdoch, shifted their support 
from Prime Minister Menzies partly because of his authoritarian and dismissive 
approach towards journalists.253  Curtin was able to generate reporters’ support 
through the following initiatives: appointing news executives to federal government 
positions; developing professional working relations with Murdoch and his news 
companies, and elevating the status of press gallery journalists by treating them with 
an egalitarian respect.254  Moreover, Elsie Curtin held press conferences in Australia 
and the US, thereby pioneering direct relationships between a prime minister’s wife 
and international journalists.255  Furthermore, Curtin expanded the government’s use 
of popular culture by instigating direct talks to more radio and film audiences at 
home and in other Allied nations.256  Through the use of popular culture symbols, 
Curtin strove to portray himself as being both a commonsense Australian and a 
forceful, democratic leader.257  He appealed to Australia’s “gallant” fighting 
traditions to promote a sense of national identity.258
 
  In sum, Chapter 3 contrasts 
Curtin’s strategies with those of his prime ministerial predecessors and identifies his 
distinctive use of the press, radio and films. 
Chapter 4 conducts a cross-national analysis to investigate the particularity of 
Curtin’s media interactions in comparison with those of three other Allied leaders of 
                                                            
253 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Douglas, “Douglas interview”; Griffen-Foley, 
“Political opinion polling”, p. 43; Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 62-63, 86. 
254 For example, Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Alexander, “Papers”, 21, 27, 28 and 31 
August 1943; Griffen-Foley, “Frank Packer”, pp. 553-556. 
255 (Anon.), “Impression of U.S.A.: Mrs Curtin Interviewed”, The West Australian, Perth, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/119, 28 April 1944; (Anon.), “Mrs. Curtin Buys 
Gloves, No Nylons; Prime Minister’s Wife Compares Shopping Conditions Here and in 
Australia”, The New York Times, New York, 26 April 1944, p. 20; (Anon.), “Mrs Curtin’s 
Racy Story Of Her Trip”, The Argus, Melbourne, 21 July 1944, p. 8. 
256 For example: (Anon.), “Publicity: Relations with America: Australia Expands”, The 
Canberra Times, Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4; Cinesound Productions and Cinesound 
Review, Compiled speeches; Curtin, “American relations”; Curtin, “US radio broadcast”; 
NFSA, “Curtin fact sheet”. 
257 Cited in (Anon.), “Australia: Journey Into the World”, Time, New York, 24 April 1944, 
retrieved on 30 November 2010 at 
<http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19440424,00.html>; (Anon.), “Canberra Hush: 
A Poignant Scene”, The West Australian, Perth, 5 July 1945, p. 7; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s 
Tragedy”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 6 July 1945, p. 2; (Anon.), “Vale, John 
Curtin”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 6 July 1945, p. 3; Day, “Curtin as hero”, pp. 1-3. 
258 John Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London” [hereafter “London 
broadcast”], DDA, no. 81, 8 May 1944, pp. 53-56. 
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liberal democracies: Churchill, Mackenzie King and Roosevelt.  They shared similar 
contests and contexts as Curtin because all four men were leaders of free 
democracies, who needed to persuade and convince mass populations.  I have chosen 
not to compare him with the dictators of the Axis powers because they used 
repressive police tactics to transform the public spheres of conquered countries into 
echo chambers for state propaganda while Curtin developed his relationships with 
journalists and initiated media strategies to win over Australians to support his 
leadership.  Similarly to Curtin, these other three Allied leaders had journalism 
backgrounds and used the media to counteract the Nazi propaganda machines.259  As 
Curtin expanded the prime ministerial press secretary’s role,260 this chapter 
investigates the role of media advisors during the leaderships of Churchill, King and 
Roosevelt.  While Roosevelt, or FDR, employed the first US presidential full-time 
press secretary, neither Churchill nor King created such a position.261  None of these 
three leaders held such frequent and interactive interviews as Curtin’s media 
briefings.262  Yet their administrations employed journalists to become government 
censors and achieve the news media’s consensus.263
                                                            
259 
  Churchill, King and Roosevelt 
also expanded the use of radio talks, newsreels and other films to communicate their 
Philip M. Boffey, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Harvard”, The Harvard Crimson, 
Cambridge, 13 December 1957, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=108910>; Library and Archives Canada, “The 
Political Man of Letters: Mackenzie King as Writer and Bookman”, 2002, retrieved on 8 
December 2008 at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/king/023011-1010.02-e.html>; 
Simon Tait, “A war leader’s love affair with the press”, The Times, London, 8 March 2008, 
p. 80. 
260 Rodgers, “Rodgers interview”, transcript np. 
261 Gordon C. Case, “The Lessons of Munich: Mackenzie King’s Campaign to Prepare 
Canada for War”, Canadian Military Journal, vol. 5, no. 4, 2004-2005, retrieved on 9 
December 2008 at <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo5/no4/history-histoire-eng.asp>; 
Linda Lotridge Levin, The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. Early, America’s First 
Modern Press Secretary, Prometheus Books, New York, 2008; Martinelli and Mucciarone, 
“Stephen Early”, pp. 49-57; Wendy Maxwell, interviewed by James Holland, James 
Holland’s Second World War Forum, 2003, retrieved on 9 December 2008 at 
<http://www.secondworldwarforum.com/my-oral-history-archive/civilians/wendy-maxwell-
british>; Moss, “Churchill museum”. 
262 (Anon.), “Canada At War”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01222/15, 12 June 1944, p. 16; Douglas, “Douglas interview”; Lloyd, Parliament and the 
press, p. 126; Richard M. Perloff, Political Communication: Politics, Press, and Public in 
America, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey and London, 1998, p. 39. 
263 For example, Kerr, “Press censorship”, p. 48; Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 8 December 
1941; Lysaght, “Bracken”, pp. 14-19; Steele, “Propaganda”, p. 1653. 
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goals to public audiences.264  They were often portrayed as celebrities during the 
war, but they left different legacies for their nations’ media.  Since their private 
documents were preserved carefully by their executors, Churchill and Roosevelt 
were shown to be great communicators and role models in several contemporary 
news outlets.265  It seemed that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt kept a diary that 
would become subject to media scrutiny later.  After the publications of King’s 
diaries, Canadian journalists argued whether they should have been more 
interrogative towards the prime minister during the war.266
 
  To provide an 
international context to evaluate the closeness of Curtin’s media associations, 
Chapter 4 contrasts the roles of other Allied democratic leaders’ press secretaries, 
news conferences, radio talks, newsreels, censorship policies and their media images. 
 Following this cross-national comparison, Chapter 5 investigates in more 
detail the role of the Australian prime ministerial press secretary, news interviews, 
radio, newsreels and censorship in Curtin’s wartime administration.  This chapter 
evaluates the reforms, innovations, trends and developments in Australian journalism 
that contributed to Curtin’s media interactions.  Applying a conceptual approach that 
sees journalism as a product of “institutional demands and processes”,267
                                                            
264 King, “Diaries”, 3 September 1939, pp. 923, 925; Steven Schoenherr, “History of the 
Newsreel”, University of San Diego, San Diego, 2008, retrieved on 10 December 2008 at 
<
 this chapter 
asserts that Curtin, as a former labour newspaper editor, was able to generate positive 
news because he understood the media profession’s everyday work routines.  This 
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/filmnotes/newsreel.html>; Sikorsky, “Churchill”, pp. 30-36. 
265 (Anon.), “Churchill ‘greatest PM of 20th Century’”, BBC News World Edition, London, 4 
January 2000, retrieved on 26 May 2009 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/575219.stm>; PBS (producer), The Online 
NewsHour (television program – transcript),Washington DC, 27 November 2008, retrieved 
on 12 December 2008 at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-
dec08/historians_11-27.html>; Patrick T. Reardon, “FDR books on Obama’s nightstand”, 
Chicago Tribune, Chicago, November 18, 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/obama/chi-FDR-barack-obama-books-
1118,0,4563603.story>; Edward Rothstein, “Churchill, Heroic Relic or Relevant Now?”, The 
New York Times, New York, 29 March 2003, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9505E6D71639F93AA15750C0A9659C8
B63>; Time, New York, vol. 172, no. 21, 24 November 2008, front cover. 
266 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (producer), Front Page Challenge (television 
broadcast), Toronto, 27 March 1978, retrieved on 10 December 2008 at 
<http://archives.cbc.ca/version_print.asp?page=1&IDLan=1&ID.C.lip=7244&IDDossier=0
&IDCat=335&ID.C.atPa=260>. 
267 Tiffen, News, p. 3. 
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chapter, therefore, outlines the processes involving news gathering, processing and 
production.  Curtin sponsored major professional media reforms, such as the 
Australian Journalists’ Association Code of Ethics 1944,268 and instigated “off-the-
record” interviews.269  He also initiated media developments such as releasing more 
important announcements on the radio, rather than in the press;270 broadcasting radio 
talks directly to US audiences;271 insisting the ABC should adopt more Australian-
oriented programs;272 funding a film-processing laboratory, and opening a publicity 
association in New York to promote more local films to overseas audiences.273  
Many of these initiatives became established media procedures.  Despite a brief 
censorship dispute during Curtin’s absence in 1944 and a nine-day Sydney 
journalists’ strike during the same year, he mainly achieved reporters’ 
cooperation.274
 
  This Labor prime minister’s media strategies appeared to resemble 
those of Roosevelt more closely than the policies of Churchill and King.  Yet the 
British, Canadian and the US leaders did not seem to invest as much time and trust in 
journalists as did Curtin.  Chapter 5 delves into the day-to-day news operations of 
Australia’s wartime press, radio and film professions to ascertain the impact of 
Curtin’s strategies on the media. 
 Chapter 6 focuses on Curtin’s endeavours to gain journalists’ endorsement for 
his foreign policies from late 1941 until 1942.  The chapter begins with his journalist 
interactions when it is announced that he will be appointed as the prime minister in 
October 1941.  Even though he had sought a federal parliamentary seat since 1914, 
he seemed surprised by the appointment, according to The Sun-News Pictorial 
Canberra correspondent, Harold Cox.275
                                                            
268 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 229. 
  News owners published editorials that 
269 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
270 (Anon.), “A Lesson To Be Learnt”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 20 
March 1942. 
271 JCPML, “Index to John Curtin’s speeches”. 
272 Inglis, ABC, pp. 96, 99, 110-112, 117. 
273 (Anon.), “Publicity: Relations With America: Australia Expands”, The Canberra Times, 
Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4; Curtin, “American relations”, pp. 13-14. 
274 Cox, “Cox interview”; Holt, “Holt interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 78, 96-
105. 
275 Cox, “Cox interview”. 
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conveyed their support for the new prime minister.276
 
  The chapter will continue to 
analyse his media strategies during the following events: Australia’s declaration of 
war against Japan in December 1941; his appeals for US military assistance; the 
Japanese bombings on the city of Darwin in the Northern Territory in February 1941; 
his disagreement with Churchill over the allocation of Australian troops; Australia’s 
role in overseas conflicts including the Battle of the Coral Sea and fighting on the 
Kokoda Track in New Guinea; as well as the national conscription debate.  This 
chapter contains a limited content analysis to identify Curtin’s keywords and 
messages in six major addresses that he gave during this period.  Further, the 
readability scores are calculated for these six addresses and, when possible, the 
speaking rates are given.  This content analysis of Curtin’s communications has been 
elaborated in the methodology section earlier in this introductory chapter.   
More specifically, Chapter 6 analyses the following texts: 
1. Curtin’s announcement of war with Japan on 8 December 1941.  This 
announcement – the first independent declaration of war made by an 
Australian prime minister – was broadcast on the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (ABC) radio to national audiences.277
2. The prime minister’s press article on “Australia looks to America”.  This 
newspaper editorial was published in The Herald, a Melbourne-based 
newspaper, on 27 December 1941.
 
278
3. His parliamentary speech on 19 February 1942 to announce the Japanese 
bombings on Darwin.
 
279
                                                            
276 Supportive press editorials were published to announce Curtin’s prime ministerial 
appointment in Australian metropolitan dailies including the following: The Advertiser, The 
Age, The Argus, The Brisbane Telegraph, The Canberra Times, The Courier-Mail, The Daily 
Mirror, The Herald, The Mercury, The Sun, The Sydney Morning Herald, The West 
Australian.  See Scrapbooks, no. 1, 4-9 October 1941. 
 
277 Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22. 
278 John Curtin, “The Task Ahead”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in JCPML, Bentley, 27 
December 1941, retrieved on 25 January 2011 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/pmportal/text/00468.html>. 
279 John Curtin, “Attack On Darwin”, DDA, no. 19, 19 February 1942, p. 9. 
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4. His radio talk to American audiences that was broadcast from the Canberra 
radio station, 2CY, to the US on 14 March 1942.  The radio broadcast also 
reached listeners in the British Isles, Canada, Europe and South America.280
5. His parliamentary announcement of the Battle of the Coral Sea on 8 May 
1942.
 
281
6. The prime minister’s parliamentary address about the Kokoda campaign on 
10 December 1942.
 
282
Along with providing an analysis of Curtin’s public communications in 1941 and 
1942, Chapter 6 examines his private discussions with military and political leaders 
through archival research of cable telegrams,
 
283 Cabinet minutes,284 reporters’ 
notes,285 oral histories286 and other secret diplomatic documents.287  Also this chapter 
conducts a limited content analysis of relevant news coverage of the selected Curtin 
texts, as explained earlier in the methodology section.  Furthermore, a semiotic 
analysis has been conducted to examine relevant newsreels, editorial cartoons and 
photographs.  Thus in this chapter, it is argued that on the whole, the media 
favourably reproduced Curtin’s inclusive key messages about the need for civic 
“duty”288
 
 as he prepared to expand Australia’s conscription policies. 
                                                            
280 Curtin, “US radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
281 John Curtin, “Naval Engagement – Coral Sea” [hereafter “Coral Sea”], DDA, no. 28, 8 
May 1942, pp. 4-5.  This study will consider two separate announcements made by Curtin in 
the parliament on 8 May 1942.  In the transcripts of the same date, the DDA also included 
texts of two communiqués, which were not included in this analysis. 
282 John Curtin, “State Of The War”, DDA, no. 47, 10 December 1942, pp. 17-24. 
283 For example, Winston Churchill to John Curtin, NAA, Canberra, A816, 52/302/142, 20 
February 1942, p. 285; John Curtin to Winston Churchill, NAA, Canberra, A816, 
52/302/142, 22 February 1942, pp. 279-280. 
284 Advisory War Council, “MacArthur discussions”, 26 March-17 June 1942; Advisory War 
Council, “AWC minutes”, 1942; Shedden, “AWC minutes”, vols 3-4, JCPML acc. no. 
00928/4-00928/5, 6 August 1941-26 March 1942. 
285 Alexander, “Papers”, 1941-1942; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, pp. 49-123. 
286 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Commins, “Commins interview”; Cox, “Cox 
interview”; Fraser, “Fraser interview”; John Frith, interviewed by Shirley McKechnie 
[hereafter “Frith interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01064/1, 30 April-1 May 
1994, transcript np; Reid, “Reid interview”; Rodgers, “Rodgers interview”. 
287 For example, Franklin D. Roosevelt to John Curtin, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential 
Library and Museum, Hyde Park, 1 June 1942, retrieved on 28 September 2009 at 
<http://docs.FDRlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/a09a01.html>; Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00719/1/11, 22 March 1942. 
288 Curtin, “Coral Sea”, pp. 4-5.  Refer to: The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The West Australian, 9 May 1942. 
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 Chapter 7 uses the same multimethod approach to analyse three major media 
events in Australia in 1943.  This chapter will continue the content analysis of 
Curtin’s keywords and messages by examining the following texts: 
1. His parliamentary address on 11 February 1943 that announced the 
imposition of military conscription beyond Australian territorial limits.289
2. His radio broadcast on 26 July 1943 to promote his party’s achievements and 
policies during the federal election campaign.
 
290
3. His speech on the state of the war at the Labor Party’s federal conference in 
Canberra on 14 December 1943.
 
291
Additionally, an evaluation is made of the impact of Curtin’s messages on the news 
media by analysing relevant press, radio and film coverage.  This chapter asserts that 
journalists responded favourably to his 1943 foreign policy statements that were 
aimed at strengthening British Commonwealth collaboration and Australia’s new 
alliance with the US. 
 
 
Curtin’s global communications expanded in 1944, and Chapter 8 analyses 
his ability to publicise Australia’s war achievements to international audiences 
during his visits to Roosevelt in the US, Churchill in England and Mackenzie King in 
Ottawa.  A cross-national comparison is made of the four Allied leaders’ media 
strategies during their 1944 meetings, as well as Elsie Curtin’s press statements in 
the US.  Chapter 8 analyses the following Curtin texts: 
1. His radio broadcast to British listeners on 8 May 1944 to stress his 
approval of the “Beat Hitler First” strategy and galvanise their support to 
defend Australia in the Pacific war.292
2. His parliamentary speech on 17 July 1944 to announce the availability of 
“large and powerful” Allied forces, enabling more Australian troops to 
 
                                                            
289 John Curtin, Commonwealth of Australia: Parliamentary Debates (hereafter CPD), vol. 
173, 11 February 1943, pp. 592-596. 
290 John Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np. 
291 John Curtin, “State Of The War”, DDA, no. 70, 14 December 1943, pp. 31-36. 
292 Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
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work in “economic services” at home and alleviate a national food 
shortage.293
As this chapter has demonstrated, the resultant news coverage of these two speeches 
was favourable.  Journalists generally cooperated with Curtin’s attempts to magnify 
Australia’s role in the Pacific war even as US troops led the final victories against 
Japanese forces.  Curtin’s international mass communication strategies have been 
contrasted with Menzies’ more distant media interactions during his visit to Allied 
countries as the prime minister in 1941.
 
294
 
   
 Chapter 9 begins by examining Curtin’s attempts to focus media attention on 
Australia’s military role in the final stages of the Pacific war as he increasingly 
struggled with personal health problems.  He attempted to divert news coverage from 
political tensions to his foreign policy priorities including publicising Australia’s 
involvement in the Allied advancement towards Japan, counteracting MacArthur’s 
US-oriented public relations unit, campaigning for justice for the nation’s prisoners 
of war and securing an “effective voice”295 in the United Nations.  In early 1945 he 
was frequently ill and sometimes appointed colleagues to act as the prime minister.  
This chapter will examine media reports about his return to the parliament on 22 
January 1945 after about three months’ absence due to illness, as well as his death 
later that year.  This investigation provides insights into Australian news reporters’ 
consensus to present him as the nation’s legitimate leader in the early months of 
1945 until his death about a month before Japan’s surrender.296
                                                            
293 John Curtin, “Meeting of Prime Ministers – Australian Prime Minister’s Report”, DDA, 
no. 84, 17 July 1944, pp. 28-44. 
  Similarly to US 
press reports about Roosevelt’s health in early 1945, the Australian media cooperated 
with the government to assure citizens that Curtin would recover from his illness.  As 
294 This comparison will be based on sources including: Campbell, “Diary”; Martin and 
Hardy, Dark and hurrying days. 
295 John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Statement, February, 1944”, DDA, no. 75, 9 February 
1944, p. 19. 
296 For example, (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Health: Longer Rest Likely”, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 4, JCPML acc. no. 00297/4, 14 June 1945; Clive 
Turnbull, “Mr Curtin And The Nation’s Future”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 4, 24 May 1945. 
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US correspondents had portrayed Roosevelt’s death as a shock to Americans,297 
similarly many Australians were reportedly astonished by the loss of Curtin.298
 
  In 
this chapter, it is argued that Australia’s senior federal political journalists largely 
supported Curtin’s desire to remain as the prime minister in the final year before his 
death; they cooperated with national security requirements to help conceal the news 
about his ill health. 
 Chapter 10 uses questionnaires and interviews, as described earlier in this 
chapter, to gain some appreciation of Curtin’s significance for present-day 
government-media communications.  This study conducts a survey of 21 current 
political journalists to ascertain their opinions of Curtin as well as more 
contemporary prime ministerial media strategies.  Of the survey respondents, 11 
journalists shared their views in telephone interviews299 and another three editors 
returned completed questionnaires as part of this thesis.300
                                                            
297 Meghan O’Shaughnessy, “The Hidden Campaign: FDR’s Health and the 1944 Election 
(review)”, (Hugh E. Evans), Rhetoric & Public Affairs [hereafter “FDR’s health”], vol. 6, no. 
4, winter 2003, pp. 792-794. 
  Chapter 10 argues that 
Curtin’s innovative use of media conferences, news briefings, confidential interviews 
and relatively new audiovisual technology have now become accepted conventions 
practised by politicians to communicate with journalists.  Successive Australian 
leaders have continued to use and develop many Curtin journalism initiatives to 
communicate more directly to public audiences.  Among a small minority of 
respondents, who were the more senior editors, Curtin is a journalism figure and a 
298 (Anon.), “A People’s Judgement”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 6 July 1945, p. 
3; (Anon.), “Nation Loses Her Leader”, Truth, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 4, 8 July 
1945; (Anon.), “Opinion-He Was A Good Man”, The Daily Mirror, Sydney, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 4, 5 July 1945. 
299 They were Andrew Bolt (Herald Sun); Paul Bongiorno (Network Ten); Tony Eastley 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio); Malcolm Farr (The Daily Telegraph); Peter 
Kennedy (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Television); Glenn Milne (The Australian); 
David Speers (Sky News); Les Welsh (Curtin FM); the author and former Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation Radio news editor Bob Wurth; and two others, Editor B and Chief 
of Staff C, who requested confidentiality. 
300 They were Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio Australia correspondent Michael 
Cavanagh; The West Australian economics editor Shane Wright; and another journalist, 
Correspondent A, who asked not to be named. 
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founding father in their profession.301  Yet most journalists knew little of Curtin’s 
leadership and his mass media strategies.  The survey findings indicate that most 
journalists are not conscious of their own profession’s history and of its leading 
lights.  These findings support those of previously published research that there has 
been little written by way of a history of Australian journalism.302
 
  This thesis aims 
to contribute towards the development of this needed history.  Thus the survey 
findings in Chapter 10 allows for this thesis to build a picture of the legacy left by 
Curtin.   
 As the concluding chapter, Chapter 11 marshals the findings of the previous 
chapters to assert that Curtin was a successful and innovative media strategist.  These 
findings extend to his initiatives in news statements, international radio broadcasts 
and newsreel appearances.  He frequently used inclusive public language, an 
impersonal characterisation of the war enemy and attempted to create a sense of 
national unity, balancing his calls for civic “duty” by appealing to liberty ideals.303  
By the time of the Allied advance in 1944, his tone became more optimistic as he 
invited Australian people to establish a national “purpose” in the “new world” 
order.304  While Curtin’s radio talks were slightly intellectual and faster than the 
recommended standards, they were not beyond the comprehension of working-class 
listeners, given the average education levels at the time.305
                                                            
301 Editor B, confidential personal communication, 24 March 2010; Shane Wright, personal 
communication, 27 December 2009; Bob Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 
2009. 
  Moreover, this thesis 
argues that Curtin communicated more frequently to radio listeners than did 
Roosevelt, who was recognised for his ready acceptance and use of relatively new 
302 Ann Curthoys, Julianne Schultz, and Paula Hamilton, “A history of Australian journalism, 
1890 to the present: report on a research project”, Australian Studies in Journalism, no. 2, 
1992, p. 45; John Henningham, cited in Denis Cryle, “Australian newspaper industry: 
Intercolonial perspectives”, Australian Studies in Journalism, no. 1, 1992, p. 101; Margaret 
Van Heekeren, “Who’s Gough Whitlam? What journalism graduates don’t know about the 
past and what news editors want them to know”, Australian Journalism Review, vol. 27, no. 
1, 2005, pp. 209-218. 
303 Curtin, “Coral Sea”, pp. 4-5; “US radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
304 Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56; “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
305 S.R. Carver, Year book; Kelley and Evans, “Educational attainment”. 
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media technology.306  This study has calculated that the selected sample of 11 Curtin 
texts received mainly positive news coverage in The Age, The Canberra Times, The 
Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian.  At least 12 wartime senior 
journalists affirmed in their historical reminiscences that he was a great prime 
minister.307  Furthermore, this thesis argues that film teams cooperated with Curtin to 
create the appearance of a relationship between him and the moviegoers watching his 
newsreel images.  After he practised different gestures, postures and words, the film 
teams edited series of eye-level close-ups and medium shots to convey an intimate, 
personal connection between the prime minister and cinema audiences.308
 
  These 
media strategies assisted him as he strove to secure Australia’s role in the post-war 
world while publicly masking his occasional disagreements with other Allied leaders. 
 
Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has outlined the methodological and theoretical 
frameworks of this thesis to answer the research question: how successful was Curtin 
in persuading the predominantly conservative news media to promote his wartime 
views?  The central theories informing this thesis are based on the insights that 
journalism is a critical part of social governance; that news is a governmental 
function within an “administered society”.309
 
   
This thesis uses a multimethod approach to analyse the keywords, readability 
and speaking rates of selected Curtin public communication texts and the extent to 
                                                            
306 Bonner, Our recent past, p. 213; Bradenburg and Braden, “Roosevelt”, pp. 520, 522; Lim, 
“FDR’s fireside chats”, p. 438; Link, American epoch, p. 383; Scroop, “The making of 
FDR”. 
307 Australian wartime journalists praised Curtin in their oral histories including: Alexander, 
“Alexander interview”; Bray, “Bray interview”; Chamberlain, Chamberlain interview”; 
Commins, “Commins interview”; Cox, “Cox interview”; Davidson, “Davidson interview”; 
Douglas, “Douglas interview”; Ewing, “Ewing interview”; Fraser, “Fraser interview”; Holt, 
“Holt interview”; Reid, “Reid interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 82. 
308 For example, ScreenSound Australia, Parliament in Session (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00876/4, 1944. 
309 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 16; Mickler, Visualising 
Aboriginality, pp. 20-21. 
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which his messages were reproduced by the media to news audiences.  A semiotic 
analysis builds a picture of Curtin’s media image in newsreels, press photographs 
and editorial cartoons.  Curtin’s public speaking is contrasted with his private 
statements and behind-the-scene relationships, as revealed in confidential Allied 
leaders’ cables, secret wartime diaries, Advisory War Council minutes and oral 
histories.  On this basis of the material, Curtin’s private discussions are compared 
with his public image, as revealed in media interviews, press statements and films.  
His media strategies are contrasted with those of his Australian prime ministerial 
predecessors, particularly Menzies during his prime ministership from 1939 to 1941.  
This results in an assessment of Curtin’s ability to minimise negative reports and 
promote positive news coverage of his foreign policies.  The thesis aims to 
demonstrate that Curtin’s impact on political communications is evident today.  He 
has bestowed a powerful legacy for political journalism and government-media 
relations, although it seems many journalists are unaware that they are benefiting 
from the strategies that he created. 
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 Chapter 2 
Media and cultural conceptual approaches 
 
 
This chapter will discuss the theoretical and conceptual literature that informs how 
and why the media cooperated with Curtin in Australia’s liberal democratic wartime 
society.  These theories will help to establish a critical framework within which to 
interpret and understand the interactions between Curtin and news organisations in 
the wider historical, political and social contexts of the expanding mass media.  More 
specifically, this chapter elaborates the theoretical approaches on the following 
related topics: the notion of the public sphere; the social function of journalists; the 
state’s role towards citizens; how liberal-democratic governments govern; how 
political leaders use the news media; the semiotics of governments’ visual images 
and language; and the significance of news values and processes.  The three central 
concepts that inform my thesis are: Jürgen Habermas’ notion of the public sphere;1 
the governmental function of news in an administered society, as outlined by Richard 
V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, who were influenced by 
Michel Foucault; 2 and Isaiah Berlin’s discourse of political liberalism.3  While this 
thesis is no sense a systematic Foucauldian analysis, it is nonetheless worthwhile to 
discuss Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” because a) it deeply informed 
Ericson et al’s concept of news in an administered society and b) it can help to 
provide insights into the modern character of governance in general.4
                                                            
1 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society [hereafter The public sphere], MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1989. 
  Also I will 
examine these related terms and concepts: the political economy and agenda-setting 
2 Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A 
Study of News Organizations [hereafter Visualizing deviance], Open University Press, 
Milton Keynes, 1987. 
3 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty [hereafter Liberty], Oxford University Press, London, 
1969; Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty [hereafter 
Freedom and its betrayal], ed. Henry Hardy, Chatto & Windus, London, 2002; Isaiah Berlin, 
The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays [hereafter The proper study of 
mankind], Chatto & Windus, London, 1997. 
4 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” [hereafter “Governmentality”], in Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies In Governmentality: With 
Two Lectures By And An Interview With Michel Foucault, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1991. 
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approaches to news analysis;5 Rodney Tiffen’s insights into journalistic processes, 
particularly Australian political reporting;6 the semiotic analytic approaches of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Arthur Asa Berger and other scholars;7 as well as the 
influential list developed by Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge about significant news 
values.8
 
  These key conceptual and theoretical approaches to the study of journalism, 
media and social governance inform the analysis of Curtin’s use of journalism 
strategies and popular culture. 
 
Engaging more reporters in public spheres 
The theory of “the public sphere”, a historic domain of rational deliberation 
including the government, the citizenry and media, assists us to understand the role 
of journalism in governmental affairs.9  In his book, The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (1989), the 
Frankfurt School social theorist, Jürgen Habermas, traces the origins of the public 
sphere to the ancient Greek city state and the polis of free citizens.  In the Hellenic 
model, this social space became “a realm of freedom and permanence”.10
                                                            
5 Scott Fitzgerald, Corporations and Cultural Industries: Time Warner, Bertlesmann, and 
News Corporation [hereafter Corporations and cultural industries], PhD thesis, Curtin 
University of Technology, Bentley, 2008; John Street, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy 
[hereafter Mass media], Palgrave, Hampshire and New York, 2001, pp. 10-11. 
  By the 
1789 French Revolution, the public sphere was structured by the newspaper, 
6 Rodney Tiffen, News & Power [hereafter News], Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Wellington, 
London and Boston, 1989. 
7 Roland Barthes, Mythologies [hereafter Mythologies], trans. Annette Lavers, Paladin 
Grafton, London, 1973; Arthur Asa Berger, Media Analysis Techniques [hereafter Media], 
Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi, 1982, pp. 38-39; Michel Foucault, 
“Orders of discourse” [hereafter “Discourse”], trans. Rupert Swyer, Social Science 
Information, vol. 10, no. 2, April 1971, pp. 7-30; Niall Lucy and Steve Mickler, The War on 
Democracy: Conservative Opinion in the Australian Press [hereafter The war on 
democracy], University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, 2006, pp. 21-22, 26; Ferdinand 
de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics [hereafter General linguistics], trans. Roy Harris, 
Open Court, Chicago, 1995. 
8 Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge, “The structure of foreign news: the presentation of the 
Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers” [hereafter “Foreign news”], 
Journal of International Peace Research, vol. 1, 1965, pp. 64-91. 
9 Juho Rahkonen, “Mapping Media and Communication Research” [hereafter “Mapping 
research”], Australian Communication Research Centre, Department of Communication, 
Helsingin Sanomat Foundation, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 2007, p. 58, retrieved on 15 
February 2009 at <http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/crc/ReportAustralia.pdf>. 
10 Habermas, The public sphere, pp. 3-4. 
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particularly by the rise of political news journals in Paris.  At this time, it was 
recognised that in order to create a truly “public” opinion, the mass media needed to 
be a “linkage” between two domains, between personal and official opinions.11  As 
political and economic motives increasingly influenced the press publishers, their 
papers became ideologically motivated, the “carriers and leaders of public opinion” 
and “instruments in the arsenal of party politics”.12  Ever more publishers in Great 
Britain and the United States were moving from overt ideological positions to 
entrepreneurships dealing in advertisements during the nineteenth century.  The 
growth of newspaper advertisements coincided with the establishment of a 
bourgeois, constitutional state and the legalisation of the political, public sphere in 
the nineteenth century.  As publishers increasingly concentrated on commercial 
opportunities, they became “manipulable” and adversely affected by their 
companies’ advertising departments, according to Habermas.13
 
 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, large newspaper syndicates 
emerged, including those owned by William Randolph Hearst in the US and Lord 
Northcliffe in London.  These monopolistic press organisations led to the 
“homogenization of news services” as newspaper companies shared printing plates 
and used factories to produce their inserts.14  The dominance of advertising resulted 
in lower newspaper prices, the mass “penny press” and the “depoliticization” of 
editorial content.15  By the 1880s, literary journals were overshadowed by cheap, 
sensationalist and popular newspapers with yellow-coloured comics that were 
dubbed “yellow journalism”.  The techniques of the cartoon, news picture and 
human-interest story emerged from this genre of the weekly press, which “was as 
optically effective as it was undemanding on the literary level”.16
                                                            
11 Habermas, The public sphere, pp. 181, 183-184, 245-248. 
  At about the end 
12 Habermas, The public sphere, p. 182.  Indeed, Curtin himself worked as a journalist with 
precisely this form of newspaper, including The Westralian Worker, a labour movement 
publication. See “Personal papers of John Curtin family”, JCPML, Bentley, SER acc. no. 
0207, 1906-1988, retrieved on 5 July 2008 at 
<http://dtl.lis.curtin.edu.au/F/?func=direct&doc_number=000000525&current_base=era01w
eb>. 
13 Habermas, The public sphere, pp. 184-185. 
14 Habermas, The public sphere, pp. 186-187. 
15 Habermas, The public sphere, p. 169. 
16 Habermas, The public sphere, p. 168. 
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of the nineteenth century, the US form of mass press became dominant throughout 
the European continent and it was “designed predominantly to give the masses in 
general access to the public sphere”.17  Despite the prevalence of yellow journalism, 
traditional elites and social reformers criticised the popular news content for 
hampering “the ability of the public to engage in sustained or complex thought or 
deliberation”.18  Many people in the media profession, including John Curtin, sought 
to develop newspapers that would involve more readers in political discussions in the 
early twentieth century.19
The power of the press is greater than that of the Caesars of the school books, 
or the statesmen of our existing Legislatures.  It shapes and moulds the 
thought of millions, even as the potter shapes the clay spinning on his 
wheel.
  As editor of the The Westralian Worker, Curtin argued 
that the media might have a positive, informative and educational role.  He wrote in a 
1922 editorial:  
20
While working at his Perth newspaper office and through his involvement with the 
state’s AJA, he became part of a broader movement that had emerged in western 
societies at the turn of the twentieth century as journalists sought to improve their 
professional standing by founding press clubs, associations, codes of ethics, unions 
and also schools of journalism to teach students how to develop respected careers.
 
21
  
  
Curtin recognised the enormous opportunities offered by the media to influence mass 
opinions more than 20 years before he became the prime minister. 
                                                            
17 Habermas, The public sphere, pp. 169. 
18 Kevin G. Barnhurst and John Nerone, “Journalism History” [hereafter “Journalism 
history”], in Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (eds), The Handbook of 
Journalism Studies, Routledge, New York and Abingdon, 2009, pp. 20-21. 
19 During the latter years of the nineteenth century and the early half of the twentieth century, 
the following news publications began to be published to provide more analyses of current 
events: International Herald Tribune (1887); The Christian Science Monitor (1908); Time 
(1923); and Newsweek (1933). 
20 John Curtin, “The Editor Writes A Message”, The Westralian Worker, Perth, 17 March 
1922, retrieved on 8 October 2009 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/journalist/worker2.html>. 
21 Barnhurst and Nerone, “Journalism history”, p. 21. 
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With the rise of the relatively new media of the twentieth century – film, 
radio and television – politicians became increasingly interested in attempts “to sell 
politics” to public audiences.  Between the two world wars, public relations 
strategies were developed by some of the largest US enterprises.  The “opinion 
management” methods became useful to Roosevelt to ensure a “national consensus” 
when the US entered the war in December 1941; however, the techniques were not 
diffused widely outside that country until after the war.  As a result, the industry of 
market and opinion research became prevalent after the upheavals of World War II.  
According to Habermas, the cutting edge of the modern public sphere was in the US, 
where it was dominated by middle-class control and the consumption of the flow of 
cultural materials, such as popular films.  The mass media expanded their influence 
and changed the concept of the public sphere; increasingly distinctions were blurred 
between the private and public domains, Habermas wrote.22
 
  Journalism was 
transformed into powerful mass media monopolies that were deemed to shape public 
opinion. 
Although Habermas has pessimistically traced the decline of “rational-critical 
debate”23 and the rise of commercialised, profit-maximising mass media, other 
authors have written that the news may encourage audiences to participate in public 
life.24  This section will examine scholarly analyses of the public sphere to help this 
thesis to determine how communication was facilitated between the Curtin 
government and the media by formal and informal relationships.  While Habermas’ 
theoretical account became very influential among researchers, it has been subject to 
critical evaluation in media studies and political science fields.  The theory has been 
challenged for idealising the historical, bourgeois public sphere, which was 
dominated by wealthy men and excluded the participation of women and working 
people.25
                                                            
22 Habermas, The public sphere, pp. 181-216. 
  For example, the German film director, Alexander Kluge, and the 
philosopher and social theorist, Oskar Negt, discuss the possibilities of an 
23 Habermas, The public sphere, p. 184. 
24 John Hartley, Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity, Popular Culture [hereafter 
Popular reality], Arnold, London and New York, 1996, pp. 71, 72, 234; Ian Ward, “The 
Press, Television and the Public Sphere” [hereafter “The public sphere”], in Ian Ward (ed.), 
Politics of the media, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1995, p. 12. 
25 Ward, “The public sphere”, pp. 13-15. 
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“oppositional” public sphere, influenced by workers.26  Feminist literary theorist, 
Rita Felski, expands this concept of the public sphere to concentrate on women’s 
achievements in society.27  Other scholars, including James Curran, John Hartley and 
Ian Ward, object to Habermas’ view that the broadcast media have led to the 
corruption of society into depoliticised consumers.28
 
   
This rejection of the most pessimistic assumptions of the Frankfurt School of 
Marxist social theorists, such as Habermas,29 is highly significant.  Particularly 
communication and cultural studies have recognised the democratic, liberating 
function of modern popular culture.  For example, thousands of educated Iranian 
youths attracted global media attention for their “social networking” protest tactics to 
challenge the Islamic Republic’s fraudulent elections in June 2009.  They organised 
rallies through cell phone connections, emails and online video clips in their so-
called “Twitter Revolution”, as it was dubbed by international journalists.30
                                                            
26 Alexander Kluge, Thomas Y. Levin and Miriam B. Hansen, “On Film and the Public 
Sphere” [hereafter “On film and the public sphere”], New German Critique, no. 24/25, 
autumn 1981-winter 1982, pp. 206-220; Stuart Liebman, “On New German Cinema, Art, 
Enlightenment, and the Public Sphere: An Interview with Alexander Kluge” [hereafter “An 
interview with Alexander Kluge”], October, vol. 46, autumn 1988, p. 42; Dana Polan, “The 
Public’s Fear; Or, Media as Monster in Habermas, Negt, and Kluge” [hereafter “Media as 
monster”], in Bruce Robbins (ed.), The Phantom Public Sphere, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1993, pp. 33-41. 
  While in 
China, only eight per cent of citizens were considered to be internet users in 2006, 
more urban, young professional people, white-collar workers and students have been 
posting blogs to debate their nation’s public affairs within the confines of 
27 Rita Felski, Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change [hereafter 
Beyond feminist aesthetics], Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 164-182; 
Hartley, Popular reality, p. 68. 
28 James Curran, “Rethinking the media as a public sphere” [hereafter “Rethinking the 
media”], in Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks (eds), Communication and Citizenship: 
Journalism and the Public Sphere, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, pp. 42-43; 
Hartley, Popular reality, pp. 71, 72, 234; Ward, “The public sphere”, p. 15. 
29 Similarly pessimistic media theories were developed by Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School of philosophers.  See: Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Verso, London, 1944, pp. 120-67; Dorinda Outram, 
“The Enlightenment Our Contemporary”, in William Clark, Jan Golinski and Simon 
Schaffer (eds), The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London, 1999, pp. 32-40. 
30 Reza Afshari, “A Historic Moment in Iran”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 4, 
November 2009, pp. 839-855. 
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Communist Party censorship.31  Due to the rising wealth of many workers and the 
middle class at the turn of the twenty-first century, popular culture has allowed for 
the spreading of ideas that aid the establishment of participatory democracy.  In the 
light of Habermas’ conception of the public sphere, Chapters 6 to 9 will examine 
Curtin’s expansion of the Australian governments’ use of popular culture to 
communicate more frequently and openly with voters.32
 
  As it will be discussed in 
Chapter 10, Curtin set media precedents that assisted successive prime ministers to 
use the latest technology to speak directly with more diverse media audiences and 
involve them in political discussions. 
Despite influential critiques of Habermas’ particular conception of it, then, 
the concept of the public sphere remains pertinent to researchers, who reject the 
notion that the expanding electronic media have resulted in social alienation and 
disenfranchisement.  The electronic media, it is argued, can also provide more, not 
fewer, opportunities for people to engage in open, peaceful debates.  According to 
Ward, the concept of the public sphere “holds out the possibility of a universal, 
democratic and informed politics”.33  The media scholar, Michael Meadows, states 
this concept has become popular among Australian researchers, who use it as a 
theoretical approach to analyse the practice of journalism.34  Thus while more 
contemporary theorists35 reject the idealisation of a bourgeois, nineteenth-century 
“forum of rational-critical debate”,36 they reconceptualise the concept of a public 
sphere to evaluate citizens’ participation in public affairs.  This concept of a 
“universal, democratic and informed” public sphere37
                                                            
31 Rebecca Mackinnon, “Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civil 
discourse in China”, Public Choice, vol. 134, 2008, pp. 31-46. 
 is useful to this study’s 
evaluation of Curtin’s mass communication strategies to involve more citizens, 
including journalists, in governmental affairs. 
32 (Anon.), “Publicity: Relations with America: Australia Expands”, The Canberra Times, 
Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4; Curtin, “American relations”, pp. 13-14. 
33 Ward, “The public sphere”, p. 12. 
34 Rahkonen, “Mapping research”, p. 58. 
35 Curran, “Rethinking the media”, pp. 42-43; Felski, Beyond feminist aesthetics, pp. 164-
182; Hartley, Popular reality, pp. 68, 71, 72, 234; Kluge, Levin and Hansen, “On film and 
the public sphere”, pp. 206-220; Liebman, “An interview with Alexander Kluge”,  p. 42; 
Dana Polan, “Media as monster”, pp. 33-41; Ward, “The public sphere”, pp. 13-15. 
36 Habermas, The public sphere, p. 184. 
37 Ward, “The public sphere”, p. 12. 
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Hartley, for instance, extends this idea about active – not docile – audiences 
in a public sphere.  He affirms that news audiences can become active “citizens of 
media” and advocates “abandoning the habit of taking media producers to be 
monsters and consumers to be mice”.  Some media have contributed to more 
citizens’ involvement in contemporary ethnic, gender, environmental, youth and 
peace-seeking politics.38  For example, although the specific effects of news 
magazines on public discourse during the Vietnam War cannot be determined, 
millions of American readers subscribed to these media publications because they 
wanted more depth and perspective in the news of this conflict.39  In terms of the 
online media, the internet studies scholar, Michele Willson, states technologically 
aided communication has not destroyed the ideal of community, which is “associated 
with a valued sense of connection and belonging”.  Although Willson refers to being 
“uneasy about uncritically valorizing the so-called networked society”, she asserts 
“that community is not lost, rather that the ways in which we examine, understand 
and negotiate being-together need to change”.  It is important, she notes, to use 
innovative communications technology to avoid “the excluding and conforming 
practices of the past” and to prevent a community that is “repressive and 
conformist”.40
 
  Thus multiple truths and diverse knowledge are shaped in an active, 
inclusive and informative public sphere.   
This expansive concept of the public sphere, which encompasses the 
democratic, liberating function of popular culture and active, astute citizens of the 
media, assists our understanding of Curtin’s interactions with wartime 
correspondents.  As it will be argued in Chapter 3 and the ensuing chapters, Curtin 
extended the boundaries of the sphere in which a prime minister traditionally 
associated with journalists.  While his predecessor, Menzies, preferred to deal 
directly with news executives, Curtin engaged Canberra correspondents in two-way 
                                                            
38 Hartley, Popular reality, pp. 71, 72, 234. 
39 This specifically relates to the American subscribers of Newsweek, Time and U.S. News & 
World Report, which included increasingly critical and sceptical analyses of the Vietnam 
War policies by mid-1967.  See: James Landers, The weekly war: newsmagazines and 
Vietnam, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2004, pp. 3-5. 
40 Michele Willson, Technically Together: Rethinking Community within Techno-Society 
[hereafter Technically together], Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2006, pp. 1-3, 20. 
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public policy discussions in his private office.41  Furthermore, he sponsored 
advanced, broadcast media technology to communicate more frequently with 
Australian and international audiences.42  Through his development of new media 
strategies, he moved away from “the excluding and conforming practices of the 
past”43
 
 to encourage more citizens to participate in the public sphere. 
 
The social function of journalists 
If the modern public sphere is the arena in which politics and governance are played 
out, whom or what is the organising agency of public discourse?  The conceptual 
approach of this thesis is informed by insights into the news media’s “governmental” 
function and roles.  Journalists are responsible for interpreting matters of social 
governance to public audiences.  As they cultivate their news sources, or “contacts”, 
and search for current story ideas, reporters need to be active and key participants in 
governing society.44  This social function of the news assists us to gain a better 
understanding of Curtin’s relationships with the media.  As Steve Mickler notes, 
news is “manufactured” and the process involves “multiple and lengthy production 
lines”.  The main subjects of the news stories, including political leaders such as 
Curtin, institutions and organisations, often have critical roles in constructing news 
reports about themselves.45
 
   
Furthermore, journalists are the central agents in articulating society’s views, 
in producing authoritative meanings about world events through the lenses of their 
“preferences and prejudices”, shaped in daily newsrooms and at editorial meetings.  
                                                            
41 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
42 (Anon.), “Publicity: Relations with America: Australia Expands”, The Canberra Times, 
Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4; Curtin, “American relations”, pp. 13-14. 
43 Willson, Technically together, p. 2. 
44 Steve Mickler, The Myth of Privilege: Aboriginal Status, Media Visions, Public Ideas 
[hereafter The myth of privilege], Fremantle Arts Centre Press, South Fremantle, 1998, p. 14; 
Stephen Brent Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality: Image Campaigns and News Routines in 
the Western Australian Media [hereafter Visualising Aboriginality], PhD thesis, Murdoch 
University, Murdoch, 1996; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 356. 
45 Mickler, The myth of privilege, p. 14. 
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For Ericson et al, the most significant role adopted by journalists is to be “knowledge 
linkers” and “information brokers” between the government and public audiences.  
Reporters seek the views of official spokespeople46 and “engage in reproducing the 
knowledge of their sources”.47  Mickler, Ericson et al have written of the value of 
analysing the relationships and influences that contribute to the construction of news.  
“Studying the ways in which journalists make sense of the world is a significant 
means of achieving understanding of society”, Ericson et al write.48  Further, the 
news media influence every aspect of the public domain of contemporary society, 
consisting of the spheres of the economic, political, cultural and the 
representational.49  Ericson et al write that news reporters help to “shape the moral 
boundaries and contours of social order, providing an ongoing articulation of our 
sense of propriety and impropriety, stability and change, order and crises”.50  
Journalism works as a form of knowledge to make “the impression of truth” and to 
assist to maintain social order.51  This conception of news journalists as active 
participants in the manufacturing of news making challenges the traditional notion 
that the media merely present an objective “mirror” of reality.52
 
 
This theorisation of the function of journalism within an administered, 
information society expands upon an argument made by the historian and 
philosopher, Foucault, that social institutions produce discourses that shape people’s 
understanding and practices.53  As Mickler notes, following Ericson et al, “bad 
news” stories are an “inevitable focus” of this information society, whose public 
domain exists through mass communications.54
                                                            
46 Douglas M. McLeod and James K. Hertog, “The Manufacture of ‘Public Opinion’ by 
Reporters: Informal Cues for Public Perceptions of Protest Groups” [hereafter “The 
manufacture of public opinion”], Discourse & Society, vol. 3, no. 3, July 1992, p. 260. 
  Furthermore, “bad news” 
47 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 16; Mickler, Visualising 
Aboriginality, pp. 20-21. 
48 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 15. 
49 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 22. 
50 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 356. 
51 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 346; Hartley, Popular reality,  
p. 240. 
52 Tiffen, News, p. 4. 
53 Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, trans. A. Sheridan, Allen 
Lane Penguin Books, London, 1977; Willson, Technically together, p. 10. 
54 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 22. 
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commentaries are a characteristic of liberal democracies because of their “discourse 
of politics and failure”, which allow national leaders and aspiring candidates to 
campaign for “the need for more correction, repair, alteration, improvement, and 
resources”.55  The essence of the journalism method is “visualisation”, meaning news 
reporters are in the business of “making something visible to the mind even if it is 
not visible to the eye”.  Through the media’s intense focus on negative news, for 
example, the Axis enemies during World War II, journalists help to shape our 
cultural identity and our sense of that which is wrong or “deviations” in the world.56
 
 
Another social characteristic of the news media is that journalists are part of a 
“knowledge class”, who take or retain power by controlling knowledge, as described 
by John Frow, John Hartley and other scholars writing from a broad cultural studies 
perspective.57  These information workers include reporters, writers and other media 
professionals,58 who speak “for” others while controlling the institutions of cultural 
capital and social life.59  Although Frow’s 1995 analysis has been resisted by some 
Marxist and feminist sociologists, who do not recognise a separate, intellectual social 
class, his ideas are widely accepted as being relevant to cultural studies disciplines.60  
These approaches to the social function of the news61
                                                            
55 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, pp. 359-360. 
 will permit more insights into 
how Curtin worked with journalists to consolidate his leadership.  As it will be 
argued in the next chapter and ensuing chapters, he held highly interactive 
conferences to provide journalists with more responsibilities to interpret matters of 
governance to public audiences.  As a result, the reporters became active and key 
participants in governing society.  By elevating the role and status of these wartime 
correspondents, Curtin indeed seemed to view them as part of a “knowledge class”, 
56 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 356. 
57 John Frow, Cultural Studies & Cultural Value [hereafter Cultural studies], Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1995; Hartley, Popular reality, p. 241; Andrew Milner, 
Literature, culture and society [hereafter Literature], Routledge, London and New York, 
2004, pp. 37-41; Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity [hereafter Interdisciplinarity], Routledge, 
London and New York, 2002, pp. 75-81. 
58 Frow, Cultural studies, p. 90; Moran, Interdisciplinarity, p. 77. 
59 Frow, Cultural studies, pp. 164-165; Milner, Literature, pp. 34, 35-36. 
60 Moran, Interdisciplinarity, p. 77. 
61 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance; Michel Foucault, “Film and Popular 
Memory: An Interview with Michel Foucault”, trans. Martin Jordan, Radical Philosophy, 
vol. 11, summer 1975, pp. 24-29; Frow, Cultural studies. 
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who would work with him to galvanise public support for Australia’s battles against 
Axis enemies.62
 
 
It is useful here to consider Foucault’s concept of “the politics of truth” 
because wartime Canberra correspondents worked with the prime minister to imprint 
images of reality in the public consciousness.  This thesis will draw on this concept 
to demonstrate how news media processes produced official discourses that 
contributed to wartime societies’ “regimes of truth” about Curtin.63  As Foucault 
notes, truth is constructed as a genre and discourse.  Reporters are involved in the 
“general politics” of deciding the truth as they accept and reproduce types of 
communication.64  News coverage is affected by such factors as cultural values, 
financial constraints, technology and journalists’ access to information sources, 
particularly relating to politicians.65  Thus truth is subject to “immense diffusion and 
consumption” in diverse forms and it is disseminated by the “apparatuses of 
education and information”, including the mass media.66  This process is complex 
because the news is a “contested site”67 and “[t]here is a battle ‘for truth’, or at least 
‘around truth’”, Foucault writes.  Newsmakers and reporters are continuously 
negotiating which statements are true and false.  Journalists contribute to the “régime 
of truth” because they assist in producing and circulating media statements deemed 
“factual” by powerful, political elites.68
                                                            
62 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
  Informed by Foucault’s concept of “the 
politics of truth”, this thesis understands that the wartime Canberra correspondents 
were not objectively mirroring “universal values” when filing their reports; external 
and internal pressures affected their news selection. 
63 John L. McMullan, “News, Truth, and the Recognition of Corporate Crime” [hereafter 
“News”], Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, vol. 48, no. 6, October 
2006, pp. 905-939, retrieved on 23 July 2009 at 
<http://proquest.umi.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=07-22-
2014&FMT=7&DID=1180603141&RQT=309>; John L. McMullan and Melissa McClung, 
“The Media, the Politics of Truth, and the Coverage of Corporate Violence: The Westray 
Disaster and the Public Inquiry”, Critical Criminology, vol. 14, 2006, pp. 67, 71. 
64 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power” [hereafter “Truth and power”], trans. Colin Gordon, 
Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980, p. 
131. 
65 McMullan, “News”. 
66 Foucault, “Truth and power”, p. 131. 
67 McMullan, “News”. 
68 Foucault, “Truth and power”, pp. 132-133. 
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A number of scholars have developed Foucault’s concept of “the politics of 
truth” to analyse journalists’ production, ordering and distribution of the news in 
ways that uphold dominant views of the world.69  This “politics of truth” is related to 
Ericson et al’s model of the governmental function of news in an administered 
society.  According to both concepts, journalism is a part of government that sustains 
an overriding, political perception of reality.  Although many reporters purpose to be 
objective by using depictive, realism grammar,70 the media have the power to 
visualise and define deviations from moral and ethical principles of fairness, justice 
and decency.71  Foucault will be examined further because he has provided the most 
influential conception of governmental functions.72  The next sub-section will 
establish central features of his ideas on “governnmentality”.73  This broad term, 
“governmentality”, includes the construction of the news and the interrelated, social 
functions of the media, politicians, the public, government agencies and associated 
organisations.74
                                                            
69 For example, Hartley, Popular reality, p. 245 (and Hartley’s references to the intellectual 
tradition of “Foucauldianism”); McMullan, “News”; Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality. 
  Foucault focuses on “the art of government”, a subject that has 
intrigued political theorists since the posthumous publication of the Italian statesman 
70 Allen Feldman, “On Cultural Anesthesia: From Desert Storm to Rodney King”, in Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (eds), Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology, 
Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2003, p. 207. 
71 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 21. 
72 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault effect: studies in 
governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault [hereafter The 
Foucault effect], The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, p. ix; R. McGreggor 
Cawley and William Chaloupka, “American Governmentality: Michel Foucault and Public 
Administration” [hereafter “American governmentality”], American Behavioral Scientist, 
vol. 41, no. 1, September 1997, pp. 30-31. 
73 Foucault, “Governmentality”, p. 30; Michel Foucault, “Method”, in Louise Amoore (ed.), 
The Global Resistance Reader, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 86; Michel Foucault, Society 
Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, trans. David Macey, in 
Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana and François Ewald (eds), Penguin Books, London, 
2003, pp. 15-21; Foucault, “Truth and power”, p. 118. 
74 James Cracraft, “A Berlin For Historians”, History and Theory, vol. 41, October 2002, pp. 
277-279; Bruce Curtis, “Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible 
Discovery” [hereafter “Foucault”], Canadian Journal of Sociology, vol. 27, no. 4, fall 2002, 
p. 521; John Hartley, Understanding News [hereafter Understanding news], Metheun & Co., 
London and New York, 1982, p. 12; Mark Hearn, “Michel Foucault, Society Must Be 
Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76” (Michel Foucault), Labour History, 
no. 86, May 2004, p. 219; Philippe Marlière, “The Rules of the Journalistic Field: Pierre 
Bourdieu’s Contribution to the Sociology of the Media”, European Journal of 
Communication, vol. 13, no. 2, 1998, p. 223; Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein, “The 
Learning Society and Governmentality: An introduction” [hereafter “Governmentality”], 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, vol. 38, no. 4, 2006, p. 418. 
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and writer Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince.75  After Machiavelli, many political 
writers were not as concerned with sovereignty and “imposing laws on men”; their 
notion of government was conceived as “the right manner of disposing things so as 
to lead ... to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things which are to be 
governed”.76  Informed by this concept, the next chapters will examine Curtin’s “art 
of government” and his use of the media and popular culture to lead the democratic 
society of wartime Australia.77
 
 
According to Foucault, western liberal governments (such as Curtin’s 
administration) have used modern technologies to promote self-government and 
manage the nation state.78  While Foucault’s model of power has directly influenced 
the development of Ericson et al’s model of the governmental function of news in an 
administered society, he mainly focuses on past forms of government and does not 
provide many detailed analyses of more contemporary political developments.79
 
  Yet 
the notion of governmentality, encompassing political newsmakers and journalists, 
provides a theoretical framework to examine the practice of liberal democracy.  This 
concept of governmentality is useful to analyse the relations between Curtin and the 
press gallery as part of the central research question of this thesis.  Foucault’s theory 
helps us to understand the historical functions of governed societies, such as wartime 
Australia, that have produced a citizenry with optimal capacities, a sense of self-
government and an inclination towards self-discipline.   
This thesis intends to demonstrate that Curtin viewed journalists as a crucial 
part of his governance.  This relationship is aptly described by Ericson et al’s 
observation that reporters are “knowledge linkers” and “information brokers” 
                                                            
75 Foucault, “Governmentality”, pp. 88-89, 90; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, transl. Peter 
Bondanella and Mark Musa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. 
76 Foucault, “Governmentality”, p. 95. 
77 Foucault, “Governmentality”, pp. 95-97; Curtis, “Foucault”, p. 521. 
78 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self”, in L.H. Martin, H. Gutman and P.H. Hutton 
(eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Tavistock Publications, 
London, 1988, p. 18. 
79 Foucault, “Governmentality”, pp. 87-104; Simons and Masschelein, “Governmentality”, p. 
419. 
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between governments and public audiences.80  These theoretical approaches assist us 
to understand the relationships of power and consensus between governments and the 
media much better than simplistic concepts of them as constituting separate, 
autonomous entities.  As it will be discussed later, Curtin was able to work 
successfully with Canberra correspondents because he treated them as colleagues 
rather than replicating Menzies’ authoritarian communications system.81
 
  The next 
section considers how liberal democratic administrations, like John Curtin’s, use the 
news media as a critical part of their governance. 
 
How do liberal-democratic governments govern? 
An understanding of Curtin’s governance, communication methods and media 
strategies is informed by Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism theories.  More specifically, 
Berlin’s theories are informative to the discussion of Curtin’s rhetorical devices from 
Chapters 6 to 9.  One of the most distinguished representatives of the liberal 
tradition, Berlin wrote about US politics and public opinion for the wartime British 
Government and his weekly reports were sent to Churchill.  As a liberal, he was 
aligned with the eighteenth century European Enlightenment tradition and its 
philosophical focus on human reason.  An understanding of liberty, or freedom, is 
central to human being and human agency in politics, according to Berlin.82  He 
declares: “The values of the Enlightenment ... are deeply sympathetic to me”.83  To 
Berlin, all individuals possess human dignity, inviolable rights, minimal freedoms 
that must not become subject to government abuse.  “Acceptance of common values 
(at any rate some irreducible minimum of these) enters our conception of a normal 
human being,” he writes.84
                                                            
80 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 16; Mickler, Visualising 
Aboriginality, pp. 20-21. 
  These individual rights, including liberty, equality, 
justice and courage, constitute a “central core” of values shared by all people.  As 
William A. Galston states, it may not be possible to identify the summum bonum, or 
81 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
82 William A. Galston, “Moral Pluralism and Liberal Democracy: Isaiah Berlin’s Heterodox 
Liberalism” [hereafter “Moral pluralism”], The Review of Politics, vol. 71, 2009, pp. 85, 88. 
83 George Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 
98. 
84 Berlin, Liberty, p. xxxi. 
Chapter 2   Media and cultural conceptual approaches 
72 
 
a universally accepted, supreme good, but it is realistic to specify the summum 
malum, or the great evils of the human condition.85  Curtin would appeal to such 
values in his film and radio broadcasts to inspire Australians to fight fascist Axis 
enemies.86
 
 
Curtin’s media policies manifested elements of both the negative and positive 
conceptions of liberty, as defined by Berlin.  Curtin appealed to ideals of liberty 
when persuading journalists, and all Australian citizens, to accept his conscription 
policies, and this will be discussed further in Chapter 7.  How Curtin used the 
rhetoric of liberty in his press statements, radio broadcasts and newsreels to engage 
media producers’ consensus to omit negative statements and amplify his language to 
public audiences, is evaluated in Chapters 6 to 9.87
 
 
 
How democratic politicians generate positive news on their administrations 
When commenting on how governments use the media, Ericson et al note that 
“[p]owerful sources” (those people providing information) may develop strategies to 
“avoid and make news”.88  Since journalists “are a part of a system of politics”, they 
are “perpetually referring and deferring to the valued facts of authorized knowers in 
bureaucratic settings”.89  Through this type of political discourse, reporters articulate 
politicians’ views and media audiences perceive the world through “the eyes of the 
existing authority structure”.90
                                                            
85 Galston, “Moral pluralism”, pp. 96-97. 
  As Foucault states, western liberal governments can 
master advanced technology, including media, to enable the effective management of 
a nation.  Also any analysis of media power must refer to the political economy of 
86 For example, Cinesound Productions and Cinesound Review (producers), Compiled 
speeches of John Curtin, 1941 – 1945 (newsreels) [hereafter Compiled speeches), JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00130/1, 1941-1945; John Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime 
Minister” [hereafter “National broadcast”], DDA, no. 10, 8 December 1941, pp. 19-22; John 
Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United States” [hereafter “US radio broadcast”], DDA, no. 
22, 14 March 1942, pp. 9-13. 
87 For example, Cinesound Productions and Cinesound Review (producers), Compiled 
speeches; Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22; Curtin, “US radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
88 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 364. 
89 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 359. 
90 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 359. 
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the mass media, according to politics scholar, John Street.  Since it is evident the 
media have power, Street writes, then the important questions become: who gets to 
benefit from it and who has access to media power?91  The political economy 
approach can provide answers to these questions by focusing on the production and 
distribution of news content, the patterns of media ownership and control, as well as 
the links between the news institutions and the capitalist structure.92  To understand 
media power, it has been necessary to study the wider historical, political economic 
context of a news organisation’s development93 and the ways in which this control is 
mediated.94  This approach is particularly relevant in Australia because of the 
nation’s concentrated media ownership95 and the historically close links between 
news proprietors and the nation’s leading Labor and Liberal politicians.96
 
  
For example, sociologist Scott Fitzgerald analyses news corporations’ 
development within the field of critical political economy and identifies broad 
categories of state intervention in the media.97
                                                            
91 Street, Mass media, p. 99. 
  Since World War I, for instance, the 
development of radio has been subject to government regulations in western 
industrialised countries, including Australia, to increase its commercial efficacy.  In 
accordance with public service and public utility philosophies, unrestrained 
competitive media enterprises are not consistent with the common interest.  
Governments have enacted political initiatives to ensure a plurality of media 
92 John Sinclair, “The media and communications: Theoretical traditions” [hereafter 
“Theoretical traditions”], in Stuart Cunningham and Graeme Turner (eds), The Media and 
Communications in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, first edition, 2002, pp. 24-29. 
93 Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries, p. 120. 
94 Street, Mass media, p. 143. 
95 David Denemark, “Mass Media And Media Power In Australia”, in Shaun Wilson, 
Gabrielle Meagher, Rachel Gibson, David Denemark and Mark Western (eds), Australian 
Social Attitudes: The First Report, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2005, p. 
220; Rahkonen, “Mapping research”, pp. 58-60; Sinclair, “Theoretical traditions”, pp. 24-29; 
Christopher Warren, “The Price Of Freedom: New Media Ownership Laws And A Free 
Australian Press”, University of New South Wales Law Journal, vol. 30, no. 1, 2007, pp. 269-
270. 
96 For example, Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries, pp. 350, 357; Bridget 
Griffen-Foley, The house of Packer: the making of a media empire, Allen & Unwin, St 
Leonards, 1999, p. 123; Neville Petersen, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, & Politics 
1932-1947 [hereafter News not views], Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1993, pp. 163-166; R.M. 
Younger, Keith Murdoch: Founder of a media empire, HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 
2003, pp. 151-152. 
97 Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries, pp. 3, 117-118, 358. 
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voices.98  European broadcasting stations and telecommunications have operated 
historically as public utilities, funded by taxation, to provide all citizens with 
universal access to primary communications networks and encourage programs that 
promote information, “culture” and entertainment.  In the US, the dominant strategy 
has been to regulate commercial and cultural sectors to ameliorate the harmful 
influence of capitalist competition.99  In accordance with the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission Act 1932, the ABC radio was officially subsidised and 
subject to government influence.100  Almost eight decades later, Australian 
government regulators require radio and television corporations to produce balanced, 
impartial and accurate news; however, critics say commercial influences still 
adversely affect fair broadcasting.101  This requirement is an artefact of the 
Australian Constitution,102 with section 51 giving legislative authority to the 
Commonwealth Government over only the electronic media and not the older press 
organisations.103
 
  Within this framework of national cultural regulation, this study 
examines Curtin’s objectives and strategies to use radio and film media to 
communicate his wartime goals. 
This consideration of liberal democratic governments’ use of the media 
returns to Foucault’s notion of governmentality and the social function of journalism 
set out by Ericson et al.  The news media derive legitimacy from governmental, 
political and legal authorities.  Reporters constantly use the “rhetorics, personalities, 
methods and press releases” of the elected establishment.  Through such 
interdependent, mutually beneficial relationships, news reporting can be shown as 
“impartial” to public audiences.104
 
  As Ericson et al write: 
 
                                                            
98 Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries, pp. 116-120. 
99 Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries, pp. 120-121. 
100 Petersen, News not views, p. 38. 
101 Joseph Fernandez, Media Law Handbook, Network Books, Australia Research Institute, 
Perth, fifth edition, 2007, pp. 209-211. 
102 Ward, “The public sphere”, p. 6. 
103 Office of Legislative Drafting, Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act (The Constitution), Canberra, 1 July 2001, section 51, p. 28. 
104 Hartley, Popular reality, p. 241. 
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By giving such predominant attention to the law and legal authorities, the 
news media can go a long way towards making convincing the image that 
they are an objective, impartial, universal and general voice of the people.105
Their mutual association helps journalists to be seen as objective and assists 
governments to publish their perspectives in the mass media, to retain power and to 
direct society.  Thus a political leader may set media agendas by working with 
journalists to outline his or her vision to public audiences, and it is the assertion of 
this thesis that Curtin fulfilled this role of a successful leader in the wartime news 
media. 
 
 
Contemporary communications studies traditionally focus on how wars are 
propagandised by the mass media, a legacy of the global conflicts.  Journalism 
scholar, Allen Feldman, notes the largely untheorised relationship between war and 
media technology that account for a lack of explanations about how modern, global 
conflicts generate new visual cultures, new news networks, new modes of witnessing 
and archiving the traumatic.106  This thesis examines the relations between the 
wartime news media and political leaders, a research area that has been far less 
studied than the related issue of journalists’ impact on public opinion.107
 
 
 
Processes of political news making 
To comprehend fully the extent of Curtin’s media associations, the thesis analyses 
the news as the product of institutional demands, processes, and structures rather 
than being solely personality-driven.108
                                                            
105 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 53. 
  Although Canberra wartime correspondents 
were responsible for producing the “extraordinary, the sensational, the campaign-
style treatments” of the day’s leading news, they were able to generate such stories 
106 Allen Feldman, “War and Media Theory” (syllabus), Department of Media, Culture and 
Communication, New York University, New York, 2009. 
107 Peter Van Aelst, Kees Brants, Philip Van Praag, Claes De Vreese, “The Fourth Estate as 
Superpower? An Empirical Study on Perceptions of Media Power in Belgium and the 
Netherlands”, International Communication Association, Montreal, 21 May 2008, p. 1, 
retrieved on 7 February 2009 at <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p231966_index.html>. 
108 Street, Mass media, p. 143; Tiffen, News, p. 3. 
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only by developing the “routine relationship between journalists and sources”.109  As 
Street writes: “Media power is the product of political decisions, values and 
processes”.110  To produce irregular, unpredictable, news commodities, media 
organisations have established institutionalised routines, predictable, productive 
means for gathering information, and shared conventions about newsworthiness and 
presentation.  Rodney Tiffen notes this view of journalism is known as the news 
making approach, news as a structured activity.111  Due to his journalism 
background, Curtin used his knowledge of reporting routines, including news 
deadlines, conferences and “off-the-record” confidentiality agreements, to develop 
journalism strategies.112  Other significant news characteristics influence audience 
perceptions of reality.  For instance, the news is also shaped by media competition, 
budgets and space limitations.113
 
  Informed by the news making approach, Chapters 
3 and 5 investigate Curtin’s use of established reporting procedures to help 
strengthen his relationships with the press gallery. 
As the war led to a greater concentration of Commonwealth Government 
powers at the expense of state legislatures, the Canberra press gallery was expanded 
to report on federal parliamentarians’ increased initiatives.  The gallery now 
accommodates a higher concentration of writers, broadcasters, camera operators, 
photographers and other journalist teams than anywhere else in the nation.  “Greater 
size can help a gallery reach a ‘critical mass’ which gives it more impact, and makes 
it more likely politicians will respond to stories rather than ignore them”, Tiffen 
writes.114
                                                            
109 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 16. 
  If the parliamentarians are seeking to influence the news directly, they will 
be in a stronger position if they are a “patron” sponsoring an important story rather 
than a “petitioner” asking for publicity.  Their efforts will be more effective if they 
are trying to promote and prolong good news instead of defusing negative news 
about themselves.  The parliamentarians’ success will also depend upon whether and 
110 Street, Mass media, p. 144. 
111 Tiffen, News, pp. 3, 4, 155-158. 
112 C.J. Lloyd, Parliament And The Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 1901-
88 [hereafter Parliament and the press], Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988, pp. 125-
157; Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s war [hereafter 
Backroom briefings], National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], Canberra, 1997. 
113 Tiffen, News, pp. 4, 25, 50. 
114 Tiffen, News, p. 36. 
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how the news attention is impinging upon the political conflicts in which they are 
engaged.115  While it is crucial to examine the parliamentarians’ media interactions 
in an analysis of federal political journalism, it is also important to trace the 
development of technologies that have altered the tone and nature of these 
relationships.  Australian political news coverage has changed in response to 
technical developments, according to Tiffen.116
 
  For the purpose of achieving a more 
comprehensive analysis of the Australian media during Curtin’s prime ministership, 
this thesis will examine the processes of news making, including their organisational 
attributes, news characteristics, source structures, technological developments and 
the dissemination of information to audiences. 
 
The semiotics of news  
In an analysis of news media content, it is important to study texts (including written, 
audio and visual formats) not only as accurate documents of real events, but as 
“works of imaginative reconstruction ... intended to produce responses and feelings 
in viewers and readers”.117  The study of semiotics emphasises images, impressions 
and the “science of signs” as much as the written and spoken words.  Semiotic 
methods of analyses will be used in the evaluation of Curtin’s media image, as 
shown in relevant photographs, editorial cartoons and newsreels.  Anders Hansen et 
al write that in scholarly media analyses, “[v]isuals are all too often taken at face-
value and simply assumed to ‘reflect’ or ‘mirror’ the events and people captured on 
film”.118
 
   
This qualitative approach will be grounded in linguistic theories about signs 
and language as developed by de Saussure and Berger.  According to de Saussure, a 
                                                            
115 Tiffen, News, pp. 31-34, 36-37, 51, 65. 
116 Tiffen, News, p. 25. 
117 Street, Mass media, p. 35. 
118 Anders Hansen, Simon Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris Newbold, Mass Communication 
Research Methods [hereafter Mass communication], Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1998, p. 190. 
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sign is composed of a “signifier” (the quasi-material form) and the “signified” (the 
mental concept represented by the sign).  The signifiers bring the world into meaning 
and produce “reality effects” for those interpreting the signifiers.119  For example, in 
a wartime 1940s newsreel, a scene of Churchill looking down at the camera (the 
signifier), would convey power and authority (the signified), according to Berger’s 
semiotic film conventions.120  If the signifier is a political leader gazing up at the 
camera, the signified represents a small, weak and forgettable person.  This study 
includes an analysis of visual imagery, based on Berger’s semiotic film conventions 
(see Appendix 4).121
 
 
Along with media images, “(n)ews is a representation of the world in 
language”, as the literature and linguistics scholar, Roger Fowler, writes.  Systems of 
signs are structured into codes – the principal code is language – and they acquire 
meaning.  As a semiotic code, language “imposes a structure of values, that are social 
and economic in origin, on whatever is represented”, Fowler explains.122  Newspaper 
colloquialisms, incomplete sentences, written questions and varied typography in a 
press article suggest the journalist’s biases, emphases and his or her attempt to mimic 
a speaking voice.123  As cultural studies theorists, Stuart Hall et al, write, each 
newspaper reflects a distinctive “public idiom”, which is the publication’s own 
version of the language of its public audience, the readers to whom the editorial 
content is principally addressed.124
 
  A limited content analysis, conducted from 
Chapters 6 to 9, will analyse the language used in news reporting of Curtin to sustain 
dominant political views of reality. 
                                                            
119 Roland Barthes, Mythologies; de Saussure, General linguistics; Foucault, “Discourse”, 
pp. 7-30; Lucy and Mickler, The war on democracy, pp. 21-22, 26. 
120 Street, Mass media, p. 27. 
121 Berger, Media, pp. 38-39; Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, Mass communication, 
p. 207. 
122 Roger Fowler, Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press [hereafter 
Language in the news], Routledge, London and New York, 1991, p. 4. 
123 Fowler, Language in the news, pp. 4, 39. 
124 Fowler, Language in the news, p. 40; Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John 
Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order, The 
Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1981, p. 61. 
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News values 
Another key component in the analysis of the wartime media representations of John 
Curtin is understanding how stories are considered to be newsworthy.  Journalists 
construct news, facts and reality, as discussed earlier; this process is shaped by their 
professional values.125  As Ericson notes, a tone of factuality is produced by media 
communication practices, which blur distinctions among facts, value, information 
and knowledge.126
Communication does not stand apart from reality.  There is not, first, reality 
and then, second, communication about it.  Communication participates in the 
formation and change of reality.
  He writes: 
127
Galtung and Ruge developed a list of twelve factors they deemed important to news 
editors.  Their “working hypotheses” are accompanied by their warning: “No claim is 
made for completeness in the list of factors or ‘deductions’”.
 
128  Other media 
scholars have further developed Galtung and Ruge’s taxonomy, including more 
mundane, day-to-day events.129
 
  This will inform the gleaning of insights into the 
operation of professional news values to the way that wartime journalists and editors 
represented John Curtin. 
“Frequency” is the first important factor that determines a story’s 
newsworthiness, according to Galtung and Ruge.  If a news journalist is searching for 
                                                            
125 Peter L.M. Vasterman, “Media-Hype: Self-Reinforcing News Waves, Journalistic 
Standards and the Construction of Social Problems”, European Journal of Communication, 
vol. 20, no. 4, 2005, pp. 508-530. 
126 Richard V. Ericson, “How Journalists Visualize Fact” [hereafter “Journalists”], The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 560, November 
1998, p. 83. 
127 Ericson, “Journalists”, p. 84. 
128 Galtung and Ruge developed their list of news values after examining 1,262 press cuttings 
in Norwegian newspapers that concerned three international events: the political crises in the 
Congo and Cuba in 1960, and Cyprus in 1964. See: Galtung and Ruge, “Foreign news”, pp. 
64-91. 
129 For example, Tony Harcup and Deidre O’Neill, “What is News? Galtung and Ruge 
revisited” [hereafter “News”], Journalism Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 2001, pp. 261-262, 265; 
Jeremy Tunstall, Journalists at work [hereafter Journalists], Constable, London, 1971, p. 21. 
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a story, he or she is more likely to publish a recent, significant, local event than to 
report on a long-term social trend.  Secondly “threshold” influences the media; the 
event with a greater intensity produces a higher impact on news producers.  A story 
is deemed to be more valuable if it imparts “unambiguity”; that it is about an 
uncomplicated event not easily lending itself to multiple interpretations.  
“Meaningfulness” is the fourth value; a story needs to be relevant to an audience’s 
nationality, ethnicity and cultural background.  Fifth, a news editor may foreshadow 
or desire an event to occur and then find a story that is in “consonance” with his or 
her prediction.  A rare event is likely to be published due to its “unexpectedness”; 
while “continuity” is the seventh news value because a headline is often repeated 
when it is familiar and accessible to audiences.  Due to the media’s spotlight on the 
powerful, they tend to describe “elite nations” – this term can be defined according to 
political, economic and cultural factors – and “elite people” with whom audiences 
can identify.  Editors prefer human interest stories with a “reference to persons” 
rather than impersonal, anonymous and esoteric depictions of social forces.  Lastly 
“negative news” can be viewed as unambiguous, unexpected, not long-lasting and 
this is the twelfth value listed by Galtung and Ruge.  In the light of this taxonomy, it 
is tenable that the Canberra wartime correspondents would prefer to report on a story 
about a political leader, such as Curtin, if the news item met the following criteria: it 
is relevant and may produce a large impact on national audiences; it is communicated 
clearly; it can be personalised; and it focuses on shocking, negative news such as 
global military battles.130
 
 
Scholars have expanded the Galtung and Ruge catalogue of news values.  For 
example, similarly to Ericson et al, Douglas M. McLeod and James K. Hertog have 
discussed journalists’ tendency to seek the “unusual” and characterise this as being 
“deviant” from the mainstream.131  Further, Jeremy Tunstall,132 Tony Harcup and 
Deidre O’Neill,133
                                                            
130 Galtung and Ruge, “Foreign news”, pp. 65-71; Harcup and O’Neill, “News”, pp. 262-264. 
 concur that journalists often respond to strong visual elements 
because a news editor may decide to publish a “non-newsworthy”, whimsical and 
trivial story when it includes an image of a dramatic event, humorous incident or 
131 McLeod and Hertog, “The manufacture of public opinion”, p. 260. 
132 Tunstall, Journalists, p. 21. 
133 Harcup and O’Neill, “News”, p. 265. 
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glamorous celebrity.  Hall emphasises the role of ideology in the formation of news 
values134 while Denis McQuail notes it is important to focus on political and 
economic factors too.135  In their analysis, Harcup and O’Neill note that the terms, 
“threshold”, “unambiguity” and “negative news”, are highly subjective because they 
are open to different interpretations by editors.136  After their study of UK 
newspapers, Harcup and O’Neill concluded that newsworthy stories must focus on 
one or more of the following requirements: power elites; celebrities; entertainment; 
an element of surprise; particularly negative overtones; remarkably good news; a 
magnitude of people and impact; and a follow-up story.137  Other significant news 
values have been identified by Mickler, Ericson et al.138  They write journalists spend 
a great deal of time to visualise and define “deviance” from “moral and ethical 
principles of fairness, justice and decency”.139  In wartime Australia, the deepest 
“deviance” was personified by Nazi and other fascist supporters.  Furthermore, news 
organisations focus on the “media events” of celebrations, coronations and 
conquests, as described by the journalism analysts, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz.  
The rhetoric of media events emphasises great individuals and apocalyptic events, 
including heroic missions and political contests, to enlist mass support.140
 
  These 
definitions of news values will be very useful in determining whether Curtin was 
able to magnify journalists’ reports about him and enlist their support in helping him 
to govern. 
 
  
                                                            
134 Stuart Hall, “The determinations of news photographs” [hereafter “News photographs”], 
in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds), The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social 
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Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oakes and New Delhi, 1994, p. 271. 
136 Harcup and O’Neill, “News”, pp. 268-269. 
137 Harcup and O’Neill analysed 1,276 page lead stories in every issue of The Sun, Daily 
Telegraph and Daily Mail in March 1999.  See: Harcup and O’Neill, “News”, pp. 277, 279. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the theories and concepts that assist with explaining the 
complex associations and interdependence of news journalists, political leaders and 
their governments.  A theoretical and conceptual framework has been developed for 
this study of media and politics.  First, it has been useful to elucidate Habermas’ 
notion of the public sphere in which government leaders, the news media and public 
audiences interact with one another.141  While Habermas’ public sphere is criticised 
as being too limited, scholars have expanded this concept to include the democratic, 
liberating function of popular culture, diverse audiences and multiple perspectives.142  
This concept will be particularly relevant when analysing Curtin’s use of popular 
culture to attract broad public support for his wartime strategies.  Moreover, the 
insights of Ericson et al will underlie this thesis’ main assertions, particularly their 
theorisation of the function of journalism within an administered, information 
society.  As they note, the news media are a part of government that assist in 
constructing, ordering and distributing information to audiences.143  Journalists are 
also members of a “knowledge class”,144 who take or retain power through their 
close links with political newsmakers to influence the public’s awareness of facts.  
Ericson et al’s concept draws upon Foucault’s writings.  According to Foucault, truth 
has been produced as a genre and discourse by “governmentality”.  As discussed 
earlier, governmentality encompasses journalism institutions, procedures, analyses, 
reflections, calculations and tactics that allow for the use of “this very specific albeit 
complex form of power”.145
                                                            
141 Habermas, The public sphere. 
  This power is applied to the distribution and shaping of 
public knowledge, including reports published in the media.  Governmentality is the 
linking factor among journalists, politicians, public audiences, government agencies 
and associated organisations.  These ideas of the public sphere and the governmental 
function of news in an administered society will be applied later in the analysis of the 
role and effect of Curtin’s mass media strategies in his wartime governance of the 
country. 
142 Curran, “Rethinking the media”, pp. 42-43; Hartley, Popular reality, pp. 71, 72, 234; 
Ward, “The public sphere”, p. 12. 
143 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 346; Hartley, Popular reality,  
p. 240; Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 20. 
144 Frow, Cultural studies, pp. 119-30; Hartley, Popular reality, p. 241; Milner, Literature, 
pp. 37-41; Moran, Interdisciplinarity, pp. 75-81. 
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Furthermore, Isaiah Berlin’s conceptions of liberty inform this thesis’ 
discussions of Curtin’s vision of democracy that he forcefully projected in wartime 
press articles, film appearances and radio broadcasts.  Curtin inherited the ideals of 
the European Enlightenment movement with its emphasis on human reason and a 
responsible government free from public coercion.146  These ideas will be explored 
further in Chapter 7 during the discussion of Curtin’s journalism strategies to elicit 
public support for the extension of compulsory military service to more young men 
in 1943.  This thesis asserts that Curtin’s democratic liberalism, as exemplified in his 
mass media strategies,147
 
 created a powerful legacy for Australian leaders. 
Other conceptual approaches and analytical tools have been considered in this 
chapter and they relate to political economy, agenda-setting and semiotics.  Through 
the political economy approach, it is possible to understand media power by 
identifying patterns of ownership and control of news organisations, as well as the 
links among them, political leaders and government structures.148  This approach will 
be taken later in this thesis when analysing powerful wartime news organisations and 
the media strategies of Allied leaders in Australia, Britain, Canada and the US.  
Another relevant conceptual tool is agenda-setting, referring to the extent to which 
news organisations prioritise news stories, shape public knowledge and influence 
politicians.149  A semiotic analysis of relevant films, photographs, radio broadcasts 
and press articles150
  
 will be conducted to ascertain whether Curtin was generally 
portrayed as a forceful leader.   
                                                            
146 Berlin, Freedom and its betrayal; Liberty; The proper study of mankind; John Curtin, 
“Duty With Press”, DDA, no. 81, 19 April 1944, p. 46. 
147 For example, Cinesound Productions and Cinesound Review, Compiled speeches; Curtin, 
“National broadcast”, pp. 19-22; Curtin, “US radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
148 Fitzgerald, Corporations and cultural industries, p. 120; Sinclair, “Theoretical traditions”, 
pp. 24-29; Street, Mass media, p. 99. 
149 Street, Mass media, p. 99; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 53. 
150 Berger, Media, pp. 26-27; Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, Mass communication, 
p. 207. 
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Lastly, this chapter has evaluated theories and concepts pertaining to news 
processes – particularly those of Tiffen151 and Ericson152 – as well as to journalistic 
values, as elucidated by Galtung and Ruge.153  To be successful media strategists, 
political leaders should be familiar with news making processes and “the mundane 
milieu in which news stories and commentaries are created and circulate”.154  These 
work practices include the development of the “routine relationship between 
journalists and their sources – sources that are mainly expert, bureaucratic and 
political”,155 as well as the use of the latest media technology.  Politicians need to 
release timely information that coincides with media deadlines.  The Canberra 
Parliamentary Press Gallery, from 1941 to 2010, provides a unique venue to analyse 
news making processes because of the increasing concentration of journalists and the 
diverse number of sources, ranging from ministers to opposition backbenchers.  
These politicians will be more successful in publicising their main messages if they 
are trying to promote and prolong good news, rather than seeking to defuse negative 
reports about themselves.  Their stature is elevated further in the public domain if 
they are able to generate positive feedback from their audiences that can be published 
in a variety of media formats and that can influence news editors.156  To provide us 
with the components constituting a newsworthy article, Galtung, Ruge and other 
scholars have described the news values that permeate newsrooms and journalistic 
culture.  Scholars concur the media are predisposed to negative news, such as foreign 
enemies, and eye-catching visual images, particularly if the reports are given 
legitimacy by authoritative sources.157
  
 
                                                            
151 Tiffen, News, pp. 3, 4, 155-158. 
152 Ericson, “Journalists”, pp. 83-95. 
153 Galtung and Ruge, “Foreign news”, pp. 64-91. 
154 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 20. 
155 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 20. 
156 Tiffen, News, pp. 31-34, 36-37, 51, 65. 
157 For example, Ericson, “Journalists”, pp. 83-95; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing 
deviance, pp. 139-178; Galtung and Ruge, “Foreign news”, pp. 64-91; Hall, “News 
photographs”,  
p. 182; Hartley, Understanding news, pp. 75-81; Harcup and O’Neill, “News”, pp. 261-280; 
McQuail, Mass communication theory, p. 271; Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, 
particularly pp. 22-28; Tunstall, Journalists, p. 21. 
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Thus conceptual approaches and tools of media-government relations enable 
insights into how successful political leaders may marshal journalists and news 
coverage to ensure their definition of issues and national priorities prevail, along with 
declared consent and re-electability.  The next chapter begins to focus closely on 
Curtin’s interactions with the mass media.  To evaluate the successes of his 
journalism strategies, Chapter 3 examines the historical context of Australia’s 
emerging mass media leading to the war and especially the news making policies 
developed by Curtin’s predecessor, Menzies, from 1939 to 1941. 
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Chapter 3 
The changing context of the Australian press, film and radio professions, 
1831-1945 
 
 
This chapter begins with a historical examination of the major social, political, 
technological and economic conditions that shaped the development of the principal 
metropolitan newspapers in Australia.  Since the establishment of most Australian 
capital city dailies in the nineteenth century, the press publishers had actively 
intervened in politics and they were sometimes elected to be parliamentarians.  To 
investigate further the interlinked layers of governmental politics, media 
organisations and public audiences, the first section will analyse the impact of these 
mutual influences on the main city newspaper organisations throughout the nation.  
This examination will enable a comparison to be made later between the pre-war and 
wartime press in such areas as their relations with political leaders, editorial policies, 
target audiences, as well as their selection and presentation of the news.  Secondly, 
for the purpose of making this comparison, the chapter will analyse the intricate 
news interactions developed by Curtin’s conservative rival and prime ministerial 
predecessor, Menzies, who governed from 26 April 1939 to 29 August 1941.  
Menzies’ difficult, multifaceted and intense relationships with the press gallery1 
contrasted remarkably with the positive reception by journalists of Curtin as a new 
Labor prime minister.2
                                                            
1 E.g. Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling and the professionalization of public 
relations: Keith Murdoch, Robert Menzies, and the Liberal Party of Australia” [hereafter 
“Political opinion polling”], Australian Journalism Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2002, pp. 42-45; 
C.J. Lloyd, Parliament And The Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 1901-88 
[hereafter Parliament and the press], Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988, pp. 125-
130. 
  The third section will ascertain the extent of Curtin’s 
influence on the practices of the wartime Australian mass media, focusing on the 
2 The appointment of Curtin as the prime minister was welcomed by such newspapers as The 
Canberra Times, The Herald (Melbourne), The Sun (Sydney) and The West Australian.  
(Anon.), “The New Ministry”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 7 October 1941, p.2; 
Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], John Curtin 
Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, no. 1, JCPML acc. no. 00297/1, 7 
October 1941. 
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mainstream, city newspapers, film industries and radio stations.  To set about 
answering the research question – “How successful was Curtin in persuading the 
predominantly conservative news media to promote his wartime views?” – this 
chapter identifies the political attitudes and ideas conveyed by the Australian press 
publishers, prominent journalists and other media professionals, who influenced 
public perceptions of this prime minister.  They were responsible for interpreting his 
military strategies for audiences, framing his film appearances and reporting on his 
radio talks.  This study uses rarely researched primary sources to show that the news 
media manifested a growing plurality of voices that were broadly supportive of 
Curtin’s strategies to create a more independent, assertive Australian identity. 
 
 
Politics of the press, 1831-1939 
With the exception of The Canberra Times, all of Australia’s capital city dailies were 
established in the nineteenth century.3  Although all of these newspapers were 
products of their varied, local histories, the major metropolitan press often adhered to 
conservative formats and sometimes proprietors resisted innovations in layouts until 
the transformative 1940s.  Political cartoons, for example, were a feature of some 
newspapers for more than 150 years;4 but at The Sydney Morning Herald, established 
in 1831, the Fairfax proprietors did not employ a cartoonist until 1944.5
                                                            
3 The following section will provide short historical summaries of many Australian capital 
city dailies.  Also the Darwin newspaper indexes date to 1883.  See Northern Territory 
Library, “Northern Territory Newspapers”, 2007, retrieved on 14 July 2010 at 
<http://www.ntl.nt.gov.au/collections/northern_territory_newspapers>. 
  At the turn 
of the twentieth century, most of the press establishments viewed it as unnecessary 
for serious publications to promote news stories on the front covers to attract readers’ 
attention.  While in Melbourne, The Herald became the first Australian newspaper to 
feature a main news page on the front cover regularly from 1889, many mainstream 
dailies did not incorporate page one news as a usual format until well into the 
4 Parliament of Victoria, “Celebrate 150 years”, Melbourne, no. 8, February 2006, p. 1. 
5 John Frith, interviewed by Shirley McKechnie [hereafter “Frith interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01064/1, 30 April-1 May 1994. 
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twentieth century, according to Victor Isaacs and Rod Kirkpatrick.6  For example, in 
the late nineteenth century, the main Sydney newspapers displayed front and back 
pages that were entirely filled with classified advertisements.7  Gradually more 
traditional press owners approved page one headlines and reports.  By 10 December 
1949, The West Australian became the last metropolitan daily to show a main news 
page on the front cover regularly.8
 
   
Visual images reflected shifting newspaper editorial attitudes on Australia’s 
place in the world and these views ranged from imperialism to racism to international 
cooperation.  In the early twentieth century, the nation showed “the early signs of 
widespread Australian aspirations to effective nationhood”.9  Occasionally line 
drawings were used to illustrate significant news, such as the inauguration of the 
Australian Commonwealth on 1 January 1901 and the death of Queen Victoria on 22 
January in the same year.  At first, photographs were published very sparingly as 
small portraits of people in the news.  The first press photographs appeared in two 
Melbourne newspapers, The Age and The Argus, on 22 April 1908;10 The Sydney 
Morning Herald followed this trend with a photographic feature about the Australian 
visit of the US Navy squadron, known as The Great White Fleet, in August of the 
same year.11  The arrival of the battleships indicated a peak in closer US-Australia 
ties, but the bilateral relationship then languished until World War II.12  Emerging 
radical nationalism, notions of “White Australia” and racial superiority appeared in 
The Bulletin magazine and industrial cartoons of the urban, labour press.13
                                                            
6 Victor Isaacs and Rod Kirkpatrick, Two hundred years of Sydney newspapers: A short 
history [hereafter Sydney newspapers], Rural Press, North Richmond, 2003, pp. 8, 13; Rod 
Kirkpatrick, “Select chronology of significant Australian press events to 2005” [hereafter 
“Australian press events”], National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], Canberra, 
September 2006, retrieved on 21 January 2009 at 
<
  
Technological improvements, particularly the radio transmission of photographs 
http://www.nla.gov.au/anplan/heritage/1851-1900.html>. 
7 Isaacs and Kirkpatrick, Sydney newspapers, p. 8. 
8 Kirkpatrick, “Australian press events”. 
9 Christopher Hubbard, Australian and US military cooperation: fighting common enemies 
[hereafter Australian and US cooperation], Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, 2005, p. 12. 
10 Kirkpatrick, “Australian press events”. 
11 Isaacs and Kirkpatrick, Sydney newspapers, p. 13. 
12 Hubbard, Australian and US cooperation, p. 12. 
13 Peter Love, Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour Populism 1890-1950, 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984, particularly pp. 10-17, 72. 
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during the 1920s, led to more visually appealing pictorial features.  Despite the new 
columns set aside for photographs, creative standards in layout, production and 
journalistic techniques made incremental progress for Australia’s principal, 
established newspapers.14
 
 
Sometimes the nineteenth-century newspaper owners were also politicians, as 
in the case of the first West Australian proprietors, John Hackett and Charles Harper, 
who established the daily on 1 January 1885.15  Harper held the North District seat in 
the Legislative Council from 1878 and 1890, while Hackett represented the South-
West Province in the Council from 1890 until his death in 1916.  Although Hackett 
reflected the same concerns about direct democracy and radical politics as many 
other western legislators, he identified himself as an “advanced liberal”.  For 
example, he published West Australian editorials to campaign successfully for 
additional funding to government schools to improve public education standards.  
According to the historian, Lyall Hunt, the press owner was a “central figure” in 
these reforms and his newspaper became “the instrument of the change”, leading to 
the emergence of free, compulsory and secular education in WA in 1899.16
 
 
Similarly to Hackett’s professional background as a politician and news 
proprietor, The Sunday Times owner and news editor, Frederick Vosper, was a 
parliamentarian when he established his Perth newspaper in 1898.  Although the 
newspapers’ journalists were trained to write for papers of record and to avoid bias, 
they became involved in political disputes that were characteristic of the prevailing 
                                                            
14 Isaacs and Kirkpatrick, Sydney newspapers, pp. 12-13. 
15 Various newspapers had been published in Fremantle and Perth WA for short time spans 
since 1830.  Kirkpatrick, “Australian press events”. 
16 O. K. Battye, “Harper, Charles (1842 – 1912)” [hereafter “Harper”], Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 4, 1972, pp. 348-349, retrieved on 21 
January 2008 at <http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A040395b.htm>; Lyall Hunt, 
“Hackett, Sir John Winthrop (1848-1916)” [hereafter “Hackett”], Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 9, 1983, pp. 150-53, retrieved on 21 January 
2009 at <http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A090143b.htm>. 
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international trend of sensationalist “yellow journalism”.17  For example, Sunday 
Times writers harshly denounced the state engineer C.Y. O’Connor’s pipeline 
proposal to transport water from Perth to the drought-stricken Goldfields.  Some of 
Vosper’s contemporaries blamed his editorial criticism for contributing to 
O’Connor’s suicide in 1902.18  Five years later, The Sunday Times’ second publisher, 
James McCallum Smith, led WA protesters who were agitating for secession from 
the nation.  Smith continued to manage The Sunday Times while he joined the 
Legislative Assembly as a conservative MP in 1914.19  Thus the first West Australian 
and Sunday Times proprietors established a tradition of political interference in 
governmental affairs20 and later Curtin would need to negotiate the newspaper 
managements’ attempts to influence him.21
 
 
 Although some of the first major newspaper owners were not as overtly 
involved in politics, they and their families became deeply entrenched in the public 
spheres of their cities.  Since its origins in 1831, The Sydney Morning Herald was 
known as the city’s authoritative newspaper and it came under the control of the 
Fairfax family in 1841.22
  
  The first issue of Melbourne’s The Age was published on 
17 October 1854; two years later, it was acquired by the Syme family, competing  
                                                            
17 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989, p. 168. 
18 Leigh Hays, Criena Fitzgerald and Andrew MacDonald, “WA and Federation: Frederick 
Vosper”, State Library of WA, Perth, 2000, retrieved on 21 January 2009 at 
<http://www.slwa.wa.gov.au/federation/fed/017_vosp.htm>; Roger Stitson, “Constructing 
Australia: Pipe Dreams”, Film Australia, Woolloomooloo, 2007, retrieved on 22 January 
2009 at <http://www.filmaust.com.au/constructingaustralia>. 
19 Donald Grant, “Smith, James MacCallum (1868 – 1939)” [hereafter “James McCallum 
Smith”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 
651-652, retrieved on 21 January 2008 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A110671b.htm>. 
20 Beate Josephi, “Federation: The West Australian between Empire and Nation”, 
ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-17, retrieved on 10 December 2010 at 
<ejournalist.com.au/v1n2/josephi.pdf>. 
21 Lloyd Ross, John Curtin: A Biography [hereafter A Curtin biography], Macmillan 
Publishing Company, South Melbourne, 1977, pp. 141-142. 
22 Kirkpatrick, Sydney newspapers, p. 15. 
Chapter 3   The changing context of the Australian press, film and radio professions,  
1831-1945 
91 
 
with The Argus, which began to be published in the city on 2 June 1846.23  In 
Tasmania, the first issue of the bi-weekly Hobarton Mercury was published on 5 July 
1854 by John Davies, a London-born former convict of Hobart.  According to The 
Mercury history, Davies might have committed a “petty crime” to escape the harsh 
conditions of England and obtain free shipping passage to a potential “land of 
opportunity”.  Benefiting from the fluidity of the colonial society, he was discharged 
after serving a six-year sentence and joined the police force, being promoted to a 
chief constable in Sydney in 1840.  The Davies family retained control of their 
newspaper during World War II.24  Their experience indicated that Australian urban 
communities offered opportunities for social mobility for such individuals as Davies 
and Curtin in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.25
 
  The nation’s 
fledgling journalism profession presented numerous possibilities for an enterprising, 
cash-strapped young man, such as Curtin, who was intelligent but lacked a formal 
education, to distinguish himself in society. 
While traditional newspapers, including The West Australian, reflected an 
“empire loyalty”,26 and The Sydney Morning Herald publishers resisted such 
“gimmicks” as competitions and comic strips,27
                                                            
23 Sybil Nolan, “Half a Century of Obscurity: The Age, 1908-64” [hereafter “The Age”], 
ejournalist, 2001, pp. 2-5; Geoffrey Serle, “Syme, Sir Geoffrey (1873-1942)” [hereafter 
“Geoffrey Syme”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 
12, 1990, pp. 154-55, retrieved on 21 January 2009 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A120172b.htm>; Jim Usher (ed.), The Argus: Life 
& Death of a Newspaper [hereafter The Argus], Australian Scholarly Publishing, North 
Melbourne, 2007, pp. 11, 30. 
 more sensational, tabloid 
newspapers emerged.  In Sydney, for example, the first issue of Truth was published 
24 F.C. Green, “Davies, John (1813 – 1872)” [hereafter “John Davies”], Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 4, 1972, pp. 27-28, retrieved on 
21 January 2009 at <http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A040027b.htm>; Kirkpatrick, 
“Australian press events”; Peter Mercer, “The History of The Mercury” [hereafter “The 
Mercury”], Mercury Print Museum, Hobart, 2007, retrieved on 21 January 2009 at 
<http://ink.iim.uts.edu.au/mercury/print_museum/merc_history.htm>. 
25 David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings [hereafter In 
his own words], Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 1; Green, “Davies”, 
pp. 27-28; Peter Love, “‘The Boy – His Relation to Industry’: George Swinburne on 
Technical Education and Nation Building”, in Bobbie Oliver (ed.), Labour History in the 
New Century, Black Swan Press, Perth, 2009, p. 5; Mercer, “The Mercury”. 
26 Beate Josephi, “Reluctant consent: The West Australian’s slow embrace of a sense of 
nationhood” [hereafter “West Australian”], in Denis Cryle and Jean Hillier (eds), Consent 
and Consensus: Politics, Media and Governance in 20th century Australia [hereafter 
Consent and consensus], API Network, Perth, 2005, pp. 45, 56. 
27 Kirkpatrick, Sydney newspapers, p. 15. 
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on 3 August 1890 and six years later, it was acquired by John Norton.  With his “new 
weekly journal of sport, crime and exposé articles”,28 Norton entered the “very 
competitive” market to attract Sunday newspaper readers.29  As a Protectionist and 
later an independent politician, Norton was elected to the New South Wales 
Legislative Assembly at various times between 1898 and 1910.30  Other prosperous 
Sydney proprietors included Robert Clyde Packer and his associates at Smith’s 
Newspaper Ltd, who launched the Daily Guardian in 1923 and The Sunday 
Guardian in 1929, “setting the pace in turning news into entertainment”.31  In 
contrast to the sensationalist trend, Thomas Mitchell Shakespeare began publishing 
The Canberra Times in 1926 with the motto, “Serve the national city and through it 
the nation”; its pages were dominated by federal parliamentary reports.32  In 
Melbourne, Keith Murdoch, a World War I news correspondent, became the 
managing director of the “modest company”,33 The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd, in 
1924.34  Murdoch acquired more newspapers including The Adelaide Advertiser and 
The Courier-Mail in Brisbane.  After he led a Melbourne syndicate that bought The 
West Australian in 1926, he issued shares to local people to appease their concerns 
about interstate control and retain the newspaper’s WA identity.35  As well as 
managing the Melbourne afternoon Herald, Murdoch ran the city’s morning Sun 
News-Pictorial, known for its brash, “modern” format.36
                                                            
28 Michael Cannon, “Norton, John (1858 – 1916)” [hereafter “John Norton”], Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, 
  While the mid-1920s 
marked “the height of competition” among rapidly expanding media companies, the 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 41-42. 
29 Kirkpatrick, Sydney newspapers, p. 15; Kirkpatrick, “Australian press events”. 
30 Cannon, “John Norton”, pp. 41-42. 
31 Richard White, “Packer, Robert Clyde (1879 – 1934)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 117-118, retrieved on 14 July 
2010 at <http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A110126b.htm>. 
32 H. J. Gibbney, “Shakespeare, Arthur Thomas (1897 – 1975)” [hereafter “Arthur 
Shakespeare”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 
1988, pp. 573-574, retrieved on 21 January 2008 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A110722b.htm>. 
33 The Herald & Weekly Times, Keith Murdoch: Journalist, The Herald & Weekly Times 
Ltd., Melbourne, 1952, p. 5. 
34 Kirkpatrick, “Australian press events”; Geoffrey Serle, “Murdoch, Sir Keith Arthur (1885 
– 1952)” [hereafter “Keith Murdoch”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne 
University Press, vol. 10, 1986, pp. 622-627, retrieved on 22 January 2008 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A100610b.htm>. 
35 Kirkpatrick, “Australian press events”; Serle, “Keith Murdoch”. 
36 Nolan, “The Age”, p. 2; Serle, “Geoffrey Syme”. 
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1930s depression led to the collapse of nine papers because the owners were unable 
to adjust to the new economy of large-scale production. 37
 
 
With the trend towards oligopolistic control of the nation’s newspapers, some 
of the media owners’ sons became fierce rivals.  The press industry’s economic 
strength had become more concentrated since 1903, when 17 proprietors owned 21 
dailies.38  In 1936 Packer’s son, Frank, helped form a new company, Consolidated 
Press, including Sydney’s The Daily Telegraph, which became influential among the 
city’s middle-income market.  Frank Packer’s business partner, Edward Granville 
Theodore, had been the federal treasurer in the Scullin Labor Government from 1929 
to 1930.39  Meanwhile Norton’s son, Ezra, inherited Truth and he launched the 
afternoon “scandal” Sydney paper, The Daily Mirror, in 1941.40  Most of the 
newspaper owners also wrote editorials on occasions; Packer, Norton and Warwick 
Fairfax had been young journalists in their fathers’ newspaper offices.41  
Shakespeare’s son, Arthur, had been a sub-editor and later he became The Canberra 
Times owner.42  By 1941, Australia’s six capital cities produced 15 daily newspapers, 
controlled by ten proprietors.43
                                                            
37 Henry Mayer, The Press in Australia [hereafter The press], Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 
1968, p. 31. 
  Thus as Australian society diversified, mainstream 
press proprietors produced serious broadsheets and different tabloids, aimed at the 
working and middle classes, to cater to a wider range of public readerships.  
According to the wartime news correspondent, Don Whitington, the newspaper 
38 Bridget Griffen-Foley, “The Fairfax, Murdoch and Packer Dynasties in Twentieth-Century 
Australia” [hereafter “The Fairfax, Murdoch and Packer dynasties”], Media History, vol. 8, 
no. 1, 2002, p. 94. 
39 Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Packer, Sir Douglas Frank Hewson (1906 – 1974)” [hereafter 
“Frank Packer”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 15, 
2000, pp. 553-556, retrieved on 21 January 2009 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A150644b.htm>; Kirkpatrick, Sydney newspapers, 
pp. 13, 15. 
40 Valerie Lawson, “Norton, Ezra (1897 – 1967)” [hereafter “Ezra Norton”], Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 15, 2000, pp. 495-497, retrieved 
on 21 January 2009 at <http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A150576b.htm>. 
41 Griffen-Foley, “Frank Packer”; Lawson, “Ezra Norton”; Gavin Souter, Heralds and 
Angels: The House of Fairfax 1841-1990 [hereafter The house of Fairfax], Melbourne 
University Press, Carlton, 1991, pp. 44, 47. 
42 Gibbney, “Arthur Shakespeare”, pp. 573-574. 
43 Griffen-Foley, “The Fairfax, Murdoch and Packer dynasties”, p. 94. 
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oligopoly was “controlled and manipulated” by principally four men in the 1940s: 
Fairfax, Murdoch, Norton and Packer. 44
 
 
 Even so, Murdoch seemed to be the “political king-maker” among the press 
owners since his promotion of conservative politicians in the 1920s and 1930s.45  At 
The Herald, for example, he published secret government cables that might have 
contributed to influencing the 1931 election outcome, with the defeat of the Scullin 
Labor government and the victory of Joseph Lyons as the new prime minister and 
leader of the conservative United Australia Party (UAP).46  The Herald senior 
political journalist, Joseph Alexander, reported on the criticisms that Scullin had 
written about some of his party members and then cabled to the acting Prime 
Minister, J.E. Fenton.  At the time, Scullin was meeting major London financial 
advisers, attempting to solve the economic woes of the depression, and The Herald 
report focused on ALP divisions during a deep crisis.  Scullin initiated a police 
investigation to discover who leaked the cables and although no-one was charged, 
Alexander was temporarily suspended from the press gallery.  After several months, 
Scullin removed the ban and Alexander resumed his Canberra editorial position, 
never divulging the source of the leak.  Alexander reminisced that “the decisive role 
was played by Keith Murdoch in the selection and grooming of a successor to 
Scullin”.47  Later, scholars agreed with Alexander’s acknowledgement that Murdoch 
had used his newspaper to help replace the Labor Federal Government with an 
administration more sympathetic to his business interests.48
                                                            
44 Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography [hereafter Strive to be fair], 
Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 85. 
  This episode indicated 
that since press proprietors did not always support an incumbent prime minister in 
the 1930s, one decade later Curtin would need to develop adept media strategies to 
secure their consensus to report on his foreign policies favourably. 
45 Cited in Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 86.  This view was supported in Mayer, The press, 
pp. 29, 143. 
46 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 88–109; Nick Richardson, “Sir Keith Murdoch’s 
relationship with Prime Minister Joseph Lyons” [hereafter “Sir Keith Murdoch”], National 
Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], Canberra, 5 May 2006, pp. 1–10; Serle, “Keith 
Murdoch”. 
47 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Alexander interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np. 
48 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
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 At another Murdoch newspaper, The West Australian, the editorial 
management recognised Curtin’s achievements as the Labor federal member for 
Fremantle from 1928 until his defeat in 1931.  Curtin’s biographer, Lloyd Ross, 
wrote that about three years later, The West Australian editor, H.J. Lambert, joined 
other community leaders in attempting to persuade him to nominate for the safe 
Labor seat of Bourke, Victoria.  After hearing rumours that Curtin might stand for 
the Bourke seat, Lambert wrote a “purely personal” letter to him before the 1934 
election.  In fact, Curtin’s mentor, Frank Anstey, had announced his retirement as the 
ALP Federal Member for Bourke and was urging his protégé to nominate for the 
same seat.  Lambert advised Curtin that he “would be wise to take this step” because 
he would be more likely to win an easy victory and the nation needed “the best 
brains of every school of thought to grapple with the problems which confront us”.  
The conservative press editor emphasised that he did not concur with Labor’s 
political views; however, he wanted Curtin to stay in politics.  Lambert noted: “I 
believe that the best safeguard against the sterilization of constructive thinking is that 
all schools of thought should find expression through their most capable mediums”.  
Although the private letter indicated Lambert’s blatant attempts to influence the 
election campaign, the candid tone suggested there might have been a friendship 
between the two men.  Lambert also noted to Curtin that his letter was “tinged with 
regret” because if his advice was heeded, “you may lose your identification with 
WA”.49  Yet Curtin was determined to re-nominate for the Fremantle seat and he 
won the 1934 election with a majority of 2,000 votes.50
 
  Immediately he announced 
his top priorities would be economic recovery and job creation; although the national 
unemployment rate had fallen from 29 per cent in 1932, it was almost 18 per cent in 
1935.  Lambert’s letter indicated that the conservative media still valued an ALP 
politician, such as Curtin, during times of crisis. 
 On the whole, however, a number of scholars have agreed that the media 
owners were generally conservative in the late 1930s.51
                                                            
49 Cited in Ross, A Curtin biography, pp. 141-142. 
  For example, Murdoch’s 
managing editor at The Adelaide Advertiser, Lloyd Dumas, strengthened his alliance 
50 Ross, A Curtin biography, p. 144. 
51 Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, p. 42, 44; Mayer, The press, p. 27; Neville 
Petersen, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, & Politics 1932-1947 [hereafter News not 
views], Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1993, p. 130. 
Chapter 3   The changing context of the Australian press, film and radio professions,  
1831-1945 
96 
 
with South Australia’s Liberal and Country League Government in a bid to boost his 
newspaper’s influence.  After the state government’s election in November 1938, 
Dumas agreed to back the industrialisation policies of the Adelaide leader, Thomas 
Playford.  The agreement assisted the government to maintain power for a record 
term of nearly 27 years.52  Given The Canberra Times motto of impartial journalism, 
Shakespeare seemed to be an exception among the press proprietors because he did 
not directly attempt to intervene in politics “to avoid any conflict of interest”.53  
News editors and owners initially assured Menzies of their support when he became 
the new UAP prime minister on 26 April 1939.  Yet fractures emerged in his press 
relationships by the time of his resignation on 29 August 1941 during the Nazi 
advances.54
 
 
 
Menzies and the media, 1939-1942 
While senior wartime correspondents praised Menzies’ rhetorical skills,55 his media 
strategies as the prime minister and leader of the UAP have not been a prominent 
subject of scholarly analysis.  A few media historians – such as Griffen-Foley,56 
Lloyd57 and Petersen58
                                                            
52 S. Cockburn, “Dumas, Sir Frederick Lloyd [1891 – 1973]” [hereafter “Lloyd Dumas”], 
Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
 – devoted some attention to his complex press relations as 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 14, 1996, pp. 44-46, 
retrieved on 21 January 2009 at <http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A140047b.htm>. 
52 Government of South Australia, “SA Newspapers: Early history”, Adelaide, 2007, 
retrieved on 21 January 2009 at <http://www.samemory.sa.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=604>; 
Kirkpatrick, “Australian press events”. 
53 Gibbney, “Arthur Shakespeare”, pp. 573-574. 
54 Irvine Douglas, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Douglas interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01061/1, 15-19 June 1972, transcript np; Griffen-Foley, p. 44; Alan 
D. Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Reid interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00501, 4 October 1972-28 February 1973, transcript np. 
55 E.g. Menzies’ speech-making abilities were praised during oral history interviews with 
Frank Chamberlain of the The Sun News-Pictorial, Peter Ewing of The West Australian and 
Edgar Holt of The Daily Telegraph.  See Frank Chamberlain, interviewed by Mel Pratt 
[hereafter “Chamberlain interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00552, August 
1972-January 1973, transcript np; Peter Ewing, interviewed by Bill Bunbury [hereafter 
“Ewing interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00492/2, 15 December 1999, 
transcript np; Edgar George Holt, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Holt interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01059, 23 May 1978, transcript np. 
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57 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 125-130. 
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part of their larger research projects about other prominent figures of his era.  Yet 
Menzies cared deeply about his public image, scrutinising the media reports about 
himself and delivering polished speeches in newsreels and radio broadcasts.59  
Increasingly he shifted from press interviews to the radio airwaves to speak with 
supporters, as shown by an analysis of his diary,60 oral histories of his 
contemporaries,61 wartime film footage62 and radio transcripts.63  These sources 
suggested that as the prime minister, he was unable to conceal his “thinly veiled 
disdain” for the Canberra press gallery.64  Also he blamed negative media coverage 
for contributing to a loss of confidence in his leadership that led to his resignation in 
1941.65  The next year, he began a series of weekly Friday night radio broadcasts to 
speak directly to the so-called “forgotten people” from Australia’s middle class.66
                                                            
59 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 127. 
  
Yet Menzies’ seeming retreat from face-to-face news interviews might not have been 
entirely his choice.  Journalists did not appear to be as interested in reporting on his 
opinions once he ceased to be the prime minister.  For example, a wartime 
correspondent, Frank Chamberlain, recalled that the press table was “quite empty” at 
one of Menzies’ public speeches during the 1943 election campaign.  Chamberlain 
said the press organisations had already received a transcription of Menzies’ 
statement and they did not think it would be sufficiently newsworthy to justify 
60 Robert Menzies, cited in A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: 
Menzies’ 1941 Diary [hereafter Dark and hurrying days], NLA, Canberra, 1993, pp. 69, 82, 
126. 
61 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Chamberlain, “Chamberlain interview”; Douglas, 
“Douglas interview”; Reid, “Reid interview”. 
62 Robert Menzies, “Declaration of War” [hereafter “War declaration”], Menzies Virtual 
Museum, East Melbourne, 3 September 1939, retrieved on 18 May 2009 at 
<http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/1930s/1939.html#MenziesEvents>; Robert 
Menzies, “Transcript of Press Conference Film” [hereafter “Press conference film”], 
Menzies Virtual Museum, East Melbourne, 1941, retrieved on 18 May 2009 at 
<http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/1940s/1941.html#MenziesEvents>; Penny 
Robins (executive producer), The Prime Ministers’ National Treasures: Robert Menzies’ 
Camera (television broadcast – hereafter Robert Menzies’ camera), Film Australia, Old 
Parliament House and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [hereafter ABC], Canberra, 
11 September 2007, retrieved on 27 January 2011 at 
<http://www.filmaust.com.au/primeministers/default.asp>. 
63 Robert Menzies, “The Forgotten People” [hereafter “Forgotten people”], Menzies Virtual 
Museum, East Melbourne, 22 May 1942, retrieved on 18 May 2009 at 
<http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/ForgottenCont.html>. 
64 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 125. 
65 Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, p. 43. 
66 NAA, “Robert Menzies: In office”, Canberra, 2009, retrieved on 11 December 2010 at 
<http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/menzies/in-office.aspx>. 
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sending reporters to cover the event.67  According to Griffen-Foley, several press 
proprietors met Menzies one evening in July 1942 to discuss rebuilding his national 
stature; however, Murdoch “privately harboured doubts about the politician” because 
he seemed “short of some valuable qualities”68 including the necessary diplomacy to 
unify conservatives.69
 
  This section will identify the successes and failures of 
Menzies’ media strategies from 1939 to 1942 to provide a basis for comparing these 
with Curtin’s mass communications and journalist relationships. 
When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, Menzies was 
relatively inexperienced in his prime ministerial role, but quickly cultivated strong 
relations with the news media to strengthen his position.  He had been sworn in as 
Australia’s leader on 26 April after Lyons’ sudden death.  On the same day, he made 
his first prime ministerial radio broadcast, directly appealing to Australians by 
declaring:  
I am a singularly plain man, born in the little town of Jeparit, on the fringe of 
the Mallee; educated at Ballarat, in a state school, and then by scholarship at 
a public school and Melbourne University.  Apart from having parents of 
great character, intelligence and fortitude, I was not born to the purple.70
Although he publicly emphasised his humble, hard-working and “plain” origins, 
Menzies’ series of educational scholarships assisted him to become one of the 
nation’s most well-known constitutional lawyers.  In 1929, he became “the youngest 
King’s Counsel in Australia”.
 
71
                                                            
67 Chamberlain, “Chamberlain interview”. 
  He developed a rapport with the press gallery 
because as an arbitrator in 1927, he helped to introduce a professional grading 
68 Cited in Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, p. 44. 
69 Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, p. 52. 
70 Robert Menzies, Menzies Virtual Museum, East Melbourne, 26 April 1941, retrieved on 
18 May 2009 at 
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71 Cited in NAA, “Robert Menzies: Before office”, Canberra, 2009, retrieved on 11 
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system for journalists and to improve their working conditions significantly.  
According to Griffen-Foley, his legal support for the Australian Journalists’ 
Association (AJA) provided an “inestimable advantage” later when he sought 
positive publicity in his news conferences.72  Lloyd contended the new leader’s 
“credibility with journalists was reasonably high”.73
Bob Menzies had a very good relationship with all newspaper men – just 
because he was Bob Menzies who gave us the award, you know, to some 
extent.  But I think he liked newspaper people too and … whenever he was in 
Perth, he would always be at any AJA thing too.
  As The West Australian 
correspondent, Peter Ewing, reminisced: 
74
While Menzies and Curtin were “[t]otally different men”, they shared “this common 
link with the newspaper fraternity”, Ewing commented.
 
75  According to Edgar Holt, 
a Daily Telegraph correspondent, Menzies was a brilliant speechwriter and orator 
with a “feeling for words”.76  Menzies, with his links to Victoria, continued to 
develop a close affinity with The Age in Melbourne77
 
 and enjoyed a high level of 
media goodwill as the war against Germany escalated. 
 In a similar manner to major Allied democratic leaders, Menzies made use of 
radio and film technology to galvanise public opinion in favour of fighting Nazism.  
As the first Australian prime minister to announce the nation’s involvement in war in 
a radio broadcast, he invoked empire loyalties by proclaiming on 3 September 1939: 
Fellow Australians,  
It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially that in consequence of a 
persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared 
                                                            
72 Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, p. 42. 
73 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 125-130. 
74 Ewing, “Ewing interview”. 
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war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.  No harder task can 
fall to the lot of a democratic leader than to make such an announcement.78
This declaration of imperial obedience was consistent with government policies that 
influenced the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC).  Since its inception in 
1932, the broadcaster was meant to be a bastion of imperialism, as media scholar, 
David Pyvis, has noted.  In the early days, the ABC executives deliberately pursued 
“exaggerated English accents” for their programs.  In Sydney, one half of the 
station’s announcers were English in 1939.
 
79  As a well-known “film buff”,80 
Menzies established the Department of Information (DOI) to direct the content of 
stirring, morale-boosting battle footage five days after the war began.81
 
  Through his 
radio broadcast and the DOI, Menzies established innovative practices in the use of 
relatively new media technology in wartime Australia. 
His publicity officer, Claude Charles Dawson, had worked for Lyons from 
1938 to 1939 and was encouraging him to continue the former prime minister’s 
practice of two media conferences each day.  Neither Lyons nor Menzies shared 
confidential information with the press gallery.  Due to the pressures of war, Menzies 
adopted a system of a single daily interview, which did not satisfy the reporters, 
according to Lloyd.82  Yet one wartime journalist, Don Whitington, remembered, “he 
held two press interviews on most days” during the winter of 1941.83
                                                            
78 Menzies, “War declaration”. 
  In an oral 
history interview, Alan Reid, a former reporter for the Sydney Sun, remembered 
Menzies’ “extraordinary rapport” with his favourite journalist, Eric McLaughlin, a 
correspondent for the rival Sydney Morning Herald.  McLaughlin and Menzies “used 
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79 David Pyvis, “When the AIR BEER CEER pushed the Aussie twang” [hereafter “Aussie 
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80 Robins (executive producer), Robert Menzies’ camera. 
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Books, Sydney, 2005, p. 8. 
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Government”, Reid recalled.  Menzies provided frequent “scoops” for McLaughlin’s 
weekly column.  Reid commented:  
The other newspapermen, myself included, had to wait for Eric McLaughlin’s 
Monday column – in those days the ‘Sydney Morning Herald’ ran a column 
every Monday – and this gave a wonderful preview of Menzies’ intentions 
and his approach.84
Despite his formal media meetings, therefore Menzies often released news in a 
selective, partial and controlled way.
 
85
 
 
According to Reid, the relations became strained because of disagreements 
between Menzies and The Sydney Morning Herald editors about defence policies.  
The Menzies Cabinet was criticised in the newspaper for being too slow to make 
decisions and for “their incapacity for the responsibilities [that] war was forcing on 
them”.86  Also, on 19 February 1941, a Sydney Morning Herald editorial writer 
criticised the federal administration for showing signs of “vacillation” because many 
press owners had “submitted willingly” to newsprint rationing; however, the 
government had permitted more newspaper titles as well as the increased 
consumption of writing and parchment paper.87  McLaughlin’s editors had been 
instructing him to write this type of negative news.  Yet McLaughlin refused and he 
was replaced by Ross Gollan.  Reid said: “Gollan’s instructions were that Menzies 
had to go”.  As the prime minister prepared the country for more overseas battles, he 
faced increasing press criticism, internal divisiveness within the UAP-Country Party 
coalition and an Axis offensive in Europe.88
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Editorial discontent increased when Menzies appointed Murdoch to be the 
director-general of information on 8 June 1940.  Responsible for enacting the 
government’s censorship policies, Murdoch was confronted by hostile, rival press 
proprietors, leading to his resignation in December of the same year.89  Although 
Ewing fondly remembered Menzies’ achievements as an arbitrator in 1927, when he 
helped to improve journalists’ working conditions, Alexander recalled the prime 
minister’s “sharp contempt for the Press” from 1939 to August 1941.  As Murdoch 
“greatly resented Menzies’ attitude to journalism”,90 he did not fully endorse the 
UAP leader in The Herald by this time.  As Griffen-Foley has noted, Murdoch held 
equivocal private views about Menzies and became unsure whether he was the 
“suitable successor” to Lyons.91
 
 
 As the first Australian leader to fly overseas, Menzies created an historical 
record of the Nazi devastation by making home movies with his tiny, clockwork, 
wind-up film camera and writing detailed descriptions of his journey in his diary.  
Menzies’ voyage to Asia, the Middle East, the UK and North America was made 
from 24 January to 24 May 1941.  His objectives were to secure more aircraft to 
defend Australia, visit troops in the Western Desert and consolidate Churchill’s 
assistance to protect Singapore, which subsequently surrendered to Japan on 15 
February 1942.92  The historian, David Day, suggested that as Menzies departed 
Sydney, he might have been considering “the possibility of transferring his 
considerable talents to Westminster”.93  Towards the end of his London visit, 
Menzies wrote in his diary that the British minister and press proprietor, Maxwell 
Aitken, urged him to remain there, saying it was “absurd that I should go back to 
Australia!”94
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that his criticisms of Churchill were a “recurring theme” in his private notes.95  
During a London press conference, Menzies asked Australian news representatives 
whether he should stay in Britain to participate in War Council meetings.  Irvine 
Douglas recalled the “majority opinion” of the editors was “that his place was in 
Australia and not in Britain”.96
 
  These sources revealed Menzies’ British loyalties. 
In contrast to leading wartime Labor politicians – such as Curtin, Ben 
Chifley, Francis Forde and Scullin – who bequeathed very few memoirs to the 
National Library of Australia,97 Menzies and his secretary accumulated so many 
documents that they left “the largest personal archive ever acquired”.98
Curious interview with British & Australian press.  Some noodle 
[representing The Argus] thinks my speech about the Pacific was 
“appeasement”.  What a perversion.  What a tyranny over inferior minds 
words and phrases exercise!  I must be careful not to say “Good day” to my 
neighbour.  Our true policy vis á vis Japan is firmness & [sic] friendliness: 
the two are not inconsistent.
  As a result, 
Menzies’ diary entries provided many direct, unguarded and private comments that 
were largely absent from Curtin’s official, published writings.  For example, in a 
diary excerpt on 5 March 1941, he conveyed his impatience with a journalist, who 
had criticised his Japanese strategy as being “appeasement”.  He commented tersely: 
99
In other diary pages, however, Menzies wrote he received “excellent” coverage in 
The Times and The Telegraph in London, as well as from The Washington Post.
 
100  
During his four-month trip, he gave 90 speeches and broadcasts.101  While 
monitoring sympathetic press reports, he described his interest in watching a “talkie” 
film of his speech and broadcasting from a London radio station to US listeners.102
                                                            
95 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 159. 
  
Yet in a Cinesound newsreel, depicting Menzies’ Tobruk visit, he did not directly 
address the camera and thereby did not communicate with cinema audiences.  Filmed 
96 Douglas, “Douglas interview”. 
97 Graeme Powell, “The First in the Field: Prime Ministers’ Papers in The National Library 
of Australia” [hereafter “Prime ministers’ papers”], Australian Academic & Research 
Libraries, vol. 36, no.1, March 2005, pp. 57-58. 
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by Damien Parer, the newsreel included two close-up camera shots, looking down, to 
show Menzies asleep in a fighter plane over the Tobruk harbour.  The film narrator 
said that as a wartime leader, Menzies was subject to criticism that was “not always 
just”, but did not elaborate on this remark.  Parer also showed scenes of Australian 
troops cheering Menzies; however, the occasional camera technique of looking down 
on him and the commentary that he was a criticised prime minister signified that he 
was slightly weak.  These film methods indicated that Menzies’ media relations were 
more troubling than he suggested in his diary.103
 
 
Some journalists, such as the Australian Associated Press London-based 
deputy editor, Irvine Douglas, remembered Menzies’ criticism of the press.  In his 
oral history interview, Douglas talked about waiting for Menzies at a London 
conference in 1941:  
Menzies came in and scarcely apologised for being late, and then said, ‘You 
know, I loathe the press … Do you know, when I became Prime Minister, I 
took over as press officer Dick Dawson who had been with Mr Lyons, and do 
you know, Dawson tried to tell me that I should see the press twice a day?  I 
ask you, twice a day?  He told me that Lyons used to’.104
Douglas also discussed his reaction to Menzies’ statement: 
 
And this made my hackles rise and I said, ‘Well, it didn’t do him [Lyons] any 
harm, did it?’  All Menzies could say was, ‘I wonder, I wonder,’ and that was 
that.105
Douglas’ comments were particularly candid, considering his professional 
credentials as a publicity officer for the conservative Commonwealth Government 
from 1934 to 1938 and a private secretary to Lyons between 1936 and 1938.  
Menzies had served as a deputy prime minister to Lyons.  But by 1938, Menzies was 
involved in a campaign with Murdoch to destabilise Lyons.  Murdoch was 
“[b]ecoming increasingly impatient with Lyons’ leadership” and wanted the 
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government to quicken the pace of rearmament.106  The animosity within the UAP 
resurfaced between Menzies and Lyon’s former private secretary.  Douglas’ opinion 
was supported by other Canberra news colleagues.107  In his autobiography, 
Whitington remarked that Menzies “made few efforts to charm the men who were 
presenting him to the Australian public through the columns of the metropolitan and 
country press”.108  The ABC’s first press gallery news reporter, Warren Denning, 
privately wrote of Menzies’ “subtle, super-refined leg-pulling” attitude towards 
reporters.109
 
  These sources indicate that Menzies was intensely focused on the far-
flung theatres of war and did not divert his full energies to maintaining close press 
relations. 
After returning to Australia, Menzies faced dissension from his coalition 
partner, the Country Party.  During a filmed interview, he emphasised his desire to 
avoid disruptive, partisan politics during the war: 
I come back to Australia with just one sick feeling in my heart and that is that 
I must now come back to my own country and play politics.  I think that it’s a 
diabolical thing that anybody should have to come back and play politics – 
however cleanly, however friendly – at a time like this.110
He spoke solemnly, accentuating “cleanly” and “friendly” to indicate his preferred 
style of honest politics.  Yet the internal divisiveness within his coalition 
government, the Labor opposition’s refusal of his invitation to join an all-party 
government
 
111 and increased media antipathy led to his resignation.  According to 
Griffen-Foley, “Menzies held the press responsible for the campaign of 
destabilisation that culminated in him losing the UAP leadership in 1941”.112
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Telegraph and The Herald.113
 
  Moreover, the Axis offensives did not help to restore 
confidence in his leadership.  In April, for instance, the Nazi General, Erwin 
Rommel, forced Allied troops to retreat into Egypt, but the fortress of Tobruk, Libya, 
garrisoned mainly by the 9th Australian Division, held out against the siege.  In 
Greece, the Commonwealth troops evacuated Crete in May, leaving the mainland 
and all Greek Aegean islands under German occupation.  On 29 August, Menzies 
was replaced by Arthur Fadden, leader of the Country Party within the coalition 
government, who resigned fewer than two months later because of a House of 
Representatives vote of “no confidence” over his budget proposals.  Labor was in 
government on 7 October.  Although Menzies and the journalists did not appear to 
trust one another by this time, the disastrous military battles worsened his public 
relations problems. 
Despite the coalition instability, Menzies had prepared Australia for war and 
as he retained the affluent, suburban Melbourne electorate of Kooyong, he 
immediately began to plan his leadership comeback.  His weekly, homespun radio 
chats, given on Friday evenings, were a pivotal strategy in his 1942 political 
campaign.  While the historians, Griffen-Foley and Lloyd, have focused on Menzies’ 
cooling press relations,114 there was scarce scholarly material about his radio talks 
that were instrumental in assisting him to maintain his House of Representatives seat 
while in the political opposition.  Beginning on 22 May 1942, the talks were directed 
to “the forgotten people”, which was later the title of his published collection of radio 
essays.  They were the middle class, representing the “backbone of this country” and 
“constantly in danger of being ground between the upper and the nether millstones of 
the false class war”.115  Even as the Labor Government was advising the ABC 
producers to eschew the English accents of the past in favour of distinctive 
Australian voices,116
                                                            
113 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, pp. 140-141. 
 Menzies told his radio listeners: “I am – like you – dyed-in-the-
114 Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, pp. 41-59; Lloyd, Parliament and the press, 
pp. 125-130. 
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wool British”.117  The weekly essays were broadcast by Sydney’s 2UE, which had 
begun operating in 1925, and its associated commercial stations in Victoria and 
Queensland.  In his volume of essays, Menzies wrote “many thousands” of people 
listened to the radio programs and “hundreds” of his supporters asked him to publish 
the transcriptions.118
 
   
While directing his remarks to his voters, Menzies used his broadcasts to 
deride the Australian press.  For example, he rebuked one unnamed newspaper 
organisation for “carrying its hostility beyond defeat ... The campaign was deliberate 
and sustained”.  He extended his criticisms to other journalists, who reflected “a 
perceptible tendency to mingle report with comment”.  In his view, government-
media relations were unsatisfactory because “[i]t is unfortunate that both Parliament 
and Press cannot regard themselves as engaged in a vital joint enterprise”.119
In point of fact the newspapermen by whom I have been cross-examined in the 
United States are conspicuously the best-informed, the quickest and the 
shrewdest that I have encountered anywhere in the world.
  Also he 
spoke admiringly of US journalists to the detriment of Australian news reporters: 
120
Although Menzies spoke compassionately about the need to fulfil post-war 
aspirations for economic progress, thereby creating a sense of a friendship with his 
target radio listeners, he also tried to influence them to share his dislike of Australia’s 
press. 
 
 
On the whole, Menzies made some lasting innovations in Australian media 
practices, particularly in his recognition of the potential benefits of the relatively new 
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wartime newsreels.  World War I cinemagoers were shown only silent pictures of 
battle zones.121  Also Menzies was the first leader to deliver a radio broadcast to 
announce that Australia was following Britain to war.  Five days later, he established 
the DOI “to mobilise the film medium for national ends”.122  Similarly to Churchill, 
Menzies attempted to use films to stir cinema audiences to fight the Nazis.  The DOI 
recruited its first cameraman, Parer, who filmed overseas battle scenes and helped 
create the popular Letter to Australia newsreel series in 1940.  Some of the 
documentary scenes showed volunteers queuing to enlist in the military, soldiers 
training on a beach and a stand-up of one young man, who said he was eager to 
travel from his home in Central Australia “to get to old Hitler”.  Government 
legislation stipulated that conscripted soldiers could be used only for the defence of 
the nation on Australian soil.  Yet Menzies’ low-key “business as usual” slogan did 
not inspire many young people to volunteer for overseas combat roles in the 
Australian Imperial Force (AIF).123
 
  Despite Menzies’ interest in creating home 
movies as historical records of devastated battle zones, he did not seem to make any 
considerable use of the film medium to communicate publicly to cinema audiences. 
Although Menzies initially enjoyed friendly press relationships, he later used 
his radio talks to try to snub newspaper reporters.  According to news 
correspondents’ oral histories, Menzies’ friendships with journalists began to 
disintegrate when he criticised their profession and selected a favourite Sydney 
Morning Herald correspondent to write exclusive, political, weekly columns.124
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Confronted by the rising Nazi challenge abroad and the aggressive in-fighting in his 
coalition government, Menzies even lost The Sydney Morning Herald support and he 
eventually blamed the press for generating negative publicity that forced him to 
resign.  When in opposition, he turned to the radio microphones in the middle of 
1942 to broadcast his homey essays about Australian life and appeal to the 
“forgotten” middle class.  He was one of Australia’s first conservative politicians to 
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deliver weekly radio talks to this constituency.  Through his extensive use of the 
airwaves to speak directly with voters, he developed a powerful persona that assisted 
him to become Australia’s longest serving prime minister from 19 December 1949 to 
26 January 1966.  Yet before this time, Curtin had deliberately cultivated a media 
image as an ordinary, friendly and patriotic Australian prime minister since 1941.  
Thus a radio battle escalated between the two great political orators to win voters’ 
trust in their wartime records of achievements. 
 
 
Curtin’s press relations, 1941-1945 
In contrast with Menzies’ selective use of favoured journalists and editors, Curtin 
adopted an inclusive, open and direct approach towards the press gallery.  His 
journalism background as a former labour newspaper editor and the AJA’s WA 
district president assisted him to gain reporters’ support.  His appointment as prime 
minister seemed to transform many Australians from a mood of disillusionment to a 
sense of unified optimism, according to academic and public opinion surveys.  In a 
report published in August 1941, the anthropologist and sociologist, Professor A.P. 
Elkin, concluded that after he interviewed different age groups in NSW, Australians 
had lost confidence in the press.  According to Elkin, only 18 per cent of readers 
viewed the press war coverage as “fully reliable”; more than twice this percentage 
regarded it as “unreliable” and the rest were uncertain about its credibility.  
Furthermore, all of the surveyed age groups expressed “widespread distrust” in 
Australian political leaders two months before Curtin’s appointment as the prime 
minister.125  One year after Elkin released his report, a new Australian Public 
Opinion Polls survey indicated that eight out of ten Australians were “satisfied or 
more than satisfied with Curtin’s job as Prime Minister”.  The opinion poll results 
were published under the headline, “Mr Curtin’s Job Pleases People”, in The 
Courier-Mail on 14 August 1942.126
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electors” including non-Labor voters throughout Australia.  The 1941 and 1942 
surveys suggested that after Curtin became prime minister, Australians were less 
likely to be cynical about their national leader.   
 
Certainly the prevailing battlefront conditions could not account for this 
seemingly renewed mood of national optimism.  By August 1942, the Australian 
army had shifted its focus from fighting “a conventionally organised opponent” in 
Europe and North Africa to the new jungle warfare against Japan.  The Japanese 
army had advanced to New Guinea with “speed, ferocity and effectiveness”.  Many 
Australian troops were “insufficiently trained” and “badly equipped” to fight in the 
rugged terrain and harsh climate of the territories, Papua and New Guinea.  Between 
July 1942 and January 1943, the Australian army mastered the Japanese forces and 
the jungle.127  During this period, Australian censors prevented the DOI cameraman, 
Parer, and the ABC radio correspondent, Chester Wilmot, from reporting on the 
British Commonwealth armed forces’ lack of preparation for the new type of warfare 
in dense, tropical vegetation.128
 
  The public opinion poll in August 1942 suggested 
that Curtin benefited from this type of censorship, which had been instituted at the 
beginning of the war. 
Yet the mainstream press also witnessed a major transformation as they 
experimented with a broad range of innovations to keep pace with the tumultuous 
events in the 1940s.  Despite the censorship and rationing restrictions, the war 
created new opportunities for men and women journalists in Allied nations including 
Australia.  In April 1942, some 62 correspondents were accredited to Australian 
forces.  About one year later, there were 261 permanent and visiting Australian 
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correspondents.129  The US reported 1,646 accredited correspondents and the total 
worldwide number was estimated to be 10,000 during the war.130  Due to the impact 
of newspaper rationing, large features diminished in favour of “hard news”, mainly 
international war bulletins.  The problem was not alleviated until April 1945, when 
the Federal Government granted a 45 per cent increase to publishers in the base year 
consumption for newsprint.131
copious
  Notwithstanding these editing limitations, banner 
headlines and  illustrations became a permanent feature in some tabloid 
Australian newspapers during the latter part of the war.  All of the journalists faced 
the same pressures to write newsworthy, sellable stories that would pass the censors’ 
penetrating gaze; however, they framed their articles differently to suit the varied 
styles and political preferences of press proprietors, as well as to meet the needs and 
aspirations of local populations. 
 
 
Curtin’s distinctive newspaper strategies across Australia 
To identify the reasons for Curtin’s success, this section will examine the 
interconnections between Australian wartime politics and journalists.  During most 
of his prime ministership, he shared top-secret information at his twice-daily media 
conferences and this was a significant departure from his predecessors’ more 
authoritarian, formal press meetings.132
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investigation of his interviews.  This section will begin with the WA press for these 
reasons: first, Curtin developed good relations with the local news media when 
visiting his Fremantle electorate; secondly, this thesis intends to contribute to filling 
gaps in our understanding of the WA media during this war.  Curtin strengthened his 
amicable relations with The West Australian editor, Lambert, on the day of his 
appointment as the prime minister in 1941.  Surprisingly, the editor seemed to 
approve the sudden overturning of the UAP-Country Party government in favour of a 
Labor majority, dependent upon the support of two independent MPs.  Lambert 
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affirmed the outcome was in “the public interest” because the conservative 
government’s budget was “scarcely practical politics”, as he wrote in a confidential 
letter to Curtin on 7 October 1941.  He also conveyed his hopes that Curtin would 
receive “fair and generous treatment” from the national press.133  Gradually The West 
Australian reflected a shift in editorial attitudes from “empire loyalty” to a national 
consciousness similar to the sense of Australian identity promoted by Curtin in his 
media statements.134  As the newspaper’s editors promoted a consensual war effort, 
they allocated generous space to Curtin’s announcements and this was significant 
because their daily editions were half of the size of their pre-war issues due to 
newsprint shortages.  The West Australian journalist, Ewing, spoke of Curtin’s 
strategy to diminish parochialism and promote a sense of national unity.  In an 
interview, Ewing said Curtin led Australians in a new direction towards national self-
determination because “the allegiance to Britain was secondary in his mind to the 
welfare of the country”.  Furthermore, Ewing praised Curtin’s development of a 
bilateral partnership with the US.135  Therefore war-related items dominated the 
news and by mid-August 1945, The West Australian editorials promoted a national 
consciousness and referred to Australians as “we”. 136
 
 
 At The Sunday Times in Perth, the editorial management moved away from 
their previous secessionist, acerbic tone and, in like manner to their West Australian 
rivals, they began supporting Curtin’s positive affirmation of Australian nationhood.  
During the war, The Sunday Times was owned by Victor Courtney and John J. 
Simons.  Although Courtney had been a Nationalist political candidate, he distanced  
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himself from his earlier conservative affiliations137 and became Curtin’s friend.138  
Also Simons and Curtin had been anti-conscription activists and prominent members 
of the WA Labor movement during World War I.139  As a prime minister, Curtin 
benefited from his well-established press relationships with The Sunday Times 
management.  In an interview, Frank Davidson, the wartime editor-in-chief of the 
Western Press company (including The Sunday Times)140 spoke of the strong bonds 
between Curtin and WA journalists.  Davidson was also the officer-in-charge of the 
DOI in the state.  He said Curtin was highly regarded in WA because he was a 
“genuine” politician without “any personal touches of vanity”, who “had a very good 
standing with the old West Australian group”.141  When Curtin had been the AJA’s 
WA district president and Westralian Worker editor, he developed friendships with 
Perth journalists from rival newspapers.142
... I think his standing in The West Australian was particularly good because 
he always gave you the impression that he intended to gain nothing from you 
personally.
  Davidson observed: 
143
Davidson recalled borrowing the office’s old Plymouth car to drive Curtin to the 
Perth railway station so that he would not miss the train bound for Canberra.  He 
commended Curtin’s ability to transcend party politics and adopt a bipartisan 
approach to the WA voters whom he met in the Perth pubs where he spoke.   
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Davidson said:  
He was able to hold the nation together – he was no longer a Labor Prime 
Minister he was the Prime Minister.  And that was I think the success of it, 
that whatever he did was done for Australia without any personal cheers at 
all.  He just was there to fight to win the war for Australia, that’s all there is 
about it.144
The historical recollections conveyed that journalists from WA’s two competitive 
newspapers, The West Australian and The Sunday Times, were united in their respect 
for him. 
 
 
 Similarly Curtin cultivated positive press relationships with reporters from 
other conservative newspapers including Murdoch’s prosperous Herald & Weekly 
Times Ltd, which enjoyed the greatest profits among all of the major Melbourne 
newspaper publishers during the war.145  Alexander’s unpublished diaries provided 
an insider’s perspective of Curtin’s foreign policies.146  For example, after the prime 
minister’s declaration of war against Japan on 8 December 1941, Alexander wrote: 
“Curtin is doing a splendid job.  He is cool, determined and decisive.”147
 
  No 
previous researcher has published findings on the diaries as a source for Curtin’s 
journalism strategies.  The diaries became a record of Alexander’s great esteem for 
Curtin, untarnished by faulty memory – a potential challenge posed by oral history 
reminiscences – and free from the influence of hindsight about the Australian 
leader’s legacy. 
 Although Packer was known to be a pro-Menzies powerbroker,148
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appointed him and his Daily Telegraph business partner, Theodore, to public service 
and this strengthened the Labor administration’s relationships with the two 
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director-general and Packer to be the director of personnel of the Allied Works 
Council, which provided funds for war-related projects.149
 
  The Daily Telegraph 
correspondent, Edgar Holt, recalled the two newspaper publishers’ tactics to 
influence Curtin.  Holt said Packer insisted that he write critical articles about the 
Curtin Government’s early days.  Holt’s stories were published in the newspaper 
under Theodore’s byline.  Packer predicted this type of negative political coverage 
would “make Curtin aware of Theodore’s existence ... and offer him a job”.  Yet 
Holt’s employers did not require him to make direct criticisms of Curtin.  Holt 
admitted he was given a tough assignment because “after all the Government had 
been doing a pretty good job”.  Soon afterwards, according to Holt, Curtin made an 
appointment to see Theodore; then the prime minister announced the press owner’s 
new position in the Allied Works Council.  Beyond the political machinations of The 
Daily Telegraph newsroom, Curtin revealed himself to be “a terribly sensitive man” 
to Holt, who decided to vote for Labor in 1943.  While Curtin seemed to succeed in 
developing formal business relationships with the newspaper’s publishers, as well as 
friendly exchanges with the chief political correspondent, this episode suggested that 
he was vulnerable to media owner pressure. 
 As well as placating the two Sydney tabloid publishers, Curtin established 
good relationships with working journalists representing other newspapers in this 
city.  The Sun correspondent, Reid, remembered that during the war, Curtin “had 
virtually a honeymoon with the Australian Press” even though he estimated 98 per 
cent of the newspaper organisations “would probably be anti-Labor”.  Reid admired 
Curtin for his dedication to winning the war, his sensitivity and honesty, as well as 
his reading interests and “magnificent library”.150  At least one journalist, The Daily 
Mirror Canberra political correspondent, Allan Fraser, continued a tradition of 
moving from news reporting to Labor politics.151  Fraser gained pre-selection as the 
ALP candidate for the federal seat of Eden-Monaro in NSW in 1943.  As Reid 
recalled, Eden-Monaro was a predominantly rural electorate that was expected to be 
won by one of the conservative parties.152
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“vigorous personal electioneering” and the national swing towards Labor.153  Fraser 
seemed to be in a small minority of mainstream journalists because most did not 
have Labor affiliations before Curtin’s prime ministership.154
 
 
 Despite their traditionalist reputation, The Sydney Morning Herald also began 
supporting the Labor wartime administration.  The newspaper’s most senior 
representatives were Fairfax and the general manager, Rupert Henderson.155  
Although the Fairfax group had shunned bold, page one headlines, they started to 
feature political stories on the newspaper front cover156 and employed their first 
cartoonist, John Frith, in 1944.  In an oral history interview, Frith described Curtin as 
“a very fine man”, who took the “generous action” of visiting his office desk, where 
they were “carrying on quite a conversation” with “the very delightful” Elsie 
Curtin.157  The Fairfax publishers were staunch advocates of Curtin during the 1943 
federal election, as Alexander noted in his diaries.158  This stance was the least 
conservative political position that the editorial staff had ever taken in the 
newspaper’s history.  The Sydney Morning Herald’s shift towards the ALP did not 
harm sales among the city’s affluent readership.  Indeed the group’s high profit rates 
became a “wartime embarrassment” to the company.159
 
  Chapters 6 to 9 examine the 
reasons for the newspaper group’s unpredictably vocal enthusiasm for Curtin. 
 Likewise, Curtin developed sound relationships with press managers at 
Melbourne’s Argus and The Adelaide Advertiser.  The Argus proprietor, Errol Knox, 
was a loyal UAP supporter as well as a highly experienced journalist.  Yet despite his 
conservative affiliation, Knox remained as the Federal Government’s director 
general of public relations for the Australian Armed Services during the war.160
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Advertiser’s Dumas praised new Prime Minister Curtin for “the smoothness” of his 
distribution of new ALP budget material to the cities’ media.  Dumas and his 
colleague asked the Murdoch company’s reporter, Harold Cox, to convey “their 
warm appreciation” to Curtin.  In his letter, Cox noted his “personal obligation” to 
Curtin’s press secretary, Don Rodgers, for the budget information.161  Yet months 
later, the SA Labor opposition leader, Robert Richards, wrote to Curtin that he was 
“perturbed” by the Murdoch press in his state and added, “to say it is unfair is to pay 
it a compliment”.162  In his reply Curtin acknowledged, “it is unfortunate that we 
should have to contend with such a powerful influence, particularly when it is used 
unfairly, and that the public should be misled”.  He did not make specific 
recommendations to redress the SA press comments, noting only: “I think it is better 
to let the matter stand for the present”.163  Despite their conflicting views, Curtin 
acknowledged Dumas’ stature as an influential media manager by asking him to 
report on his experiences after he led a group of Australian editors on a three-month 
visit of overseas war zones in 1943.  During the fact-finding tour, Dumas and other 
editors interviewed Roosevelt, Churchill, King George VI and Queen Elizabeth.  As 
a result, Dumas was in an informed position to discuss the British war effort with 
Curtin after the journey.164
 
  The personal correspondence and subsequent news 
conference indicated Curtin did not hold a grudge against Dumas for his occasional 
adversarial editorial tone. 
 The Brisbane press was understandably concerned with Queensland’s 
vulnerability to Axis attacks and in his speeches, Curtin emphasised that he shared 
these concerns.  While Menzies was the prime minister, Queensland journalists were 
writing that their state’s defence weapons and personnel were inadequate.  For 
example, a Brisbane Telegraph writer commented wryly on 6 May 1939 that: 
It is well known that the attitude of big business interests in Melbourne and 
Sydney is directed towards securing by far the greatest part of defence 
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expenditure for the protection of Sydney and Melbourne.  The attitude of the 
Minister of Defence is that all Queensland needs is a few popguns.165
After Japan entered the war, the federal DOI initiated a national media campaign 
including radio broadcasts, press advertisements and posters, which focused on 
Queensland’s exposure to enemy attacks in March and April 1942.  Some prominent 
Australians, including Menzies, criticised this type of publicity for being “anti-
Japanese”.
 
166  By this time, Curtin took the unprecedented step of directing 
journalists to remove references to “the White Australia issue” in a bid to improve 
the nation’s global standing.167  While he urged advertisers to focus on “their urgent 
war job to-day”,168 he seemed to heed the criticisms about the DOI propaganda and 
directed media professionals to withdraw racist statements.169
 
 
 Yet the sense of Queensland defencelessness escalated in the media during 
the 1943 election campaign.  After Japanese forces bombed Townsville in the state’s 
north on 29 July 1942, the local newspaper reported that the town’s “lone air raid 
‘casualty’” was a coconut tree.  Also the Queensland town of Mossman was bombed 
in late 1942 with little damage.  Australia’s most northern Allied base, Horn Island, 
became the state’s most attacked location, with about 500 bombs dropped in the 
region between March 1942 and July 1943.  Cairns’ population of 15,700 people was 
diminished by almost half between 1941 and 1942 because thousands of women and 
children were evacuated.170
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Australia undefended if the Japanese attacked the nation.171
… the Labor Government … rejected the concept that the little islands to the 
north of Australia would be taken, that upper Queensland and the Darwin 
area would be over-run by the enemy.
  During a radio broadcast 
in July 1943, Curtin said: 
172
Chapter 7 contains a more detailed account of the controversy.  Certainly, Curtin’s 
oratory, which was crafted to negate the “Brisbane Line” strategy, might have helped 
to secure his triumph at the polls.  State newspapers reflected the population’s natural 
pre-occupation with securing a strong defence. 
 
 
 Similarly to the Brisbane press, the perceived threat of Japanese invasion 
dominated the political coverage in Darwin’s main metropolitan newspaper and 
raised concerns in WA.  The first issue of Darwin’s Army News, established in 
October 1941, carried a prominent warning, urging readers to avoid leaking 
important information to the “enemy”.  The city’s Northern Standard offices closed 
after the Japanese bombing of Darwin on 19 February 1942; this was Australia’s 
worst air raid and the first time since European settlement that a foreign enemy had 
attacked the mainland.  The Army News became the city’s only newspaper during the 
war.173  Two weeks after the bombing in Darwin, Japanese air forces attacked the 
WA town of Broome on 3 March and killed 70 people.  Due to their state’s location, 
many Western Australians felt “more isolated, vulnerable, and thus defence-
conscious than other states”.174
 
  Curtin did not publicly refer to the fact that at least 
243 Australians died in the Darwin air raid and he did not release a major statement 
about the Broome tragedy.  Chapters 6 to 9 will evaluate his combined use of stirring 
rhetoric in the media and censorship to increase public morale for a protracted war. 
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 While this analysis is confined to the major metropolitan newspapers, 
Curtin’s mainly positive press interactions extended to regional publications, as 
evidenced in correspondence between him and William Robert Rolph, the Australian 
Provincial Press Association President.  Based in Launceston, Tasmania, Rolph 
published the Launceston Examiner, the Weekly Courier and the Saturday Evening 
Express.  In a letter to Curtin on 20 December 1943, Rolph wrote to “express our 
deep appreciation and thanks to you for your co-operation and support during the last 
difficult 12 months”.175  Another respected, regional journalist, Frederick Thomas 
Smith, recorded detailed notes of Curtin’s frequent, confidential press conferences.  
Smith was the Canberra-based news chief of the Australian United Press, which 
serviced almost all of Australia’s regional newspapers, and his notes became detailed 
transcripts of Curtin’s interviews, without the intrusion of the journalist’s personal 
opinions.  Yet his commentaries reflected press sympathy for Curtin’s objective to 
modify the “Beat Hitler First” strategy and gain more Allied support to fight the 
Japanese war.176  “The senior roundsmen are convinced John Curtin is right about 
the Japanese danger in the north”, Smith wrote shortly after a press conference on 4 
February 1943.177  Curtin would emphasise the need for the press to self-censor top-
secret military news in their reports.  At an interview on 25 November 1943, he said 
the war correspondents’ role was to “glamourise” and “tell their stories”, but the 
chiefs of staff should “simplify the communiqués”.178  Almost one year later, he 
praised Australian journalists for providing “a far better picture of the global 
conflict” than the biased or “one-eyed” coverage in Canada, the UK and the US.179
 
  
The correspondence and annotations revealed a mutual respect between rural news 
organisations and the national leader. 
So far, this section has mainly focused on Curtin’s relationships with the 
male-dominated press.  While he was the prime minister, the mainstream dailies 
reflected a new sense of national identity, improved attitudes towards Labor and an 
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intense focus on military battles close to home.  John and Elsie Curtin also supported 
more professional roles for women as the war brought new openings for female 
journalists in Australia, as it did for their colleagues in Canada and the US.  While 
female news correspondents were rare prior to World War I, a small number of 
Australian women were prominent in this field of journalism before 1939.180  Female 
participation in the nation’s workforce had increased by 31 per cent between 1939 
and 1943.  The expansion of new jobs did not only occur in war-related nursing 
posts, industries and factories, but also in journalism.181  Elsie Curtin used press 
conferences to encourage women to enter professional careers.182  For example, 
some 20 female US journalists attended the news interview that she gave in 
Washington DC during the Curtins’ visit to the nation in 1944.183  Elsie Curtin 
revealed her aspirations for more women to be active in public roles and to help 
forge international peace agreements after the war.  In a US media statement, she 
commended the “continuous agitation” of Australian women, who had achieved “a 
great number” of social and economic reforms including maternity allowances and 
child endowment.184
That this great event in the development of Australian citizenship should 
occur during the greatest war that our country has ever waged is, I think, no 
mere accident; it occurs because women, as women, and men, as men, have 
come to look at problems as problems ... we all sit here as persons upon 
  On 29 September 1943, Curtin paid tribute to the first women 
MPs, the WA Labor Senator, Dorothy Tangney, and Enid Lyons, the late prime 
minister’s wife, who became a member of the House of Representatives for the UAP.  
Curtin declared: 
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whom our fellow citizens have imposed a duty by preferring us to others who 
offered at the polls.185
The statement conveyed his politically inclusive approach and his championing of 
social reforms. 
 
 
 Australian news organisations, perhaps partly influenced by the ALP 
government’s progressive attitudes, appointed women reporters at an unprecedented 
level to report war news demanded by public audiences.  Although their numbers 
were still relatively small, the female correspondents fulfilled significant news 
assignments.  At The Herald, Murdoch employed Pat Jarrett as a writer in 1942; soon 
afterwards, she interviewed MacArthur on the first day of his arrival at his 
Melbourne command base on 21 March 1942.  The Federal Government appointed 
Jarrett to be a captain in the Australian Women’s Army Service and she was 
commissioned to write promotional articles for the military organisation.  In 1945 
Jarrett became the only woman to visit the battle zone in Burma.  As an accredited 
war correspondent, Lorraine Stumm was invited by MacArthur to report on the 
attack of Rabaul in 1943.  Packer sent Adele (Tilly) Shelton-Smith of The Australian 
Women’s Weekly to cover the living conditions of Australian troops in Malaya in 
1941.  He also hired Pat Holmes as a Sun photographer.  Norton selected Elizabeth 
Riddell to report in New York City for The Daily Mirror.186  The ABC hired its first, 
female radio announcer, Margaret Doyle, in 1940.  Two years later, the ABC female 
staff members included 19 announcers, sound effects officers, technicians and 
journalists.187  At the same time, The Sydney Morning Herald women’s editor, 
Connie Robertson, did not receive accreditation to be a war correspondent because of 
her gender; the discrimination against her seemed to be exceptional.188
 
 
 Generally the Australian Government adopted a more open-minded approach 
than British politicians and military officials, who did not approve of any women 
reporting in battle zones.  For example, General Montgomery refused to accept the 
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accreditation of British female war correspondents.189  Yet British women entered 
other traditionally male occupations and they were legally conscripted into military 
service in December 1941.  By the middle of 1943, almost 90 per cent of single 
women and 80 per cent of married women were employed in essential work for the 
war effort.190  Although many British women writers did not enjoy the same 
opportunities as the Australian female reporters, Claire Hollingsworth was an 
English freelance journalist who became a war correspondent in Poland for London’s 
Daily Express.191
 
 
 In like manner to Curtin, the wartime North American leaders seemed to 
support professional roles for women journalists.  In the US, at least 127 women 
received official, military accreditation as war correspondents.  They were backed by 
Eleanor Roosevelt, who conducted 350 women-only press conferences during her 
residence in the White House.  On 6 March 1933, only two days after her husband’s 
inauguration, Eleanor Roosevelt commenced a series of weekly interviews to force 
each US news organisation to employ at least one female journalist; these interviews 
continued until FDR’s death in 1945.192
I would like you to know that we all feel that the recent newspaper women’s 
conference in Ottawa has meant a real contribution to a fuller appreciation of 
the war effort of our country.
  Canada’s wartime Prime Minister, Dr 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, supported the national women’s press association by 
attending a meeting with the journalist members that significantly raised their profile.  
After the meeting, King wrote to the Canadian National Women’s Press Club 
president, Dora Dibney, that: 
193
                                                            
189 Audrey Tate, Fair Comment: The life of Pat Jarrett 1911-1990 [hereafter Pat Jarrett], 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1996, p. 79. 
 
190 Carol Harris, “Women Under Fire in World War Two”, British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2009, retrieved on 14 July 2010 at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/women_at_war_01.shtml>. 
191 Tate, Pat Jarrett, p. 79. 
192 Maurine H. Beasley, “Eleanor Roosevelt’s Press Conferences: Case Study in Class, 
Gender, and Race”, The Social Science Journal, vol. 37, no. 4, October 2000, pp. 517-528; 
US Library of Congress, “Women journalists”. 
193 Cited in Marjory Lang, Women Who Made the News: Female Journalists in Canada, 
1880-1945 [hereafter Women who made the news], McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Kingston, 1999,  
Chapter 3   The changing context of the Australian press, film and radio professions,  
1831-1945 
124 
 
As a result, specialist female reporters were seconded to Ottawa to become 
government media writers and to advise women on how to help win the war.  Only 
one woman, Margaret Aitken of The Toronto Telegram, covered the London 
conference of the British Empire in 1944.  Canadian women did not become war 
correspondents because the government discouraged them from travelling 
internationally.194  The prospects of securing an overseas news assignment were 
better for the Australian and US female journalists; they benefited from the strong 
press statements and groundbreaking news conferences given by the national leaders’ 
wives, Elsie Curtin and Eleanor Roosevelt.  Their active involvement in “the 
masculine, elite and exclusive world of the traditional public domain”, as described 
by media scholar John Hartley,195
 
 contributed to the creation of a new political 
agenda for future generations of women. 
 
Cinema “signifiers” 
Curtin’s electoral success was not only due to high-level government policies, 
decisions and organisations, but also because he articulated a powerful persona in 
popular cultural symbols, including films, which resonated with many Australians.  
The nation’s motion picture profession started slowly196 and in the 1930s, many 
filmmakers were struggling financially, realising “there were going to be very few 
films successfully made in Australia”.197  Prime Minister Scullin became Australia’s 
first prime minister to appear in a “talkie”,198 when he used a British Movietone 
News film to “speak to the people of Great Britain” about investment, manufacturing 
and trade opportunities in 1929.199
                                                                                                                                                                        
p. 95. 
  Australia’s Cinesound Productions and the rival 
multinational, the US-based Fox Movietone, began screening the country’s first 
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“talking” newsreels in 1931.200  In the 1930s, the filmmakers emphasised that “bright 
red Movietone wagons chased the news” to create the appearance of being 
independent reporters.201  By 1936, the nation had opened 1,334 sound cinemas.202  
Although Movietone occasionally showed direct addresses of Scullin,203 Lyons204 
and Menzies,205 Curtin became the first prime minister to develop extensively the 
film medium as a form of political communication.206  Due to the war, he sponsored 
the nation’s film industry to turn short newsreels from “novelties” into “important 
information vehicles”.207  Curtin presided over the creation of popular, narrative 
films, dramatic newsreels and carefully scripted, montage documentaries that 
articulated an Australian identity.208  Featuring distinctively Australian characters, 
the films were popular at home and also targeted a wide Allied audience;209
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movie studios had publicised their newly hired, Tasmanian-born actor, Errol Flynn, 
as being Irish because his home country was considered “too obscure” for US cinema 
fans.210  The films were popular with Australian moviegoers, as well as serving the 
government’s purpose to build national morale.211  The local industry benefited from 
the innovative techniques of the 1930s British realist filmmakers and lively US 
action pictures, as well as the technological, international innovations that allowed 
for more artistic sophistication.  Rapid advances were made in camera equipment, 
film stocks, colour and sound recording; the new technology was introduced in 
response to the leaders’ needs to disseminate war information easily.212
 
 
This war was unique in history because of the thoroughness with which it was 
recorded on film by the Allies and their Axis enemies; they created motion pictures 
for starkly different purposes.213  The totalitarian leaders attempted to exert their 
power and promote their style of belle guerre, or beautiful war, to vast film 
audiences.  Soon after German Fuehrer Adolf Hitler secured control in 1933, his 
propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, organised the movie industry to conform to 
the Nazi racial requirements.  Fictional, dramatic formats conveyed common themes: 
violent characterisations of Europe’s Jewish communities; gross caricatures of 
British leaders; and the exaltation of German “heroes”, including the nineteenth 
century Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Luftwaffe pilots and U-boat personnel.  
Italian films were designed to reflect the country’s new image as an imperial, 
conquering power.  Under the rule of the Italian Fascist Party leader, Benito 
Mussolini, the vast Cinecittà movie studios were built outside Rome and a film 
school, Centro Sperimentale di Cinemato-grafia, was established.  Mussolini’s son, 
Vittorio, pursued an active interest in the media, securing his name on film credits 
and on the masthead of a movie magazine.214
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their production of overtly propagandist films.  At the start of the international 
conflicts, Japanese movie companies were amalgamated and they produced 554 films 
until the country’s defeat in August 1945.  North American censors judged 225 of the 
Japanese movies to be feudal or anti-democratic.215
 
 
Hitler and Mussolini used symbols, myths, rituals and cults to contribute to 
their political identities, means and goals.  For example, many movies foregrounded 
Nazi and Fascist salutes, reminiscent of the imperial signals used by powerful, 
ancient Romans, while recounting fabricated tales about glorious, military 
victories.216  Hitler – as a failed artist who did not graduate from high school – 
delegated and distributed power “within the very heart of the population”, giving 
responsibilities to “a relatively large section” of “the masses” for conducting state 
functions including propaganda, repression, control and policing.217  Mussolini – a 
former daily newspaper owner dedicated to manipulating the media – liked to talk of 
his intentions to dominate “the masses” in the same way that a “sculptor” or “poet” 
would work at a craft, as he described to German journalist Emil Ludwig in 1932.  
“The masses” became an object to be moulded into a desired form through ideology 
and rhetoric.  Both dictators adopted a dramatic speaking style, as well as highly 
exaggerated facial expressions and gestures that mimicked the melodramatic, 
theatrical performances of an older era.218
 
 
For the purpose of countering the Axis media propaganda, Curtin publicised 
the heroism of the dedicated, hard-working and egalitarian Australian to the Allied 
world.  For example, Nazi radio propagandist, “Lord Haw Haw” (William Joyce), 
derisively labelled the Australian and British servicemen, who were besieged by 
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Rommel’s forces, as “the rats of Tobruk” in 1941.219  During the siege, AIF members 
made “Tobruk Rat” medals from shell casings and other metal scraps to present these 
to servicemen for valiant acts.  As an Argus reporter explained on 30 December, the 
triangular medal featured a brass rat and the inscription, “Presented by Lord Haw 
Haw to the Tobruk Rats, 1941”.220  Likewise, Curtin publicly turned the intended 
insult into a compliment during his radio broadcast to US audiences on 14 March 
1942.  He reminded Americans that Australians “are the Anzac breed.  Our men 
stormed Gallipoli.  They swept though the Libyan Desert.  They were the ‘rats of 
Tobruk’”.221  His radio statements were published in Time and one of the magazine’s 
writers likened Curtin’s eloquent rhetoric to the words of the US Civil War poet, 
Walt Whitman.  As the Time reporter opined, Curtin’s statements “should have 
roused the fight in the entire U.S. public”.222  A large, news picture distributing 
organisation in New York, Interphoto News Pictures, sent a cable to The Sydney 
Morning Herald, affirming that “Curtin’s speech made great impression”.  The 
newspaper’s general manager, Henderson, passed on the message to Curtin two days 
after his radio broadcast.223  As a result, the Nazis’ constructed “rats” image was 
overturned by Curtin, who used the same word-picture to create a heroic, admirable 
vision of Australians.  This mental image, “the signified”,224
 
 was legitimised by 
Allied filmmakers. 
In 1944, the Australian film director, Charles Chauvel, used the phrase 
promoted by Curtin and released a movie about the battle siege, The Rats of Tobruk.  
Two Australian actors, Peter Finch and “Chips Rafferty” (John William Goffage), 
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were granted official leave from their military responsibilities to perform in the 
movie’s leading roles.  Goffage was a flying officer with the Royal Australian Air 
Force.  Finch had been a gunner in the AIF and after the film’s release, he was 
promoted to the rank of sergeant.  The movie’s leading characters were Milo, a dingo 
trapper (Goffage), Bluey, a tough drover (Grant Taylor) and Pete, an English “new 
chum” (Finch).225  Such films represented a unique blend of social realism and 
lyricism, factual news and patriotism.  The same movie was released in the US under 
the title, The Fighting Rats of Tobruk.226  The cinematic tribute to the servicemen’s 
courage was justified.  Both Allied and enemy combatants testified that Australians 
were among the best troops fighting in the North African and Middle East regions in 
1941 and 1942.227
 
  While the Australian and Nazi movie industries shared the same 
objectives – to expose their enemies’ weaknesses and inspire their audiences to 
greater efforts to win the war – Curtin responded to Hitler’s messianic propaganda 
messages by forging partnerships with artistic filmmakers to create a national 
cinematic identity and a distinctive style celebrating austerity, egalitarianism and 
lyricism. 
In contrast to the Axis dictators’ projections of superiority, Curtin 
deliberately portrayed himself as an ordinary Australian in newsreels.228  Although 
there were significant differences between the propaganda techniques of Hitler and 
Curtin, both leaders cultivated a “man of the people” image.  Nazi newsreel images 
showed Hitler pausing to talk with groups of smiling, young schoolgirls, who 
presented him with flowers at military parades.229
                                                            
225 Chauvel, Rats of Tobruk. 
  It seems that these meetings were 
frequently staged and publicised globally as impromptu displays of affection for the 
Fuhrer.  For instance, General Motors Overseas Corporation circulated a multi-page 
cover story in its company house publication to state that Berlin’s streets “were full 
226 Chauvel and Munro, Fighting Rats of Tobruk. 
227 Mark Johnston, “The Hinge of Fate: Australians and Turning Points of World War II”, 
Tasmanian Historical Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2001, p. 31. 
228 David Day, “Curtin as Hero” [hereafter “Curtin as hero”], The Sydney Papers, vol. 12, no. 
2, autumn 2000, p. 65. 
229 According to British Pathé, this newsreel of Hitler, filmed at a Third Reich parade in 
Berlin, Germany, did not include any attached recorded details about the date or year.  
British Pathé, Third Reich Parade (newsreel), London, circa 1933-1945, retrieved on 13 
December 2010 at <http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=50250>.  Also see Schuler, 
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of people waiting to see Herr Hitler go meet the children” at the beginning of a 1934 
“May Day” festival.230  Through government-sanctioned documentaries, Curtin was 
portrayed to be an average, patriotic Australian, even though he worked tirelessly in 
his Canberra offices from 9am until midnight most days.  For example, Day referred 
to an official newsreel screened in an outdoor cinema near Darwin, showing an 
unpretentious Curtin strolling in his modest Cottesloe garden, an image which 
received spontaneous standing ovations from servicemen; this was evidence that he 
was “Australia personified” for many citizens.231  While Hitler’s objective was to 
convey that the masses were subordinate to him,232
 
 Curtin seemed to approve of film 
images that showed he identified with the aspirations of working-class Australians. 
Curtin’s reputation as “a man of the people” was so popular to American 
audiences that US magazine companies used his image in their advertisements, 
according to a “cabled report” printed in The Daily Mirror.  The news article stated 
that magazine publishers sponsored posters in New York subway cars, which showed 
a photograph of Curtin reading in bed and an eye-catching headline with an 
inaccurate title: “Australia’s Premier reads pulp fiction for exactly 1 hour in bed 
every night.”  The Daily Mirror repeated a statement “described in Canberra today” 
that “like any other man, Mr Curtin reads a few of the better type wild-Western 
stories for relaxation”.233  The US press also conveyed an endearing picture of Elsie 
Curtin; for example, The Sun quoted an article in America’s Look magazine, which 
described her as “the sort of woman who should be chosen as a typical mother for 
Mother’s Day”.234  At her press conference in Washington DC, Elsie Curtin 
surprised American female reporters by acknowledging that she shopped for 
groceries and cooked her family’s meals, rather than relying on domestic staff.235
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232 Lynette Finch, “The man in the street and Second World War propaganda” [hereafter 
“War propaganda”], Journal of Australian Studies, vol. 23, issue 60, 1999, p. 102. 
233 (Anon.), “Slick U.S. Magazines Use Curtin To Boost Sales”, The Daily Mirror, Sydney 
cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, JCPML acc. no. 00297/2, 9 October 1942. 
234 (Anon.),“Miracle Man Curtin”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 3 June 1942. 
235 Black, “Elsie Curtin”. 
Chapter 3   The changing context of the Australian press, film and radio professions,  
1831-1945 
131 
 
The public statements belied Curtin’s private interest in classical literature and Elsie 
Curtin’s political activism.   
 
Consistent with Curtin’s media image, Australian films were low budget 
productions that featured “individual stories of the everyday and mundane” with the 
use of central characters representing “the man in the street”.236  The DOI directed 
the content of film footage by distributing material to the country’s two major 
companies, Cinesound and Movietone, which provided different perspectives of the 
battle scenes for their audiences.  As Movietone was part of the US 20th Century Fox 
company, the filmmakers interspersed Australian footage with international scenes 
from overseas filmmakers.  Since Cinesound was associated with Australia’s Greater 
Union Cinemas, the company concentrated on the national war effort.237  Some 90 
per cent of Cinesound’s newsreel material focused on some aspect of the war by 
mid-1942.238  Apart from The Rats of Tobruk, which was released by a smaller 
company, Chamun Productions, the high-profile movies of this period included 
Kokoda Front Line! (1942),239 South-west Pacific (1943)240 and Jungle Patrol 
(1944);241 all titles were sponsored by the DOI.  South-west Pacific, for example, 
focused on vignettes of characters, talking about their war contributions to Australian 
and US audiences.  Chips Rafferty played the role of a young naval serviceman, 
recently returned from New York to see his girlfriend, a munitions factory worker 
and former beauty parlour assistant (Muriel Steinbeck).  In another scene, a motor 
mechanic (Bert Baily) addressed the camera to explain that his job of helping to 
construct aircraft “puts a mark on a man, a democratic mark.  Something [that] we 
will all be proud of once this war is won”.242
                                                            
236 Finch, “War propaganda”, p. 105. 
  The newsreel’s director, Ken G. Hall, 
used the technique of “back projection”, which allowed scenes, normally needing to 
be shot on location, to be filmed inside a studio.  The staged story was intercut with 
237 Fallows, War, p. 8; National Film and Sound Archive, “Cinesound review”. 
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Education, Australian Government Department of Education, Science and Training, 2002, 
retrieved on 22 January 2009 at 
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239 Hall, Kokoda front line. 
240 Hall, South-west Pacific. 
241 Gurr and Allan, Jungle patrol. 
242 Hall, South-west Pacific. 
Chapter 3   The changing context of the Australian press, film and radio professions,  
1831-1945 
132 
 
grainy, actuality footage of Australian vessels including HMAS Sydney, which had 
been sunk about two years earlier.243  Through these techniques, Hall cooperated 
with Curtin’s aims to create inexpensive newsreels that elicited audiences’ empathy 
and he became one of the country’s most popular producers.244
 
 
Yet auteur theory, which focuses on only one person as generating the source 
of meaning in a film, would be inadequate to represent the creative input of the casts 
and production crews.245
warfare in the Kokoda Track in New Guinea.
  Hall’s Cinesound company, for example, quickly 
acknowledged the success of the team effort to produce Kokoda Front Line!  This 
documentary won an Academy Award in 1942, the first time that an Australian film 
had been so honoured.  Parer filmed the scenes of young diggers in Kokoda Front 
Line!  The film was distributed to the newsreel cinemas of major Allied cities and 
audiences saw personalised, full shots of wounded, local men engaged in jungle  
246
… if only everybody in Australia could recognise that this country is in peril, 
that the Japanese are a well-equipped and dangerous enemy, we might forget 
about the trivial things and go ahead with the job of licking them.
  Parer’s powerful words were 
equally as stirring as the mise-en-scène of a close battle, appealing to an Australian 
sense of duty and self-sacrifice.  In a close-up shot, he emphasised: 
247
The film conveyed the same messages as Curtin’s media campaign that encouraged 
austerity and rationing.
 
248
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rehearsals and editing.249
 
  By promoting Curtin’s messages on the need for civic 
responsibility, teamwork and thrift, the film teams contributed to his popularity and 
strengthened public support for the war. 
After Menzies had established the DOI “to mobilise the film medium” in 
1939, Curtin greatly developed the prestige of the Australian film industry.  Despite 
the formidable challenges of rationing, conscription and the day-to-day battle for 
survival, Australia exported 3,378 standard-sized movies between 1939 and 1945, as 
recorded by government statisticians.  Eighty-six per cent of the 1939 film exports 
were distributed throughout the British Empire.  This percentage slightly decreased 
during the war, with 70 per cent of the 1944 movie exports sent to Britain.  Australia 
imported more North American movies, reflecting the increasing cultural links 
between the two countries.  The proportion of imported movies from the US 
increased from 34.8 per cent in 1939 to 55 per cent in 1944.  Altogether, Australian 
audiences watched 8,234 imported films throughout the war years and only 58 of 
these were rejected by the three-person Censorship Board, based in Sydney.250  
Australian cinemas imported films partly because of a shortage of skilled local 
technicians at the beginning of the war.251  About two weeks after becoming the 
prime minister, Curtin announced plans to produce Australian shorts for release 
through US film bureaus and transfer the National Publicity Association to New 
York; also he instigated the National Films Laboratory to process footage.252
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.  The 
publicity association was renamed the Australian News and Information Bureau.  In 
February 1944, Curtin told reporters he would give “more assistance and more 
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money” to the bureau’s head, David Bailey.253  These types of media strategies might 
have contributed to the international success of such films as Kokoda Front Line! and 
The Fighting Rats of Tobruk.  In 1944, the Australian Ministry of Information’s 
supervising editor of films for the liberated territories, Alan Osbiston, wrote in The 
Sydney Morning Herald that pre-war short films had been “the bugbear of 
exhibitors”; however, since then, “the immediate need is for shorts and a very serious 
need it is”.254  Curtin sponsored the 1945 foundation of the National Film Board to 
be responsible for training Australian film technicians and preparing for an increased 
production of documentaries.255
 
  Through his initiatives, he expanded the local film 
industry and its international stature. 
 
Radio news 
Along with his film strategies, one of Curtin’s foremost media priorities was to enlist 
the support of radio news broadcasters, particularly the traditionally conservative 
ABC.  In June 1942, an ABC report concluded that world leaders viewed the nation 
as “a vital centre of war” and in response, radio became “a major instrument of 
national policy”.256
 
  The following section will briefly outline the development of 
amateur radio operations into the intense, wartime broadcasts of the country’s 
professional journalists. 
Although continuous radio news pervaded 1940s Australian society, it was 
not a principal means of communicating government information to audiences during 
World War I.  The nation’s first radio station began operating in 1912, but the 
progress of this medium was slow and it was often funded by newspaper proprietors.  
Catering to public entertainment, regular broadcasting stations opened in Sydney in 
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1923.257  For the first time, Australian press journalists were confronted by the 
prospect of a rival, albeit much smaller, medium.  Technological developments were 
introduced as the principal media owners accumulated radio stations, which 
broadcast the main stories appearing in their newspapers.  By 1931, some 55 licensed 
stations operated nationwide, but the techniques of broadcasting had not changed 
markedly since its experimental stage.258  The next year, the Federal Parliament 
established the ABC, which immediately attracted a broad audience across the 
nation.259  Curtin early recognised a shift in the traditional mode of public address for 
Australian politicians.  Instead of devoting most of his public addresses to giving 
rousing, loud speeches in crowded, town halls and at beachside gatherings in the 
Fremantle electorate, he increasingly turned his oratory skills to the radio 
microphone in 1935.260  At the time, the number of commercial stations had 
expanded to 65 throughout the country and Murdoch owned stakes in 11 of these 
media outlets.261  Radio sets were found in two out of every three Australian homes 
by 1937, but the medium’s growing popularity did not immediately produce an 
increased quantity of news reports, more original sources or a wider range of voices.  
The ABC was allocating more than half of its airtime to music before the war and the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was viewed as the model to be emulated by 
Australian broadcasters.262
                                                            
257 Peter Mercer, “Getting the News”, Mercury Newspapers in Education, Hobart, 2009, 
retrieved on 22 January 2009 at 
<http://ink.iim.uts.edu.au/mercury/print_museum/gettingthenews.htm>. 
  Due to the new medium’s gradual evolution, the press 
258 Melbourne Observer, “The 3AW Story – Part 1”, Melbourne, 2005, retrieved on 23 
January 2009 at <http://www.overnighters.com.au/3awstory_01.htm>; Radio Heritage 
Foundation, “Australian Radio Dial 1931”, New Zealand, 2004-2008, retrieved on 23 
January 2009 at <http://www.radioheritage.net/Story133.asp>. 
259 Petersen, News not views, p. 11. 
260 L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 
1978, pp. 78, 88; Ian Ward, “The early use of radio for political communication in Australia 
and Canada: John Henry Austral, Mr Sage and the Man from Mars”, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, p. 322. 
261 Bruce Arnold, “Herald & Weekly Times: Overview”, Ketupa.net – A Media Industry 
Resource, 2007, retrieved on 21 January 2009 at <http://www.ketupa.net/hwt.htm>. 
262 Fiona Crawford, “Beyond the bakelite box: a history of commercial radio in Australia”, 
Macquarie University News, North Ryde, 2003, retrieved on 31 March 2008 at 
<http://www.pr.mq.edu.au/macnews/feb03/bakelite.htm>; Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Radio” 
[hereafter “Radio”], in Stuart Cunningham and Graeme Turner (eds), The Media and 
Communications in Australia [hereafter The media], Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, second 
edition, 2006, pp. 133-153; Petersen, News not views, p. 153. 
Chapter 3   The changing context of the Australian press, film and radio professions,  
1831-1945 
136 
 
was preeminent in the sphere of information and enjoyed a “social monopoly” during 
the 1940s.263
 
 
With the acceleration of European battles, the ABC reporters began a shift 
from relying on BBC and press reports to collecting their own news.264  In 1939 
Prime Minister Lyons directed the ABC to appoint its first Canberra news 
correspondent, Denning, because of his “dismay” over the Murdoch newspapers’ 
withdrawal of support for him.265  In the previously mentioned academic media 
survey published in August 1941, Professor A.P. Elkin concluded that 70 per cent 
of all age groups listened to radio news and afterwards, the majority discussed the 
reports with other people.  Elkin noted listeners disliked “repetition” and 
“padding” in the war news and he found a lack of interest in many Australian 
commentators because they seemed distant from the significant overseas crises.266  
Audiences preferred the BBC’s immediate new style of war coverage.267   As a 
result, the ABC established a mobile recording unit in Gaza to report on the 
Middle Eastern and Greek battles.268  When Curtin was the opposition leader in 
April 1941, he proposed for the ABC to “provide an adequate and independent 
news service under its own control”.269  As the prime minister, he backed the 
Australian Broadcasting Act, 1942, which provided freedom for the ABC to 
decide when and in which circumstances political speeches should be 
broadcast.270  The ABC commissioners worked with Curtin and the DOI to 
minimise contentious news broadcasts, which might alert the enemy to 
confidential military plans; they developed policies to ensure the exclusion of 
unconfirmed overseas reports.271
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service under the requirements of the 1942 Act, the organisation was able to 
increase eye-witness reports significantly.272
 
 
Curtin approved of the ABC’s significant investment in domestic and 
foreign correspondents to relay crucial information almost instantly.  Some 20 per 
cent of the station’s total program time was devoted to war-related news between 
June 1941 and June 1942.  Mobile recording units were established in Darwin in 
December 1941 and in New Guinea in 1942 to cover the Pacific battles.  At the 
ABC’s national offices, more federal political reporters began working in the 
Sydney and Melbourne stations by January 1942.  In the same year, it was agreed 
that all commercial stations would broadcast the first part of the ABC federal 
news bulletins three times a day.  Moreover, the commission offered to provide 
overseas news to the commercial competitors at no charge.  To give more time to 
the expanded political coverage, the ABC reduced its sports reports while 
religious talks and cultural programs increased to boost public morale.273  
Increasingly domestic audiences were able to tune into news collected from 
original sources, which were recounted by Australian voices.  The ABC’s 
expansion of national and Pacific regional radio operations reflected its close 
cooperation with Curtin’s requirements to abandon its “heavy reliance” on BBC 
material, which was “overwhelmingly concerned with the war in Europe”, and 
instead focus on the geographically closer war theatre.274
 
 
Curtin strengthened his reputation as an innovative, political communicator 
by initiating a number of groundbreaking radio broadcasts.  For example, he was the 
first Australian leader to make an independent declaration of war and gave a radio 
broadcast on 8 December 1941 to announce Japan’s entry to the war.275
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installing a new shortwave transmitting station.276  His addresses were positively 
portrayed in many of the nation’s daily newspapers and this will be elucidated later 
in the thesis.  During the 1943 election campaign, Curtin became the first party 
leader to deliver an election manifesto from Canberra through a radio hook-up.277
Help Labor and John Curtin win 
  
Also the ALP made effective use of radio jingles, such as: 
And so make sure of our defence 
Against the foes without, within,  
His leadership gives confidence. 
The advertisement emphasised Curtin’s personal popularity and suggested his 
inspiring leadership would enhance national security; the two complementary 
political themes might have contributed to his election victory in 1943.278  After the 
election, the prime minister’s sponsorship of more Australian-oriented radio news 
coverage was justified.  Ninety-one per cent of domestic radio listeners heard news 
relays regularly during the war.279  Similarly to films of the era, the stations produced 
a unifying effect on public audiences, with the ABC recognised as the nation’s 
authoritative radio voice.  It was only after the war that radio would become a 
medium of major social fragmentation, subdividing listeners according to their ages, 
education, locations, class backgrounds and income levels.280  Curtin’s ability to win 
the respect of the traditionally conservative ABC reporters was evidenced in an oral 
history provided by John Commins, a 1940s political news broadcaster, who 
described him as a “superb wartime leader”.281
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eyewitness broadcasts, and his public talks conveyed an assertive, Australian 
identity. 
 
 
Curtin and the mass media 
After an examination of the development of many of Australia’s major, metropolitan, 
daily newspapers and electronic media, from their inception to World War II, the 
historical method revealed a strong tradition of interlinked relationships between the 
news editors and political leaders.  Although some press organisations adopted 
visually appealing, pictorial features, incisive, editorial cartoons and front page news, 
these creative advancements in layout techniques were slow among the principal, 
mainstream, metropolitan newspapers at the turn of the twentieth century.  Yet far 
from taking a monolithic view, the research revealed that as Australia advanced to 
help win the Pacific war, a high level of diversity was developing among press 
organisations in terms of their political affiliations, social cultures, target audiences 
and the extent to which they were receptive to fresh trends in large, banner headlines, 
visual images and page one news.  Although some proprietors, such as Murdoch, 
Packer and Norton, showcased newspapers with brash, modern formats – particularly 
in the highly competitive media markets of Melbourne and Sydney – other press 
owners adhered steadfastly to traditional layouts with their covers filled with 
classified advertisements, a dearth of photographs and absence of editorial cartoons.  
Such old-fashioned print appearances were manifested in Fairfax’s The Sydney 
Morning Herald, Murdoch’s The West Australian, Knox’s The Argus, Shakespeare’s 
The Canberra Times and Syme’s The Age.  The press organisations were constrained 
by newsprint rationing, which forced owners to cut page numbers substantially and 
led to an emphasis on immediate, concise “hard news”, rather than longer features 
and in-depth analyses.   
 
Yet this study indicates the wartime newspapers cannot be divided into a 
simplistic, binary opposite of sensationalist, anti-establishment tabloids and serious, 
politically conservative broadsheets.  Strong variations and contrasting attitudes 
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emerged among different newspaper companies, as well as between some media 
owners and their employed journalists, and even within the press proprietors’ 
newsrooms.  Metropolitan news articles evidenced local loyalties to their respective 
states.  This tone was exemplified in The Brisbane Telegraph lobbying to secure 
more defence weapons due to Queenslanders’ sense of vulnerability to Japanese 
attacks, and the Northern Territory’s Army News warnings to avoid conversing with 
inhabitants of an enemy nation that was geographically closer to Darwin than to 
other Australian capital cities.  Yet the print media, including the isolated West 
Australian, reflected a shift from parochialism to a collective national consciousness 
and a sense of shared identity during the war.   
 
Many mainstream journalists shifted their support from Menzies to Curtin.  
The remarkably different media strategies adopted by Menzies and Curtin 
significantly affected their relationships with political reporters.  The two leaders’ 
strategies and attitudes towards journalists were evidenced in an innovative 
examination of primary sources including diaries, oral histories, press articles, radio 
and film transcripts.  Menzies’ public persona as an honest, hard-working, pro-
British Australian belied his complex press interactions.  Although journalists 
welcomed the UAP leader’s 1939 declaration of war, and recognised him as the 
former barrister who had helped to improve their working conditions, they began to 
develop more ambivalent attitudes.  In oral histories, these journalists criticised 
Menzies for his perceived, disdainful treatment of the news media, for reducing 
interview times and favouring The Sydney Morning Herald correspondent, 
McLaughlin.  Also his appointment of Murdoch to lead his censorship program 
appeared to backfire because rival proprietors complained about seemingly 
authoritarian directives.  Menzies’ diaries indicated his impatience with any reporter 
whom he deemed had misrepresented his Pacific strategy as “appeasement”.  He 
quickly recognised the benefits of broadcasting, being the first prime minister to 
announce on radio that Australia would follow Britain to war and creating the DOI to 
produce films in 1939.  Yet he did not appear in newsreels nor use radio talks to a 
significant extent in Australia.  His press relationship problems were compounded by 
his divided UAP-Country Party Coalition, a forceful opposition and a series of Allied 
military setbacks.  After he resigned and was replaced by the Country Party’s Arthur 
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Fadden on 28 August 1941, he turned to commercial radio in mid-1942 to advocate 
for the so-called “forgotten” middle class, thus paving the way for a political battle 
over the airwaves with Curtin, who had already begun his prime ministerial radio 
talks.   
 
As the AJA’s former WA district president and labour press editor, Curtin 
heralded a new era of optimism and a break from the previous public cynicism 
towards politicians, according to a Sydney University survey and Australian Public 
Opinion Polls.  To ascertain his success in generating positive news coverage about 
his wartime strategies, this chapter examined the political attitudes manifested in the 
media, from the highly experienced press owners, who were astute newsmen, to the 
staff journalists.  First, he responded skilfully to the overtures of powerful newspaper 
proprietors, such as Packer and Fairfax, who were aiming to establish closer ties with 
him.  Five news insiders – Packer, his business partner Theodore, Alan Fraser of The 
Daily Mirror, The Argus proprietor Errol Knox and The Herald journalist Pat Jarrett 
– joined the Federal Government administration.  Curtin’s second media strategy was 
not to be vindictive towards Murdoch’s right-wing company and he did not harbour 
grudges after his resounding electoral victory on 21 August 1943.  Instead he 
strengthened his amicable relationship with Murdoch’s trusted staff member, Joseph 
Alexander of The Herald.  Although Curtin was pressured by his ALP colleague, 
Robert Richards, to be more outspoken in redressing conservative editorial 
comments in SA’s Murdoch media, he cultivated a professional relationship with The 
Adelaide Advertiser editor, Lloyd Dumas.  After Dumas returned from a fact-finding 
tour of Allied countries, he discussed wartime strategies with Curtin.  By cultivating 
professional relationships with several press managers, appointing them to 
government positions and refusing to engage in public arguments with them, he 
helped to ameliorate mainstream news organisations. 
 
Thirdly, Curtin treated newspaper staff respectfully and seemed to enjoy 
talking with them, such as his discussion with editorial cartoonist John Frith from 
The Sydney Morning Herald.  He shared confidential war information with reporters 
at his twice-daily interviews and this will be examined in the next chapters.  Curtin 
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worked hard to maintain his friendships with WA newspapers, as evidenced in an 
oral history by Frank Davidson of The Sunday Times.  As the prime minister, he 
would travel by train from Canberra to visit his Fremantle electorate, speaking at 
Perth pubs, talking to local reporters, sometimes even riding in Davidson’s old 
Plymouth car to return to the railway station.  This high level of trust, respect and 
accessibility extended to his informative briefings of the regional press and women 
journalists.  Fourth, Elsie Curtin’s female press conferences enhanced the positive 
media image at home and in other Allied nations.  The primary sources revealed the 
Labor Party received editorial support from such diverse newspapers as The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The Sunday Times in Perth.  Even in the conservative Packer 
and Murdoch press, Curtin won the admiration of battle-hardened, Canberra-based 
correspondents.  The political news coverage will be investigated further from 
Chapters 6 to 9.   
 
Curtin used popular cultural symbols to expand an Australian tradition of 
cinematic innovations and combat the Axis film propaganda.  Through a semiotic 
analysis, this study showed that he overturned the Nazis’ “rats of Tobruk” insult by 
using the metaphor in his US radio talk and later it became the title of an 
internationally popular movie.  The “rats of Tobruk” became a noble symbol of the 
Anzac fighting spirit.  Fewer than one per cent of Australia’s imported films was 
censored by government authorities during the war years, according to the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics.  Yet as he became the prime 
minister, Curtin announced initiatives to develop closer links between the Australian 
and US film markets.  These strategies included producing and releasing Australian 
“shorts” to US film bureaus and transferring the National Publicity Association to 
New York.  For this purpose of enlarging Australia’s film industry, he instigated the 
National Films Laboratory to process footage and sponsored the foundation of the 
National Film Board to train local technicians and prepare for an increased 
production of documentaries.  Under Curtin’s leadership, Australian teams made 
highly acclaimed documentaries, newsreels and other films that helped to inspire the 
cinéma vérité movement later. 
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Likewise, he led a number of groundbreaking changes to political radio 
broadcasting.  The expansion of Australian radio programs seemed even more 
dramatic in comparison with the medium’s slow progress before the war, partly 
because of press hostility to the emergence of an independent competitor.  As a 
Labor politician in 1935, Curtin quickly recognised the importance of radio to 
influence voters.  He became the first prime minister to broadcast an independent 
Australian declaration of war; a direct radio talk to North Americans from Canberra; 
and a national election campaign speech from the federal capital.  By sponsoring new 
legislation, he provided more autonomy for the ABC to report independent news 
under the Australian Broadcasting Act, 1942.  Authentic Australian voices replaced 
British accents and the station promoted more federal news reporting and other local 
programs in response to Curtin’s strategies.  As a result of the ABC’s heightened 
coverage of the Pacific war, more Australians were being alerted to Curtin’s 
preeminent priority of fighting Japan.  His radio strategies were justified because of 
the medium’s popularity as a source of journalistic integrity and reliable news.  His 
skilful management of radio earned the respect of ABC wartime political journalist, 
John Commins; this helped Labor to retain the government and created a legacy for 
federal political reporting,  
 
Curtin, therefore, persuaded journalists to publicise his Pacific wartime 
strategies, both at home and abroad.  By speaking directly to radio and film 
international audiences, he developed an affinity with many Allied supporters, 
creating a unifying effect at a time when electronic broadcasters had not yet 
fragmented into smaller, separate, demographic sub-cultures.   Reputable national 
and overseas news organisations agreed with his assertions that Australia was a vital 
global war base to fight the Axis Japanese danger in the Pacific.  His media image as 
a dedicated, forceful and commonsense Australian leader struck a popular chord with 
audiences.  As a result of his success, his fellow ALP colleagues promoted him as a 
celebrity.  As outlined in this chapter, many Americans were interested in his 
favourite books, Elsie’s grocery shopping and the family meals; photographs of his 
face adorned New York subway posters and US magazine advertisements.  Time 
likened his rhetoric to Walt Whitman’s operatic poetry.  With these conclusions 
established that pertain to Curtin’s development and extensive use of confidential 
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news conferences, radio and wartime newsreels, the next chapter will compare the 
media strategies used by Churchill, Mackenzie King and Roosevelt.  Unique research 
will be conducted of primary and secondary sources relating to the Allied leaders and 
their propaganda campaigns to win domestic support for their foreign policies.  The 
investigation will include the role of press secretaries, media conferences, 
newspapers, radio reports, newsreels and censorship in Britain, Canada and the US.  
This research study will provide an international context to evaluate the closeness of 
Curtin’s relations with the press gallery.  
 
 
145 
 
Chapter 4 
Allied World War II leaders and their mass media agendas, 1939-1941 
 
 
Across the Allied nations of the world, war leaders mastered the use of rapidly 
expanding, mass media technology in a bid to control propaganda.  While several 
historians have focused on Curtin’s international relations,1 very little published 
research is to be found comparing the extensive mass media strategies developed by 
the Allied leaders in Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States.  The purpose 
of such a global analysis would be to indicate whether aspects of Curtin’s 
communications policies were unique.  To achieve this aim, this chapter examines 
the dominant British and US powers2 as well as Canada because the latter was 
another middle-ranking power, similar to Australia, with a federal parliamentary 
democracy, an English political heritage and a strong tradition of press freedom.  
Furthermore, a two-country comparative analysis of the journalism strategies of the 
wartime Canadian and Australian governments would help to extend our knowledge 
of the Canberra political sphere at this time.3
                                                            
1 E.g. David Black, ‘Friendship is a sheltering tree’: John Curtin’s letters 1907 to 1945 
[hereafter John Curtin’s letters], John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], 
Perth, 2001; David Black, “The Art of the Possible: Creating an independent Australian 
foreign policy 1941-1945” [hereafter “The art of the possible”], JCPML, Bentley, 2004, 
retrieved on 4 June 2008 at <
  Therefore to understand Curtin’s press 
interactions in the context of the Allied 1940s milieu, this chapter will compare the 
media relations of Churchill, Canada’s Mackenzie King and Roosevelt.  Part of the 
work of this chapter is a fresh investigation of primary sources relating to these three 
leaders and their campaigns to win media support for their foreign policies.  While 
http://john.curtin.edu.au/artofthepossible/printessay.html>; 
Bobbie Oliver, “Shaping the Nation: John Curtin and Australia” [hereafter “Shaping the 
nation”], JCPML, Bentley, 2001, retrieved on 4 June 2008 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/shapingthenation/index.htm>; Geoffrey Serle, For Australia and 
Labor, JCPML, Bentley, 1998; Bob Wurth, Saving Australia: Curtin’s secret peace with 
Japan [hereafter Saving Australia], Lothian Books, South Melbourne, 2006. 
2 In 1939 the British Empire and the US accounted for about 60 per cent of the world’s 
industrial production and controlled about three-quarters of its mineral wealth.  Yet the Axis 
countries dominated a third of the global population and minerals by 1942.  See David 
Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International 
History of the 1940s, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 2006, p. 61. 
3 Paul Chantrill, “Social Policy Development in Australia and Canada: Historical and 
Comparative Approaches”, Australian-Canadian Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 1999, pp. 41-58. 
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historians have noted that Churchill, King and Roosevelt were concerned chiefly 
with the European war – and the Pacific theatre was a lesser priority4
 
 – it will be 
shown that Australian security was a prominent subject at several of the leaders’ 
press conferences, as detailed later in this chapter.  Furthermore, an assessment of 
King’s diaries indicated that other Allied leaders respected Curtin’s eloquent 
speeches and his rapport with journalists.  This investigation of primary and 
secondary materials included the role of press secretaries, media conferences, 
newspapers, radio reports, newsreels and censorship in Britain, Canada and the US.  
This work provides an international context in which to evaluate the closeness of 
Curtin’s relations with the Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery.  
 
Press relationships 
Similarly to Curtin, the other three Allied leaders developed an early affiliation with 
the press and spent varying degrees of time as working journalists that later assisted 
their ability to develop media strategies as political leaders.  In contrast to Curtin, the 
British, Canadian and US leaders were from privileged family backgrounds and they 
attended prestigious education institutions.  Churchill was educated at Harrow and 
the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.  While a young British soldier in 1895, 
Churchill travelled with Spanish troops and wrote about Cuba’s fight for 
independence, sending his news stories to London’s Daily Graphic.  The following 
year, he despatched regular reports from India to another popular English newspaper, 
the Daily Telegraph, and provided direct accounts of the British re-conquest of the 
Sudan in 1898.  His political ambitions were supported by Alfred Harmsworth (later 
Baron Northcliffe), the owner of The Times, the Sunday Times, the Observer, the 
Daily Mirror and the Daily Mail.  During Churchill’s first quest for a parliamentary 
seat, Harmsworth attempted to drive the aspiring Conservative Party candidate in a 
                                                            
4 See Advisory War Council, “Advisory War Council Minutes”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00641/1, 19 June 1942; David Black, “Menzies and Curtin in World War Two: A 
comparative essay” [hereafter “Menzies and Curtin”], JCPML, Bentley, 2006, retrieved on 
10 May 2008 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/ww2leaders>; Paul Hasluck, Australia In The War 
Of 1939-1945: The Government And the People 1942-1945, The Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra, vol. 2, 1970, pp. 153-154; Wurth, Saving Australia, p. 163. 
Chapter 4   Allied World War II leaders and their mass media agendas, 1939-1945 
147 
 
new motor car to the Oldham constituency to conduct door-to-door campaigns in 
early 1899.  Harmsworth was forced to stop the journey after six tyre punctures, but 
continued to support Churchill in the Daily Mail, although he did not win the by-
election.5  Instead Churchill developed a reputation as a skilful writer among 
London’s editors.  The Morning Post hired him to cover South Africa’s Boer War in 
1899 and he became the highest-paid war correspondent in history to that point.  It is 
believed his early publications extended to other British newspapers.6
 
 
The youthful journalist forged alliances with conservative, London news 
executives until the rise of Nazism in Europe.  After winning the seat of Oldham in 
the 1900 general elections, Churchill remained friendly with Harmsworth’s younger 
brother, Harold (Baron Rothermere), who took over the newspaper chain in 1922.  
As the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1926, Churchill edited eight issues of the 
government’s news sheet, the British Gazette, during the general strike that included 
press workers, who refused to print regular newspapers.  Instilling his faith in the 
power of the Gazette to influence public audiences, Churchill used strike breakers to 
expand the print run from 232,000 copies to about two million news sheets for each 
issue until the industrial action ended on 12 May 1926.7  Two months after the 
Conservative Party’s electoral defeat in May 1929, Churchill wrote to the US 
newspaper owner, William Randolph Hearst, that: “We must discuss the future of the 
world, even if we cannot decide it.”8
                                                            
5 Paul Ferris, The house of Northcliffe: A Biography of an Empire, The World Publishing 
Company, New York, 1972, pp. 93-94. 
  Also he developed a strong friendship with 
Canadian-born press proprietor, Maxwell Aitken (Baron Beaverbrook), owner of 
6 Paul Addison, Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005; 
Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War, Hambledon and London, London, 2005; Brenda Haugen, 
Winston Churchill: British Soldier, Writer, Statesman, Compass Point Books, Minneapolis, 
2006 [hereafter Winston Churchill]; David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill 
Fighting and Writing the Second World War, Allen Lane, London, 2004; Simon Tait, “A war 
leader’s love affair with the press” [hereafter “A war leader”], The Times, London, 8 March 
2008, p. 80. 
7 Fred Farrow, “Churchill and the General Strike”, International Churchill Societies 1994-
95, London, 1995, retrieved on 19 Dec 2010 at 
<http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/biography/radical/churchill-and-the-general-strike>; 
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, In 1926: Living At The Edge Of Time, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998, p. 218; Chris Wrigley, Winston Churchill: A Biographical Companion, 
ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 2002, pp. 188-189. 
8 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: The Wilderness Years 1929-1935 [hereafter 
Churchill], Heinemann, London, vol. 5, companion part 2, 1981, p. 31. 
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London’s widely read Daily Express, the Sunday Express and the Evening Standard.  
In a 1930 letter, Churchill addressed him as “my dear Max” and noted: “We both had 
to try very hard when we were young.”9  Through these associations, he became a 
contracted columnist for several London newspapers during the 1930s and needed to 
employ a team of secretaries and assistants to help him to complete hundreds of 
articles.  Yet as the Nazis ascended in Germany, his anti-appeasement views led to 
disagreements with London newspaper owners.  Harold Harmsworth sympathised 
with Hitler and Mussolini; in 1938 Aitken predicted in the Daily Express that Britain 
would not be involved in a European war.  Although Aitken ended Churchill’s 
Evening Standard contract in the same year due to their political differences, they 
remained friends.10
 
 
When Churchill became the prime minister on 10 May 1940, he did not bear 
a grudge against Aitken and this helped him to generate favourable news coverage in 
the conservative press.  In this respect, his press relations resembled Curtin’s strategy 
of cultivating various sections of the press.11
minister of aircraft production
  Churchill appointed Aitken as the 
 and later, the minister of supply during the war.  
Another powerful news executive, Brendan Bracken, became minister of information 
from July 1941.  Bracken was the editor of the Financial News, The Economist, the 
Investors Chronicle, the Liverpool Journal of Commerce and The Practitioner.  In 
1945, he was made First Lord of the Admiralty, but lost his Cabinet position with the 
Conservative Party’s defeat on 27 July 1945.12
                                                            
9 Gilbert, Churchill, p. 183. 
  Churchill’s powerful media contacts 
10 Michael J. Cohen, “The Churchill-Gilbert Symbiosis: Myth and Reality, Martin Gilbert, 
Churchill and the Jews”, Modern Judaism: A Journal of Jewish Ideas and Experience, vol. 
28, no. 2, 2008, pp. 224-225, endnote 26, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<http://mj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/28/2/204>; Tait, “A war leader”, p. 80. 
11 See for example, J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957” [hereafter “Papers”], National 
Library of Australia, Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA acc. no. MS 2389, August 
1943, transcript np; Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np. 
12Charles Edward Lysaght, “Brendan Bracken: ‘The Fantasist Whose Dreams Came True’” 
[hereafter “Bracken”], Finest Hour, The Churchill Centre, no. 113, winter 2001-2002, p. 18. 
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did not prevent the decisive victory of the Labour Party, whose promises of post-war 
economic prosperity appealed to many Britons.13
 
 
In Canada, Mackenzie King’s family enjoyed a long-time association with the 
nation’s press.  He was the grandson of the independent newspaperman and Toronto 
mayor, William Lyon Mackenzie, who had started the Colonial Advocate in 1826.  
He was sympathetic with the politically radical aims of his grandfather, who was a 
leader of the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837 and 1838, seeking to overthrow 
British colonial authorities and conservative Tory groups.  Mackenzie King’s father, 
a lawyer, drafted the nation’s libel legislation and was accepted as an honorary 
member of the Canadian Press Association.14  Emulating his grandfather’s career 
path, King was a newspaper reporter for the nation’s leading daily newspaper, The 
Globe and Mail, while completing a bachelor of arts, a bachelor of laws and a master 
of arts at the University of Toronto, where he graduated in 1897.  Also he graduated 
with a MA in political economy and a doctorate at Harvard University, where 
Roosevelt had received a BA in history.  Later in a letter to Curtin, Roosevelt wrote 
he had been “close to Mackenzie King almost since we were boys”.15  King 
published almost 400 articles between 1893 and 1906, mostly in newspapers such as 
The Globe and Mail, as well as The Daily Mail and Empire.16
                                                            
13 Ashley Jackson, “Churchill: Warrior and Writer”, The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 96, no. 2, 2007, pp. 193-199, retrieved on 8 December 
2008 at 
<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a782905111~db=all~order=page>. 
  Beginning in 1900, 
King edited the Labour Gazette in Canada’s new Department of Labour, where he 
campaigned actively against child labour.  As part of his public service journalism, 
he prepared speeches for Canada’s postmaster general, who then oversaw 
government labour matters.  The young writer became a friend of The Globe and 
Mail business manager J.F. Mackay, who assisted him to win a parliamentary seat as 
14 William Lyon Mackenzie King, “The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King” 
[hereafter “Diaries”], Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 16 December 1944, retrieved on 
8 December 2008 at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html>. 
15 Franklin D. Roosevelt to John Curtin, Australian Government Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Barton, vol. 7, 3 January 1944, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf>. 
16 Library and Archives Canada, “The Political Man of Letters: Mackenzie King as Writer 
and Bookman”, Ottawa, 2002, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/king/023011-1010.02-e.html>. 
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a Liberal Party of Canada candidate in the 1908 election.  Mackay reminisced, “he 
took some small part at the time of his (King’s) entrance into public life”.17  King 
was also a close friend of J.E. Atkinson, owner of the Toronto Star.18
 
 
Despite this powerful press support, King lost his seat in the 1911 election 
and was appointed the director of the industrial relations department of the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the US.  Hallahan wrote of King’s contributions to the 
development of modern public relations as a consultant to John D. Rockefeller Jnr. in 
the bitter aftermath of the Colorado coal strike during 1913 and 1914.19  In addition 
to advising Rockefeller, King was the editor of his Canadian political party’s journal, 
The Liberal Monthly, which began publication in 1913.  In editorials, he focused on 
the need to reduce living costs, increase employment and abolish a reportedly 
“corrupt” alliance between the Conservative Party and big business interests.  Such 
persuasive editorials assisted him to win and retain the leadership of the Liberal Party 
from 1919 until he resigned in 1948.20
 
  He was Canada’s longest serving prime 
minister, holding this position intermittently for 22 years, from 1921 to 1930 and 
later from 1935 until his resignation.  As with Churchill, King seemed to make the 
transition easily from newspaper reporting to leading an Allied nation. 
Roosevelt (or FDR) liked to view the White House Press Corps as his 
colleagues, often referring to his undergraduate experience as the managing editor 
and president of his university’s newspaper, The Harvard Crimson.21
  
 During the  
                                                            
17 Henry Stanley Ferns, The age of Mackenzie King: the rise of the leader [hereafter 
Mackenzie King], Heinemann, London, 1955, p. 95. 
18 Ferns, Mackenzie King, p. 182. 
19 K.W.L. Hallahan, “Mackenzie King: Rockefeller’s ‘other’ public relations counsellor in 
Colorado”, Public Relations Review, vol. 29, no. 4, November 2003, pp. 401-414. 
20 Ferns, Mackenzie King, p. 167. 
21 Henry F. Graff (ed.), “Presidents and the press” [hereafter “Presidents”], in Presidents: A 
Reference History, Macmillan Publishing Company, London, 1997, retrieved on 8 December 
2008 at <http://www.presidentprofiles.com/General-Information/A-History-of-the-
Presidency-Presidents-and-the-press.html>. 
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newspaper’s seventieth anniversary in 1943, FDR said:  
I am sure that I voice the sentiment of all that company of happy men when I 
say that none of them would exchange his CRIMSON [sic] training for any 
other experience or association in college days.22
His good-natured relationship with working journalists was evidenced in the 
transcripts of his White House press conferences.  For example, he joked with the 
nation’s newspaper financial editors at the beginning of an interview on 6 January 
1942, when he said: “Of course, very few newspapermen know the difference 
between a dollar and a dime, anyway.  But then, on the other hand, very few 
Presidents do.  So we start even.”
   
23
I had suggested to him (Churchill) this morning that if he came to this 
conference he would have to be prepared to meet the US press, who, 
compared with the British press –  as was my experience in the old days – are 
‘wolves’ compared with the British press ‘lambs’.
  During a White House press conference with 
Churchill on 23 December 1941, FDR explained to correspondents:  
24
The transcript did not indicate whether Churchill agreed with the light-hearted 
description of his country’s journalists as mild-mannered and the White House media 
as aggressive.  Yet the US reporters developed a friendship with the president and 
their goodwill extended to other Allied leaders, who were invited to his news 
interviews.  During Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to a conference on 19 February 
1943, Roosevelt announced that he and journalists “still talk to each other.  I think 
we rather like each other.”  His comments were greeted with laughter from the White 
House press.
 
25
                                                            
22 
  Churchill, too, was fond of referring to his past press career at the 
Philip M. Boffey, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Harvard”, The Harvard Crimson, 
Cambridge, 13 December 1957, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=108910>.  
23 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Extracts from the Press Conference” [hereafter “Press 
conference”], in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds), The American Presidency 
Project [hereafter American presidency project], Santa Barbara, 6 January 1942, retrieved on 
8 December 2008 at 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences.php?year=1942&Submit=DISPLAY>. 
24 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 23 December 1941. 
25 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 19 February 1943. 
Chapter 4   Allied World War II leaders and their mass media agendas, 1939-1945 
152 
 
conferences.  When journalists were covering an Allied meeting in Quebec, Canada, 
on 24 August 1943, Churchill told them:  
As an old reporter, newspaperman, war correspondent, when most of you 
were still unborn, I know the feelings of irritation which come when the 
trouble taken by the press does not seem to reap a proportionate reward. 26
He described them as “probably the most distinguished body of great representatives 
that could be gathered together”.  King was equally respectful towards the media in 
Quebec, saying, “how deeply we appreciate the very helpful cooperation that you 
have given to all of us during the period of the conference”.
 
27
 
  All three Allied 
leaders referred to their previous journalism experiences to try to develop favourable 
media relations in a bid to gain positive news coverage. 
 
Media management 
Due to their early press associations, Churchill, King and Roosevelt recognised that 
one of their top wartime strategies was to invest in cultivating good media relations.  
Yet they did not grant interviews as frequently as Curtin’s twice-daily conferences.  
When FDR was inaugurated for his first presidential term on 4 March 1933, 
mainstream US correspondents were adopting a new interpretive style of reporting.  
They were spurning factual, objective news in favour of investigative, analytical 
stories, which provided reasons for such national crises as the 1930s economic 
depression.28  Glamorous images were replaced with a gritty photojournalism, 
depicting the social problems of rising national joblessness.29
                                                            
26 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 24 August 1943. 
  Generally news 
correspondents viewed their professional responsibility as interpreting not only the 
27 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 24 August 1943. 
28 Betty Houchin Winfield, FDR and the News Media [hereafter FDR], University of Illinois 
Press, Urbana, 1990, p. 53. 
29 K. S. Miller, “U.S. Public Relations History: Knowledge and Limitations”, in M. E. Roloff 
(ed.), Communication Yearbook 23, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2000, p. 385. 
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“cold, hard facts” but also “complex arguments and ideas” to public audiences.  As 
Mickler and Lucy note:  
It is part and parcel of a journalist’s job to interpret for a popular readership 
the many branches of knowledge, each with its own particular jargon, which 
various experts use to comment on life and society.30
To explain his intricate “New Deal” government work projects to journalists, 
Roosevelt became the first president to employ a full-time press secretary, Stephen 
T. Early, who remained in the White House administration during the war.  Early’s 
predecessors were involved in other presidential duties, extending beyond public 
relations.  Since he was an experienced reporter for the Associated Press, United 
Press and Paramount News, Early was given responsibility for coordinating the 
White House news conferences.
 
31  The presidential interviews were not new.  FDR’s 
distant cousin, Theodore Roosevelt, would chat with reporters while he was being 
shaved during morning interviews at the White House, beginning in 1902.  The 
meetings were formalised in 1913 by another one of FDR’s predecessors, Woodrow 
Wilson, who expected correspondents to submit written questions in advance.  
President Hoover continued Wilson’s official press policies and answered prepared 
media questions during his term from 1929 to 1933.  According to FDR historian, 
Betty Houchin Winfield, most of the US presidents found it difficult to tolerate 
media independence and the democratic ideal of a free press.32
 
 
Roosevelt increased the frequency of the presidential press conferences by 
holding twice-weekly news interviews during his terms.  This amounted to 998 
conferences during slightly more than 12 years, from 8 March 1933 to 5 April 
1945.33
                                                            
30 Niall Lucy and Steve Mickler, The War On Democracy: Conservative Opinion in the 
Australian Press [hereafter The war on democracy], University of Western Australia Press, 
Crawley, 2006, p. 89. 
  For the first time, reporters were allowed to attribute selected, news-
31 Linda Lotridge Levin, The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. Early, America’s First 
Modern Press Secretary, Prometheus Books, New York, 2008; Diana Knott Martinelli and 
Jeff Mucciarone, “New deal public relations: A glimpse into FDR press secretary Stephen 
Early’s work”, Public Relations Review, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2007, pp. 49-57. 
32 Winfield, FDR, p. 2. 
33 Richard M. Perloff, Political Communication: Politics, Press, and Public in America, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey and London, 1998, p. 39. 
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breaking announcements to the president, when he announced them at the press 
conferences.  This practice continued after FDR’s death on 12 April 1945.  Harry 
Truman, FDR’s successor as president, also a Democrat, “read the rules” to 
journalists at his first White House media interview on 17 April.  The rules were “in 
keeping with the practice of President Roosevelt’s news meetings with the press”, 
Truman explained.  Off-the-record, confidential announcements “are to be kept 
secret by the newspapermen attending the conferences and not passed on by them to 
outsiders”.  Background information “may be given to the press for its guidance and 
use” but “it cannot be attributed to the President”.  News information might be 
attributed to the president, but he could not be quoted directly “unless he gives 
special permission”.34  Occasionally FDR would agree to correspondents’ requests to 
quote him directly at the interviews, thereby setting a precedent in White House 
media relations.35
 
 
The conference transcripts indicated that White House correspondents 
accepted FDR’s strict rules of etiquette.  For example, they seemed to honour 
Roosevelt’s “off-the-record” agreement and maintained confidentiality about his trip 
to see Churchill at Casablanca in January 1943.  Afterwards he thanked “the press 
and the radio of the United States for living up so very faithfully” to the privacy 
deal.36  In reality, editors “had the fidgets” during the news ban, according to Time, 
which printed the story about FDR’s North African travels on 8 February 1943.  The 
Time writer added that many press headlines “hinted to the hilt” about the 
presidential journey immediately before the Casablanca meeting, causing public 
rumours and chaos.37
  
  The nation’s leading magazine reflected more sympathy for 
Roosevelt than for the reportedly impatient news executives from rival publications.   
                                                            
34 Harry Truman, “The President’s News Conference”, in Woolley and Peters, American 
presidency project, 17 April 1945. 
35 E.g. Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 9 December 1941. 
36 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 2 February 1943. 
37 (Anon.), “Casablanca Story”, Time, New York, 8 February 1943, retrieved on 9 December 
2008 at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,774228,00.html>. 
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Yet the press remained secretive about his struggle with paralysis during the war.38
 
  
Due to the relaxation of Wilson’s rules about submitting questions, reporters enjoyed 
the freedom to ask spontaneous questions during FDR’s conferences; they decided to 
focus on his military strategies rather than his health. 
On some occasions, the press chose to direct the interviews towards a 
discussion of Australia, particularly during Churchill’s visits to the White House.  
Roosevelt’s press conferences provided fresh insights on how he and Churchill 
managed Pacific news and relayed messages intended for Australian audiences.39
We are going to do our utmost to defend Singapore and its approaches until 
the situation becomes so favourable to us that the general offensive in the 
Pacific can be resumed.
  
On 23 December 1941, FDR introduced Churchill, who disdained the idea of 
“banning questions” and answered the first journalist’s query, which related to 
Australia. “What about Singapore, Mr. Prime Minister?” the unidentified 
correspondent asked.  “The people of Australia are terribly anxious about it.  Would 
you say to be of good cheer?”  Churchill replied: 
40
At another joint interview with Churchill on 25 May 1943, the first question focused 
on Australia.  “Mr Prime Minister, in Australia there is a very great fear as to the 
Japanese threat in that area.  What is your feeling about the matter?” the unnamed 
reporter asked.  Churchill answered: “The threat is certainly, in our opinion, less 
serious than it was when I saw you last in this room [on] December 23, 1941.”  Later 
he added: “I am very anxious to increase the intensity of the war effort against 
 
                                                            
38 In 2003 health researchers debated whether FDR had polio or Guillain-Barre syndrome.  
(Anon.), “New Study Questions Roosevelt’s Polio”, The New York Times, New York, 1 
November 2003, retrieved on 13 December 2008 at 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9C00EFD91230F932A35752
C1A9659C8B63>; Hugh Gallagher, “The Politics of Polio” [hereafter “Politics”], Social 
Education, vol. 60, no. 5, 1996, pp. 264-266. 
39 To my knowledge, no previous researcher has published findings on Roosevelt’s answers 
to press queries about Australia. 
40 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 23 December 1941. 
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Japan”.41
Mr President, there is a great deal of disturbed feeling in Australia as 
reflected by dispatches by US correspondents from there, as to the authority 
that General MacArthur has, and as to what naval forces are at his disposal.
  Another interviewer referred to the southern hemisphere at FDR’s 
conference on 24 April 1942.  The correspondent stated: 
42
Roosevelt responded that “a particular little group” of newspapers had “completely 
falsified” his statement by reporting the “Pacific” would be under the command of 
General MacArthur.  He corrected the reporters by stating “the phrase was Southwest 
Pacific” for MacArthur’s area of command.
 
43
 
  At each of the three interviews, the 
leaders framed their media responses to send a message of support for Australia. 
The press exchanges indicated reporters gave a strong priority to Australian 
security during the international news conferences.  After journalists asked about 
Australia’s safety during two of Roosevelt’s joint media briefings with Churchill,44 
the leaders’ responses were favourably portrayed in major Australian newspaper 
front pages.45  Their first joint conference on the Pacific war, held on 23 December 
1941, attracted about 250 correspondents including representatives from the 
Australian Associated Press (AAP), Melbourne’s Argus and The Sydney Morning 
Herald.46  Also the FDR interview transcripts suggested that Curtin faced 
considerable challenges in his efforts to assert his nation’s independence to Allied 
leaders.  Roosevelt did not seem to share Curtin’s views about Australian autonomy.  
At a press conference on 6 February 1942, the president reminded correspondents 
that, “London of course includes the British Empire people – Australia and New 
Zealand – and it also includes the Dutch Government in London”.47
                                                            
41 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 25 May 1943. 
  By stating 
directly that “London” represented the two southern hemisphere countries and 
Holland, Roosevelt was not recognising Curtin’s assertion of Australian 
42 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 24 April 1942. 
43 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 24 April 1942. 
44 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 23 December 1941, 25 May 1943. 
45 E.g. The Argus [hereafter Argus], Melbourne, 26 December 1941, p. 1, 27 May 1943, p. 1; 
The Canberra Times [hereafter Canberra], Canberra, 25 December 1941, p. 1, 27 May 1943, 
p. 1; The Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter SMH], Sydney, 25 December 1941, p. 1. 
46 Argus, 26 December 1941, p. 1; SMH, 25 December 1941, p. 1. 
47 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 6 February 1942. 
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sovereignty.48  Yet he was responsive to Curtin’s requests for US assistance.  At 
another news interview four days later, Roosevelt noted it was important for 
Americans to resist their “complacency” about the Pacific during the war against 
Japan.  He told reporters that in the Pacific: “We are engaged in preventing 
breakthroughs and damaging or destroying as much of the personnel and material of 
the enemy as we possibly can”.49
 
  While the Allied leaders’ top priority was beating 
Hitler, the transcripts suggested that Curtin promoted Australia’s plight successfully 
to the international media. 
Despite the “rules”, Roosevelt cultivated an informal tone during the news 
interviews.  Visiting Quebec on 16 September 1944, he told the White House press 
that: 
… the Prime Minister of Canada asked me to address you in a formal manner, 
but we have never done a thing like that before in a press conference yet, and 
I hope I won’t have to begin in Quebec.50
The good-natured rapport between FDR and working journalists was evidenced in 
the Australian journalist Joseph Alexander’s diaries.  Alexander recalled his meeting 
with a New York Times correspondent in Canberra on 17 November 1941.  The US 
reporter “says he bet Roosevelt a new hat” that Nazi Germany would not attempt 
another invasion of England, Alexander wrote.
  
51
 
 
While FDR developed good relations with the White House Press Corps, he 
complained about some media proprietors.  At a conference on 1 October 1942, he  
  
                                                            
48 David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings, Paradigm 
Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 197; John Curtin, “The Task Ahead”, The 
Herald, Melbourne, cited in JCPML, Bentley, 27 December 1941, retrieved on 25 January 
2011 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/pmportal/text/00468.html>; Jeffrey Grey, A Military 
History of Australia [hereafter Military history], Cambridge University Press, Port 
Melbourne, third edition, 2008, p. 176. 
49 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 10 February 1942. 
50 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 16 September 1944. 
51 Alexander, “Papers”. 
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talked about: 
… certain elements in press and radio that are hurting the war effort.  And we 
all know.  I don’t have to particularize on it at all.  You people know even 
better than I do who the fellows are, who the owners of the papers are.52
In an undated letter to Churchill, FDR commented on “that delightful god, which we 
worship in common, called ‘the freedom of the press’”.  He surmised the news 
stories were generally “not so bad”, but acknowledged both leaders were “menaced” 
by “a handful or two of gentlemen who cannot get politics out of their heads in the 
worst crisis”.
  
53  The president’s pro-war policies were opposed by the “isolationist”, 
conservative US newspaper owners, Hearst, Colonel Robert McCormick and Cissy 
Paterson.54  Moreover, Truman also enjoyed the informality and camaraderie of 
White House journalists, but he “despised press lords”, according to his biographer, 
David McCulloch.55  Truman would give only three or four media conferences a 
month, a significantly smaller number than Roosevelt’s wartime briefings.56
 
 
Both FDR and Truman attached great importance to public opinion polls, 
even though the reliability of such surveys seemed questionable by today’s 
standards.  The historian, Hal Brands, wrote of serious flaws in 1940s surveys due to 
the pollsters’ simplistic questions, which discouraged a range of nuanced, reasoned 
answers.57
                                                            
52 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 1 October 1942. 
  Yet the Roosevelt and Truman administrations would use polls to 
ascertain US attitudes about a range of wartime issues, which would become the 
53 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Boston, 1950, p. 200. 
54 Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American public opinion, and 
the war against Nazi Germany, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2001, pp. 
155, 215. 
55 David McCulloch, Truman, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992, pp. 492-493, 818-819. 
56 William James Willis and Jim Willis, The Media Effect: How the News Influences Politics 
and Government [hereafter The media effect], Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 
2007, p. 108. 
57 Hal Brands, “Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and Policy in the American Debate over the 
Japanese emperor during World War II” [hereafter “World War II”], Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs, vol. 8, no. 3, 2005, p. 432. 
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basis of news stories and regular press columns.58  For example, Brands referred to a 
“flawed” survey conducted by Dr George Gallup’s company, The American Institute 
of Public Opinion.  Respondents were asked about their views of the Japanese 
Emperor Hirohito in June 1945.  The questions were designed to inflame American 
animosity towards Hirohito, although some US political advisers were attempting to 
shift the blame from the emperor to the Japanese military.  The findings probably 
would have influenced Truman’s perceptions of the level of anti-emperor sentiment 
in the US, according to Brands.59  As polls became more sophisticated and pervasive 
in domestic political news coverage, their accuracy was increasingly challenged by 
contemporary analysts.60
 
 
In contrast to the voluminous books about FDR’s press interactions, there has 
been little investigation of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s diaries for the 
purpose of publishing an analysis of his media relationships.  King began keeping a 
diary as a University of Toronto undergraduate in 1893 and continued his 
handwritten entries for the next 41 years.  As the prime minister, he dictated his 
diaries to his principal secretary, Edouard Handy, who typed the entries.  Although 
King instructed several literary executors to destroy most of his diaries after his 
death, they decided to lodge this important historical source at the Library and  
  
                                                            
58 Stephen L. Vaughn, Encyclopedia of American Journalism, Routledge, New York, 2007, 
p. 406. 
59 Brands, “World War II”, pp. 445-448.  As noted by Brands, the poll asked: “What do you 
think we should do with the Japanese Emperor after the war?”  The following choices were 
offered to respondents: “Execute him”; “Let court decide his fate”; “Keep him in prison the 
rest of his life”; “Exile him”; “Do nothing – he’s only a figurehead for war lords”; “Use him 
as a puppet to run Japan”.  Seventy per cent of the respondents chose one of the first four 
options; only seven per cent of people selected one of the latter two options.  Later, Allied 
leaders preferred for Hirohito to remain as the emperor, hoping he would be a stabilising 
influence in post-war Japan. 
60 Reed L. Welch, “Polls, Polls, and More Polls: An Evaluation of How Public Opinion Polls 
Are Reported in Newspapers”, The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 7, 
no. 1, 2002, pp. 102-114. 
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Archives of Canada.61
Whereas Roosevelt invested in a press secretary, King was concerned about 
his lack of a “first-class modern journalist” to enhance his media image.
   
62  It seemed 
he was not able to persuade the Liberal Party of Canada to employ such a staff 
member.  Soon after he became the prime minister in the 1921 election, he wrote in 
his diary that he intended “to keep the press at arm’s length”.  Although this 
statement might be viewed as indicating a disdain for journalists, in fact, he was 
noting privately his determination to maintain a degree of independence.  He 
believed the previous Conservative government had been too “cosy” with the 
media.63  Based on the 1930s diary entries, it appeared King relied on his principal 
adviser, Dr Oscar Douglas Skelton, to assist with writing draft copies and proof 
reading press statements.64  After Skelton’s death in January 1941, King’s diaries 
suggested his speeches were reviewed by another principal secretary, Arnold 
Heeney, as well as his assistant private secretary, Jack Pickersgill, who became the 
special assistant to the prime minister in 1945.  Although King’s media advisers were 
highly educated, distinguished bureaucrats, he noted in his diary on 26 April 1939 
that “it is little short of a crime that I have not, in connection with my office, a 
thoroughly trained publicity man to help in matters of this kind”.65
… that men in the (public) Service think that once anything is on Hansard 
(the official report of Canadian parliamentary debates) that it serves the 
  The following 
day, King added: “What I need above everything else is a first-class modern 
journalist, full of vitality and colour, who would make my life and work known to 
the public”.  As he dictated to Edouard Handy, King complained: 
                                                            
61 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Digital Archives, “King diaries released” [hereafter 
“King diaries”], Toronto, 2006, retrieved on 9 December 2008 at 
<http://archives.cbc.ca/version_print.asp?page=1&IDLan=1&ID.C.lip=7244&IDDossier=0
&ID.C.at=335&ID.C.atPa=260>; Library and Archives Canada, “A Real Companion and 
Friend: The diary of William Lyon Mackenzie King” [hereafter “King’s diary”], Ottawa, 
2002, retrieved on 9 December 2008 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-131.html>. 
62 King, “Diaries”, 27 April 1939, p. 454.  The page numbers were cited from the online 
version and not from the original diary. 
63 Library and Archives Canada, “King’s diary”.  
64 Gordon C. Case, “The Lessons of Munich: Mackenzie King’s Campaign to Prepare 
Canada for War” [hereafter “The lessons of Munich”], Canadian Military Journal, vol. 5, 
no. 4, 2004-2005, retrieved on 9 December 2008 at 
<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo5/no4/history-histoire-eng.asp>. 
65 King, “Diaries”, 26 April 1939, p. 468. 
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purpose, whereas Hansard is of really no value in reaching the public.  The 
only thing of value is the press reports.66
The diaries are a valuable source because they reveal his successful management of 
sensitive news reports.  For example, in an entry on 26 April 1939, he described a 
“contemptible” editorial in the Ottawa Journal.  The editorial writer had criticised 
his preparations for the imminent visit of Great Britain’s King George VI to Canada.  
In the prime minister’s words, the newspaper made the false accusation that the royal 
reception was “being used for purposes of social prestige of Bigwigs”.
 
67  Overriding 
Skelton’s objections, Mackenzie King decided to prepare a media statement to “clear 
my position ... from being attacked in the press very unjustly”.68  Later it seemed the 
Canadian reception of King George was judged to be a success by the media.  In 
another diary entry, the prime minister reflected: “Coming out of the elevator 
tonight, an Englishman journalist said: ‘We all congratulate you on the exceptionally 
fine reception today.  We have seen nothing better anywhere’.”  It seemed he was 
able to increase local press enthusiasm for the royal visit, too.69
 
 
During the beginning of the European war, Mackenzie King needed to 
reconcile diverse media interests that were unique in the Allied world.  Canada’s 
English and French populations expressed conflicting wartime attitudes in their 
representative newspapers.  In early 1939, many English Canadians shared an 
emotional attachment to the British Empire and supported their nation’s involvement 
in a war if London were attacked.  Traditionally French Canadians mistrusted British 
intentions and opposed overseas conscription.  On 1 April 1939, an editorial writer 
for the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir, asked readers: “Since When is Canada a 
Country of Europe?”  In contrast, English Canadian journalists rushed to publish 
premature reports of the nation’s intervention in the conflict.  On 3 September 1939, 
the day of Britain’s declaration of war against Germany, the Canadian newspaper, 
The London Free Press, published the inaccurate front-page headline: “Canada is 
now at war.  France jumps in too”.  Toronto Daily Star published a similarly 
                                                            
66 King, “Diaries”, 27 April 1939, p. 454. 
67 King, “Diaries”, 26 April 1939, p. 468. 
68 King, “Diaries”, 27 April 1939, p. 454. 
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misleading cover title: “War declared”.  In fact, King preferred to refer crucial 
decisions to the Canadian Parliament to enable a democratic vote.  The parliamentary 
members took another week to make a decision and Canada entered the war on 10 
September.70  King delayed introducing conscription after a 1940 plebiscite revealed 
that support for compulsory military service was divided along ethnic lines.  While 
most of English Canada agreed to follow Britain’s lead, 72 per cent of Quebec voters 
were opposed.  After deliberate stalling, King announced on 22 November 1944 that 
conscription had become necessary.71
 
  Throughout his prime ministerial terms, he 
managed the news in an attempt to prevent social fractures.  
It seemed King earned the Canadian media’s respect for his wartime 
strategies.  According to his diary entry of 16 December 1944, he devoted a large 
portion of his day to preparing a speech for a dinner ceremony that night, when he 
was presented with a life membership in the press gallery of the House of Commons.  
Reflecting on his family’s long association with the newspaper industry, he noted: 
“All of this gives me a close affiliation with journalists of our country.”72  Yet 
Canada’s media conferences appeared to be relatively formal because the evidence 
suggests that King did not answer spontaneous questions from journalists.73
This is a press conference, I am told, in the usual manner – limited as usual in 
Quebec, to the principal speakers, not to the correspondents.  In other words, 
no questions will be asked of us, which I think we are all agreed is rather nice 
for us.
  FDR 
made these observations to the international news corps at the Quebec meeting on 16 
September 1944.  Speaking to the US correspondents in the meeting, Roosevelt 
explained: 
74
                                                            
70 Case, “The lessons of Munich”. 
  
71 About Canada Multimedia Study Guide Resources, “Conscription for Wartime Service”, 
Mount Allison University, 2001, retrieved on 9 December 2008 at 
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72 King, “Diaries”, 16 December 1944, p. 1441. 
73 (Anon.), “Canada At War”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01222/15, 
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74 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 16 September 1944. 
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The Canadian press gallery was characterised as upholding a media etiquette that 
prevented reporters from debating the prime minister’s announcements during his 
interviews. 
 
King’s diary notes revealed his favourable opinion of Curtin’s media and 
communication skills.75  Likewise, when Curtin was the Westralian Worker editor, 
he wrote positive newspaper articles about the Canadian politician’s independence.76
“I equally admire Churchill’s restraint in listening to the presentation as 
Curtin made it.  He had what he wished to say written out and read it quite 
emphatically, directing special attention to the point to which he wished 
consideration given ... He stated emphatically that he wanted Australia to be 
on the highest level, when it came to reaching decisions on peace ... Churchill 
admitted that the presentation had made a deep impression on him ... I felt he 
[Curtin] was well justified in making the presentation he did.”
  
When Commonwealth leaders met at Churchill’s office on 3 May 1944, King wrote 
approvingly of Curtin’s speech.  “I confess I admired his (Curtin’s) straightforward 
direct manner”, King confided in his diary.  He added: 
77
The description conveyed the Australian prime minister’s use of speech notes on this 
occasion to assist him to deliver an “emphatic” presentation, a departure from his 
usual practice of speaking “off the cuff”.
   
78
 
 
Later in London in May 1944, Mackenzie King listened to Curtin “speaking 
extemporaneously” and delivering “an excellent speech, without a note and without 
hesitating for a word.  It was well put together and well delivered”.79
                                                            
75 To my knowledge, previous research has not delved into the Canadian leader’s diary 
regarding the nature of his relationship with Curtin. 
  Moreover, 
Curtin accepted King’s invitation to address the Canadian Parliament on 1 June 
1944.  “His address was carefully prepared”, King recalled in his diary.  Although 
76 Oliver, “Shaping the Nation”. 
77 King, “Diaries”, 3 May 1944, p. 433. 
78 Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s war, National 
Library of Australia, Canberra, 1997. 
79 King, “Diaries”, 10 May 1944, p. 457. 
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Curtin spoke for more than 40 minutes, he did not need notes.  “His diction was very 
good, and his memory remarkable.  One felt, however, that he had memorized very 
carefully what he was saying.”80  Also King paid special attention to Curtin’s press 
interactions upon his arrival at an Ottawa train station on 30 May.  “Quite a number 
present.  Same old business of photographs, microphones, etc.  Curtin spoke very 
nicely over the microphone”, he remarked in his diary.81  “He seemed to attach great 
importance in the morning to the press interview”, King continued on 1 June.  “He 
came with material prepared for distribution, welcomed questions, etc.”  Curtin was 
focused “almost exclusively” on his nation’s war effort and the need for a world 
organisation to maintain stability in peacetime.82
 
  King’s descriptions provided some 
answers to the researcher investigating reasons for Curtin’s reputation as a strong 
speech maker.  When Curtin was seeking a greater role for the nation in making 
crucial wartime decisions, he prepared a written address and stated his main 
arguments “emphatically” to other Commonwealth leaders.  He adopted a different 
approach when addressing the Canadian Parliament, rehearsing and memorising 
carefully a lengthy address so that he could speak passionately about Australia’s war 
effort without the use of notes.  Another key to his success was his focus on the 
international media during his overseas trips.  He did not seem to hesitate to answer 
radio journalists’ questions at an Ottawa train station and distributed prepared 
material to those attending his Canadian press conference.  His ability to select the 
best communication strategy that suited the occasion – whether it was the need to 
memorise a lengthy speech or to emphasise the main arguments in a prepared address 
– as well as his careful preparations for media interviews demonstrated that he 
worked hard to be a forceful speaker. 
Churchill and his closest assistants did not publish detailed memoirs that 
might have permitted insights into their relationships with journalists.83
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archival material was exemplified by the secretive methods of his friend and Minister 
of Information Brendan Bracken, who systematically destroyed the bulk of his 
papers.  The remnant was burned by his faithful chauffeur after his death.84  Another 
Minister of Information, Duff Cooper – who served in the position briefly before 
Bracken was appointed to the role – wrote a diary that was published posthumously 
by his son.  The diary did not reveal major insights about Churchill’s press 
interactions.85  An advisory role was held by Aitken, the press proprietor who held 
crucial ministerial portfolios, but he did not keep a diary.86  Scholarly post-war 
publications did not focus on any publicity officer in Churchill’s administration.87  In 
2008 a London museum identified Wendy Maxwell as his press secretary.88
Once Churchill was on the scene, he was our God; right from the word go ... 
he used to come along and look over one’s shoulder (in the Cabinet war 
room) ...  I was absolutely in awe of him.
  In a 
brief oral history, Maxwell said she typed Churchill’s speeches, but she did not 
indicate any public relations roles.  Instead she was a personal assistant to Sir Ian 
Jacobs, the military assistant secretary to the War Cabinet from 1939 to 1945.  
Maxwell reminisced: 
89
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Churchill’s heroic stature was strengthened with the 1966 publication of the first 
volume of an official biography, produced by his son, Randolph, and historian Sir 
Martin Gilbert.90  One of the few primary sources publicly available was an edited 
volume of wartime letters exchanged between Churchill and his wife, Clementine.  
The volume, which was edited by their daughter, Mary Soames, enhanced 
Churchill’s reputation as a great writer.91
 
 
 Differing from his friendships with conservative press executives, Churchill 
was criticised by Labour-oriented newspapers, The Daily Herald and The Daily 
Mirror.92  Confronted by the challenge of the new medium of radio, the British press 
was struggling financially during the 1930s.  Moreover, the press reporters’ 
reputation and morale were reduced to “tatters” by the early 1940s because of the 
overly optimistic predictions of conservative London newspapers, such as Aitken’s 
Daily Express, that there would not be another European war.  According to a 
wartime British survey, 75 per cent of respondents said they had more faith in the 
accuracy of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio news than in 
newspaper stories.93  Although records are scarce, Lloyd has written that Churchill 
did not hold daily press conferences.94
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great duty to perform in maintaining the unity of the British Empire”.95  Due to his 
customary distance from the working press, London’s journalists never knew that he 
was on occasions ill and bedridden for up to a week during 1943 and 1944.96  
Churchill complained the leftist Daily Herald war coverage was calculated to 
undermine the national army.97  Contrasting with its rivals, The Daily Mirror 
experienced a surge in circulation and its increased popularity was attributed to a 
trend away from war news in favour of more entertainment stories.98  While 
conservative newspapers, such as The Times, campaigned for Churchill in 1945,99 
The Daily Mirror opposed his bid for re-election.  The Daily Mirror advertising 
director was Cecil King, the nephew of Alfred Harmsworth.  Although Harmsworth 
had boosted young Churchill’s first political campaign, Cecil King was a vocal 
Labour supporter.100  During the 1945 general election, the Labour newspapers 
accounted for 35 per cent of the national circulation and helped to secure Churchill’s 
defeat.101
 
 
 
Mass radio and film communications 
These major Allied leaders understood the value of radio addresses to communicate 
directly to the public, without press interpretations or editorialising.  One of FDR’s 
most outstanding media innovations was initiating the first informal, presidential 
radio broadcasts, known as the “fireside chats”.  Many historians have written about 
Roosevelt’s rhetoric and argue this new aural genre includes between 25 and 31 radio 
“chats”.102
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concluded the president gave 27 “fireside chats” between 3 December 1933 and 6 
December 1944 on a wide range of economic, military and political topics.103  While 
his press secretary, Early, was credited with the technical expertise to master the 
broadcasting equipment, media historians agreed the chats were only successful 
because of Roosevelt’s ability to project a warm, fatherly persona to US 
audiences.104  When he was seeking relief from his health problems in rural Georgia, 
he lost a youthful “air of arrogant superiority” and developed “a genuine 
understanding” of the problems confronting poor farmers, small businesses and 
African-American sharecroppers.105  Distancing himself from his privileged 
background, FDR selected his words carefully to create an egalitarian atmosphere.  
Often, he would introduce the chats by greeting radio listeners as “my friends” or 
“my countrymen and my friends”, as well as “my fellow Americans”.106  As the 
“glamour boy of the radio”, he spoke slowly, with a mean rate of 105 to 110 words 
per minute, allowing ample time for his listeners to absorb his meaning, according to 
Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. Braden.  When he wished to emphasise important 
passages, he talked at an even more leisurely pace and developed a technique of 
using dashes in his manuscript to symbolize pauses.107  Another scholar, Elvin T. 
Lim, stated that Roosevelt spoke an average of 117 words each minute during his 
“fireside chats”.108  Bradenburg and Braden explained most of his sentences were 
short for a speaker, ranging from 16 to 27 words in length.109
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by educators and rhetoricians at the time.110  While the press agreed with the White 
House that FDR’s handicap was not a “story”,111 American people admired him for 
battling illness and he “seemed to be almost a member of the family”.112
 
 
FDR’s speeches were usually the product of careful collaboration with his 
advisers.  His official speechwriter was Samuel Rosenman.  Historian and critic, 
John T. Flynn, asserted that Roosevelt “was one of those many public men who were 
willing to have their speeches written for them”.113 Although advisers did most of the 
writing of his speeches, he re-read the manuscripts so often that he almost 
memorised them.  Eleanor Roosevelt reminisced that often six to eight drafts were 
written before the speech met with approval.  As described by Eleanor and his early 
adviser, Raymond Moley, the regular speech writing process was a complex 
business.  First, the president decided on a subject and discussed major ideas with his 
advisers; then, the writers completed a draft copy and submitted it for approval; 
afterwards, the draft was discussed and revised until it was acceptable.114  More than 
half of the “fireside chats” were published on The New York Times front pages, with 
the full texts of the speeches continuing inside the issues.115  Such prominent news 
columns indicated press endorsement for FDR in his home state, as he was a former 
governor of New York.  Furthermore, when he mentioned “Australia” occasionally 
in his wartime radio “fireside chats”,116 his speech was often favourably promoted on 
Australian metropolitan newspaper front covers.117
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newspaper publishers disagreed with his democratic ideology, he developed mainly 
mutually respectful, egalitarian relationships with news correspondents.118
 
 
Despite Roosevelt’s preference for radio as the primary means of his public 
communications, he recognised the value of popular movies to boost war morale.  
During his 1930s “fireside chat” newsreels, he had sought to develop a close 
connection with film audiences of the depression era.  Universal Studios newsreel 
scenes showed him as he spoke directly to the camera at eye level, with his hands 
placed on the table before him to signify his straightforward manner.  Also he was 
framed in close-up and medium shots to convey a personal relationship with US 
moviegoers.119  In a 1934 scene, for example, he removed his spectacles and looked 
straight at the camera to criticise “a timid few people” opposed to his labour policies 
and to emphasise his words: “I believe in practical explanations and in practical 
politics”.120  In June 1942, he established the propaganda agency, the Office of War 
Information, and it worked with America’s five largest newsreel companies to create 
United Newsreel.  The film teams of United Newsreel followed voluntarily the 
Office of War Information guidelines and accepted direct censorship.  The 
mainstream Hollywood movie companies supported Roosevelt’s wartime policies; 
for example, military news comprised 77 per cent of Paramount Pictures’ film 
content in 1944.  United Newsreel disbanded on 15 December 1945 following the 
conclusions of the European and Pacific wars.121
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Although few historians have focused on FDR’s use of the film media, they 
refer to his determination to address wartime public audiences “despite his 
handicap”.  Film companies agreed to turn their cameras away from the president’s 
leg braces.  Often before a speech, he was carried and raised to a platform stage in 
the arms of men.  Since the media did not mention his disability, Roosevelt could 
smooth down his hair nonchalantly and begin his speech as if nothing unusual had 
occurred.122  While most reporters supported his activist presidency and were united 
in their desire to defeat Germany and Japan, a new generation of correspondents was 
more likely to be “aggressive and contentious” towards politicians because of a 
“profound change” in government-media relations during the 1960s and 1970s.  The 
unsuccessful US role in the Vietnam War and the controversial Watergate scandal, 
involving Richard Nixon’s presidency, caused more journalists to be suspicious of 
government motives.123  Since then, the mass media expansion has accelerated 
competition among news networks, which have increasingly produced biased and 
sensational presidential reports to attract more public attention.  According to the 
journalism scholar, Fredric T. Smoller, the commercial media environment meant 
that a modern president would receive mainly unfavourable coverage after the first 
six months in office.124
 
 
In like manner to Roosevelt, Mackenzie King’s private wish was to keep the 
press “at arm’s length” from his private life, but he was keen to use radio and film to 
counter Nazi propaganda.125
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based in the United Kingdom to provide war news to audiences at home.126  
Although King was “never a great communicator”, he grappled with the new media, 
“working diligently to control his image and message”.127  An Ottawa Citizen 
wartime correspondent, Betty Kennedy, reminisced in 1978 that King was “a 
charming person” but “when making speeches, [he] seemed rather austere and 
cold”.128  Perhaps he lacked opportunities to make ardently patriotic, militaristic 
speeches because he was mindful of many French Canadians’ strong opposition to 
conscription, although young Quebec men volunteered to fight overseas.  King’s 
diaries indicated he rehearsed speeches carefully before live radio broadcasts to 
present a confident media image.  For example, he devoted an entire day to prepare a 
public address about how Canada must be “strong, secure and united” on 3 
September 1939, when Britain declared war against Germany.  King wrote that this 
speech was “the largest broadcast” made from Canada at the time and reached 
listeners “worldwide”.129  He came to regard radio speeches as vital for persuading 
French Canadians not to be influenced by Parisienne propaganda from the pro-Nazi 
Vichy regime.130
 
 
Similarly to the US movie companies, the film industry flourished in Canada 
during the war.  The Canadian Army Film and Photo Unit made 106 newsreels for 
distribution to the nation’s army troops.  A typical newsreel report would show King 
chatting informally with army personnel at an unidentified military site.  The 
filmmakers followed censorship rules by removing the details of locations and army 
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unit names.131  Associated Screen News Limited, a Montreal-based film production 
company, produced prominent war movies for national and overseas cinemas.  
Although King made a significant investment in the development of newsreels, he 
would express concerns about his appearance and voice.  It seemed he secured the 
industry’s support and Associated Screen News filmed a “laudatory” tribute to him 
upon his retirement in 1948.132
 
 
Similarly to Roosevelt, Churchill relied predominantly upon the radio, rather 
than the printed word, to broadcast his powerful rhetoric and evocations.  The 
classically educated, British leader voiced “basic English” deliberately; his speeches 
were remarkable because of their studied simplicity.133  Churchill positioned his UK 
audiences as if they were the centre of the world, the star actors on a main stage.  As 
a journalist and historian, he knew how to craft a story.  His speeches were brutally 
honest, emphasising the hardships that Britons must endure before winning the 
war.134
... I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat ... You ask what is 
our aim?  I can answer in one word: Victory.  Victory at all costs.  Victory in 
spite of all terror.  Victory however long and hard the road may be.  For 
without victory there is no survival.
  For example, in his first speech as the prime minister, Churchill addressed 
the House of Commons on 13 May 1940 and announced: 
135
                                                            
131 Library and Archives of Canada, “Premier King Visits Armoured Troops, 1945”, Ottawa, 
2002, retrieved on 10 December 2008 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/king/053201/05320113020981_e.html>. 
 
132 Library and Archives Canada, “Highlights from the Parliamentary Life of the Right 
Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1948”, Ottawa, 2002, retrieved on 10 December 
2008 at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/king/053201/05320113020984_e.html>. 
133 K.E. Garay, “Empires of the Mind? C.K. Ogden, Winston Churchill and Basic English”, 
Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers, vol. 23, no.1, 1988, retrieved on 12 May 
2008 at <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=527>. 
134 John Baldoni, Great communication secrets of great leaders [hereafter Great leaders], 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 2003, pp. 10-11. 
135 Winston Churchill, “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat”, The Churchill Centre, London, 13 
May 1940, retrieved on 13 December 2008 at 
<http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=391>. 
Chapter 4   Allied World War II leaders and their mass media agendas, 1939-1945 
174 
 
Through this poetic rhythm, he stressed his themes on the need for “toil” before 
achieving “victory”.  The speech, and subsequent radio broadcasts, instilled a sense 
of pride and patriotism in Britons: a belief that they could control their destinies.136
 
 
Churchill’s broadcasts captivated an international audience, as noted by the 
Australian newspaper correspondent, Joseph Alexander.  On 2 December 1941, 
Alexander was alarmed by the Japanese threat in the Pacific and confided in his 
diary, “if faith in Churchill goes, there does not seem to be much left”.137  His 
confidence was restored soon afterwards because he wrote favourably about the 
British leader’s speech on 27 December 1941.  Based in Canberra, Alexander 
listened to a shortwave broadcast of Churchill’s address to the US Congress.  “It was 
one of the greatest occasions in history”, Alexander wrote in his diary. “The 
reception he was given was rapturous.”138  As well as generating Australian press 
coverage, generally the texts of Churchill’s speeches were reprinted in major US 
newspapers and magazines.139
 
 
Despite Churchill’s wartime popularity with the conservative media, 
historians noted he clashed frequently with BBC director, John Reith.  The conflict 
was a “strange and somewhat sad chapter in British politics”, noted the scholar, Ron 
Cynewulf Robbins.  Reith’s diaries revealed he was envious of Churchill’s eloquence 
and angered by his anti-appeasement stance during the 1930s, according to 
Robbins.140  Also D.L. LeMahieu agreed the diaries presented “an unflattering 
portrait of Reith’s personality”.141
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In the six volumes of his wartime history, there were fewer than ten minor references 
to broadcasting or the BBC.142  Yet he recognised Reith’s wartime contribution by 
awarding him with the Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath 
(Military).143
 
  Rather than concentrating solely on the BBC, Churchill made 
enthusiastic use of other media to promote his military strategies. 
Due to his high regard for the power of the cinema to influence public 
opinions, Churchill directed Minister of Information Bracken to ensure that two US 
Army documentaries “should have the widest possible showing” because “they are 
the best propaganda films yet seen in this country”.  Directed by Frank Capra, the 
two films, Divide and Conquer and The Battle of Britain, focused on the European 
conflict.  In a letter to Bracken on 19 July 1943, Churchill stated he would “ask for 
legislation if necessary” if the British cinemas refused to broadcast them.  He 
intended to make a screen appearance to introduce the films and praise “the attitude 
of the Americans” for supporting their UK ally.144  During the Blitz – the Nazi 
bombing campaign against British cities – local newsreels captured the energy of 
Churchill’s leadership.  Movie camera operators followed his inspections of war-torn 
factories, shipyards and city ruins.  He would “canter” deliberately to portray himself 
to be in a hurry.  His walking sticks were not crutches, but “striking” devices, and his 
victory salutes were a sign of defiance.  The harsh realism of the British newsreels 
represented a departure from traditional US movie entertainment.  Before the war 
began, US theatre owners were convinced that entertainment and sports films were 
the best drawcards to attract audiences.  They believed most people watched movies 
because they wished to be distracted temporarily from tough economic conditions.  
The film genre changed quickly with the US entry in the war.  By 1942, American 
cinemagoers were filling theatres to watch the latest military news, featuring 
Churchill.145
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Journalists and censors 
The new wartime censors provoked mixed reactions from Allied reporters.  FDR 
established the Office of Censorship on 19 December 1941, immediately following 
the Pearl Harbour tragedy.  Early was surprised that radio and press journalists were 
cooperative; sometimes correspondents asked for censors to review their stories and 
editors offered to publish war-related advertisements without payments.146
What we want is to get the news out as soon as we can, subject to the two 
qualifications, and do it in the most convenient way.  In other words, our 
objectives are exactly alike.  It is going to work out all right.
  One day 
after the US declaration of war against Japan on 8 December 1941, FDR announced 
new censorship rules at his press conference.  He said news reports would need to 
conform to two “obvious” conditions: accuracy and not giving “aid and comfort to 
the enemy”.  In a persuasive manner, he added:  
147
Yet the White House Press Corps did not express complete enthusiasm for the 
announcement.  One reporter questioned: “Will there eventually be a censor who we 
can get our teeth stuck into?”  Roosevelt replied: “It is awfully hard to answer it.  
Talk to Steve [Early] about this”.
 
148  Ultimately journalists were willing to accept a 
voluntary system because it was preferable to punitive war secrets laws and they 
recognised the popular support for fighting Axis enemies.  Additionally the Office of 
Censorship’s director was a longstanding newsman, Byron Price.  Roosevelt, Price 
and top military leaders were sympathetic to the principle of a free press.149
 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, British journalists described the nation’s 
new censorship system as shambolic.  The Ministry of Information was formed on 4 
September 1939, a day after Britain’s declaration of war, and it became responsible 
for press censorship as well as other publicity and propaganda.  Threatened by 
censorship, editors and reporters reacted angrily to government interference.  Four 
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men headed the new ministry in quick succession between 1939 and 1941.  The first 
minister was Lord Hugh Macmillan, who lacked a media background.  Reith, the 
second minister, was the BBC director who did not work well with Churchill, as 
described previously.  Duff Cooper, who replaced Reith, made radio speeches but did 
not have journalism experience.  In July 1941, Churchill “conscripted” Bracken to 
the position because he was a highly experienced editor of conservative London 
newspapers, who was supported by the press.  Differing from Cooper, Bracken did 
not make direct radio broadcasts and kept a distance from the day-to-day operations 
of news offices.  After the initial clashes between censors and journalists, Bracken 
continued to lead the ministry until victory was obvious.150
 
 
Most of Canada’s newspapers accepted censorship rules at the start of the war 
in 1939.  King was credited with making the successful decision to recruit journalists 
as censors because they understood the temperament and demands of the news 
industry.  During the first year of the war, he set up a Censorship Co-ordination 
Committee, which was directed by Walter Thompson, the publicity chief for the 
Canadian National Railways.151  Immediately King’s former employer, the nation’s 
leading newspaper, The Globe and Mail, supported his censorship policies.  As a 
Globe and Mail editorial writer stated in September 1939: “Freedom of speech must 
be curtailed when the nation is at war.  What use of fighting an enemy without if the 
enemies within are given a free hand?”152  Of more than 100 daily Canadian 
newspapers, only one group was suspended from publication; the communist 
Toronto Clarion correspondents were forced to cease printing in November 1939.  
Most Canadian journalists decided to agree with the majority of their readers, who 
seemed willing to accept temporary restrictions on their civil liberties, such as 
curfews and rations.153
 
 
                                                            
150 Lysaght, “Bracken”; The National Archives, “The Art of War”, Surrey, 2005, retrieved on 
11 December 2008 at <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/theartofwar/inf3.htm>. 
151 George D. Kerr, “Skirting the Minefield: Press Censorship, Politics and French Canada, 
1940” [hereafter “Censorship”], Canadian Journal of Communication, vol. 8, no. 2, 1982, 
pp. 47-48. 
152 (Anon.), The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 23 September 1939.  Cited in Kerr, “Censorship”, 
p. 46. 
153 Kerr, “Censorship”, pp. 49, 51, 59. 
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Media legacies 
Despite some censorship complaints, journalists helped to portray the Allied leaders 
as media celebrities.  Even FDR’s black Scottish terrier, Murray the Outlaw of 
Falahill (nicknamed Fala), became a movie star.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer made a 
short film about wartime conditions, viewed from Fala’s perspective, in 1943.154
I have a little dog who is called Fala — F-a-l-a.  But in the beginning, 
everybody got into their heads that his name was F-a-l-l-a, and you can’t 
break them of the habit.
  
Roosevelt corrected journalists’ misspelling of his pet’s name at an interview on 27 
July 1943, when he told amused reporters: 
155
He was not the first national leader to use a dog to enhance his media image.  Hoover 
distributed thousands of photographs of his Belgian police dog, King Tut, to voters 
during the 1928 election campaign.  The picture – depicting a grinning Hoover 
holding King Tut’s front paws – softened the aspiring president’s dour image and 
helped him to win the election.  Yet Roosevelt extended the public relations strategy; 
Fala accompanied him to wartime conferences around the world.
 
156  Mackenzie 
King’s pet dog, Pat, was well-known to the Ottawa Press Gallery.  When Pat died, 
the Ottawa Journal political correspondent, Richard Jackson, visited King’s home to 
ask for an old photograph of the Irish terrier when in good health.  As a result, the 
Ottawa Journal published a picture of a younger, cheerful King, dressed in tweed 
plus fours, with Pat.157  In wartime London, Churchill was a “terrific showman” for 
the cameras when journalists accompanied him on his organised tours of city 
ruins.158
                                                            
154 The White House Historical Association, “White House Pets”, Washington DC, 2008, 
retrieved on 11 December 2008 at <http://www.whitehousehistory.org/03/pets/04_best-
friend.html>. 
  As the son of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer and a US millionaire 
heiress, Churchill was accustomed to dealing with media publicity.  His birth in 1874 
was announced on page one of The Times.  As a 34-year-old politician, he married 
Clementine Hozier in “the society wedding of 1908”, which was reported as a 
155 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 27 July 1943. 
156 Peter Grier, “An Obama dog: for the kids ... and the country”, The Christian Science 
Monitor, Boston, 21 November 2008, p. 1. 
157 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Front page challenge. 
158 Sikorsky, “Churchill”, pp. 30-36. 
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pictorial story on the covers of the Daily Graphic and the Daily Mirror, sparking a 
demand for more personality-driven news.159
 
  In all three countries, journalists 
cooperated with the national leaders’ media strategies to present them as popular, 
although somewhat aristocratic, personalities. 
Later, the media portrayed their legacies differently.  US leaders invoked Churchill’s 
name as “an icon of idealised and inspirational ‘toughness’”.160  In the twenty-first 
century, US Republican leaders seemed more willing to praise Churchill than to 
commend Roosevelt’s Democratic Party presidency.  Churchill became a role model 
to US President George W. Bush, who remarked in July 2001, “he wasn’t afraid of 
public opinion polls ... he didn’t need focus groups to tell him what was right”.161  
Bush and US Vice-President Dick Cheney increased the references to Churchill after 
the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in a bid to gather public support for the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.162  The New York Times correspondent, Edward 
Rothstein, agreed that Churchill had become an “inescapable presence” during these 
twenty-first century conflicts.163
  
 
                                                            
159 Tait, “A war leader”, p. 80; The Westminster Collection, “‘Churchill and the Press’ and 
the re-launch of the Harmsworth Room at the Churchill Museum and Cabinet War Rooms”, 
Westminster, 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
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160 Richard Toye, “The Churchill Syndrome: Reputational Entrepreneurship and the Rhetoric 
of Foreign Policy since 1945” [hereafter “Churchill”], The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, pp. 364-378, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125196/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0>. 
161 George W. Bush, “President discusses European trip: Remarks by the president in 
acceptance of bust of Winston Churchill” [hereafter “Remarks by the president”], 16 July 
2001, transcript np, retrieved on 16 December 2008 at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010716-3.html>.  
162 George W. Bush, “President Bush discusses importance of democracy in Middle East”, 4 
February 2004, retrieved on 16 December 2008 at 
<http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html>; Richard Cheney, 
“Remarks by the vice president at Westminster College”, 26 April 2004, retrieved on 16 
December 2008 at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040426-8.html>; 
Toye, “Churchill”. 
163 Edward Rothstein, “Churchill, Heroic Relic or Relevant Now?”, The New York Times, 
New York, 29 March 2003, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9505E6D71639F93AA15750C0A9659C8
B63>. 
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Despite historical tributes, it remained uncertain whether Churchill’s wartime 
legacy was fully understood by young Britons.  He won the Nobel Prize in Literature 
in 1953 and was considered to be the greatest British prime minister of the twentieth 
century, according to a BBC survey of 20 prominent historians, politicians and 
commentators in 2000.164  Yet other surveys suggested some young British 
secondary school students and teenagers did not know about Churchill’s leadership.  
According to a UKTV Gold poll, 20 per cent of 3,000 teenagers said in 2008 that 
Churchill was a mythical figure.  News editorial writers decried a lack of historical 
knowledge shown by the surveyed teenagers.165
  
  In another study, academic 
researchers found that some eighth-grade students had not yet received twentieth-
century history lessons because these were not included in the official curriculum for 
the lower and middle school levels in England.  While eighth-grade Americans had 
studied some major twentieth-century events, the English children recognised the 
significance of World War II because of information they had learned from  
                                                            
164 (Anon.), “Churchill ‘greatest PM of 20th Century’”, BBC News World Edition, London, 4 
January 2000, retrieved on 26 May 2009 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/575219.stm>.  Also in a BBC survey in 2002, 
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“Churchill”], Free Republic, Fresno, 13 July 2007, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1865231/posts>. 
165 Jonah Goldberg, “Western Civilization and Other Fairy Tales”, National Review Online, 
New York, 6 February 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTk1MmZiOTJkNmFlZjFhNjBmZGZjNjdmZjJhMD
g3ZTg=>; Robert Hardman, “Winston Churchill’s extraordinary relationship with the 
founding fathers of the Mail” [hereafter “Churchill”], Daily Mail, London, 8 February 2008, 
retrieved on 11 December 2008 at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
512982/Winston-Churchills-extraordinary-relationship-founding-fathers-Mail.html>; Aislinn 
Simpson, “Winston Churchill didn’t really exist, say teens”, The Telegraph, London, 4 
February 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1577511/Winston-Churchill-didn%27t-really-
exist%2C-say-teens.html>; David Wooding, “Two-finger salute to Churchill”, The Sun 
Online, London, 13 July 2007, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
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“unofficial” sources including the media.166
… he didn’t need spin doctors or focus groups.  He had an innate 
understanding of the relationship between the papers and the public, not least 
because he was a prolific journalist and writer throughout his life.
  Even so, Churchill’s reputation as a 
gifted media communicator had endured.  For example, Hardman wrote in the Daily 
Mail that: 
167
The statement resembled Bush’s 2001 remark that Churchill “wasn’t afraid of public 
opinion polls” and “didn’t need focus groups”.
   
168
 
  These positive summations were 
exaggerated because Churchill relied on Minister of Information Bracken to manage 
wartime propaganda, media publicity and censorship from July 1941 to 1945.  
Historians discovered little about Bracken’s behind-the-scenes role because he 
destroyed his papers.  It appeared Churchill’s closest advisers guarded his legacy 
carefully. 
Many years after the war, high-profile Canadian journalists acknowledged 
that King had benefited from the prevailing media protocols during his lifetime.  
Ottawa Journal wartime correspondent, Richard Jackson, was interviewed about 
King’s diaries during a national current affairs television program in 1978.  Jackson 
admitted he was unaware of King’s interest in spiritualism.  One of his interviewers 
was Pierre Berton, a Vancouver newspaper editor in the 1940s.  Berton questioned 
his colleague: “Is it not an indictment of the Ottawa press corps, of which you were a 
member, that these facts did not emerge in some form during King’s lifetime?”   
  
                                                            
166 Elizabeth Anne Yeager, Stuart J. Foster and Jennifer Greer, “How Eight Graders in 
England and the United States View Historical Significance”, The Elementary School 
Journal, vol. 103, no. 2, 2002, pp. 203, 213-214.  Also see Graeme Paton, “Conservative 
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5 October 2010, retrieved on 22 December 2010 at 
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“British teach less Churchill, more global warming”, The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 
24 July 2007, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
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Jackson replied:  
You’ve got to remember, it was a different day and age.  The press gave the 
prime minister a lot more respect than it does now.  Now, they go after him 
[referring to Pierre Trudeau, Canada’s leader in 1978] like a pack of howling 
dogs.169
It seemed the wartime reporters’ news coverage of King was similar to the Australian 
media’s attitudes towards national politicians.  As Mickler and Lucy have 
commented, Australian correspondents generally showed “a fairly good record when 
it comes to respecting and protecting the privacy of public figures, especially 
politicians”.
   
170  In the same televised Canadian interview, Jackson described King as 
“less than a friend [and] a little more than an acquaintance.  I quarrel with the idea of 
there being a dark side to the man”.171  Although King was an astute manager of his 
media image during his lifetime, journalists later scrutinised his diaries and this 
affected the way that he was portrayed to more contemporary generations.172
 
 
Similarly to their Canadian colleagues, US reporters did not pry into the 
private life of their nation’s wartime leader.  The media remained protective about 
Roosevelt’s paralysis even after his death.  For example, the journalist and 
playwright, Dore Schary, wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt to request her permission to 
open a theatrical production about FDR’s struggle with paralysis.  Eleanor granted 
her approval and Schary’s play, Sunrise of Campobello, opened successfully in 
1958.173
  
  The wartime media etiquette did not seem to generate debates among US 
                                                            
169 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Front page challenge. 
170 Lucy and Mickler, The war on democracy, p. 70. 
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reporters in later decades, as it did for Canada’s journalists following the posthumous 
publication of King’s diaries in the 1970s.  FDR remained a popular historical leader 
as the White House Press Corps pursued a more interrogative approach towards 
presidents.174  He ranked as the best US president in annual surveys conducted by 
public opinion pollster, Zogby International, between 1997 and 2008.  In the final 
annual poll, Zogby surveyed 1,026 Americans and found that Roosevelt received the 
most votes (69 per cent) for being a “great” leader among the past 12 US 
presidents.175
And what you see in FDR that I hope my team can emulate is not always 
getting it right, but projecting a sense of confidence and a willingness to try 
things and experiment in order to get people working again.
  News coverage of the nation’s 2008 elections included references to 
FDR as a role model because of his communication skills.  Historians and media 
commentators compared him with 2008 President-elect, Barack Obama, because they 
contrasted the recent global economic crisis with the depression circumstances in 
1932 and 1933.  In a televised 60 Minutes interview on 16 November 2008, Obama 
mentioned he was reading about Roosevelt’s inspiring leadership.  As he told the 
interviewer: 
176
After his election victory, Time published a caricature of him in a pose reminiscent of 
Roosevelt.  On the magazine’s cover of 24 November, he was shown using objects 
favoured by FDR: pince-nez glasses, a cigarette holder and an open convertible.
 
177
                                                            
174 Mark Feldstein, “Watergate Revisited”, American Journalism Review, August/September 
2004, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at <http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3735>. 
  
According to Brands, Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” remained significant because he 
made “an emotional appeal to the US people”, saying that he needed their support, 
thereby making them a “part of his administration”, which benefited from this media 
175 (Anon.), “Poll: FDR best modern president”, United Press International, 2008, retrieved 
on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/02/28/Poll_FDR_best_modern_president/UPI-
69301204252671>. 
176 Patrick T. Reardon, “FDR books on Obama’s nightstand”, Chicago Tribune, Chicago, 18 
November 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/obama/chi-FDR-barack-obama-books-
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strategy.178
 
  Certainly Obama’s weekly internet addresses might be viewed as a 
modern-day version of the “fireside chats”.  While in 2008, journalists frequently 
referred to FDR’s economic policies to overcome the depression, they did not 
provide such a strong focus on his military strategies.  This favourable media 
portrayal of Roosevelt suggested that his wartime communication messages 
resonated with Americans, even after his death. 
 
Transforming journalism 
It appears that the accessibility of historical records had influenced the contemporary 
media’s presentation of the Allied leaders and their achievements.  While King 
succeeded in maintaining a private life away from the media glare during his 
lifetime, his accomplishments became more controversial after the publication of his 
diaries.  Since their legacies were preserved carefully by their executors, Churchill 
and Roosevelt were portrayed as great communicators and role models in several 
2008 news outlets.  Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt kept a diary that would become 
subject to media scrutiny later.  Evidence suggested recent British and US 
governments did not give a high priority to publicising the military accomplishments 
of the former leaders of their nations.  In the cited examples of speeches, US 
Republican Party leaders preferred to invoke the legacy of a conservative British 
politician – Churchill – rather than to promote Roosevelt and his rival Democratic 
Party.  Contemporary US media commentators seemed to focus more on FDR’s work 
programs than his wartime strategies.  Recently the British Government has not 
required teachers to give history lessons about Churchill and twentieth-century 
events to children in year eight and in lower school levels.  A media survey 
suggested some British teenagers did not know that Churchill was a real person with 
a significant role in the recent history of Britain and the world.  While the survey size 
was limited, it became another news report to indicate that Churchill’s legacy was 
not fully recognised by younger generations. 
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Each leader’s news management style was the product of the unique political 
circumstances in his nation as he mastered the expanding mass media to persuade 
diverse audiences to accept his directions in another global war.  Churchill was the 
first wartime prime minister to use a combination of movies, recorded radio 
broadcasts and newspapers as a military strategy.  Benefiting from his extensive 
journalistic experience, he cultivated friendships with some media owners, who filled 
ministerial positions and then they tried to develop positive relations with a wide 
range of reporters.  Yet he was criticised by anti-censorship editors and labour-
oriented media managers, who contributed to his 1945 election defeat.  Roosevelt set 
a series of public relations precedents, to be used by future US presidents: employing 
a full-time press secretary, “fireside chats”, interactive news conferences, war 
documentary movies, successful mass media censorship and developing informal 
relationships with the White House correspondents.  Differing from several British 
media owners’ patronage of Churchill, FDR did not enjoy such good friendships with 
some conservative US press proprietors, nor did his successor, Harry S. Truman, 
work well with the news executives.  Both FDR and Churchill developed formidable 
legacies but it seemed partisan politics influenced contemporary perceptions about 
them.   
 
King adopted a subtler news tone because he needed to balance the 
competing views of his voters including the pro-conscription English Canadians and 
the majority of Quebecers, staunchly opposed to a compulsory military draft, 
although many were voluntary combatants.  His overriding priority of national unity 
probably precluded opportunities to give rousing, public addresses, akin to the 
militaristic style of Churchill and Roosevelt, thus earning him a reputation as being a 
more austere speech maker.  Yet he understood the value of the mass media and 
when Britain declared war against Germany, he devoted a day to prepare his radio 
talk, which was the first Canadian speech to have been broadcast to such a large, 
international audience at the time.  An investigation of King’s diaries revealed he 
voiced an urgent need for a staff journalist to create a more vibrant media image, but 
this request was denied to him by his political benefactors.  Yet he cultivated 
friendly, albeit formal, relations with the Ottawa press corps and was the nation’s 
first leader to appear in movies to inspire his multicultural constituency to support 
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the war.  Primary sources, such as King’s diaries and FDR’s media transcripts, 
showed Australia was a prominent story for international correspondents.  
Furthermore, this elite, close-knit circle of English-speaking leaders respected the 
Australian prime minister’s communication skills.  Their media conferences were not 
as frequent as Curtin’s twice-daily confidential briefings.  To gauge the unique 
qualities of Curtin’s journalism associations within the Allied 1940s milieu, the next 
chapter will delve more deeply into the operations, processes, reforms, innovations, 
trends and developments of Australian newsrooms in the wartime era.  As this thesis 
will argue, Curtin stood alone among the Allied leaders in his ability to develop 
relationships of trust with journalists from opposite sides of the political spectrum.  
He won journalists’ confidence across Australia, as well as when he visited the US, 
London and Ottawa. 
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Chapter 5 
Traditions and innovations in Australian journalism: John Curtin and the 
Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery, 1941-1945 
 
 
So far this thesis, particularly from Chapters 2 to 4, has examined the concepts 
underlying journalists’ relationships with wartime liberal democratic governments.  
It has been argued in Chapter 3 that close government-media interactions shaped the 
development of Australian journalism from the nineteenth century to World War II.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the British, Canadian and United States leaders were 
former newspaper journalists, who cultivated press relationships and developed the 
use of the relatively new media of radio and newsreels from 1941 to 1945.  As 
members of an elite society, Churchill, Mackenzie King and Roosevelt projected a 
somewhat patrician, yet reassuring, image in the media.  They respected Curtin’s 
communication skills that he had developed as an editor in labour-oriented 
newsrooms and as a fiery orator at town halls, beachside gatherings and street corner 
platforms.  During the wartime era, the public sphere changed significantly and the 
modern media contained the visual, audio and press elements that allowed Curtin to 
communicate adeptly to mass audiences.   
 
This chapter investigates the Australian journalism reforms, trends, 
innovations and developments that helped Curtin to develop positive relationships 
with the Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery.  Following the theories of Ericson et 
al, journalists have cooperated with political leaders to “visualise deviance” and 
campaign for “the need for more cooperation, repair, alteration, improvement, and 
resources”.1
                                                            
1 Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A 
Study of News Organizations [hereafter Visualizing deviance], Open University Press, 
Milton Keynes, 1987, p. 350. 
  As this chapter will assert, news correspondents assisted Curtin’s aims 
to visualise deviance, predominantly in the form of Axis enemies, and enlist public 
support for defeating foreign foes.  He actively developed the governmental function 
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of news by involving reporters in major decisions and expanded the democratic 
scope of the public sphere by making extensive use of radio broadcasts and 
newsreels to appeal directly to mass audiences, whom he regarded, in Hartley’s 
terms, as “active citizens of the media”.2  Applying a news making approach of 
journalism as a product of “institutional demands and processes”,3
 
 this chapter will 
investigate the day-to-day media routines that provided opportunities for Curtin to 
generate favourable news about his foreign policies. 
As more news correspondents reported on robust parliamentary debates in 
Canberra (with a population of 13,000 people in 1941), the nation’s young press 
gallery was developing into a pivotal, global news centre.4  By 1939 Australia was 
ranked seventh among the world’s nations in teledensity, a measurement of 
economic development including “voice grade” telephone lines, which were 
significantly better than those of the United Kingdom and most of continental 
Europe.5  As the Pacific war escalated, Australia became the command base for 
General MacArthur, hosted a visit from Eleanor Roosevelt and was an increasingly 
important destination for Allied news correspondents.6  While Australia’s opposing 
federal politicians exchanged heated remarks as they sat across from one another on 
green leather benches, assembled on the “jarrah parquet floors” in the House of 
Representatives,7
                                                            
2 John Hartley, Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity, Popular Culture [hereafter Popular 
reality], Arnold, London and New York, 1996, pp. 71, 72, 234. 
 the journalists needed to adjust to “sparsely furnished”, “gruelling” 
and “primitive” conditions in the Canberra Parliament House.  Officially inaugurated 
by the Duke and Duchess of York in May 1927, the building was meant to be only 
temporary after the transfer of the Australian Parliament from Melbourne to 
3 Rodney Tiffen, News & Power [hereafter News], Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Wellington, 
London and Boston, 1989, p. 3. 
4 Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography [hereafter Strive to be fair], 
Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 68. 
5 Bruce Arnold, “Australasian Telecommunications: Beginnings [History]”, Caslon 
Analytics, Braddon, 2005, retrieved on 19 June 2009 at 
<http://www.caslon.com.au/austelecomsprofile1.htm>. 
6 J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833–1957”, [hereafter “Papers”], National Library of Australia 
[hereafter NLA], Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA MS acc. no. 2389, 17 November 
1941, transcript np; R.M. Younger, Keith Murdoch: Founder of a media empire [hereafter 
Keith Murdoch], HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2003, p. 262. 
7 (Anon.), “The Great Game”, Time, New York, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library 
[hereafter JCPML], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01222/10, 5 July 1943, p. 5. 
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Canberra.  At first, newspaper representatives were accommodated in 12 small rooms 
so bare that staff members helped to move chairs and tables into the press offices as 
the bells announced the first sitting of parliament in September 1927.8  They watched 
the parliamentary chamber proceedings from platforms slightly elevated to allow 
them to report the speakers’ rhetoric and gestures.  In the early 1930s, the permanent 
press corps numbered only six or seven people, yet the group could expand to 23 
members during parliamentary sessions.  Most members represented the Sydney and 
Melbourne newspapers, but the Australian United Press agency writers sent stories to 
other metropolitan and regional publications.  Back then, “the general tone of 
political journalism was provincial, even parochial”, Lloyd wrote.9  Before war 
necessitated the expansion of commonwealth powers, state political reports were 
more prominent than federal parliamentary coverage in city newspapers, as discussed 
in Chapter 3.  As The Daily Telegraph Canberra bureau head, Don Whitington, 
affirmed: “The war, and a Labor Government, were to bring Canberra and the 
Federal Parliament to an eminence and importance they never lost again”.10
 
 
Tenured newspaper bureau chiefs were regarded as part of a select elite,11 
often socialising at the Hotel Canberra, which Whitington light-heartedly described 
as the city’s “only quality hotel” and “the hub of the Australian universe”, when 
many conservative parliamentarians stayed there during Menzies’ prime ministership 
in early 1941.12  Journalists visited the hotel lounge and deliberately “overheard” the 
politicians’ private conservations.13  Whitington emphasised the honesty of most 
parliamentarians: “Federal politics was not and is not generally corrupt.  There is too 
much at stake for members to risk their careers”.14
                                                            
8 C.J. Lloyd, Parliament And The Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 1901-88 
[hereafter Parliament and the press], Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988, p. 78. 
  Later the press frequented the 
cheaper, non-licensed Hotel Kurrajong because Curtin regularly dined there as the 
prime minister and became well-known for his dark suits, plain ties and stiff, white  
9 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 73, 83, 80. 
10 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 67. 
11 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 85. 
12 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 68. 
13 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 69. 
14 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 71. 
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collars, a symbol of support for his clothes rationing policies.15  Lloyd wrote the 
senior journalists held “prized jobs” because of their relatively high salaries and 
membership in social and sporting clubs, where they mingled with top-level public 
servants and diplomats.16  Yet The Herald’s Joseph Alexander said the working 
“conditions left a lot to be desired” because reporters lacked research resources and 
recreational outlets during their lengthy news rounds,17 which could extend to “all-
nighters”.18
There were no reading room facilities in the generally accepted sense, though 
one could read the interstate newspapers standing up in the [parliamentary] 
Library vestibule.  There were no [lending] library services for those who 
accepted this deprivation in a city with no public library.  I was not one of 
those.  There were no recreation facilities for men working at Parliament 
House for very long stretches.  Arrangements for meals were deplorable.
  As he recalled: 
19
Although they belonged to a select circle in Canberra, Alexander said the prime 
ministers before Curtin did not treat them with respect. 
 
 
 From the mid-1930s to 1940, the reporters met the prime minister for formal 
press conferences, as discussed in Chapter 3;20 however, crucial insiders’ 
information was often withheld from them because national leaders, such as Lyons 
and Menzies, preferred to communicate directly with press proprietors.  After his 
1934 election victory, Lyons often travelled from Canberra to Melbourne to meet 
Murdoch in his Herald office.21
                                                            
15 (Anon.), “Clothes would not worry Curtin”, The Sunday Sun, Sydney, 14 June 1942, 
retrieved on 19 June 2009 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/behindthescenes/pms/text/curtin.html>; JCPML, “John Curtin: 
Fairest & Best: Man on the Tram”, Bentley, 2006, retrieved on 5 August 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/jcexhibition/index.html>; Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 68. 
  Alexander lamented the lack of open-ended, 
interactive press conferences at this time because they were “like angel’s visits, few 
and far between”.  He explained that Lyons and Menzies tried to avoid direct, 
16 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 85. 
17 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Alexander interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np. 
18 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 78. 
19 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
20 Irvine Douglas, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Douglas interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01061/1, 15-19 June 1972, transcript np; Lloyd, Parliament and 
the press, p. 125. 
21 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 109. 
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informative, one-to-one talks with a press gallery member.  This type of 
communication, “where it existed at all at top level, had been through social 
functions, official dinners, private and club luncheons”.  Alexander recalled that: 
Before Mr Curtin’s time – for instance [sic], a Prime Minister would send a 
special man, one of his personal cronies, down to Melbourne to talk with the 
editors, and this was a very unsatisfactory way of doing things, both for the 
press and the Prime Minister – but Mr Curtin had no time or inclination for 
this method of doing business in wartime.22
Curtin’s predecessors appeared to favour certain, selected newspaper representatives 
while overlooking other press gallery correspondents. 
 
 
In October 1941, the Canberra correspondents welcomed Curtin’s innovative, 
relaxed and open approach to news media relations.  Their morale and working lives 
improved “immeasurably”,23 but not by materialistic measurements.  In the same 
manner as other Canberra residents, they supported the hardships of wartime 
rationing,24 electricity bans and holiday cancellations.25  Yet they were heartened by 
Curtin’s respectful, hospitable treatment.  He created unique, off-the-record, twice-
daily news conferences, where he shared confidential war secrets with ten or 12 
senior press gallery journalists, expecting them to convey the information to their 
employers, whose business title was either “the managing editor”, “editor-in-chief” 
or “chief editorial executive”.26  His frequent conferences were held partly to alert 
journalists and editors to sensitive military manoeuvres that might be jeopardised if 
the information was publicised.27  Murdoch received notes of the meetings, written 
by Harold Cox of The Sun News-Pictorial.28
                                                            
22 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
  Cox’s colleague, Frederick Thomas 
Smith of the Australian United Press, preserved his conference notes, as stated in 
23 A. Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
24 Alexander wrote in his diary: “Curtin is going in for rationing of civilian consumption to 
provide more funds, labour and materials for war”.  Alexander, “Papers”, 17 October 1941. 
25 Alexander privately noted of the Curtin Government’s policy of “blackouts to be enforced 
and holidays to be abolished ... thank God it is being done at last”.  Alexander, “Papers”, 11 
December 1941. 
26 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p.131; Donald 
Kilgour Rodgers, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Rodgers interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00497, 29 April 1971, transcript np. 
27 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 77. 
28 Harold Cox, “Typescript reports, 1944-1964” [hereafter “Typescript reports”], NLA, 
Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA MS acc. no. 4554, 1944-1964, transcript np. 
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Chapter 3.29
… was an inward flow of ideas of great value to the government from men 
trained in the judgment of public opinion, and an outward flow from the 
government to these men of confidential war information of the highest 
importance.  At one stroke, Curtin created a two-way pipeline of information 
which he regarded as of vital importance in the conduct of the war.
  As Alexander explained, Curtin “was a journalist himself and he trusted 
journalists”.  Alexander added this new style of prime ministerial meetings: 
30
Although the journalists still worked extremely long hours and endured material 
deprivations, Curtin elevated the Canberra press gallery to a more prestigious 
position by involving them in top-secret decision making. 
 
 
 Whitington and his colleagues also credited Curtin as developing more 
successful media relations than any other prime minister during the decades they 
spent in the news profession.  Whitington wrote in his 1977 autobiography: “Curtin 
had more faith in the integrity of the senior journalists at Canberra than any Prime 
Minister since, and probably any of his predecessors.”31  In his oral history in the 
early 1970s, a wartime correspondent of The Sun News-Pictorial, Frank 
Chamberlain, recalled Curtin “used to give us more information in one hour than we 
get nowadays from political leaders in a week or even a month”.32  Furthermore, 
Irvine Douglas – a 1940s editor who had been Lyons’ publicity officer and private 
secretary – declared: “I think that history will probably show that Curtin was one of 
the greatest, if not the greatest, Australian Prime Minister – that remains to be 
seen.”33  Moreover, a Canberra reporter for The Daily Telegraph in the early 1940s, 
Edgar Holt, said Curtin “used his press conference more adroitly than any [other] 
political leader I’ve known”.34
                                                            
29 Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s war [hereafter 
Backroom briefings], NLA, Canberra, 1997. 
  Throughout his terms, Curtin kept discussing top-
secret news in twice-daily interviews when he was based in his Canberra suite, where 
he would relax in his swivel chair, lean back and enjoy “thinking out loud”, as he 
30 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
31 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 77. 
32 Frank Chamberlain, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Chamberlain interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00552, August 1972-January 1973, transcript np. 
33 Douglas, “Douglas interview”. 
34 Edgar George Holt, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Holt interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01059, 23 May 1978, transcript np. 
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explained.  Through these interviews, the select band of correspondents learned more 
about the secret diplomatic and military machinations behind the battle scenes than 
many MPs outside of the War Cabinet and Advisory War Council.35  His press 
secretary, Don Rodgers, declared in a 1971 oral history interview: “I can say without 
fear of contradiction that no Prime Minister ever gave as many news conferences as 
Curtin did, before or since”.36
 
   
 It seemed that no other Allied leader shared confidences to such an extent as 
did Curtin.  As mass audiences demanded war news, Curtin often privately discussed 
policies with senior journalists before announcing his initiatives publicly.  The 
evidence indicates that Canberra correspondents appreciated their new prestigious 
positions as “information brokers”37 and members of a “knowledge class”.38
 
  
Therefore, they abided by the institutionalised censorship and did not breach their 
verbal confidentiality agreements.  Despite the strictures of censorship, the war 
created the suitable circumstances for Curtin to instigate this new style of prime 
ministerial media conference. 
 
Striving to advance Australian journalism 
The war led to unprecedented social, professional and demographic changes within 
the press gallery that benefited Curtin’s relationships with journalists.  At the 
beginning of the war, the Menzies government dealt “a notable humiliation” to the 
AJA by excluding newspaper writers from the “reserved status” while other 
occupations, including photographers and artists, received exemptions from military 
service.  After the AJA’s federal executive lodged an official complaint, the 
                                                            
35 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 77. 
36 Rodgers, “Rodgers interview”. 
37 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 16; Stephen Brent Mickler, 
Visualising Aboriginality: Image Campaigns and News Routines in the Western Australian 
Media [hereafter Visualising Aboriginality], PhD thesis, Murdoch University, Murdoch, 
1996, pp. 20-21. 
38 John Frow, Cultural Studies & Cultural Value, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995; 
Hartley, Popular reality, p. 241; Andrew Milner, Literature, culture and society, Routledge, 
London and New York, 2004, pp. 37-41; Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity, Routledge, London 
and New York, 2002, pp. 75-81. 
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government extended the reserved list to journalists more than 30 years old.39  The 
conservative officials’ initially harsh treatment of the senior writers might have 
contributed to their positive attitude towards Curtin, when he became the new Labor 
prime minister.  Moreover in 1942, the Curtin government announced the ABC 
would be a protected undertaking and radio employees would not need to fight in 
overseas battles.40  Military policies, voluntary enlistments and newsprint rationing 
had led to downsizing within the entire media profession and in mid-1943, some 
journalist staffs had been diminished by 60 per cent of their pre-war strength.41  The 
federal press gallery, however, continued to expand to report on war-related news.  
An official photograph of the 1945 Press Gallery featured 31 male and three female 
news representatives as well as one female secretary.  The group had increased since 
the 1933 press gallery with 21 male reporters, who predominantly represented 
Melbourne and Sydney newspapers.42  The 1945 media corps photograph included 
three ABC reporters and one Australian Associated Press (AAP) correspondent; 
these organisations were relatively new to the gallery.43
 
  This modernised media 
public sphere provided more opportunities for Curtin to explain his foreign policies 
to Australian and international audiences. 
Throughout the war, Curtin maintained a strong relationship with the AJA.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, he had been an AJA district president, who had arranged 
the nation’s first university extension classes for journalists, held in 1919.44  As the 
prime minister, he maintained identification with the union by wearing his AJA 
badge on his coat.45
                                                            
39 Clem Lloyd, Profession: Journalist [hereafter Journalist], Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 
1985, pp. 201-202. 
  Thus the Federal Government and the labour movement 
40 K.S. Inglis, This is the ABC: The Australian Broadcasting Commission 1932-1983 
[hereafter ABC], Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1983, p. 104. 
41 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 208. 
42 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, page facing 88. 
43 Murdoch founded the AAP in 1935.  Prime Minister Lyons insisted the ABC employ the 
first federal political journalist in 1939 to counter the Murdoch newspapers’ negative news 
about him.  See Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 243; Neville Petersen, News Not Views: 
The ABC, the Press, & Politics 1932-1947 [hereafter News not views], Hale & Iremonger, 
Sydney, 1993, p. 92; The Herald & Weekly Times, Keith Murdoch: Journalist [hereafter 
Murdoch], The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., Melbourne, 1952, p. 31. 
44 Lloyd, Journalist, pp. 165-167. 
45 Rodgers, “Rodgers interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 77. 
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welcomed the first AJA code of ethics, established in 1944, because this would assist 
journalism union members to resist employers’ demands to transgress “normal rules 
of decent behaviour”.46  Some non-Labor politicians, however, criticised the code as 
“a rejection of the freedom of the press” and many newspaper proprietors did not 
deem it to be necessary because they said that “their publications already accorded 
with the highest ethical standards”.47   The code comprised eight points including the 
requirement to “report and interpret news with scrupulous accuracy” and the need for 
a journalist to “respect all confidences received by him in the course of his calling”.48  
These progressive AJA initiatives in the areas of education and ethics, backed by 
Curtin, did not result in an immediate transformation in the journalism profession.  
Many wartime press gallery reporters had not undertaken a tertiary education.  The 
code of ethics alone was not adequate to protect news reporters’ rights if they needed 
to defend themselves in a court of law.  Yet these fledgling initiatives demonstrated 
Curtin’s leadership and support for reforms to improve journalism standards.49
 
 
 
Day-to-day media innovations 
News gathering was conducted at a faster pace for the press gallery because of 
Curtin’s personal commitment to releasing timely information.  He often made 
important announcements on the ABC radio first, instead of relying on the next day’s 
press reports.50
                                                            
46 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 229. 
  Don Whitington recalled the ten or 12 selected correspondents began 
firing questions at the prime minister’s first daily press conference at about noon, 
which suited the deadlines of evening papers such as The Herald.  Then Curtin 
would candidly talk with journalists at the second daily conference at about 5pm or 
6pm, which provided opportunities for the next morning’s press to write fresh stories 
47 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 229. 
48 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 208.  Also see Henry Mayer, The Press in Australia [hereafter The 
press], Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1968, p. 203. 
49 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 230.  Also in memoirs and oral histories, journalists discussed their 
educational backgrounds.  See Chamberlain, “Chamberlain interview”; Douglas, “Douglas 
interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 24. 
50 (Anon.), “A Lesson To Be Learnt”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks compiled by the 
Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], no. 2, JCPML acc. no. 00297/2, 20 March 
1942. 
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to outdo their evening competitors.51  The metropolitan printing presses produced a 
series of different editions for a single daily newspaper, with the final versions of The 
Daily Telegraph and other morning press “going to bed” by 3am or 4am.52  Due to 
Curtin’s accessibility, most Canberra news staffs were producing a page of “copy” or 
articles a day for their papers, overturning the pre-eminence of state politics.53  The 
ABC’s first federal correspondent, Warren Denning, arrived in the press gallery in 
1939.  “Mini-bulletins” of federal news, lasting 30 to 40 seconds, became a regular 
feature in the ABC’s relayed overseas reports by August 1941.54  The station’s 
Canberra office increased to 13 staff members in 1942.  They expanded their news 
services to produce seven national broadcasts a day.55  These ABC journalists 
prepared copy until the last bulletin at 11.20pm; then worked through the night to 
update stories for the first morning report at 6.25am.56  At this time, Australia’s only 
all-night station was Melbourne 3AK, but it was not licensed for daytime broadcasts.  
ABC updates were relayed by many commercial stations.57  When Curtin was 
temporarily unavailable, the correspondents checked facts with Rodgers, the first 
Australian prime ministerial full-time press secretary.58  While the press gallery 
reluctantly accepted a growing volume of “handouts” or media releases, distributed 
to their mail boxes due to wartime pressures and overworked ministers, they 
maintained frequent personal contact with Curtin.59
 
 
 Although they had been confined in Parliament House “for very long 
stretches” without “recreation facilities”, the Canberra press gallery entered a new 
“exciting era” when Curtin initiated his conferences, providing the correspondents 
with many travel opportunities and unprecedented insights into secret government 
                                                            
51 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 78. 
52 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 118; Mayer, The press, pp. 102-104; Whitington, 
Strive to be fair, p. 55. 
53 Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 62, 67, 97. 
54 Petersen, News not views, pp. 92, 124. 
55 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 138. 
56 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 146. 
57 Petersen, News not views, p. 144. 
58 For example, Joseph Alexander communicated with Don Rodgers during the Pearl 
Harbour crisis in early October 1941, discussed in Chapter 6.  Alexander, “Papers”, 5 and 8 
December 1941. 
59 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 153; Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 67. 
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debates.60  The members of “Curtin’s Circus” accompanied him to Melbourne for 
regular meetings of the Advisory War Council, Australia’s main decision-making 
body on the conduct of the global conflict.61  The war councillors conferred at least 
fortnightly, sometimes more often; Curtin and the “Circus” frequently departed from 
Canberra on Sunday night to Melbourne, making a return trip at the end of the week.  
Trains were used because aircraft was needed for the armed services.  The “press 
entourage” was given special security passes to enter the Victoria Barracks in 
Melbourne,62 headquarters of the Advisory War Council, War Cabinet and Defence 
Secretariat.63  By accompanying Curtin on these train journeys, the news 
correspondents knew about the bombing raid on Pearl Harbour long before it was 
revealed to the public.64  Curtin’s journalism strategies during this 1941 crisis will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.  Three years later, he supported one of the few Australian 
Government-sponsored press missions to travel overseas, an infrequent occurrence at 
the time.  At the Canadian Government’s invitation, he selected three journalists to 
cover the war effort in that part of the Allied world.  While he first chose Ross 
Gollan of The Sydney Morning Herald, the newspaper’s employers objected because 
they wanted to make the appointment.  After Gollan’s withdrawal, Whitington was 
successfully nominated to represent The Daily Telegraph and other morning 
newspapers.  Whitington was joined by Smith of the Australian United Press and 
Allen Dawes from The Herald, standing for the evening press.65
                                                            
60 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
  When Curtin held 
stirring media conferences in Britain, Canada and the US between April and June 
1944, the main Australian newspapers saved money by not sending their federal 
roundsmen and women; instead they published positive reports written by foreign  
61 Heather Campbell, “Doing the best for the country: War Cabinet and Advisory War 
Council”, JCPML, Bentley, 2004, retrieved on 19 June 2009 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/behindthescenes/cabinet/index.html>; Whitington, Strive to be 
fair, p. 78. 
62 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 78. 
63 Australian Government Department of Defence, “History of Victoria Barracks,” 
Southbank, 2008, retrieved on 15 June 2009 at 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/VBMSGTMESS/History.asp>. 
64 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
65 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 92. 
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correspondents.66
 
  His overseas media interactions will be examined in Chapter 8.  
Certainly his warm welcome of Canberra’s roving reporters provided them with 
invaluable “scoops” about fresh developments in the theatres of war. 
Curtin led technological innovations that transformed the way that an 
Australia prime minister communicated with global media audiences, as well as 
improving the delivery, breadth and depth of Australian war news coverage.  Some 
of his groundbreaking media strategies were discussed in Chapter 3 and included his 
direct radio broadcast from Canberra to North American audiences.67  His radio talks 
will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 6.  In October 1941, he had announced 
a government policy “to stimulate better understanding between the American and 
the Australian peoples”, which would allow for freer and faster international 
communications.  The new initiatives included a powerful short wave transmitting 
station to carry Australian radio broadcasts to US listeners.68  Shortwave 
broadcasting was inaugurated by Menzies on 20 December 1939, with messages sent 
in four languages to northern Australia, New Guinea and elsewhere in the Pacific to 
improve Allied morale.  By mid-1943, some 16 daily shortwave broadcasts were 
produced in seven languages, directed at Japanese-occupied countries, the US and 
the South Pacific.69  Also Curtin capitalised on a cheaper rate of transmitting 
Australian news telegrams to the US press.  At the beginning of the war, prices were 
slashed from seven-and-a-half pennies per word to only a penny for one word.70
                                                            
66 The overseas news coverage included: (Anon.), “Australia Has British Mandate In The 
Pacific”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 9 May 1944, p. 2; (Anon.), “Praise for Mr. Curtin”, 
The Age, Melbourne, 12 May 1944; (Anon.), “Substantial British Aid For Australia”, The 
Sun, Sydney, 25 May 1944.  The latter two articles were cited in Scrapbooks, no. 4, JCPML 
acc. no. 00297/4, May 1944. 
  As 
a result, Curtin said in October 1941 that the Department of Information (DOI) was 
aiming to induce more US correspondents to report on the nation.  Furthermore, local 
filmmakers were encouraged to produce “Australian shorts” to release to 
67 (Anon.), “Dr Evatt’s Mission To U.S.A.”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 16 March 1942, 
p. 1; National and Film Sound Archive, “John Joseph Curtin” [hereafter “Curtin”], Acton, 
2008, retrieved on 20 June 2009 at 
<http://www.nfsa.gov.au/the_collection/collection_spotlights/apms/curtin.html>. 
68 (Anon.), “Publicity: Relations With America: Australia Expands” [hereafter “Publicity”], 
The Canberra Times, Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4. 
69 Inglis, ABC, pp. 79, 97. 
70 (Anon.), “Publicity”, p. 4; The Herald & Weekly Times, Murdoch, p. 31. 
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international movie bureaus; this new media strategy included the creation of the 
National Films Laboratory to process film, along with the transfer of the Australian 
National Publicity Association to New York.71  Such technological advancements 
attracted visiting correspondents from high-quality US newspapers such as The New 
York Times72 and The Christian Science Monitor,73 providing opportunities to swap 
valuable information with the Canberra press gallery.  Yet there was much room for 
improvement in Australian and other Allied telegraph carriers, as Curtin said at the 
opening of the international Telegraph Conference, held in Canberra on 16 
December 1942.  He explained government traffic had increased to “relatively 
astronomical proportions”, resulting in a “somewhat inferior” service for private 
users.  Press traffic over the empire system had increased from 25 million words in 
1928 to 92 million words in 1942.74
 
  By this time press gallery reporters were 
adjusting to their increasingly globalised profession. 
Recent telecommunications inventions, installed before the war, equipped the 
Canberra correspondents to send copy more speedily to editors.  Before the 
industry’s financial troubles, The Herald & Weekly Times group and the Fairfax 
family’s Sydney Morning Herald were relocated to large, new premises with fast 
electric presses in the 1920s.75  Even during the economic depression, the most 
powerful proprietors were investing in telecommunications.  At The Herald, 
Murdoch pioneered Australian picturegram services in 1933; the next year, he 
published the first photograph sent by overseas radio networks to Australia.  His 
press headquarters in Flinders Street, Melbourne, were installed with the nation’s 
first printing machinery that could produce 50,000 newspaper copies an hour in 
1934.76
                                                            
71 (Anon.), “Publicity”, p. 4. 
  Although wartime restrictions on newsprint imports significantly reduced 
newspaper sizes, a Tasmanian milling project began operating in 1940 to produce 
local paper.  The profitable Australian Newsprint Mills were jointly owned by the 
72 Alexander, “Papers”, 17 November 1941. 
73 Younger, Keith Murdoch, p. 262. 
74 (Anon.), “Faster Cable Service: Conference Hopes to Aid Press”, Sydney Morning Herald, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 3, JCPML acc. no. 00297/3, 16 December 1942. 
75 Sybil Nolan, “Half a Century of Obscurity: The Age, 1908-64” [hereafter “The Age”], 
ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, p. 4. 
76 The Herald & Weekly Times, Murdoch, p. 11. 
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Herald & Weekly Times and John Fairfax & Sons.  Although the plant at Boyer used 
200 square miles of forest country, the joint venture provided “some relief”, helping 
to reduce reliance on overseas paper.77  Furthermore bakelite telephones, with their 
“trend-setting” design, improved microphones and metal rotary dials, were 
introduced in the press gallery in the early 1930s to improve conversational speech 
quality and news-gathering capacities.78
 
  Due to the rapidly rising efficiency of press 
operations, news organisations were prepared to deliver the latest war reports from 
home and abroad. 
Lloyd has detailed a number of ways that the press gallery used a wide range 
of the latest telecommunications equipment to report the news as a result of the 
government-sponsored innovations, publishers’ investments and the wartime demand 
for information.  Journalists dictated urgent stories to telephone operators in 
newspaper headquarters.  For example, evening paper correspondents “phoned 
stories” immediately after a newsworthy, afternoon “question time” in the 
parliament.79  Whitington recalled that when he was reporting on a riot by bored AIF 
troops in Brisbane in 1940, he “rushed into the post office” several times to write and 
“dash off” a series of “urgent telegrams” for The Daily Telegraph.80  In Canberra, 
press gallery journalists dispatched their news cables by parliamentary pneumatic 
tubes to be sent to the post office.81  ABC’s Canberra reporters telegraphed small 
news items to other state studios.82  To save money, The Herald correspondents 
drove hastily to the Canberra railway station to lodge their stories inside the last daily 
train leaving for Melbourne, which departed at 9pm.83
                                                            
77 W. Sprague Holden, Australia Goes To Press [hereafter Press], Greenwood Press, 
Westport, 1961, pp. 24-25; Lloyd, Journalist, p. 206. 
  Late in the war, Australian 
reporters began to benefit from the new development of teleprinter networks, another 
form of instantaneous communication that began in Germany in 1932 and was 
78 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 86; K. V. Tahvanainen, “The innovative bakelite 
telephone”, The History of Ericsson: Centre for Business History, Stockholm, 2007, 
retrieved on 14 June 2009 at 
<http://www.ericssonhistory.com/templates/Ericsson/Article.aspx?id=2095&ArticleID=1366
&CatID=360&epslanguage=EN>. 
79 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 86. 
80 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 65. 
81 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 85. 
82 Petersen, News not views, p. 123. 
83 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 86. 
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limited to only a few countries before the global conflict.84
 
  Thus the improved 
technological transmission of news enabled greater speed in dispatching short 
bulletins and emphasised the need for brevity. 
After sub-editors received the journalists’ reports, they ensured that the news 
conformed to two types of vetting systems: the media organisation’s internal 
censorship and the government practice of “blue-pencilling”.  With regard to the 
former convention, the news managers developed editorial policies and unwritten 
guidelines for staff members about which news they should emphasise and minimise.  
The chief of staff (the “Cos”), sub-editors (“subs”), chief sub-editor and managing 
editor often altered newspaper copy to make it harmonise with the organisation’s 
political stance.  For example, Whitington recalled that after reporting the 1940 
election results for The Courier-Mail, the editor, Jack Williams, rewrote the “intro” 
and “proof page” to emphasise Menzies’ victory and try to downplay the ALP’s net 
gain of four parliamentary seats.85  At The Herald, Murdoch was directly involved in 
two daily editorial conferences to influence news coverage.  During the first meeting 
at 8.30am, he brought “his personal views of display, to give color [sic] and 
emphasis to the news”.86
Often Murdoch would be so clear in his own mind about the subject of the 
leader [editorial] that his outline of its contents could be taken down in 
shorthand by the leader-writer and used almost verbatim.
  A leader-writer (editorial columnist) and cartoonist 
attended the second discussion:  
87
For an evening paper like The Herald, the editorial board made extensive changes for 
the purpose of “popularization”, making news more appealing to general readers, as 
well as updating each edition.  Sub-editors created the headlines, crossheads, kickers, 
photo captions and other layout designs.
 
88
                                                            
84 Anton A. Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, John Wiley & 
Sons, Hoboken, 2003, p. 300; Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 86. 
  The Daily Telegraph employed an 
85 David Black, “Curtin As An Election Leader”, JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 20 
June 2009 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/electionleader/index.html>; Whitington, Strive to be 
fair, pp. 63-64. 
86 The Herald & Weekly Times, Murdoch, p. 19. 
87 The Herald & Weekly Times, Murdoch, p. 20. 
88 Holden, Press, p. 271; Mayer, The press, pp. 102-104. 
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interpreter and translator to monitor closely foreign language broadcasts.89
 
  This 
analysis of newspaper editing processes suggested that the press owners’ blatant 
manipulation of public opinion had become an accepted routine before Curtin’s 
prime ministership. 
Although Curtin’s confidential briefings made journalism “exciting” for press 
gallery correspondents,90 the newsrooms were often dreary for the sub-editors, 
responsible for submitting potentially controversial copy to censors.91
In the reporters’ room there was just one typewriter, the lighting was poor, 
and of course there was no proper heating or cooling.  There wasn’t much 
furniture either, because the sub-editorial staff had used it to feed the fire 
during the war years when there were restrictions on kerosene for heating.
  One of The 
Age journalists, Greg Taylor, described conditions in 1949: 
92
This scene was probably comparable with the offices of some other city dailies.
 
93  
Finally after the arduous editing process, the copy was set, page one was made up 
and ready to “go to stereo”, the final stage before printing.94  Press organisations still 
depended on skilled workers for the production process; they had not yet installed 
labour-reducing, automatic, printing and copy handling systems.95  After the daily 
vetting system, “newsboys” contributed to this construction of the news by shouting 
the headlines to alert pedestrians and rushing into a factory to announce a “late 
breaking” war development to workers.96
 
 
 
 
                                                            
89 Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 58-59. 
90 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
91 Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 66-67. 
92 Cited in Nolan, “The Age”, p. 3. 
93 Nolan, “The Age”, p. 3. 
94 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 64. 
95 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 101. 
96 A scene of a newsboy inside a factory was shown in a 1943 Australian newsreel, South-
west Pacific.  Ken G. Hall (director and producer), South-west Pacific (newsreel) [hereafter 
South-west Pacific], Cinesound Productions, Australia, 1943. 
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Newsroom protests against censorship 
During the war, it became a “normal procedure” for sub-editors to decide when to 
send sensitive articles to censors.97  According to Edgar Holt of The Daily 
Telegraph, the press accepted “a voluntary censorship” during most of the war.  Holt 
explained, “if one wrote an article that involved [military] security, it was 
automatically sent to the censors and they either O.K.’d [sic] it or made cuts or 
approved [it]”.98  Yet as discussed in Chapter 3, during the Nazi offensives from 
1939 to 1941, newspaper owners sometimes expressed their dismay over harsh 
government regulations.  For example, many press owners strenuously objected to 
Menzies’ appointment of Murdoch as the director-general of information in June 
1940, leading to his resignation after six months; 99 also the Fairfax group published 
a Sydney Morning Herald editorial to criticise perceived inequities in the 
conservative government’s application of newsprint rationing rules.100  Two months 
after he became the prime minister, Curtin transferred the chief publicity censor, 
Edmund Bonney, who had been The Argus editor, from Victoria to Canberra.101  
Alexander’s family invited Bonney to stay at their house during Christmas 1941, 
indicating that he enjoyed a friendship with the chief censor.102
                                                            
97 Holt, “Holt interview”; Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 66. 
  During the first 
years of Curtin’s prime ministership, journalists upheld censorship rules because they 
wanted his confidential briefings to continue and they would try not to jeopardise 
military security, when Japanese forces were advancing towards Australia.  
Whitington wrote: “It must been only the respect [that] working journalists had for 
Curtin, and the enormity of breaching the confidence he had reposed in them, that 
98 Holt, “Holt interview”. 
99 Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling and the professionalization of public 
relations: Keith Murdoch, Robert Menzies, and the Liberal Party of Australia” [hereafter 
“Political opinion polling”], Australian Journalism Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2002, p. 43; 
Geoffrey Serle, “Murdoch, Sir Keith Arthur (1885 – 1952)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 10, 1986, pp. 622-627, retrieved on 18 May 
2009 at <http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A100610b.htm>. 
100 (Anon.), “Pruning Non-Essentials”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 19 February 
1941, p. 10. 
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Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 13, 1993, p. 215, retrieved on 29 
December 2010 at <http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A130247b.htm>. 
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Chapter 5   Traditions and innovations in Australian journalism: John Curtin and the 
Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery, 1941-1945 
 
204 
 
prevented some member of the Circus from indiscreetly dropping a security 
secret.”103
 
   
When the Axis threats were receding, however, newspaper owners – 
particularly Packer – became more combative towards the censorship system.  In 
1943 Bonney was made the director-general of an expanded DOI and Curtin gave the 
difficult portfolio of censorship responsibilities to the new Minister of Information, 
Arthur Calwell.  “[T]he appointment ensured that the proprietors would direct their 
anger towards Calwell and not Curtin”, the media historian, Ron Davidson, wrote.104  
Although this seemed to be an astute move for Curtin because he would not be 
directly involved in the controversies, press owners increasingly argued that Calwell 
and Bonney were “unduly severe” in suppressing political commentaries.105  During 
Curtin’s absence overseas in April 1944, the proprietors decided to publish blank 
spaces, where the prepared leader columns had been removed by censors.  
Confronted by a defiant Packer, Calwell sent commonwealth police officers to The 
Daily Telegraph printing presses.  Newspaper staff members threw copies of the 
current edition out of the office windows until police pulled out their guns to stop 
afternoon deliveries.  Holt recalled: “There were all sorts of fun and games, pistol 
point, ‘You can’t do it’, and a few little brawls here and there”.106  On 16 April, the 
High Court of Australia issued an injunction against the Commonwealth 
Government.  Under the direction of Attorney-General Herbert (Bert) Vere Evatt, 
new censorship regulations were written and they were ratified by the principal 
media groups by 19 May.107
 
  If he had the benefit of hindsight, Curtin might have 
tried to forestall this dispute by appointing a more diplomatic Minister of 
Information. 
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 Radio censorship restrictions were even tighter than those imposed on the 
press due to government concerns over the immediate impact of far-ranging, 
shortwave broadcasting.108  On 8 January 1941, the Menzies government suspended 
transmissions of four radio stations operated by Jehovah’s Witnesses, who were 
conscientious objectors to military service; this ban might have been intended as a 
warning to other broadcasters.  Military officials alleged that the religious 
organisation’s 5KA Adelaide station made “indirect references” to the departure of a 
troop ship from the city’s port.109  Later Curtin issued “complete blanket censorship” 
on news relating to the sinking of the HMAS Sydney on 19 November 1941 with all 
645 crew members lost after a battle with the German auxiliary cruiser, HSK 
Kormoran.110  A third of all Australian sailors lost during this war died in this battle.  
Still hoping to find the Sydney and survivors, Curtin talked about this tragedy at a 
press conference on 25 November; however, the news was so serious that Alexander 
made only a brief allusion to it, writing that journalists “were forbidden to discuss” it 
“with anyone excepting our editors”.  Alexander added the news “will be a great 
sensation once it becomes known”.111  He recognised the need to maintain secrecy 
while officials notified the next of kin that personnel were missing.112  The 
government announced the Sydney and its crew were “presumed lost” on 30 
November.113  Alexander added: “Curtin is showing a fine fighting spirit”.114  
Censors allowed only the press to report the news in the next day’s editions.  
Unaware of the continuing radio ban, Melbourne 3AR broadcast a school ceremony 
including a teacher’s tribute about the disaster.  As a result, the postmaster-general 
took 3AR off the airwaves for a day.115
                                                            
108 Inglis, ABC, pp. 78-79. 
   The Sydney and Kormoran wrecks were 
109 With the use of the National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations, the Menzies 
government declared the Jehovah’s Witnesses to be members of an unlawful association.  In 
June 1943, the High Court ruled the regulations were invalid and the ban was removed for 
Jehovah’s Witnesses organisations.  See Bobbie Oliver, Peacemongers: Conscientious 
objectors to military service in Australia, 1911-1945, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, South 
Fremantle, 1997, pp. 88-89, 158; Jayne Persian, “‘A National Nuisance’: The Banning of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Australia in 1941”, The Flinders Journal of History & Politics, vol. 
25, 2008, pp. 4-16. 
110 HSK Kormoran was disguised as a merchant ship with hidden guns and concealed 
torpedo tubes.  See Alexander, “Papers”, 27 November 1941. 
111 Alexander, “Papers”, 25 November 1941. 
112 Alexander, “Papers”, 27 November 1941. 
113 Alexander, “Papers”, 30 November 1941. 
114 Alexander, “Papers”, 1 December 1941. 
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finally discovered in March 2008 about 112 nautical miles off Steep Point in the 
Shire of Shark Bay, northern WA.116  Censors continued to vet shortwave broadcast 
scripts during the war.117
 
  
Yet as the tide of war turned in favour of the Allies, Curtin oversaw the 
DOI’s shift in focus from censorship to publicising Australia’s war effort.  Through 
his strategies to emphasise the Pacific front, Curtin increasingly urged the ABC to 
promote more positive Australian news, dramas and music while the DOI supplied 
wartime commentaries on vinyl records to the station’s “talks department”.118  By the 
end of 1944, the Curtin administration appointed censors who were largely 
journalists because it was believed that they understood how to promote Australia to 
the rest of the world.  The historian, John Hilvert, wrote that the DOI “was really a 
department of journalists” and “[t]he suppressors became the expressors”119 as the 
organisation expanded the local film industry and produced “shorts” about the nation 
to international cinema audiences.120  Perhaps Curtin was heeding the earlier 
mistakes made by the Churchill administration, which was preoccupied with secrecy 
at the expense of publicity during the first years of the war.  Although journalists 
were employed in the British Ministry of Information, they did not hold significant 
decision-making roles and the organisation was closed after the war.121
                                                            
116 The Kormoran sank at 12.30am on 20 November 1941 soon after firing on the Sydney.  
The estimated number of Kormoran survivors ranged from 315 to 317 Germans and another 
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  Due to the 
improved battle conditions, Curtin was able to ease censorship restrictions and avoid 
a re-occurrence of the government’s dispute with Packer at The Daily Telegraph.  He 
successfully directed the DOI’s initiatives in media publicity and the organisation 
117 Inglis, ABC, pp. 78-79. 
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promoted Australia as an attractive destination, in accordance with the federal 
government’s post-war immigration policies.122
 
 
During the Allied advance in Europe and the Pacific, a major industrial 
struggle erupted between Australian news management and reporters in October 
1944.  Some AJA journalists walked out on strike for the first time since 1912, 
revealing “serious cracks in the uneasy industrial truce within the newspaper 
industry”.123  Due to increasing tensions between the Sydney Sun management and 
printers, the Printing Industry Employees Union called all of its members from this 
newspaper out on strike on 7 October.  Industrial action was taken because the Sun 
proprietors rejected printers’ claims for a five-day, 40-hour working week and four 
weeks’ annual leave.124  The Sydney union printers were quickly supported by the 
AJA’s Canberra and New South Wales Districts.125  Perhaps Canberra and Sydney 
newspaper journalists were prepared to show a “spirit of solidarity” with the printers’ 
protest for better working conditions because the Allies were winning the war by late 
1944.126  More unions became involved in the dispute, which stopped production of 
all Sydney daily and Sunday newspapers.127  As Whitington recalled, the city’s press 
proprietors decided to produce one composite paper, displaying the mastheads of all 
four daily newspapers, with the assistance of union “bludgers”, including members 
who privately worked at home for the employers and those who decided “to scab 
publicly”.128  Whitington became the chief of staff of the union’s opposing 
composite newspaper, The News, which was produced with the help of printers at the 
Communist Party’s premises.129  The strike ended on 19 October after the proprietors 
reached an agreement with the printers.130
                                                            
122 The DOI continued until 1950.  Hilvert, Blue pencil warriors, p. 3. 
  One of the terms of settlement was the 
establishment of the Australian Newspaper Board to strive for “harmonious 
123 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 225. 
124 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 239. 
125 Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 96-97. 
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127 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 239. 
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relations” between press workers and proprietors.131  Yet the crisis ended poorly for 
some journalist union members including Whitington, who was demoted from his 
daily Canberra editorial position and transferred by Packer to The Sunday Telegraph 
in Sydney.  Whitington reminisced: “The journalists certainly gained little”.132  
While Curtin made several statements to oppose coal miners’ strikes in 1944, 
appealing to workers to stand firmly against foreign enemies, he continued to 
endorse the AJA and respected working reporters, helping to calm tensions.133
 
 
 
Media trends 
Journalists reported on Curtin’s media messages to a largely literate nation of “eager 
newspaper readers”.134  The nation was already highly urbanised by 1941, with 50.8 
per cent of Australians living in metropolitan areas.  Many city people bought daily 
morning, evening, Saturday and Sunday newspapers each week.  According to a 
study by Henry Mayer, 85.2 per cent of metropolitan residents read evening papers in 
1941.  Some 64.1 per cent of city people chose to buy the morning dailies, while 66.4 
per cent of these residents purchased Saturday and Sunday papers.  Readership 
figures varied significantly among the press competitors, as shown in Appendix 9.135  
The highest circulating daily was Murdoch’s Melbourne morning tabloid, The Sun 
News-Pictorial.  Perth’s main afternoon and evening newspaper, the Daily News, 
recorded the lowest sales because of the city’s relatively smaller population.136
                                                            
131 Lloyd, Journalist, pp. 225-226. 
  Even 
though a liberal-minded broadsheet like The Age was struggling financially, such 
dailies were read by influential parliamentary members.  Daily newspapers were 
transported by trains to Canberra, where they “were awaited with keen anticipation 
132 Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 101-103. 
133 Heather Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man” for April 1944, JCPML, Bentley, 2008, 
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by isolated politicians”, Lloyd explained.137  Despite the increasing concentration of 
mass media over the next two decades, Australia was still one of the top 10 nations 
with the highest daily newspaper reading populations in 1959.  Australia was fifth 
among the world’s countries for reading the most non-daily newspapers, those 
published three days a week or less frequently.138
 
  Circulation statistics were not the 
only measurement to gauge a newspaper’s success; although a serious broadsheet, 
such as The Age, might not have been as popular as an illustrative tabloid, the 
newspaper’s editorial staff might still exert an influential role in politics. 
Due to Murdoch’s sponsorship of public opinion surveys, Roy Morgan 
Research was founded in 1941 to produce unique insights into the world of 
Australian newspaper readers.139  Polls were conducted for Murdoch’s press as well 
as other news organisations, such as The Sun in Sydney.  While every customer was 
interested in the main front page headline, the majority of readers also looked for 
photographs and smaller, local news articles, according to research findings of 1945 
and 1946 Sun issues.  Cartoons and letters to the editor were highly popular among 
male and female blue collar workers.140  Murdoch’s commitment to an appealing 
letters section was evident in his staff memorandum: “I hope earnestly that effort will 
be made with the letter column.  It is the rag bag of the paper, instead of being one of 
its strong features.”141
                                                            
137 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 86. 
  These opinion polls were limited to Sydney; the findings 
might have varied if the study sample had been expanded to include different state 
newspapers.  Yet through one proprietor’s personal commitment to discovering 
readership interests, early research indicated the newspaper preferences of different 
social classes and genders.  This type of polling faded with Murdoch’s death in 1952; 
138 Mayer, The press, pp. 32, 44. 
139 Several Roy Morgan Research findings were cited as “Australian Public Opinion Polls” in 
The Courier-Mail on 14 August 1942, as stated in Chapter 3.  (Anon.), “Mr Curtin’s Job 
Pleases People”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 14 August 1942. 
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Sydney, 2006, retrieved on 20 June 2009 at <www.roymorgan.com>. 
141 The Herald & Weekly Times, Murdoch, p. 26. 
Chapter 5   Traditions and innovations in Australian journalism: John Curtin and the 
Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery, 1941-1945 
 
210 
 
market research was redirected to focus on sales and advertising, as noted by Roy’s 
son, Gary Morgan.142
 
 
The electronic news media were attracting large audiences because the 
growing emphasis on the nation’s involvement in the Pacific war spurred half of the 
population to listen more often to radio in 1942 than they had the previous year.  
Listeners indicated they mainly tuned into the war news.143  Likewise, many 
Australians were keen to watch the first public release of the nine-minute “short” 
Kokoda Front Line! on 18 September 1942; outside the cinema screenings, filmgoers 
queued in lines that stretched up to three blocks.  After quietly watching his Kokoda 
film in a Sydney cinema, Parer was greeted with “a sustained burst of spontaneous 
cheering and applause” from soldiers and members of the public.144  Similarly a 
Curtin newsreel provoked standing ovations from servicemen in the Northern 
Territory.145
 
  Although movie audience statistics were not available, anecdotal 
evidence indicated such documentaries were viewed as authentic and became 
popular among wartime Australians. 
In his parliamentary suite, Curtin was accustomed to camera crews, who 
helped to create a vast film record of his leadership.146  Although “an austere, 
reserved man”, he knew how “to say the right things” and have “the right pictures” 
taken during his newsreel scenes, according to Rodgers.147
  
  Australian wartime 
newsreels were produced by two fiercely competitive companies, Cinesound and  
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Movietone, which ceased feature film production to concentrate on documentary 
footage in cooperation with the DOI.148  The government films included 
groundbreaking, eye-witness images of battles and the destruction of Axis forces, 
which were taken by Australian camera crews sent by the DOI.149  This dangerous 
task was made even riskier by the cumbersome technical gear.  While walking with 
local troops in the wet, muddy jungle of the Owen Stanley Ranges, DOI-accredited 
Australian newsreel cameraman, Damien Parer, lugged 68 kilograms of equipment 
that included his movie camera, tripod, carrying case, cans of 35 millimetre film 
stock (which lasted for only one minute at a time), a “grotesquely large” still camera 
and various filters and parts.  Osmar White of The Sun and the ABC correspondent, 
Chester Wilmot, helped to carry Parer’s equipment.  Gradually most of the baggage 
was voluntarily shed along the track until Parer was left with his cine-camera and 
rolls of film.150  The result was the 1942 Academy Award-winning Kokoda Front 
Line!151  Although the scripts were vetted, the DOI permitted producers to assert 
creative control over the films made for the government.152  Camera teams processed 
their own pictures in the closest overseas darkrooms they could find and then sent the 
film products to the DOI.  “This was a prompt, speedy and co-ordinated way of 
getting pictures of Australian soldiers on screen throughout the world”, Parer’s 
biographer, Niall Brennan, wrote.153  Parer prepared elaborate “dope sheets”, with 
detailed suggestions about possible commentary and narrative structures, which 
influenced the editing of his footage.154
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another, and cooperated with US army filmmakers to shoot footage of Pacific battle 
scenes.  Reflecting Curtin’s media strategies, numerous newsreels were made for 
international audiences to portray Australia as the last bastion of democracy in the 
region.155
 
 
 
Curtin forged a unique style 
The wartime public sphere included the visual, audio and press elements that allowed 
Curtin to use the media adeptly.  These relatively modern media forms had already 
been founded by the time that Curtin was the prime minister.  Australians were 
largely literate consumers of the news and they were accessing radio and films more 
fully during the war.  John Hartley’s theory on active “citizens of the media” helps us 
to interpret the wartime citizens’ keen interest in the news.156  With the advent of 
radio and newsreels, a new type of politics emerged that was remarkably different 
from governments’ relations with the dominant press during the 1930s.  Expanding 
the concept of the public sphere by reducing the distance between the government 
and the governed,157 Curtin gave direct addresses that he aimed at every citizen to 
create the perception that he was one of the people.  Through this simulated one-to-
one communication, he bypassed the authority of press editors, who were losing their 
positions as gatekeepers of information.  Although his direct communication seemed 
unmediated, film teams carefully produced newsreels to ensure that “the right 
pictures” were taken.158
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Benefiting from his working knowledge of journalism practices, Curtin 
became skilful in managing and negotiating the news and public opinion.  As he 
understood the journalistic convention of news deadlines and competition, he 
instituted his twice-daily, confidential briefings at regular timeslots to benefit both 
morning and evening newspaper companies.  The HMAS Sydney tragedy provided 
Curtin with one of his first opportunities to share significant secret news with 
reporters; he continued the conferences because journalists and editors upheld the 
unwritten agreement about this ship disaster.  Later this innovative practice was 
enshrined in the AJA’s new code of ethics, established in 1944, which affirmed that 
journalists were obligated to respect confidences.  Although a censorship dispute and 
a journalists’ strike occurred in 1944, when the Axis threats were receding, reporters 
and editors largely cooperated with and supported Curtin’s system of news briefings 
and government blue-pencilling.  Censorship became another media tactic to ensure 
journalists were onside with the government to publicise Australia’s foreign policies 
positively.  As part of Curtin’s strategies, the DOI gradually shifted from being 
“suppressors” to “expressors” to promote Australia in films and radio programs.159  
Since he elevated the role of federal reporters to a privileged, elite position, they 
enjoyed being “knowledge linkers” - explaining and interpreting matters of 
governance to public audiences in accordance with the Ericson et al description of 
the governmental function of news in an administered society.160
 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that Curtin’s innovative media strategies 
appeared to resemble Roosevelt’s close relationships with journalists. Certainly, 
Curtin did not follow the lead of Churchill, who did not hold regular press 
conferences, nor did he share the plight of Canada’s Mackenzie King, whose 
government would not support paying for a full-time press secretary.  Similarly to 
Roosevelt, Curtin employed the nation’s first, full-time press secretary and 
developed a wide range of strategies to broadcast his messages by using the latest 
media communications.  He actively developed the governmental function of news 
by involving reporters in major decisions; and through his direct media talks to 
                                                            
159 Hilvert, Blue pencil warriors, p. 926. 
160 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 16; Mickler, Visualising 
Aboriginality, 1996, pp. 20-21. 
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citizens, he expanded the democratic scope of the public sphere by reducing the 
distance between the government and governed.  As discussed in Chapter 3, he 
became the first Australian prime minister to introduce a number of news initiatives 
including the following: releasing important announcements on the radio, rather than 
in the press; broadcasting radio talks directly from Canberra to US audiences; 
insisting the ABC should adopt more Australian-oriented programs; funding a film-
processing laboratory and opening a publicity association in New York to promote 
more local films to overseas audiences.  Indeed, Curtin cultivated media relations 
more intensely than FDR; no other Allied leader gave such confidential, twice-daily 
media briefings and later Australian prime ministers discontinued this extensive 
method of communicating to journalists.  His unique editorial experiences helped 
him to engage with press gallery reporters.  As a former AJA WA district president 
and labour newspaper editor, he was instrumental in improving news media 
standards by helping to create the nation’s first university courses for professional 
journalists.  He supported the AJA’s 1944 code of ethics, relished displaying his old 
union badge on his coat each day, and addressed journalists as his colleagues.  Curtin 
led important technological advancements in film, radio and the press, which 
enhanced the status of federal politics in media broadcasts.  It was an era when major 
forces converged, as Hartley reminds us.161
 
  Journalists used improved media 
services – encompassing mass, electric printing presses, shortwave radio, 
picturegrams, film processing, cheaper telegrams and teleprinters – to portray vividly 
the new global war.  They articulated the skilful communication strategies of a Labor 
prime minister, who revealed the necessary conciliatory attitudes and political 
determination to help resolve rare industrial and censorship disputes.  The next 
chapter will investigate Curtin’s mass communication strategies to identify the 
reasons for his ability to win reporters’ confidence in his leadership during the Axis 
attacks in 1941 and 1942. 
                                                            
161 Hartley, Popular reality. 
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Chapter 6 
The war comes home to Australia and the performance of “Curtin’s Circus”, 
1941-1942 
 
 
Curtin was appointed prime minister on 7 October 1941 and in this role, he led 
Australia’s new Pacific war that resulted in an increasingly assertive, independent 
foreign policy and a bilateral alliance with the United States.  Also the nation 
experienced “Australia’s greatest hour”,1 when Japan’s bombing of Darwin on 19 
February 1942 strengthened citizens’ resolve to help defeat Axis powers.  Along with 
the severe, external challenges, Curtin was confronted with internal ALP dissension 
over the military conscription question.  This chapter will approach certain questions, 
such as Curtin’s capacity to manage the news and how the Canberra media “circus” 
publicised his messages, with reference to Ericson, Baranek and Chan’s concept of 
administered society and Foucault’s theories on governance.  Ericson et al 
characterise journalists as working with political leaders and “playing a key role in 
constituting visions of order, stability and change”.2  Likewise, Foucault’s model of 
power connects with the Ericson et al model of news in an administered society.  
According to Foucault, successful government leaders in western liberal democracies 
use relatively modern technologies, including the media, to promote the optimal 
development of populations and enable the management of the nation.3
                                                            
1 (Anon.), “Into The Front Line”, The West Australian, Perth, 20 February 1942, p. 4. 
  Foucault’s 
concept is useful to analyse the close relations between Curtin and the press gallery.  
These insights help us to understand how journalists and other media professionals 
joined with Curtin to define “deviance”, predominantly Axis enemies, and to 
2 Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A 
Study of News Organizations [hereafter Visualizing deviance], Open University Press, 
Milton Keynes, 1987, p. 1; John Hartley, The Politics of Pictures: The Creation Of The 
Public In the Age Of Popular Media, Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 1992, p. 141. 
3 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” [hereafter “Governmentality”], in Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies In Governmentality: With 
Two Lectures By And An Interview With Michel Foucault, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1991, pp. 102-103; Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self”, in L.H. Martin, H. 
Gutman and P.H. Hutton (eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, 
Tavistock Publications, London, 1988, p. 18. 
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articulate the “proper bounds of behaviour”.4  As he declared in a Cinesound 
newsreel released shortly before the 1941 Christmas holiday season, all citizens 
should help “keep the workshops active” to support “our gallant fighting forces”.5
 
 
This chapter will first examine the positive press reaction to the 
announcement of a new Labor prime minister.  Then it will analyse a selected sample 
of Curtin’s public and private communications to identify his successful media 
strategies to persuade journalists to accept his foreign policies.  Six documents will 
be analysed in this chapter, beginning with Curtin’s declaration of war against Japan 
on 8 December 19416 and concluding with his parliamentary address about the 
Kokoda Track battles.7  These documents covered a wide range of communications, 
including the following: radio broadcasts to Australians and international audiences;8 
a newspaper editorial about the nation’s foreign policy;9 and parliamentary speeches 
about the Battle of the Coral Sea10 as well as the Kokoda Track conflict.11
                                                            
4 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 1. 
  
Furthermore, a comparison will be made between the public addresses and the 
resulting media coverage in the press, cinemas and radio news.  This analysis will be 
substantiated by an examination of primary sources including confidential 
government minutes, Allied cable correspondence and private journalists’ notes.  On 
this basis, the Curtin administration’s private discussions will be contrasted with the 
prime minister’s public image, as revealed in film appearances and press statements.  
This will result in an assessment of his ability to minimise negative reports and 
5 Cinesound Productions (producer), War in Pacific! (newsreel) [hereafter War in Pacific], 
1941, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01021/1. 
6 John Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime Minister” [hereafter “National broadcast”], 
Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister 
(Right Hon. John Curtin) [hereafter DDA], no. 10, 8 December 1941, pp. 19-22. 
7 John Curtin, “State Of The War” [hereafter “State of the war”], DDA, no. 47, 10 December 
1942, pp. 17-24. 
8 Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22; John Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United 
States” [hereafter “US radio broadcast”], DDA, no. 22, 14 March 1942, pp. 9-13. 
9 John Curtin, “The Task Ahead” [hereafter “The task ahead”], The Herald, Melbourne, 27 
December 1941, p. 1, cited in JCPML, Bentley, retrieved on 6 August 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/pmportal/text/00468.html>. 
10 John Curtin, “Naval Engagement – Coral Sea” [hereafter “Coral Sea”], DDA, no. 28, 8 
May 1942, pp. 4-5. 
11 Curtin, “State of the war”, pp. 17-24. 
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promote positive coverage of his Pacific war strategies.12
 
  This chapter argues that 
over the course of one year from 1941 to 1942, he developed and implemented 
successful media strategies, extending to rhetorical devices, a creative use of 
broadcast media and informal press relationships.  These strategies included the 
following: delivering clear, accessible national and international radio broadcasts; 
appealing to ideals of liberty and freedom in his radio talks and newsreel addresses, 
as well as emphasising responsibility and austerity; using a full-time press secretary; 
providing detailed background news briefings about the development of a new war; 
and persuading the press to report on his public messages and to withhold 
confidential information. 
 
Curtin “fitted for task”, October 1941 
After federal reporters witnessed the tumultuous parliamentary events of October 
1941, leading to conservative Prime Minister Fadden’s sudden resignation and 
Curtin’s unexpected ascendancy to the prime ministership, press owners welcomed 
the news of a resolution of the political crisis.13
                                                            
12 For my content analysis coding sheets, see Appendices 5-7.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the analysis of relevant press coverage was based on the Pew Research Center’s Project for 
Excellence in Journalism formula that a news article was deemed “positive” if two-thirds of 
the statements appeared to support a national leader.  See Pew Research Center’s Project for 
Excellence in Journalism, “Winning The Media Campaign: Methodology”, Journalism.org, 
Washington DC, 2008, retrieved on 26 September 2009 at 
<http://www.journalism.org/node/13314>; Public Broadcasting Service (producer), The 
Online NewsHour (television program – transcript), Washington DC, 24 June 2009, retrieved 
on 26 September 2009 at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june09/obama_06-
24.html>. 
  The UAP administration capitulated 
when two independent parliamentarians, Arthur Coles and Alexander Wilson, 
crossed the floor to vote for the Labor opposition’s no-confidence motion on the 
Fadden Government’s budget proposals, which were defeated by a vote of 36 to 33 
13 Supportive press editorials were published to announce Curtin’s prime ministerial 
appointment in Australian metropolitan dailies including the following: The Advertiser, The 
Age, The Argus, The Brisbane Telegraph, The Canberra Times, The Courier-Mail, The Daily 
Mirror, The Herald, The Mercury, The Sun, The Sydney Morning Herald, The West 
Australian.  See Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], 
JCPML, Bentley, no. 1, JCPML acc. no. 00297/1, 4-9 October 1941. 
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on 3 October.14  The Sun News-Pictorial’s Harold Cox recalled that Curtin did not 
deliberately seek to destabilise the Fadden administration.  This view was 
corroborated by Allan Dawes, who reported in The Herald that as the Federal Labor 
Opposition leader, Curtin had “not been much in the limelight” and was not a 
controversial personality between 1935 and early 1941.15
Harold, I wouldn’t have thought this possible ... You know I’ve not sought it.  
You know I was anxious to give these people [the conservative parties] every 
possible run.
  According to Cox, in the 
early morning on 3 October, only hours before the conservatives’ defeat, Curtin 
stopped him in the parliamentary “Labor lobbies” to give the news tip that both 
independent parliamentarians might vote against the government.  Curtin reportedly 
said:  
16
During a time of political upheavals, Nazi conquests in Europe and Axis battles in 
the Middle East and North Africa, press owners approved the swift formation of a 
new Labor Cabinet.  They published decidedly pro-government coverage of Curtin’s 
swearing-in ceremony with Governor-General, Lord Alexander Gowrie, on 7 
October.
 
17
 
   
Curtin’s appointment was reported positively in twelve broadsheets and 
tabloids across Australia.18  Characterising Australian people’s attitudes towards the 
new prime minister, newspaper articles included expressions of “loyalty”,19
                                                            
14 David Black, “Biography of John Curtin”, JCPML, Bentley, 2009, retrieved on 26 
September 2009 at <
 “support 
http://john.curtin.edu.au/resources/biography/details.html>; Bobbie 
Oliver, Unity is Strength: A History of the Australian Labor Party and the Trades and Labor 
Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999 [hereafter Unity is strength], API Network, 
Bentley, 2003, p. 160. 
15 Allan W. Dawes, “Men You Should Know About” [hereafter “Men you should know 
about”], The Herald, Melbourne, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1, 6 October 1941. 
16 Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Cox interview”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 01060/1, 6 April 1973, transcript np. 
17 Scrapbooks, no. 1, 8 October 1941. 
18 See footnote 13. 
19 (Anon.), “Labor’s Chance”, The Advertiser, Adelaide, 4 October 1941; (Anon.), “Labor 
Takes The Helm”, The Age [hereafter Age], Melbourne, 4 October 1941; (Anon.), “John 
Curtin Fitted For Task”, The Brisbane Telegraph, Brisbane, 4 October 1941.  Press articles 
cited from Scrapbooks, no. 1, 4 October 1941. 
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and cooperation”,20 “trust”,21 “respect and esteem”,22 as well as “good wishes”23 and 
the affirmation that it was “Labour’s [sic] right to govern”.24  Press writers 
emphasised Curtin was a “journalist by profession”,25 known for his “graceful” 
sentences and “suave” manner,26 indicating they viewed him as a colleague.  The 
Brisbane Telegraph headline writer announced: “John Curtin Fitted for Task”.27
 
  As 
they promoted favourable press images of the new prime minister seated next to the 
governor-general, the newspaper owners emphasised the need for stability, propriety 
and cooperation in Australia during the escalating global war. 
Thus the press photographs conveyed a positive portrayal of the new leader.  
In accordance with Berger’s semiotic conventions, 16 relevant newspaper 
photographs have been analysed. 28
                                                            
20 (Anon.), “Fall Of The Government”, The West Australian [hereafter West], Perth, 4 
October 1941; (Anon.), “Labor Takes The Helm”, Age, 4 October 1941.  Press articles cited 
in Scrapbooks, no. 1. 
  These visual images appeared in eight 
metropolitan dailies between 4 October and 8 October 1941.  In each image, Curtin 
appeared at an eye-level distance from the photographer, creating the visual effect 
that he appeared to be a down-to-earth leader, who would speak honestly with 
Australian people.  His level-headed image was reinforced by The Courier-Mail 
21 (Anon.), “We Must Get Swift Action”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in Scrapbooks, 
no. 1, 10 October 1941. 
22 (Anon.), “Federal Labour’s [sic] Great Chance”, The Mercury, Hobart, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 1, 6 October 1941. 
23 (Anon.), “New Lamps For Old”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1, 4 
October 1941. 
24 (Anon.), “Labour’s [sic] Right”, The Argus, Melbourne, cited in Scrapbooks, no.1, 7 
October 1941. 
25 For example, (Anon.), “The New Prime Minister”, Age, 4 October 1941; (Anon.), “5th 
Labour [sic] Prime Minister”, The Argus, Melbourne, 4 October 1941; (Anon.), “John Curtin 
Is An Intellectual”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 4 October 1941; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s 
Notable Political Career”, The Sun News-Pictorial, Melbourne, 4 October 1941.  Press 
articles cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1. 
26 Dawes, “Men you should know about”. 
27 (Anon.), “John Curtin Fitted for Task”, The Brisbane Telegraph, Brisbane, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 1, 4 October 1942. 
28 Arthur Asa Berger, Media Analysis Techniques, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London 
and New Delhi, 1982, pp. 38-39; Anders Hansen, Simon Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris 
Newbold, Mass Communication Research Methods, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1998, p. 117.  For more information on this semiotic 
analysis, see Appendix 4. 
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journalist’s description of him as “speaking straight from the shoulder”.29  The 
sample included six close-up images of Curtin either pictured alone or surrounded by 
his wife and two adult children,30 which indicated a close, intimate relationship 
between him and newspaper readers in different states.  The remaining ten medium 
and long distance images revealed Curtin’s informal and formal relationships in a 
variety of settings.  He was pictured jovially shaking hands with previous ALP Prime 
Minister Scullin; talking good-naturedly to Fadden and Menzies, and seated with his 
family again (see Figures 1-5).31
 
 
From his swearing-in ceremony to his last year, press and film images 
frequently showed Curtin in similar attire – including a stiff, white collar, plain tie, 
dark waistcoat, matching jacket and at times, a heavy overcoat.  His style was noted 
by The Sunday Sun “FACT’S Canberra Correspondent”, who wrote light-heartedly in 
1942 that Curtin would not be concerned about wartime clothes rationing because he 
had “never been a fancy dresser”.32
                                                            
29 (Anon.), “Straight From The Shoulder”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in Scrapbooks, 
no. 1, 17 October 1941. 
  As Curtin’s press secretary, Rodgers, observed 
later, the prime minister “deliberately had his suits cut very conservatively” to evoke 
“a very serious appearance”.  Since Curtin had been an experienced orator before 
amplifiers were invented, “his idea was that if you wore a stiff collar, it kept your 
30 Figure 1 was published with this newspaper article: (Anon.), “Street Corner Speaker to 
Prime Minister”, The Herald, Melbourne, 4 October 1941.  For Figure 2: Dawes, “Men you 
should know about”.  The other four close-up photographs were published in: (Anon.), “The 
New Prime Minister”, Age, 4 October 1941; “John Curtin Fitted For Task”, The Brisbane 
Telegraph, Brisbane, 4 October 1941; “Prime Minister-Elect”, West, 4 October 1941; 
“Leader and Ministers of New Federal Government”, The Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter 
SMH], Sydney, 7 October 1941.  The anonymously taken photographs were cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 1. 
31 Figure 3 was cited in: (Anon.), “Smiles”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 4 October 1941.  
For Figure 4: “Three Prime Ministers within 2 Months”, The Argus, Melbourne, 4 October 
1941.  For Figure 5: “Wife Of Labor’s Leader”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 4 October 
1941.  The other seven medium and long shots appeared in the following newspapers: 
“Victory”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 4 October 1941; “New Federal Ministry Sworn-In 
At Government House”, SMH, 8 October 1941; “Prime Minister Launches War Loan In 
Town Hall”, SMH, 8 October 1941; “Caucus Meeting Which Selected Cabinet”, SMH, 7 
October 1941; “Labor Cabinet Holds First Session”, The Sun, Sydney, 8 October 1941.  The 
anonymously taken photographs were cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1. 
32 (Anon.), “Clothes would not worry Curtin”, The Sunday Sun, Sydney, 14 June 1942, 
retrieved on 26 September 2009 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/behindthescenes/pms/text/curtin.html>. 
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Figures 1 (top left), Figure 2 (top right) and Figure 3 (below) 
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Figures 4 (top) and Figure 5 (below) 
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chin up and you threw your voice to the back of the hall’, Rodgers remarked. 33
Figure 6 
  
While emphasising the need for sacrifice and civic responsibility, Curtin practised a 
personal form of austerity that seemed endearing to The Sunday Sun correspondent.  
At the beginning of his term, his appearance was likened by The Bulletin cartoonist, 
John Frith, to an energetic, new business owner who had taken over a figurative, 
busy store named “Australia & Co”.  As the illustration depicted, the Curtin cartoon 
figure strode purposefully to the shop front door while raising his right hand in a 
victory salute to his predecessors, Menzies and Fadden, standing on the entrance  
“welcome mat”.  Curtin was shown in a workman’s apron and his shirt sleeves were 
rolled up to indicate his willingness to assume new responsibilities, as well as his 
working class origins.  Also the signs announced the newspaper’s optimism about his 
new prime ministership.34  Frith later described Curtin as a “very fine man”35
                                                            
33 Donald Kilgour Rodgers, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Rodgers interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00497, 29 April 1971, transcript np. 
 and his 
34 John Frith, “Taken Over”, The Bulletin, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1, 8 October 1941. 
35 John Frith, interviewed by Shirley McKechnie [hereafter “Frith interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01064/1, 30 April-1 May 1994, transcript np. 
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cartoon conveyed The Bulletin editorial views that the early days of Curtin’s 
administration were already inspiring.  In a similar manner to other Allied war 
leaders, he was portrayed as a celebrity in leader pages, broadsheet reports and 
tabloid features.  His shift from relative obscurity to popularity was satirised by The 
Sunday Sun cartoonist in two illustrations in November.  In the smaller picture, 
“Plain John” Curtin “shivered on the brink” of the political stage as the opposition 
leader from 1935 to 1941.  The main illustration conveyed The Sunday Sun’s 
approval of Curtin’s national leadership.36
 
  The upbeat news extended to a report that  
Figure 7 
his four-year-old black kelpie dog, Kip, would forego the Lodge’s “imposing” and 
“costly” kennel to remain with his daughter in Perth.37
                                                            
36 Figure 7 appeared with the following newspaper article: Alan Reid, “Mr. Curtin, who took 
the plunge, decides the water’s fine”, The Sunday Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1, 9 
November 1941. 
  His cultivated image as a 
common man contrasted with international media images of Roosevelt’s aristocratic 
pince-nez glasses, Churchill’s flamboyant cigar and Mackenzie King’s sporty plus 
fours. 
37 (Anon.), “Curtin’s Dog Not To Use Costly Kennel”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited 
in Scrapbooks, no. 1, 7 October 1941. 
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In their newsreels, filmmakers interwove formal commentaries, close ups and 
informal long shots to portray Curtin as a strong leader.  A Cinesound Productions 
crew focused on his face as he declared to “Australians in the Commonwealth and 
overseas” that his government accepted the “sacred responsibility” of “coordinating 
the war”.  During his stand-up (while addressing the camera), he set the tone for his 
new administration by emphasising the keywords of fighting for “the empire ... 
wherever freedom and liberty are in danger”. 38  Curtin’s forceful, direct gaze into the 
camera contrasted with a newsreel of Menzies in 1939.  Archival research suggested 
that unlike Curtin, Menzies did not make a separate public newsreel about his prime 
ministerial declaration of war, but was filmed as he mainly read from a script when 
he announced Australia’s new battle with Germany in 1939.39  A Movietone 
newsreel, titled “Personalities Living at the Federal Capital”, featured Curtin in the 
relaxed atmosphere of the Lodge gardens while he chatted with his wife, Elsie.  
Through a voice-over, the audience was informed he was setting out for his “daily 
walk to work to show how to be healthy and petrol-wise”.40
 
  While film teams 
presented a powerful cinematic image of Curtin, he established to audiences that he 
represented ordinary Australians and this inclusive approach was also reflected in 
press coverage throughout the nation. 
 
“Real leadership” in Pacific war, December 1941 
Curtin’s determination to involve Australian audiences in foreign policy discussions 
was evidenced by his radio broadcast to declare war against Japan on 8 December 
1941.  He spoke one day after Japanese forces bombed the Hawaiian naval base, 
                                                            
38 Cinesound Productions (producer), “John Curtin is Australia’s Prime Minister: Cabinet 
sworn in” [hereafter “Curtin Cabinet sworn in”], in Compiled speeches of John Curtin, 1941 
– 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00130/1, 1941. 
39 The Menzies newsreel was featured in: Cinesound Productions (producer), “Prime 
Minister Addresses Nation”, in At The Front: 1939-1945: Australia’s WWII Newsreels 
(newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00441/2, 1939.  Other film records related to 
Menzies’ home movies and his later terms as the prime minister from 1949 to 1966.  Cited in 
National Film and Sound Archive, “Prime Ministers of Australia” (fact sheets on Sir Arthur 
William Fadden and Sir Robert Gordon Menzies), Acton, 2008, retrieved on 29 November 
2009 at <http://www.nfsa.gov.au/the_collection/collection_spotlights/apms/index.html>. 
40Movietone News (producer), Personalities Living At The Federal Capital (newsreel), 
JCPML, JCPML acc. no. 00876/2, Bentley, 1941. 
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Pearl Harbour, and simultaneously invaded Malaya and Thailand.  Curtin’s vision of 
the public sphere was inclusive, egalitarian and based on a well-informed news 
media.  He made Australia’s first independent declaration of war when he officially 
announced the full-scale battle on Japan to national radio audiences.41  Australian 
newspaper publishers favourably portrayed and extensively reproduced his speech in 
their next day’s editions.  They did not publicise the time of the evening broadcast or 
the radio station, the ABC, perhaps because they wanted Australians to buy their 
newspapers and read their reports.42  Through a computer-aided, quantitative 
analysis, this study calculated the reading ease and key terms of a selected sample of 
Curtin’s public communications, beginning with the radio talk.  The purposes of this 
analysis were twofold: to find patterns of his keywords that were reflected in the 
media; and to identify whether he adjusted the simplicity and accessibility of a public 
address to suit his audience.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the Flesch readability score 
was recorded for the selected texts.43  Curtin’s radio address registered a Flesch 
readability score of 57.4, close to the recommended standard of 60 to 70.  
Roosevelt’s 27 broadcasts, known as the “fireside chats”, were calculated to be an 
average of 57.5 on the Flesch readability scale.  FDR’s other public addresses were 
an average of 59.4.44
  
  Therefore Curtin’s declaration of war was very similar to 
FDR’s public rhetoric in terms of accessibility and reading ease. 
                                                            
41 Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22; Bobbie Oliver, “Shaping the Nation: John Curtin 
and Australia” [hereafter “Shaping the nation”], JCPML, Bentley, 2001, retrieved on 4 June 
2008 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/shapingthenation/index.htm>. 
42 Army News, Darwin, 8 and 11 December 1941; The Argus, Melbourne, 8 and 9 December 
1941; The Canberra Times [hereafter Canberra], Canberra, 8 and 9 December 1941; The 
Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 8 and 9 December 1941; SMH, 8 and 9 December 1941. 
43 The Flesch readability score spanned a hundred-point scale.  A higher score indicated the 
speech included simple language.  A lower score implied the document was more complex.  
The standard recommended writing score was 60 to 70.  See Elvin T. Lim, “The Lion and 
the Lamb: De-mythologising Franklin Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats” [hereafter “Fireside 
chats”], Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 445-446. 
44 Lim, “Fireside chats”, pp. 445-446. 
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This quantitative analysis was expanded to include the Flesch-Kincaid score 
of Curtin’s radio talk.45  The broadcast text was calculated to be 9.4, meaning it 
would be appropriate for ninth graders.  Although the speech was slightly more 
complicated than the recommended Flesch-Kincaid standard of eight, it was aimed at 
the right level given Australia’s compulsory education system at the time.  On 
average, Australians born before 1930 achieved 9.3 years of education.46  In each 
Australian state in 1941, the statutory leaving age was 14 years.47
 
  This quantitative 
analysis demonstrated Curtin deliberately aimed his address at working men and 
women. 
Both Allied war leaders knew how to deliver their oratory at the right pace 
for their target audiences.  During his broadcast, Curtin spoke 119.4 words per 
minute, which some scholars would consider to be an acceptable pace.48  His speech 
rate in the 13-minute talk was comparable with that of the “fireside chats” that were 
between 105 and 117 words per minute.49
  
  After developing a reputation as a “street  
                                                            
45 As stated in Chapter 1, the Flesch-Kincaid score ranked documents on a school grade 
level.  The recommended Flesch-Kincaid score for most public documents was about eight.  
See Trevor Day, “Twelve Writing Tips for Administrative Staff”, University of Bath, Bath, 
2008, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<www.bath.ac.uk/learningandteaching/resources/TwelveWritingTipsRevisedTD.pdf>. 
46 Jonathan Kelley and M.D.R. Evans, “Trends In Educational Attainment In Australia”, 
WwA: Worldwide Attitudes, 26 August 1996, pp. 1-8, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<http://www.international-survey.org/wwa_pub/articles/hst-ed5.htm>. 
47 S.R. Carver, Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1941, 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, no. 34, 1942. 
48 Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, recommendations 
varied on this matter of public speech, with different scholars advising between 100 and 125 
words per minute.  See Lim, “Fireside chats”, p. 446, endnote 42, 458; Peter Kenny, A 
Handbook of Public Speaking for Scientists & Engineers, IOP Publishing Ltd [Institute of 
Physics Publishing], London, 1988, p. 20; Cynthia J. Pasquale, “Talking at the speed of 
confound”, The Denver Post, Denver, 29 June 2006, retrieved on 10 September 2009 at 
<http://www.denverpost.com/ci_3991442?source=rss>; Public Broadcasting Service, “All 
About Public Speaking”, Falls Church, 2009, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<http://www.pbs.org/standarddeviantstv/transcript_public.html>. 
49 Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. Braden, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt” [hereafter 
“Roosevelt”], in Marie Kathryn Hochmuth (ed.), History and Criticism of American Public 
Address, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, vol. 3, 1958, pp. 520, 522; Lim, “Fireside 
chats”, p. 446. 
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corner speaker” in his youth,50 when he was actually a very fast speaker,51 Curtin 
talked calmly with Australians in a like manner to Roosevelt’s reassurance to a joint 
session of the US Congress and radio listeners that the invasion of Pearl Harbour was 
“a date which will live in infamy”, also broadcast on 8 December.52
 
 
 A content analysis of the text was made to identify keywords used by Curtin.  
He appealed to a sense of national identity, greeting his listeners by saying: “Men 
and women of Australia”.53  Along with his references to the country, he repeated the 
keywords of democracy, freedom and liberty54 that were familiar in his newsreels 
two months earlier.55  It was clear that he was talking to “the people” – rather than to 
politicians or the monarchy – and frequently used “we”, “us” and “our” that 
supported his inclusive approach.56  This strategy resembled the approach taken by 
Roosevelt in his “fireside chats”, which always began with some variant of a greeting 
to “My Friends”.57  Also Curtin appeared to take care to make impersonal references 
to “Japan”, “the enemy” and the war, consistent with US official propaganda 
policy.58
                                                            
50 (Anon.), “Street Corner Speaker to Prime Minister”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 1, 4 October 1941. 
  It was necessary to avoid verbal “assaults” on Japan’s revered Emperor 
Hirohito, according to the US State Department and Office of War Information.  As 
early as January 1942, they attempted to remove official anti-emperor statements that 
might consolidate Japanese people’s support for their military government and could 
51 In 1916, The West Australian reported: “Curtin was a very fast speaker indeed, sometimes 
speaking at the rate of 180 to 190 words per minute”, cited in Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 66. 
52 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Teaching with Documents: A 
Date Which Will Live in Infamy” [hereafter “A date which will live in infamy”], College 
Park, 2009, retrieved on 11 September 2009 at 
<http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/day-of-infamy>; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “A 
Date Which Will Live in Infamy”, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, 
Hyde Park, 8 December 1941, retrieved on 11 September 2009 at 
<http://www.FDRlibrary.marist.edu/archives/collections/avclips.html>. 
53 Curtin, “National broadcast”, p. 19. 
54 During the broadcast, Curtin mentioned “Australia”, “country” and “nationhood” 23 times.  
He made 17 references to democracy, freedom and liberty.  See Curtin, “National 
broadcast”, pp. 19-22. 
55 Cinesound Productions, “Curtin Cabinet sworn in”; Cinesound Productions, War in 
Pacific. 
56 Curtin used keywords of “we”, “us” and “people” 10 times during the speech.  See Curtin, 
“National broadcast”, pp. 19-22. 
57 Lim, “Fireside Chats”, p. 453. 
58 Curtin used “war” and “enemy” keywords 19 times and in 20 instances respectively.  See 
Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22. 
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become counterproductive to Allied efforts in the Pacific.59  While Roosevelt 
exclusively addressed Americans during his “day of infamy” speech, Curtin stressed 
Australia’s imperial relationship in his radio broadcast by declaring: “We shall hold 
this country and keep it as a citadel for the British-speaking race and as a place 
where civilization will persist.”  Both leaders sought to portray themselves as united 
with “free men and free women” against a “ruthless and wanton” aggressor.60
 
 
Curtin often used language about a “British race” in his public talks because 
this was common parlance in Australia at the time.  A 1933 government census had 
identified 99.1 per cent of the population as being of a “British” nationality, not 
recognising Australians as a separate citizenship.61  The commonwealth statistician, 
Dr Roland Wilson, reported: “The non-indigenous population of Australia is 
fundamentally British in race and nationality.”62  Curtin used this mode of expression 
to emphasise “the imperial connection and the crimson thread of kinship time and 
time again” in his broadcasts.63  Yet he pursued an independent foreign policy and 
his international outlook seemed similar to the democratic views of Roosevelt, who 
became convinced that “imperialistic policies were no longer admissible on the part 
of any Power”.64  Towards the end of 1942, the Curtin government ratified the 
Statute of Westminster to declare that Australia would be free from any British 
control and able to form its own defence and foreign policies.65
                                                            
59 Hal Brands, “Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and Policy in the American Debate over the 
Japanese Emperor during World War II”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 8, no. 3, 2005, p. 
434. 
  In his newsreels and 
60 Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22. 
61 Indigenous Australians were not included in the census.  See Roland Wilson, Official Year 
Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1939 [hereafter Year book 1939], Commonwealth 
Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, no. 32, 1939, pp. 383-384. 
62 Wilson, Year book 1939, p. 384. 
63 David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings [hereafter In 
his own words], Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 200. 
64 Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, “The Anti-Colonial Policies Of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 1, March 1955, p. 18. 
65 The Statute was a 1931 Act of the British Parliament to declare that the self-governing 
dominions of the British Empire were fully independent states.  South Africa, Canada and 
the Irish Free State adopted the statute in 1931.  Yet Australia did not immediately adopt this 
in the interest of maintaining British defence support.  The Curtin government enacted the 
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act in October 1942.  See Oliver, “Shaping the nation”. 
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radio talks, he continued to declare the nation’s loyalty to Britain to convey the 
impression that he identified with the majority of his Australian audiences.66
 
 
Both Curtin and Roosevelt made last-minute, personal amendments to their 
radio speeches that resonated with national audiences during the aftermath of the 
Pearl Harbour attacks.  As the first prime ministerial press secretary, Rodgers wrote 
media statements, articles and radio talks.67  While Curtin often appealed to British 
sentiment, he decided to quote from the radical republican and Victorian English 
poet Algernon Charles Swinburne’s “The Eve Of Revolution”.  The citation 
concluded his broadcast and “caused great interest among his friends”, noted an 
unnamed Herald reporter, possibly the newspaper’s Canberra bureau chief, Joseph 
Alexander, whose account was published under a headline in bold, uppercase type: 
“Mr. Curtin’s Quotation”.  In the same way as Swinburne attempted to use his lyrics 
“to rouse a sleeping people”,68 Curtin believed in the persuasive power of poetry to 
stir Australian people to accelerate wartime production in defence of their country.  
The prime minister “wrote the quotation from memory a few minutes before his 
broadcast began, because he thought it peculiarly appropriate as an invocation to the 
Australian people”, according to the anonymous Herald journalist.  In the article, 
Curtin was praised for “his stirring appeal” and for choosing Swinburne’s five lines 
because of their “remarkable application to modern aerial warfare”. 69
Come forth, be born and live,  
   The selected 
excerpt was:  
Thou that hast help to give 
And light to make man’s day of manhood fair: 
With flight outflying the spherèd sun, 
Hasten thine hour and halt not, till thy work be done.70
                                                            
66 Black, In his own words, pp. 200, 243. 
 
67 Richard Hall, “Spin Doctor: The fine art of the parliamentary press secretary” [hereafter 
“Spin doctor”], National Library of Australia News, February 1998, vol. 7, no. 5, p. 5. 
68 Stephanie Kuduk, “‘A Sword of a Song’: Swinburne’s Republican Aesthetics in Songs 
before Sunrise”, Victorian Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, 2001, p. 257. 
69 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Quotation”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1, 9 
December 1941. 
70 Algernon Charles Swinburne, “The Eve Of Revolution”, Songs Before Sunrise, William 
Heinemann, London, 1917, p. 26. 
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On the same day as the Australian broadcast, Roosevelt delivered his radio address in 
the US Congress at 12.30 pm, using his “reading copy” of a typewritten draft that 
included his amendments.71  FDR’s speeches were usually the product of careful 
collaboration with his advisers.72  He made a significant change to the critical first 
line about the bombings, replacing the phrase, “a date which will live in world 
history”, with the stronger phrase, “a date which will live in infamy”, to intensify the 
sense of Allied outrage at the actions of Japan’s military government.73  While 
historians have recognised the important role of speechwriters to enhance the two 
leaders’ popularity,74
 
 Curtin and Roosevelt developed reputations for their quick 
intelligence and eloquent, original writing styles when preparing citizens for the 
Pacific war. 
Curtin’s film oratory emphasised the same keywords as his radio broadcast.  
Cinesound commentator, Peter Bathurst, told movie audiences: “Right up to the 
outbreak of this colossal war, too many of our experts of our time depreciated the 
value of air power”.  The hero was Curtin, who indicated his open, honest manner by 
raising his hands and placing them on the table where he was seated before he 
announced, “we are face to face with the struggle for sheer existence”.  To strengthen 
the impact of his words, the camera crew moved to a close-up while he declared the 
upcoming Christmas “will be a period of a stern, ruthless war” that did not allow 
“holiday making”.  In contrast to the previous “depreciated” war effort commentary, 
Curtin persuasively addressed “men and women here in the homeland” as his 
colleagues and asked them to: 
… keep the workshops active, to maintain the stream of munitions to our 
gallant fighting forces.  I say to you: “You must not waste one single hour or 
                                                            
71 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “A date which will live in 
infamy”. 
72 Bradenburg and Braden, “Roosevelt”, pp. 465-466; John T. Flynn, Country Squire in the 
White House [hereafter White House], Doubleday, Doran and Company Inc., New York, 
1940, p. 57;  
73 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “A date which will live in 
infamy”. 
74 For example, Bradenburg and Braden, “Roosevelt”, pp. 465-466; Flynn, White House, p. 
57; Hall, “Spin doctor”, p. 5. 
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even one single minute”.75
As the camera returned to a medium shot, he again emphasised his objective to 
maintain Australia as “a free citadel for the people of the British race” and “an 
outpost for civilisation”.  He vowed the government would uphold the “tradition” of 
the country’s forebears to protect “free men and free women in a free world”.
 
76
 
  In 
the 1941 newsreels, the filmmakers started a pattern of intimate, close-up scenes that 
signified Curtin was levelling with the public. 
Behind the scenes, the Australian Government was striving for more 
involvement in the high-level Allied planning of the Pacific war.  In top-secret 
negotiations of the bipartisan Advisory War Council (AWC) in Melbourne, Curtin 
was discussing options of bringing home the nation’s military servicemen who were 
fighting alongside their British counterparts in overseas battles.  Curtin “thought we 
should shortly have to consider whether we should not hold our manpower for the 
defence of Australia”, Secretary of the Department of Defence Co-ordination, 
Frederick Shedden, recorded in the AWC meeting minutes on 9 December.77  Also 
the AWC agreed the British Government should be advised that “some steps should 
ultimately be taken to ensure closer collaboration between allied countries in the 
higher direction of the war”.78
 
  While his mass media strategies were crafted to 
affirm empire loyalties in public, Curtin’s pragmatic determination was evidenced in 
the AWC minutes that showed he was reassessing Australian wartime priorities from 
Britain’s battles to the new Pacific theatre of war. 
 Along with the official AWC minutes, Alexander’s private diaries revealed 
aspects of the inner machinations of the Curtin administration during the Pearl 
                                                            
75 Cinesound Productions, War in Pacific. 
76 Cinesound Productions, War in Pacific. 
77 Frederick Geoffrey Shedden, “Advisory War Council Minutes, Records of Frederick 
Shedden” [hereafter “AWC minutes”], JCPML, Bentley, vol. 3, JCPML acc. no. 00928/4, 9 
December 1941, p. 4.  Sir Frederick Shedden was the Secretary of Defence and oversaw the 
War Cabinet Secretariat. 
78 Shedden, “AWC minutes”, vol. 3, 9 December 1941, p. 3. 
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Harbour crisis.79  Several military historians have questioned whether the Japanese-
American war was an avoidable tragedy and if Roosevelt and his inner circle 
received warnings of an impending attack.80  Alexander’s diaries indicated that in the 
early days of December 1941, Curtin was alert to an imminent Japanese assault.  
Moreover, he confidentially briefed journalists about these developments and as a 
result, they were ready to report immediately on the news of the Pearl Harbour 
disaster. 81  In contrast to the media’s portrayal of the Honolulu air and naval 
authorities as having been “caught napping” and “taken by surprise” during the 
raid,82 Curtin presented a confident image of being prepared for the Pacific war.83
 
 
 Two days before the Pearl Harbour tragedy, Alexander wrote he was planning 
to accompany Curtin on a train journey from Melbourne to Canberra on 5 December.  
Immediately before the train’s departure, Curtin was delayed by Shedden, his 
principal adviser, and the prime minister recalled Alexander from the train to meet 
Rodgers at the Victoria Barracks, Melbourne.  Rodgers also talked with the other 
members of “Curtin’s Circus”.  Alexander noted confidentially, “Rodgers warned us 
to be ready for the gravest development” because the prime minister had received 
“grave news from America”.84
                                                            
79 J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957” [hereafter “Papers”], National Library of Australia 
[hereafter NLA], Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA acc. no. MS 2389, transcript np; 
Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Alexander interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np. 
  He affirmed, “we are on the brink of war with Japan” 
and he needed to work “on call over the whole weekend”.  He added: “The Ministers 
are all very anxious but not fearful.  There is an atmosphere of great strain and of 
80 For example, Russell D. Buhite, “Book review” (John Toland and Gordon W. Prange), 
The American Historical Review, vol. 88, no. 2, April 1983, pp. 496–498; David Day, The 
great betrayal: Britain, Australia and the onset of the Pacific War, 1939-42, Angus & 
Robertson, North Ryde and London, 1988, pp. 197-203; Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We 
Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1981; John Toland, 
Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, Doubleday, New York, 1982. 
81 Alexander, “Papers”, 2-8 December 1941. 
82 (Anon.), “Australia Not To Be Caught Napping”, Canberra, 11 December 1942, p. 2; 
Richard Fleischer and Akira Kurosawa (directors), Elmo Williams (producer), Tora! Tora! 
Tora!, 20th Century Fox, USA, 1970. 
83 (Anon.), “Australia Not To Be Caught Napping”, Canberra, 11 December 1942, p. 2. 
84 Alexander, “Papers”, 5 December 1941.  Brief excerpts of Alexander’s diary entries about 
the Pearl Harbour disaster were published in: Bob Wurth, Saving Australia: Curtin’s secret 
peace with Japan [hereafter Saving Australia], Lothian Books, South Melbourne, 2006, pp. 
146, 158-59. 
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sleepless nights but all are cheerful while awaiting the deadline.”85  According to 
Harold Cox of The Sun News-Pictorial, journalists decided to remain in Melbourne 
with Curtin.  While the prime minister stayed at the inexpensive, austere and non-
licensed hotel, the Victoria Palace in Little Collins Street, the “Circus” spent “a very 
dreary week-end” at the old Oriental Hotel.86
 
   
 The tense atmosphere had eased because of Roosevelt’s “personal appeal” to 
Hirohito and “the feeling is that nothing will happen until the message is received but 
the Japanese attitude continues to be bad”, Alexander noted in his diary.87  
Throughout Sunday night, world radio news “flashes” were relayed to the “Listening 
Post” of the Department of Information and then forwarded to the hotel where Curtin 
was staying.  On Monday at 5.30am, a monitor picked up the “flash” that “[t]he 
Japanese … have now attacked Pearl Harbour, in addition to the bombing of Manilla 
reported a few minutes ago”.  The Melbourne time zone was about 20 hours ahead of 
Hawaii local time.  Immediately the news was repeated to a prime ministerial staff 
member in another hotel room near Curtin.  He and his typist began a long series of 
telephone calls.  By 6.30am, Alexander received a message from Rodgers about the 
bombing.  Other journalists were informed of the tragedy by 7.30am.88
May it make us a better people or may it reawaken that sense of spiritual 
values, dead or dormant, without which this country can never survive ... 
There is a general sense of relief in one sense, in that we know where we 
stand with Japan.  I hear it everywhere ... what most felt to be inevitable.
  Alexander’s 
diaries showed his support for Australia’s right to make an independent declaration 
of war against Japan.  He wrote:  
89
It appeared “Curtin’s Circus” honoured the “off-the-record” agreement
 
90
  
 and the  
                                                            
85 Alexander, “Papers”, 6 December 1941. 
86 Cox, “Cox interview”. 
87 Alexander, “Papers”, 7 December 1941. 
88 (Anon.), “War With Japan Is Just One Year Old”, Truth, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 
1, 6 December 1942. 
89 Alexander, “Papers”, 8 December 1941. 
90 For example, Alexander, “Alexander interview”; C.J. Lloyd, Parliament And The Press: 
The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 1901-88 [hereafter Parliament and the press], 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988, p. 131; Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An 
Unfinished Biography [hereafter Strive to be fair], Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1977, p. 77. 
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disaster was reported as a “surprise attack” by reputable international media.91
Alexander noted:  
  
… the US has been taken horribly by surprise at Pearl Harbour. That such an 
attack should be possible on this base is a horrible reflection on the 
preparedness of the naval and air forces there.92
In Australia, Curtin continuously communicated with journalists about the crisis. 
 
 
Similarly to the press gallery, Murdoch upheld the confidentiality deal 
although he alluded to the vital government negotiations in his newspapers.  His 
company’s photographers snapped pictures of Curtin as he left top-secret meetings in 
the Victoria Barracks between 6 and 9 December.  The Herald headline writer chose 
to portray the prime minister as the “Central Figure in Crisis” (see Figure 8).  In the 
newspaper’s accompanying photo caption, it was noted obliquely that he was 
involved in “important discussions on the Pacific crisis”.  Although it was the 
beginning of summer, Curtin’s dark, long overcoat and hat contributed to the 
atmosphere of enigma.93  By 10 December, he was photographed in a thoughtful, 
serious and calm mood as he read silently the formal proclamation being signed by 
Gowrie, seated next to him in the Victoria Barracks (see Figure 9).  The document 
was the official announcement of Australia’s war with Japan. 94
 
  Thus visual imagery 
contributed to Curtin’s media image as an agenda setter who was defining the 
nation’s role in the Pacific conflict. 
                                                            
91 For example,. (Anon.), “Japanese planes bomb Pearl Harbor”, BBC News, London, 7 
December 1941, retrieved on 28 January 2009 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/7/newsid_3494000/3494108.stm>; 
Christian Toto, ‘‘Legacy of Attack’ brings Pearl Harbour to life’, The Washington Times, 
Washington DC, 26 May 2001, retrieved on 28 January 2009 at 
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-75056331.html>. 
92 Alexander, “Papers”, 9 December 1941. 
93 Figure 8 appeared in (Anon.), “Central Figure In Crisis”, The Herald, Melbourne, 6 
December 1941; Also see (Anon.), untitled photograph, The Sun News-Pictorial, Melbourne, 
6 December 1941, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 1. 
94 Figure 9 appeared in (Anon.), untitled photograph, Age; Also see (Anon.), “Australia 
Declares State of War with Japan”, The Sun News-Pictorial, Melbourne.  Both articles cited 
in Scrapbooks, no. 2, JCPML acc. no. 00297/2, 10 December 1941. 
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Figure 8 (top) and Figure 9 (below) 
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Other powerful news editors besides Murdoch emphasised the significance of 
Curtin’s broadcast in their daily editions on 9 December.  A limited content analysis 
was made of press coverage in The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning 
Herald and The West Australian.  Curtin’s radio talk was publicised as “vital” on 
page one of The Sydney Morning Herald;95 as “important” on the cover of The 
Age;96 as well as announcing “[d]rastic plans” and “a total war footing” in The 
Canberra Times.97  Next to the tightly packed, front-page news summaries, the 
Fairfax and the Syme families continued their tradition of allocating multiple 
columns of classified advertisements to the front covers.98  The West Australian 
company published news coverage of Curtin in the inside pages because 
advertisements dominated the front cover during 1941 and 1942.99  Despite the 
adherence to conservative news formats, Curtin’s speech was copied almost verbatim 
in The Sydney Morning Herald, with 49 sentences reported as direct quotations.100  
Likewise, a substantial portion of the keywords were repeated in The Age,101 The 
Canberra Times102 and The West Australian.103
  
 
                                                            
95 (Anon.), “Home News”, SMH, 9 December 1941, p. 1. 
96 (Anon.), “Australia And Japan”, Age, 9 December 1941, p. 1. 
97 (Anon.), “Australia Placed on Full War Basis”, Canberra, 9 December 1942, p. 1. 
98 (Anon.), “The Age of responsibility and trust”, Age, 17 October 2004, retrieved on 15 
September 2009 at 
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/10/16/1097784094350.html?from=storylhs>; Rod 
Kirkpatrick, “War and lasting change: The battle for survival on the provincial newspaper 
front”, ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2002, p. 10. 
99 See The West Australian front pages on the following dates: 9 December 1941; 31 
December 1941; 19-21 January 1942; 20 February 1942; 14 March 1942; 16 March 1942; 9 
May 1942; 11 December 1942. 
100 (Anon.), “Declaration To-day”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 9 December 1941. 
101 Twenty-five sentences of Curtin’s radio talk were repeated in the following article: 
(Anon.), “Australia In The New War”, Age, 9 December 1941, p. 6. 
102 Six sentences from the broadcast were cited in (Anon.), “Australia On War Footing”, 
Canberra, 9 December 1942, p. 2. 
103 Three references were made to the broadcast in (Anon.), “Australia Ready”, West, 9 
December 1941, p. 6. 
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All four newspapers included supportive leader pages,104 headlines105 and 
smaller articles related to the broadcast.106  “The Prime Minister knows how and 
where Australian interests have to be protected”, The Canberra Times leader writer 
stated on 9 December.107  He “has developed the qualities of real leadership” by 
“acting with promptitude and energy”, The Sydney Morning Herald editorial writer 
commented.108  In his press editorials, The Canberra Times publisher, Arthur 
Shakespeare, recognised the country was involved in a new war, a new world order – 
another key term in Curtin’s radio speech – that needed the support of “everyone” in 
the nation.109  Such sentiments were echoed in The West Australian coverage of 
Curtin’s address to the Melbourne Town Hall.  He was raising money to replace the 
HMAS Sydney, which had been sunk on 19 November.  In the article, Curtin was 
quoted directly in 35 sentences and indirectly in one statement, interspersed with 
references to “a cheering crowd” and “applause”.110  At The Canberra Times, a 
writer contrasted the government’s readiness “for unpleasant surprises” with the US 
military, which was reportedly “caught napping” in Honolulu shortly before the Pearl 
Harbour naval base was bombed.111  Reporters approvingly referred to Curtin’s 
announcements of a more stringent rationing of goods, electricity and other public 
services as well as his cancellation of employees’ holiday leave.112  Positive 
editorials appeared in another six mainstream newspapers across Australia.113
                                                            
104 (Anon.), “A New And Treacherous Foe”, Age, 9 December 1941, p. 6; (Anon.), “The 
World At War”, Canberra, 9 December 1941, p. 2; (Anon.), “The Gravest Hour Of Our 
History”, SMH, 9 December 1941, p. 6; (Anon.), “Japan Strikes”, West, 9 December 1941,  
  In The 
Bulletin, however, it was satirically noted that “Jack” was “out of step” with the 
p. 4. 
105 . a subhead referred to “Mr. Curtin’s Broadcast” in (Anon.), “Grave New Menace To 
Australia”, SMH, 9 December 1941, p. 7.  Another subhead was “Mr. Curtin Appeals To 
Nation” in (Anon.), “Australia Ready”, West, 9 December 1941, p. 6. 
106 E.g. (Anon.), “Clarion Call To Nation”, Age, 9 December 1941, p. 6; (Anon.), “Mr. 
Curtin Demands ‘All-In’ War Effort”, SMH, 9 December 1941, p. 5. 
107 (Anon.), “The World At War”, Canberra, 9 December 1941, p. 2. 
108 (Anon.), “The Gravest Hour Of Our History”, SMH, 9 December 1941, p. 6. 
109 (Anon.), “Australia Placed on Full War Basis”, Canberra, 9 December 1941, p. 1; 
(Anon.), “New World Order For Australia”, Canberra, 12 December 1941, p. 1. 
110 (Anon.), “Australia Ready”, West, 9 December 1941, p. 6. 
111 (Anon.), “Australia Not To Be Caught Napping”, Canberra, 11 December 1941, p. 2. 
112 For example, (Anon.), “Australia In The New War”, Age, 9 December 1941, p. 6; 
(Anon.), “Australia Placed on Full War Basis”, Canberra, 9 December 1942, p. 1; (Anon.), 
“Australia Ready”, West, 9 December 1941, p. 6; (Anon.), “Grave New Menace To 
Australia”, SMH, 9 December 1941, p. 7. 
113 The positive editorials appeared in The Argus, The Courier-Mail, The Daily Mirror, The 
Herald, The Mercury and The Sun, cited in Scrapbooks, nos 1 and 2, 9 December 1941. 
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extended conscription strategies of Churchill, FDR and Stalin.114
 
  Towards the end of 
1941, Curtin had managed to gain the support of virtually all of the mainstream 
media for his foreign policies.  His journalism and mass communication strategies 
contributed to his success.  These strategies included: confidential, frequent and 
informal news briefings; developing a mutual understanding that he and journalists 
would cooperate with one another; delivering a direct, accessible radio broadcast to 
make Australia’s first independent declaration of war; giving numerous newsreel 
addresses; using language that established a sense of kinship with Australians, 
emphasising a common heritage and shared ideals of liberty, freedom and 
democracy, and making an impersonal characterisation of foreign enemies to avoid a 
tone of vengeance.  Conservative media owners seemed to appreciate his informative 
news tips and they endorsed his national leadership by reproducing his key messages 
positively in their newspapers. 
 
“Immense sensation”: New Year message, December 1941 to January 1942 
Continuing with this chapter’s analysis of selected Curtin addresses, this section will 
examine his Herald editorial and the resultant media coverage about his assertion 
that Australia should establish a stronger alliance with the US.  His vision of the 
public sphere as a site of “universal, democratic and informed politics”115 was 
exemplified when he agreed to Alexander’s request to write “a special article for the 
Herald dealing with the outlook for 1942” for the newspaper’s Saturday magazine 
section.116
Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks 
to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the 
United Kingdom.
  Curtin wrote candidly for The Herald that:  
117
                                                            
114 Cited in Black, In his own words, p. 215. 
 
115 Ian Ward, “The Press, Television and the Public Sphere” [hereafter “The public sphere”], 
in Ian Ward (ed.), Politics of the media, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1995, p. 12. 
116 Alexander, “Papers”, 28 December 1941. 
117 Curtin, “The task ahead”. 
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Alexander privately remarked that Curtin was appealing for US military aid because 
he was indignant that Australia had been “deceived or deluded” about the “lack” of 
air defences in Singapore, which was the major British base in the Pacific.118
There is a great deal of chagrin here at the news from Singapore that there is 
a shortage of fighter planes.  Imagine this after the long period of 
preparedness [since the war began in September 1939] and the repeated 
statements of great air strength.
  On 14 
December, Alexander had commented in his diary: 
119
In early 1941, Prime Minister Menzies had visited Churchill to discuss “British 
neglect”
 
120 of Singapore’s “alarming position”,121 but London was focused on 
preventing a German invasion of Britain.  It seemed that Alexander and other 
journalists did not know of Australian officials’ concerns over the “grave 
deficiencies”122 in Singapore’s naval and air strength until Curtin discussed this 
confidential news with them.123  Likewise at the end of December 1941, the war 
councillors remained apprehensive about the Nazis’ military strength, privately 
stating, “[t]he German tanks were superior to those of the Allied forces”.124 As 
Churchill recalled in his wartime history, when the Japanese conquered Singapore 
with comparative ease on 15 February 1942, this was “the worst disaster and largest 
capitulation of British history”.125
 
  Thus Curtin’s prognosis in his Herald editorial 
that “the Year 1942 will impose supreme tests” was apt. 
When Curtin submitted his editorial to The Herald, Murdoch was away in 
London and did not recognise the “tremendous importance” of the article, which was 
                                                            
118 Alexander, “Papers”, 28 December 1941. 
119 Alexander, “Papers”, 14 December 1941. 
120 A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 Diary 
[hereafter Dark and hurrying days], NLA, Canberra, 1993, p. 10. 
121 A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 11. 
122 A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 10. 
123 E.g. Alexander, “Papers”, 14-15, 18, 22-23 and 28 December 1941. 
124 Shedden, “AWC minutes”, vol. 4, JCMPL acc. no. 00928/5, 31 December 1941, p. 399. 
125 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate [hereafter The hinge of 
fate], Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1950, p. 92. 
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“held for a couple of weeks before publication”.126  To my knowledge, no-one has 
written an account to explain why Murdoch decided to feature the article, originally 
intended for the magazine section, on The Herald front page on Saturday, 27 
December.127  Curtin’s statements led with more lyrical quotations – this time from 
Bernard O’Dowd, a respected Australian poet known for his nationalism and 
opposition to the White Australia policy.128  Although it was not the customary front-
page lead of a conservative newspaper – and perhaps contributed to Murdoch’s 
decision to delay publication – it was appropriate for Curtin to cite O’Dowd, who 
had been a close friend of his father-in-law, Abraham Needham.129  A big, bold 
headline, “The Task Ahead”, was displayed on the cover with an accompanying 
photograph of Curtin writing at a desk to emphasise his “intellectual” orientation130 
and “extensive vocabulary”131 (see Figure 10).  Murdoch did not predict “[t]he stir 
over Curtin’s special in The Herald”, as Alexander recounted in his diary.132
 
  
When Sydney’s Sunday Telegraph editor, Cyril Pearl, read the freshly arrived 
Melbourne Herald on Saturday, he reportedly said that Murdoch had “missed” a 
major news opportunity because the leading article was published “without 
commentary or elaboration”.133
                                                            
126 Allan Fraser, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Allan Fraser interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00550, August 1972-January 1973, transcript np. 
  Immediately Pearl directed his staff to prepare a 
front-page story about Curtin’s editorial for the next day’s Sunday Telegraph and it 
was published under the eye-catching headline: “Australia Looks First To US”.  
Alexander noted in his diary: “The Sunday Telegraph pinched it [the editorial] and 
127 David Black, “Menzies and Curtin in World War Two: A comparative essay”, [hereafter 
“Menzies and Curtin”], JCPML, Bentley, 2006, retrieved on 10 May 2008 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/ww2leaders>; Graham Freudenberg, Churchill and Australia 
[hereafter Churchill], Pan Macmillan Australia, Sydney, 2008, pp. 340-342. 
128 Frank Bongiorno, “Aboriginality and historical consciousness: Bernard O’Dowd and the 
creation of an Australian national imaginary”, Aboriginal History, vol. 24, 2000, pp. 39-61. 
129 Irene Greenwood, “Proposed script of ABC broadcast by Irene Greenwood, ‘Mrs John 
Curtin – a personal sketch’”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00398/74, 27 July 1945. 
130 (Anon.), “John Curtin Is An Intellectual”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 1, 4 October 1941. 
131 Dawes, “Men you should know about”. 
132 Alexander, “Papers”, 30 December 1941. 
133 Claire Harvey, “Looking back over 70 years at The Sunday Telegraph”, The Daily 
Telegraph, Sydney, 20 November 2009, retrieved on 30 December 2010 at 
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/indepth/looking-back-over-70-years-at-the-
sunday-telegraph/story-fn4hieht-1225800182102>. 
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had it today.  Other Sunday papers gave it great publicity and it is being widely in 
England ... KM [Keith Murdoch] is very amazed about it”.134  When Murdoch, still 
in London, saw The Sunday Telegraph front cover, he hastily wrote articles for 
England’s conservative Daily Mail and The Times to criticise Curtin’s stance and 
urge for a national, bipartisan government in Australia.135
Figure 10
  Later, Ethel (Maie) Casey,  
136
the wife of the Australian minister to the United States of America, recalled that 
Roosevelt had privately discussed Curtin’s editorial with her husband, Richard 
 
                                                            
134 Alexander, “Papers”, 28 December 1941 and 30 December 1941. 
135 Alexander, “Papers”, 28 December. 
136 Figure 10 appeared in Curtin, “The task ahead”, p. 1. 
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Casey.137  As the UAP member for the Victorian seat of Corio, Casey had stood 
unsuccessfully for his party’s leadership in 1939; the next year, Menzies had 
appointed him to establish Australia’s first diplomatic post in Washington DC.138  As 
Maie Casey reflected in her autobiography, Roosevelt had commented to her 
husband that the editorial “tasted of panic and disloyalty”.  Also, “The President 
insisted that his remarks were to be regarded as personal and were not to be 
reportedly officially”.139  Archival research did not yield evidence of any Roosevelt 
correspondence to support this reminiscence.140  Moreover, in a cable to Curtin on 2 
January 1942, Roosevelt wrote that he and Churchill “are deeply conscious of the 
magnificent contribution which Australia has made and is making to common 
effort”.  As a result, military advisers were giving “urgent consideration to the matter 
of despatching reinforcement at earliest possible moment”.141  Although Churchill 
later wrote that Curtin’s signed article “was flaunted around the world by our 
enemies”,142 Curtin encouraged discussions of his 1942 outlook, both in media 
conferences and press columns.  Since neither Curtin nor Murdoch predicted the 
“immense” public “sensation” that the editorial would create around the world,143
 
 the 
next section will analyse the text of the editorial and press commentaries. 
While Rodgers claimed to have written the editorial, the historian, Graham 
Freudenberg, later disputed this, saying the original document was “authentically 
Curtin’s”.144  The press article registered on the Flesch-Kincaid scale as being aimed 
at an audience with a reading level slightly above the eleventh grade.145
                                                            
137 Maie Casey, Tides and Eddies [hereafter Tides and eddies], Michael Joseph, London, 
1966, p. 83. 
  The Flesch-
Kincaid and Flesch readability scores indicated this article was slightly more 
138 W. J. Hudson, “Casey, Richard Gavin Gardiner [Baron Casey] (1890 - 1976)”, Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 13, 1993, pp. 381-385. 
139 Casey, Tides and eddies, p. 83. 
140 R.G. Casey to Department of External Affairs (hereafter “Casey letter”), Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Barton, vol. 5, 2 January 1942, 
retrieved on 24 November 2010 at 
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complicated than Curtin’s radio broadcast to declare war against Japan.  Curtin’s 95 
“war” references146 overshadowed his previous keywords about “freedom” and 
“liberty”,147 which were not included in his Herald statement.  Three days after The 
Herald special, Curtin confidentially told the press gallery that Churchill had cabled 
him to advise the US navy would undertake defence of the Pacific area including 
Australasia.  In his diary, Alexander noted: “This is grand news and this ... 
transformed the whole position”.148  The AWC “fully endorsed” the establishment of 
a “unified command in the South Western Pacific”, which would be led by the US.149
 
  
The secret negotiations were a testament to the success of Curtin’s appeal to the US 
Government. 
Many mainstream, daily Australian newspaper publishers endorsed Curtin’s 
assertive policy by emphasising his statements in related leader pages and the 
kicker.150  Positive press reports, backing his “realism”, appeared in The Age, The 
Argus, The Brisbane Telegraph, The Canberra Times, The Daily Telegraph, The 
Herald, The Mirror and The Sun.151  For example, Curtin became a front-page 
personality in The Canberra Times when Shakespeare decided to publish 20 
sentences of The Herald article on his broadsheet cover on 29 December.152  It was 
highly unusual for a publisher to print an article that had appeared two days earlier in 
another state’s newspaper under a different proprietor.  Curtin’s warnings of a new 
war, the need for the “revolutionising of the Australian way of life” and particularly 
his appeal for US assistance produced a powerful impact on the press publishers.153
At last an Australian Government has told Whitehall where it stands ... the 
pity has been that Australian Governments have not had the backbone to 
  
The Canberra Times leader writer enthused: 
                                                            
146 Curtin, “The task ahead”. 
147 For example,. Cinesound Productions, “Curtin Cabinet sworn in”; Curtin, “National 
broadcast”, pp. 19-22. 
148 Alexander, “Papers”, 30 December 1941. 
149 Shedden, “AWC minutes”, vol. 4, 31 December 1941, p. 399. 
150 For example, The Age kicker was “Leading Article” above the main editorial defending 
Curtin.  See (Anon.), “The Real Task In The Pacific”, Age, 30 December 1941, p. 2. 
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152 (Anon.), “Battle For The Pacific Comes First”, Canberra, 29 December 1941, pp. 1-2. 
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assume the lead in Pacific affairs ... We have no doubt that once Whitehall 
has recovered from the shock of an Australian Government stating its 
position without apology or qualification, the reaction will be to accept the 
Australian viewpoint as a domestic consideration.154
Also metropolitan journalists reported their colleagues’ reactions overseas.  Under 
the sub-heading “Washington impressed” in The Canberra Times, it was noted 
Curtin’s article had been published on the front page of the New York Sun.
 
155  
Likewise, The Age featured the page one headline, “Australia’s Loyalty Stressed by 
Mr. Curtin”.156  The broadsheet’s readers were told London’s The Times had 
endorsed his outlook.  A Times journalist was quoted as praising the statements for 
their “timeliness” and “realism”, as well as for being “outspokenly and eloquently” 
expressed by Curtin.157  Reporters noted that at a subsequent press conference, he 
said his statement did not imply any weakening of Australia’s relations with 
Britain.158  The clarification seemed to allay The Sun editorial concerns.  The 
newspaper’s leader writer suggested Curtin’s words were “misconstrued”;159 the next 
day, however, readers were informed, “seven million Australians stand behind Mr. 
Curtin’s statement” that the country should remain in the British Commonwealth.160
 
  
Many journalists followed his lead and favourably presented his determination for a 
greater Australian role in the Pacific. 
Affirming their traditional empire loyalties, a small minority of press editors 
initially disapproved the “New Year message”; however, soon afterwards journalists 
acknowledged the US Government’s deployment of troops to Australia “vindicated” 
Curtin’s Pacific war strategies.  Criticisms appeared in Fairfax’s Sydney Morning  
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156 (Anon.), “Australia’s Loyalty Stressed by Mr. Curtin”, Age, 30 December 1941, p. 1. 
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Herald161 and Murdoch’s Courier-Mail.162  The two countries’ relations were 
satirised by Frank Packer’s Daily Telegraph cartoonist, William Mahony, on 31 
December (see Figure 11).  Curtin was shown as eager to catch a pistol thrown by a 
grim “Uncle Sam” figure, indicating some meagre support.163
 
  A Sydney Morning 
Herald leader writer on 29 December disagreed with Curtin’s views that the Pacific 
Figure 11 
front should be treated as a “new war”.164  Curtin’s appeal was shortly to be justified, 
however.  An Australian-US military alliance was formed at the end of 1941.  As a 
result, about 90,000 US servicemen were in Australia by August 1942.  They were 
either stationed in Australian bases or they were in transit to New Guinea in 
accordance with Curtin’s objective to secure US military assistance.165
                                                            
161 (Anon.), “One War Against The Axis”, SMH, 29 December 1941, p. 6. 
  A week after 
their criticisms, Packer and Fairfax were supporting him again.  His foreign policy 
was “a triumph for sheer realism” and for the power of his words, which “a lot of 
162 (Anon.), “Looking to America”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 
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163 Figure 11 appeared in William Mahony, “Team Work”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 
cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 31 December 1941. 
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unthinking people called un-British sentiment”, The Daily Telegraph Canberra 
political correspondent, Don Whitington, wrote.166  At the same time The Sydney 
Morning Herald included the crosshead, “Australia Vindicated”, with reports of US 
naval units about to begin operating in Australasia.167  The Murdoch-controlled press 
exhibited a diversity of independent opinions.  Although he led a Melbourne 
syndicate that bought The West Australian in 1926, Murdoch was described as being 
“hypercritical” by the newspaper’s leader writer on 31 December, defending 
Curtin.168  At the beginning of 1942, The Herald – with Murdoch as managing editor 
– included leader comments that, “Mr. Curtin has now been justified for the realism 
and urgency of his representations” because he had developed “a definite defensive 
plan” and gained support for his economic policies.169
 
 
The Allied Governments’ tense diplomacy was not conveyed in a Curtin 
newsreel produced by the UK film company, British Movietone News.  Although he 
was “rallying his own land and looking to America for aid in the hour of crisis”, he 
still gave “full tribute to the old country”, the English narrator assured international 
audiences in March 1942.170  Again filmmakers used informal, long shots of John 
and Elsie Curtin in the Lodge gardens.  The narrator praised the government and 
Australian people for their “energy”, as well as their “urgent organisation of total 
defence with accent on attack whenever possible”.  Cinemagoers were told, “the war 
has stormed right up to the shores of their country”.  In this official newsreel, the 
people of “the old country” were shown to support Curtin’s national leadership.171
                                                            
166 Don Whitington, “Facts behind our ‘sheer realism’”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited 
in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 5 January 1942. 
  
The film images were consistent with the memoirs of wartime press gallery 
correspondent, Tom Mead, who wrote that British comment was “sympathetic” to 
167 (Anon.), “U.S. Warships For Australasia”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 5 January 
1942. 
168 (Anon.), “Australia and America”, West, 31 December 1941, p. 4. 
169 (Anon.), “The Task For 1942”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 1 
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170 See British Movietone News (producer), “Australia’s Leader At Canberra” [hereafter 
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Movietone Digital Archive, this newsreel was made on 19 March 1942. 
171 British Movietone News, “Australia’s leader”. 
Chapter 6   The war comes home to Australia and the performance of “Curtin’s Circus”, 
1941-1942 
248 
 
Australia’s plight.172
 
  Through Curtin’s press statement, media conferences and 
newsreel images, he encouraged a vigorous, democratic and informed debate of his 
strategies in the public sphere. 
 
“Australia’s greatest hour”: Japan’s bombing of Darwin, February 1942 
When Australia’s mainland was bombed by foreign foes for the first time, news 
publishers, editors and reporters cooperated with the government’s strategies for 
portraying the attacks to the public.  The Age and The Canberra Times publishers 
gave front-page status to Curtin’s statements.173  Through bold, block letter 
headlines, they emphasised his announcement that 93 Japanese bombers had made 
two air raids on Darwin on 19 February 1942.174  It was the middle of the twelfth 
week of Australia’s Pacific war.  In their desire to report a patriotic victory, 
newspaper editors approved subheads that were variations of: “Four Enemy Planes 
Brought Down”.175  Also journalists stated the city had sustained considerable 
damage with unspecified casualties.176  In fact, the two bombing raids killed at least 
243 Australians and injured many more people in Darwin and the surrounding 
areas.177  Curtin publicised the news of the attack to mobilise Australians to support 
his strategies;178
                                                            
172 Tom Mead, Breaking The News: The events which changed life in Australia through the 
eyes of a man who worked at the front line of journalism and politics, Dolphin Books, 
Sydney, 1998, p. 58. 
 however, he did not release fatality figures as part of the Allied 
173 (Anon.), “Heavy Japanese Blows On Darwin”, Canberra, 20 February 1942, p. 1; 
(Anon.), “Two Air Raids On Darwin”, Age, 20 February 1942, p. 1. 
174 John Curtin, “Attack On Darwin” [hereafter “Attack on Darwin”], DDA, no. 19, 19 
February 1942, pp. 8-9. 
175 (Anon.), “Two Air Raids On Darwin”, Age, 20 February 1942, p. 1; (Anon.), “Two Big 
Air Raids On Darwin”, SMH, 20 February 1942, p. 5; (Anon.), “Darwin Bombed”, West, 20 
February 1942, p. 5. 
176 E.g. (Anon.), “Heavy Japanese Blows On Darwin”, Canberra, 20 February 1942, p. 1; 
“Two Air Raids On Darwin”, Age, 20 February 1942, p. 1. 
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procedure of withholding information that might hurt public morale and aid the 
enemy.179
 
 
Due to the impact, accessibility and brevity of the prime ministerial 
announcement, it received prominent, positive coverage in newspapers across 
Australia the next day.  Although Curtin was absent due to illness, his statement was 
read to the Federal Parliament on 19 February.  The speech consisted of two sections: 
first, it was announced “a number of bombs ... were dropped on Darwin”; and later at 
10.43 pm, details of “a second raid” were released.180  Altogether the average Flesch 
readability score was 61.5, well within the prescribed range, and the Flesch-Kincaid 
grade was 8.5, appropriate for a simple speech.  Newspaper publishers directly 
quoted many of Curtin’s statements and emphasised the event’s significance to their 
readers. 181   Relevancy is a central news value, as Chapter 2 has discussed.  The Age 
leader headline was: “War Comes Home To Australia”.182  As The Canberra Times 
leader writer suggested: “What has happened at Darwin could happen at many ports 
in our Northern regions”.183  This event was “Australia’s greatest hour”, according to 
The West Australian.  This newspaper reported that Darwin was important for 
Western Australians as a main route of transporting supplies and communications.184  
Reflecting press concerns, keywords about an enemy “attack” significantly 
outweighed references to “defence” in newspaper reports.185
                                                            
179 Cox, “Cox interview”; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Extracts from the Press Conference”, in 
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Curtin mentioned “enemy” only once in his statement,186 the next day’s related 
Canberra Times reports included this term 18 times.187  Neither Curtin nor the 
Australian reporters referred to the ideals of freedom, liberty and democracy, which 
were prevalent in his earlier speeches.188  Yet his appeal to “the gallantry that is 
traditional in the people of our stock”189 was repeated in the next day’s reports.190   
Although it was noted he had released his first prime ministerial statement from a 
hospital bed, the four selected newspapers did not include detailed reports about his 
health.191  In fact, The Age leader writer announced: “The Government of this 
country is entitled to the pre-knowledge that the Australian people are prepared to 
trust its considered judgment, and to accept whatever conclusion it may reach.”192  
The newspaper publishers reaffirmed their support for Curtin’s leadership by stating: 
Australians would “trust” the government’s “considered judgement”; 193 heed his call 
for “total mobilisation”194 to be “in the forefront of the fight”;195 and give “solid 
backing” for his strategies to place the nation “on a war footing”.196
 
 
 The press editorial endorsement was noteworthy, given the myriad set of 
challenges confronting the ALP administration in early 1942.  After Curtin 
confidentially briefed the press gallery, he secured journalists’ assurances that they 
would protect national security and withhold publication of his defiance of Churchill, 
when he succeeded in bringing the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions from the Middle 
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194 (Anon.), “Darwin Bombed”, West, 20 February 1942, p. 5. 
195 (Anon.), “Australia Can Take It”, Canberra, 20 February 1942, p. 4. 
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East to defend their homeland.197  In private cables, the two prime ministers clashed 
over the allocation of military forces because Churchill planned to divert the same 
Australian troops to fight in Burma.  On 20 February, one day after the Darwin 
bombing, Churchill wrote to Curtin, “a vital war emergency cannot be ignored and 
troops en route to other destinations must be ready to turn around and take part in a 
battle”.198  In his reply two days later, Curtin emphasised Australia’s precarious 
military position because of Japan’s raids in the north-west and the enemy’s 
“superior sea and air power”.  The Federal Government, he wrote, “finds it most 
difficult to understand that it should be called upon to make a further contribution of 
forces” in a distant area.  As a result of these serious threats to national security, 
Curtin declared, “we have every right to expect them [the divisions] to be returned as 
soon as possible with adequate escorts to ensure their safe arrival”.199  With 
hindsight, Churchill sympathised with Curtin’s plight in the Pacific conflict because 
“destruction was at the very throat of the Australian Commonwealth”, as he wrote in 
The Hinge of Fate.200  Despite the cable exchange, Churchill remarked he became 
friends with “this eminent and striking Australian personality” and added: “I regret 
any traces of impatience which my telegrams may bear.”  Curtin showed the “great 
pile of cables” to reporters at one of his morning conferences, requesting their 
cooperation to uphold his media embargo during the divisions’ precarious ocean 
voyage to Australia, made without the protection of air cover.201
 
   
 When Murdoch heard the news, “he was furious at the very idea of Curtin 
presuming to question Winston Churchill”, Alexander recalled.  Although Curtin 
enjoyed “friendly” relations with Murdoch at the beginning of his prime 
ministership, their relations had “cooled off” by 1942, according to Alexander.202
                                                            
197 E.g. Geoff Burgoyne to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, N/C. acc. no. 009, 27 March 1942; 
John Curtin to Geoff Burgoyne, JCPML, Bentley, N/C. acc. no. 010, 20 April 1942. 
  
Curtin continued to reject Murdoch’s calls in The Herald for a national government 
consisting of all the political parties.  The Federal Labor Conference supported 
198 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, National Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], 
Canberra, A816, 52/302/142, 20 February 1942, p. 285. 
199 Curtin to Churchill, NAA, Canberra, A816, 52/302/142, 22 February 1942, pp. 279-280. 
200 Churchill, The hinge of fate, pp. 4-5. 
201 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Don Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 77. 
202 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
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Curtin’s aim of maintaining a separate opposition party.203
 
  Also Murdoch became 
“angry” when Curtin refused Churchill’s request to divert the Australian troops to 
Burma.  Although Murdoch did not support the important strategy of bringing back 
the 6th and 7th divisions to Australia, he maintained his silence to protect military 
security, in accordance with the censorship rules. 
 Yet the press gallery supported Curtin’s determination to fight for an 
Australian victory in the Pacific war.  Alexander recounted:  
… although we were staggered at the idea of Curtin opposing the will of a 
man like Churchill at a time like this, we all felt, I think, proud of him, 
because he was determined to put Australia first.204
ABC wartime federal political journalist, John Commins, recalled Curtin’s “concern” 
for Australia’s safety “was genuine”.  Commins also supported the administration’s 
accelerated military production program because he said the previous government:  
 
… sent our best troops overseas, we’d stripped the country of equipment to 
send with them … and [Curtin] was faced with a war on his very doorstep.  
The way he hopped in and handled his Cabinet and organised the country 
was, I think, nothing short of superb.205
During the troops’ return to Australia, Commins heard Curtin’s words: “I’m not able 
to sleep while the boys are on the water.”
 
206  Other journalists learned of his personal 
struggles and night-time Canberra walks.  As they travelled together by train to 
Gisborne in Victoria, Curtin talked with The Sun bureau chief, Alan Reid, in the 
lobby about his nightmares that the troops’ ships might be torpedoed.  Reid recalled 
he “tried to comfort” Curtin by playing a game of bridge in the train, but 
“periodically you’d see him wipe the sweat from his forehead”.207
                                                            
203 Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 156. 
  One late summer 
evening in King’s Hall, Parliament House, Curtin saw Harold Cox, paused and 
exclaimed: “Harold!  What would you do if you knew their [the troops’] equipment 
was on another convoy two days behind them?”  The next evening he met Cox by 
coincidence again.  The journalist remarked to Curtin that he looked “a lot better”.  
204 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
205 John Commins, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Commins interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01092/1, 22-26 May 1971, transcript np. 
206 Commins, “Commins interview”. 
207 Alan D. Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00501, 4 
October 1972 and 28 February 1973, transcript np. 
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Curtin replied: “Yes, I feel a lot better, too.  They’re coming home.”208  In their oral 
histories, all four press gallery members cited the episode as an example of Curtin’s 
“intensity and his devotion” to his country.209
 
 
By early 1942, ABC news bulletins featured government representatives to 
such an extent that one opposition parliamentarian, Percy Spender, protested the 
practice in the AWC on 19 January.  As recorded in the meeting minutes, Spender 
said the ABC’s Canberra reports should cover “a wider field” because they consisted 
almost entirely of statements made by ministers and their anonymous 
spokespeople.210  About a month after Spender’s complaint, Curtin agreed to extend 
more ABC airtime to Fadden as the opposition leader.  Fadden would “be afforded 
facilities to broadcast over national stations, which will be governed by the occasions 
as they arise”, the AWC’s Shedden noted.211  A few days later, the AWC resolved to 
impose “a strict censorship” and remove media references to Australian Imperial 
Force movements, as well as any recommendation or decision affecting them.212  
This suppression of sensitive news was in accordance with the general approach 
taken by past and successive Australian Governments, which initiated various 
legislative provisions to prevent the disclosure of material that would prejudice 
national security or defence.213  The ABC broadcasters portrayed Curtin’s Pacific 
war strategies favourably because they respected his leadership and supported the 
war against Japan.214
 
  He managed the news efficiently, balancing censorship with 
bipartisanship as he extended opportunities for opposition parliamentarians to 
broadcast national messages, thus creating an impression of a unified war effort, 
even though he did not agree to an all-party government. 
Curtin projected this image of bipartisan unity to international cinema 
audiences during the filming of British Movietone News’ 1942 newsreel that showed 
him opening a “£20 million pound war loan drive” at crowded Martin Place in 
                                                            
208 Cox, “Cox interview”. 
209 Commins, “Commins interview”. 
210 In 1942, Shedden was the Secretary for the Department of Defence.  Shedden, “AWC 
minutes”, vol. 4, 19 January 1942, p. 427. 
211 Shedden, “AWC minutes”, vol. 4, 11 February 1942, p. 456. 
212 Shedden, “AWC minutes”, vol. 4, 19 February 1942, p. 462. 
213 Joseph Fernandez, Media Law Handbook, Network Books, Australia Research Institute, 
Perth, fifth edition, 2007, p. 94. 
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Sydney on 17 February.  As he stood on a podium to announce the government and 
opposition war councillors would regulate “the complete mobilisation” of “all the 
resources – human and material” for “the complete defence of this Commonwealth”, 
Fadden was seated directly behind him.215  Earlier the film’s narrator, Leslie 
Mitchell, said: “As we know, he is not in the habit of beating about the bush and his 
impromptu remarks on this occasion were typically frank”.  As Curtin spoke into a 
microphone, he confidently hooked a thumb into his waistcoat pocket, displaying his 
watch chain, and paused during the spectators’ applause.  Yet Fadden was shown to 
be listening grimly and remained silent in the background.  By emphasing that Curtin 
made recent, “impromptu remarks”, the filmmakers created the appearance of a 
spontaneous news report, even though the newsreel was released on 12 April, about 
two months after the event.  Contrasting with Nazi propaganda of a “master race”, 
this newsreel showed patriotic white and non-white members of the public near a big 
banner with the slogan: “We dare not fail!”  Thus the British Movietone News 
camera techniques, narration, visual imagery and focus on Curtin’s rhetoric 
conveyed him as the agenda setter, forcefully directing the country’s role in the war 
with public support.216
 
 
 
“Our principal spokesman”: Curtin’s international radio broadcast,  
March 1942 
Curtin advanced his strategy of “looking to America” by using a powerful new 
shortwave transmitting station, which he had initiated at the beginning of his prime 
ministership, to deliver the first prime ministerial broadcast directly from Australia to 
US listeners.217  He gave the radio talk on 14 March 1942, two and a half months 
after his newspaper appeal to the US.218
                                                            
215 British Movietone News (producer), “Mr. Curtin Opens War Loan” [hereafter “Curtin 
opens war loan”], in Curtin newsreels, 1942; Heather Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man” 
for 17 February 1942, JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1942.html>. 
  The speech was delivered to a receptive 
press, anticipating General MacArthur’s arrival in Melbourne on 21 March to 
establish his base as the supreme commander of the Allied forces in the South-West 
216 British Movietone News, “Curtin opens war loan”. 
217 (Anon.), “Publicity: Relations with America: Australia Expands”, Canberra, 31 October 
1941, p. 4. 
218 Curtin, “US radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
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Pacific area.  The “stirring speech” was broadcast to the “widest network available” 
and “the largest potential audience ever hooked up for an Australian”, according to 
The West Australian report.  It was noted Curtin’s words were disseminated by more 
than 700 US radio stations connected to the National Broadcasting Company of 
America.219  Although he greeted “men and women of the United States”,220 the 
broadcast was also heard by audiences in the British Isles, Canada, Europe and South 
America.221  Within a few minutes after his conclusion at Canberra’s 2CY station, he 
received a brief San Francisco report about the speech’s technical quality, which 
stated, “[v]ery good to excellent”.222
 
   
While Curtin directly addressed “the people of America”, particularly 
working-class radio listeners who were “fighting”, “sweating in factories and 
workshops” and “making sacrifices”, he might have intended Axis leaders to hear his 
words also.  Churchill, Curtin, Roosevelt and other democratic leaders became 
targets for Axis propagandists, who attempted to portray them as weak.  Enemy 
propagandists were not Roosevelt’s chief concern and they did not seem to distract 
Curtin from publicising his main messages.223   According to The West Australian, 
he wanted to counter “vicious rumours” spread by Ankara and Vichy French radio 
announcers that he would reach a separate armistice with Japan.224  Yet he did not 
mention these false allegations and instead affirmed to US listeners that Australian 
people were “firmly determined to hold and hit back at the enemy”.225
                                                            
219 (Anon.), “Pledge To U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
  Curtin’s 
speech registered a Flesch readability score of 69.4, well within the recommended 
standard for public audiences.  He spoke about 150 words a minute, somewhat faster 
than the prescribed standard but still accessible.  It was understandable that he would 
adopt simple terms for overseas audiences largely unacquainted with the 
220 Curtin, “US radio broadcast”, p. 9. 
221 (Anon.), “Broadcast to Americas”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2; (Anon.), “Dr Evatt’s 
Mission To U.S.A. Not As Medicant, Says Mr. Curtin”, Canberra, 16 March 1942, p. 1; 
(Anon.), “Pledge To U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
222 (Anon.), “Broadcast to Americas”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2; (Anon.), “Pledge To 
U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
223 For example, (Anon.), “Momentous Discussions Taking Place at White House”, 
Canberra, 25 December 1941, p. 1; Richard W. Steele, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and His 
Foreign Policy Critics” [hereafter “Roosevelt and his foreign policy critics”], Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 1, spring 1979, pp. 15-16. 
224 (Anon.), “Pledge To U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
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complexities of the battles, let alone the inner machinations of Australian foreign 
policy.  His keywords appealed to nationhood – the people united against a common 
foe – as well as ideals such as freedom, hope and a triumphant future. 226  As a result, 
the speech was reported widely by the Allied press, emphasising his warning that if 
Australia were defeated, Japan’s next invasion target would be the US west coast.227  
Americans heard the talk at the peak listening hour on Friday between 7pm and 
8pm.228  Before the event, it was not known how many listeners would tune into the 
speech because Allied governments did not advertise it due to concerns the enemies 
might “jam” the broadcast.229  In The New York Times, for example, the entire text 
was reprinted, an honour often given to FDR’s “fireside chats”.230  London’s Daily 
Mail and Daily Express reporters also praised Curtin’s “fighting message to 
America”.231
 
  Through his innovative address to the American people, with his 
emphasis on a sense of shared values, accessible terms and clarity, Curtin was able to 
strike a right chord with international audiences at a crucial time. 
Across Australia, his words received positive coverage in a diverse sample of 
newspapers, comprising The Age,232 The Canberra Times,233 The Sydney Morning 
Herald,234 The Mercury235 and The West Australian.236  The news reports included 
direct quotations of the speech and leader pages.237
                                                            
226 During this broadcast, Curtin used “nationhood” keywords 22 times; terms about “the 
people” 76 times; “enemy” keywords 19 times (including “the Japanese aggressor” and 
Nazis); and terms about freedom, liberty and democracies eight times. 
  In a front-page story, for 
example, The Canberra Times publisher, Shakespeare, applauded Curtin’s 
227 (Anon.), “Australia The Last Bastion”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2; (Anon.), “Pledge To 
U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
228 (Anon.), “Pledge To U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
229 (Anon.), “Broadcast to Americas”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2. 
230 (Anon.), “Pledge To U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
231 (Anon.), “Australia The Last Bastion”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2. 
232 (Anon.), “Australia The Last Bastion”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2; (Anon.), “Broadcast to 
Americas”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2. 
233 (Anon.), “Dr Evatt’s Mission To U.S.A.”, Canberra, 16 March 1942, p. 1; (Anon.), 
“From Pacifism To Deadly Realism”, Canberra, 16 March 1942, p. 2. 
234 (Anon.), “Australia’s Call To The U.S.A.”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 16 March 
1942. 
235 (Anon.), “Why We Look To America”, The Mercury, Hobart, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 
16 March 1942. 
236 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Broadcast”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 4; (Anon.), “Pledge To 
U.S.A.”, West, 16 March 1942, p. 5. 
237 For example, the speech text was reprinted in The West Australian on 16 March 1942.  
On the same day, Curtin was quoted directly and indirectly in 34 sentences in The Age and in 
23 sentences in The Canberra Times. 
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international “realism” diplomacy and sophisticated use of radio.  A related leader 
stated: 
Australia is to-day in the position of having to point to her realism as an 
argument still in favour of the moulding of machinery for the direction of the 
vital operations which now concern our shores, not merely as our national 
home but as the most vital base of all the United Nations in the battles that 
must be fought in the Pacific to-morrow.238
Leader writers also praised his rhetoric, particularly his “vigorous, inspiring 
words”
 
239 and his expressions of “deep and sincere emotion”240 that strengthened his 
role as “our principal spokesman”.241  In like manner to the news coverage of 
Curtin’s previous statements, editorial writers repeated his messages about a united 
people fighting a common foe.  Although Curtin emphasised ideals of freedom, hope 
and the future in his radio talk, this study sample found that journalists concentrated 
on his keywords of “fighting mad” and “total warfare”.242  After the public 
“sensation” caused by his US appeal at the end of 1941, many Australian journalists 
reported their support for the bilateral alliance by March the next year.243  In The 
West Australian on 14 March 1942, for instance, a large photograph featured Perth 
visitors, A. Raymond of the New York Herald-Tribune and R. R. Knickerbocker of 
the Chicago Sun, to mark the rare occasion of two international war correspondents 
working in the city.  They were pictured at a convivial reception held in their honour 
by the AJA state branch.244
                                                            
238 (Anon.), “From Pacifism To Deadly Realism”, Canberra, 16 March 1942, p. 2. 
  The positive attitude towards the two countries’ new 
partnership was evidenced in a prominent letter in The Age by Reverend Dr A.C. 
Button from Ballarat.  Button wrote: “It is a fact that we are ‘looking to America’ for 
most immediate material aid which can come most readily from there.”  He also 
asserted that only a “vocal few” who lacked “horse sense” would wish to sever the 
239 (Anon.), “Why We Look To America”, The Mercury, Hobart, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 
16 March 1942. 
240 (Anon.), “Broadcast to Americas”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2. 
241 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Broadcast”, West, 16 March 1942, p.4. 
242 For example, The West Australian editorial used “enemy” keywords 23 times; referred to 
wars and battles seven times; mentioned an Allied offensive and initiative three times; and 
mentioned defence only once.  In contrast, the leader writer did not use keywords about 
freedom and liberty, which appeared in Curtin’s speech.  (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Broadcast”, 
West, 16 March 1942, p. 4. 
243 Alexander, “Papers”, 28 December 1942. 
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“Imperial tie”.  In the repetition of Curtin’s phrase, “Australia looks to America”, the 
letter indicated these previously controversial words had quickly become an accepted 
part of everyday, public conversation.245
 
 
Curtin’s innovative use of the radio was not completely welcomed by rival 
press organisations, however.  A Sun editorial stated:  
Again and again the ABC is used as the first medium of announcements by 
himself [Curtin] and other members of his Government.  This even includes 
the dissemination of war news of the highest importance to the Australian 
public.246
Defending newspaper institutions, the editorial writer warned: “There are also 
dangers in national broadcasting”.  According to the editorial, radio addresses were a 
problem because: 
 
They are less perfectly interpreted by the public, and with mistakes in 
announcing, which are frequent, and mistakes in hearing, which are even 
more common, the radio has far less authority than a reputable newspaper.247
Although Curtin frequently briefed press journalists about government initiatives, 
they were forced to relinquish their news monopoly to include more federal radio 
reporters. 
 
 
Two Sydney tabloids reflected contrasting editorial views of Curtin’s 
announcement of the bilateral alliance.  Shortly after his broadcast, The Daily 
Telegraph’s Mahony emphasised his stark warning that Australia was the last bastion 
between the US and Japan (see Figure 12).248
                                                            
245 Reverend Dr A.C. Button “Australia & Britain”, Age, 16 March 1942, p. 2. 
  Similarly to an earlier Daily Telegraph 
246 (Anon.), “A Lesson To Be Learnt”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks no. 2, 20 
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cartoon,249
 
 the newspaper conveyed Curtin as a lone figure struggling to tell a mighty 
power not to underestimate a foe.  A more optimistic tone appeared in The Daily 
Mirror leader page about the “new Australian-American union in battle”.  The 
editorial writer declared, “Australia is electrified ... stimulated and energised” by 
MacArthur’s appointment in the Pacific war zone.  The alliance was a “triumph for  
Figure 12 
Mr. Curtin” and “America has hailed the news with enthusiasm”, according to the 
leader writer.250  Again Curtin was portrayed as an important newsmaker because he 
reportedly requested FDR to make the general’s appointment.251
                                                            
249 William Mahony, “Team Work”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 
2, 31 December 1941. 
  Although the 
newspaper statements reflected varying degrees of hyperbole and cynicism about the 
partnership, the four largest Australian press owners – Fairfax, Murdoch, Norton and 
Packer – endorsed Curtin’s US strategy in their news coverage of his international 
radio address. 
250 (Anon.), “Now Comes The Fight”, The Daily Mirror, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 
18 March 1942. 
251 (Anon.), “The Prime Minister: His Hair Was Thinner”, The Sunday Telegraph, Sydney, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/83, 27 December 1942. 
Chapter 6   The war comes home to Australia and the performance of “Curtin’s Circus”, 
1941-1942 
260 
 
Consistent with his largely impersonal characterisation of the enemy in his 
radio talks, Curtin moved to correct a racist media portrayal of Asian people.  Before 
the Pacific war, he had cultivated a close relationship with Japan’s first Minister to 
Australia, Tatsuo Kawai, who would later describe Curtin as one of his best 
friends.252  In this study’s content analyses of selected prime ministerial speeches and 
statements, totalling 35,444 words, Curtin made a total of four short references to 
skin colour.253  He directed DOI propagandists to stop promoting some 1942 
advertisements and radio talks, which were perceived as being racist by the Sydney 
archbishop and many Australian listeners.254  The Australian Government further 
tightened censorship rules to restrict racially adverse comments in 1943.  
Government officials advised journalists to avoid expressions that were “an 
unintentional affront” to our “Chinese allies”.255
 
  Thus Curtin targeted his messages 
increasingly to an international audience, beyond the British Empire, to gain 
sympathy for his foreign policies. 
 
“Statesmanlike warning”: The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1942 
This section will analyse Curtin’s parliamentary address about the unfolding and 
ultimately successful Battle of the Coral Sea because his press secretary remembered 
this was probably “his finest speech”; likewise the ABC reporter, John Commins, 
recalled that listening to his words was “one of the most memorable moments in my 
                                                            
252 Bob Wurth, “Saving Australia & the growing danger of revisionism”, JCPML, Bentley, 
2006, retrieved on 28 September 2009 at 
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70, 14 December 1943, pp. 31-36; Curtin, “US radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
254 Rae Allen, “A history of local radio in Brisbane”, ABC Brisbane, Brisbane, 18 February 
2008, retrieved on 20 September 2009 at 
<http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2008/02/18/2165437.htm>; Robert Crawford, “An 
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When Journalism Meets History 2003, RMIT Publishing, Melbourne, 2004, retrieved on 27 
June 2008 at 
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parliamentary life”.  Curtin was describing the first naval action in history in which 
surface ships did not fire at one another; this was a battle between aircraft carriers 
and planes256 over the Coral Sea, located between Australia and New Caledonia.257  
Curtin’s speech was reproduced practically in its entirety in the following day’s 
issues of The Age,258 The Canberra Times,259 The Sydney Morning Herald 260 and 
The West Australian.261  The speech, made on 8 May 1942, was the leading article on 
broadsheets in Canberra,262 Melbourne263 and Sydney264 while The West Australian 
featured a full reprint on page five,265
I have no information as to how the engagement is developing, but I should 
like the nation to be assured that there will be, on the part of our forces and 
the American forces, that devotion to duty which is characteristic of the naval 
and air forces of the United States of America, Great Britain and the 
Commonwealth.
 with advertisements filling the front page.  
Curtin’s speech was only 543 words.  When he addressed the House of 
Representatives shortly before 4pm, he said: 
266
The battle had begun the previous day on 7 May when operations were mounted by 
the large Japanese carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku, and accompanying air forces to 
 
                                                            
256 Encyclopædia Britannica Educational Corporation (producer), “The Second World War: 
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capture Tulagi in the Solomons and Port Moresby in New Guinea.  The Japanese 
plans were uncovered by Allied signals intelligence.  The Allies countered the 
Japanese advance by using a force built around the US carriers, Yorktown and 
Lexington, as well as two Australian cruisers, Australia and Hobart.  These Allied 
ships were detached to attack the Port Moresby invasion force.  Japanese aircraft 
attempted to attack the ships but failed; this invasion force was turned back after 
losses to US air strikes.  Meanwhile the two opposing US and Japanese carrier forces 
fought a sea battle in which Lexington was lost and Yorktown, Zuikaku and Shokaku 
were heavily damaged.  During the battle, 20 Japanese aircraft were destroyed.267  
By early June, Curtin told the parliament, “the naval action in the Coral Sea … was a 
signal success for the allied forces engaged, and averted an immediate threat to 
Australian territory”.268  While both sides suffered heavy damage, Japanese forces 
cancelled their Port Moresby invasion plans and Curtin was able to announce that 
Australians “played an important integral part” to “save this theatre from falling 
under axis control”.269
 
 
Journalistic devices, such as leader pages, headlines, subheads, crossheads 
and the pull-out quote, emphasised Curtin’s strategy to mobilise available Australian 
forces to the Pacific theatre.270
  
  In their news articles on 9 May, the four press 
publishers increased the references to Curtin’s keywords about nationhood, the  
                                                            
267 Ric Pelvin, “Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May 1942”, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 
2009, retrieved on 3 April 2009 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/coral_sea/doc.asp>. 
268 Black, In his own words, p. 206. 
269 Curtin, “Coral Sea”, 9 May 1942, p. 6.  Also see Encyclopædia Britannica Educational 
Corporation, “Allied victory documentary”. 
270 E.g. The Sydney Morning Herald featured a pull-out quote emphasising Curtin’s call: “Be 
unstinting in Australia’s defence”.  (Anon.), “Great Naval Battle In Coral Sea”, SMH, 9 May 
1942, p. 9. 
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Australian people, war and the enemy.271  After his parliamentary address, he made a 
national broadcast on consumer rationing.272  The press emphasised his term, 
“menace”, and focused on his “grave warning” by radio that: “The invasion is a 
menace capable hourly of becoming an actuality.”273  Leader writers amplified 
Curtin’s statement by asserting, “this [the Pacific] is the main war front” and 
“[i]ndeed the probability of an attack on Australia may come at any time”.274  The 
battle was presented as an Allied victory for local people.  For example, The Sun’s 
bold headline was, “Australians’ Big Part In Battle Told By Curtin”.275  While The 
Canberra Times’ Shakespeare stressed immediate dangers, he also emphasised the 
appeals to freedom, hope and the future more times than these terms appeared in 
Curtin’s speech.276  All of the four newspapers included prime ministerial statements 
about responsibility and duty.277  He was quoted as saying, “If we should not have 
the advantages from this battle, for which we hope, all that confronts us is a sterner 
ordeal, a greater and graver responsibility.”278  His position was strengthened in The 
Canberra Times by the newspaper’s inclusion of a comment made by New Zealand 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser, who said he “hoped that it would be only the beginning 
of further good news that could be expected from that [Pacific] area”.279
                                                            
271 E.g. Curtin used “nationhood” keywords seven times in his speech while The Canberra 
Times repeated these terms 33 times in three articles the next day.  He used keywords about 
“the people” eight times; these terms were repeated 32 times in The Canberra Times.  He 
referred to the “war” six times and this term was mentioned 39 times in the newspaper.  He 
used “enemy” keywords five times but they were used 36 times in the newspaper’s reports.  
See (Anon.), “Australia’s Hour Of Trial”, Canberra, 9 May 1942, p. 2; (Anon.), “Invasion Is 
Hourly Menace To Australia”, Canberra, 9 May 1942, p. 1; (Anon.), “Japanese Defeated In 
Great Naval Battle”, Canberra, 9 May 1942, pp. 1-2; Curtin, “Coral Sea”, pp. 4-5. 
  The 
Melbourne, Perth and Sydney papers featured opposition members’ brief, supportive 
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Prime Minister Warns Nation”, SMH, 9 May 1942, p. 8. 
274 (Anon.), “Australia’s Hour Of Trial”, Canberra, 9 May 1942, p. 2. 
275 (Anon.), “Australians’ Big Part In Battle Told By Curtin”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 2, 9 May 1942. 
276 In The Canberra Times reports, the journalist used the keywords of “hope”, “the future” 
and “freedom” six times.  Curtin used the terms, “hope” and “the future”, only one time 
each. 
277 See The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian, 
9 May 1942. 
278 (Anon.), “Japanese Defeated In Great Naval Battle”, Canberra, 9 May 1942, pp. 1-2. 
279 (Anon.), “Japanese Defeated In Great Naval Battle: Heartening News to N.Z.”, Canberra, 
9 May 1942, p. 2. 
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statements.280  The Courier-Mail leader writer described Curtin’s words as 
“cheering” while applauding his “statesmanlike warning” because “it would be 
foolish to buoy ourselves with hopes of a signal victory over the Japanese”.281  The 
wartime leaders’ guarded optimism, supported by the press publishers, was soon 
proven to be correct with the victory of the Battle of Midway Island from 3 to 6 June 
1942.  The successful battle allowed the Allies to hold command over the southern 
seas.  MacArthur stated, “to a significant extent the victory at Midway ended the 
threat of a possible invasion of Australia”.282
 
  Therefore it seemed appropriate for the 
news media to encourage readers to look forward to a brighter future. 
Almost a year after his appointment as the nation’s leader, Curtin’s initial 
rapport with press gallery journalists extended to widespread media support for his 
international, political and economic strategies to win the war.  Press publishers 
approved his Pacific war priorities, and newsreels portrayed his strong agreement 
with MacArthur.  In a cinematic interview, the general emphasised the “close 
cooperation” and “support” between Australia and the US.  The film also depicted 
the 1942 Allied successes at Coral Sea and Milne Bay, a deep natural harbour at the 
eastern tip of New Guinea, to strengthen Curtin’s stature as a wartime leader.283  
While both men used propaganda to consolidate publicly their mutually beneficial 
alliance,284
                                                            
280 (Anon.), “Big Naval Victory”, West, 9 May 1942, p. 5; (Anon.), “Fateful Struggle: Mr. 
Curtin’s Appeal”, West, 9 May 1942, p. 5; (Anon.), “Great Naval Battle In Coral Sea”, SMH, 
9 May 1942, p. 9; (Anon.), “Of Crucial Importance: P.M.’s Appeal To Nation”, Age, 9 May 
1942, p. 1. 
 the moving images were an accurate reflection of Curtin’s private 
relationship with MacArthur.  Both men worked hard to modify “The Beat Hitler 
First” policy adopted by Churchill and Roosevelt in December 1941 and January 
281 (Anon.), “Curtin’s Grim Words On Naval Battle”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 2, 9 May 1942. 
282 Douglas MacArthur, cited in Black, In his own words, p. 207. 
283 Cinesound Productions (producer), “Airmen Blitz Japs In Coral Sea”, in At The Front: 
1939-1945: Australia’s WWII Newsreels (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00441/2, 1942. 
284 David Black, “Assessments of the Curtin-MacArthur relationship” [hereafter “Curtin-
MacArthur”], JCPML, Bentley, 2006, retrieved on 12 May 2008 at 
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1942.285  At an AWC meeting, MacArthur affirmed, “the Pacific was the real centre 
... Australia must stand firmly by its view that the Pacific is the predominant theatre”, 
as noted in the meeting minutes on 19 June 1942.286  F.T. Smith of the Australian 
United Press wrote that during Curtin’s confidential “table talk” with press gallery 
journalists, he appeared “very disappointed” over Middle East war setbacks and 
particularly concerned that Roosevelt and Churchill “are inclined to think that 
Australia is in no great danger”.  In his typescripts of the secret media briefings, 
Smith wrote that Curtin read aloud “in full” the Churchill and FDR messages to the 
press gallery, “but would not allow us to take a note” on 21 September.287  Although 
the transcripts conveyed Roosevelt’s chief concern as defeating Nazism,288
 
 the 
president was receptive to Australian attitudes and sent a personal message to Curtin 
on 1 June, inviting him to the White House.   
While Roosevelt did not mention this to Curtin, he had been searching for 
ways to restore “goodwill” between the Australian prime minister and Churchill.  
FDR had privately cabled Churchill on 22 March to state: “I am simply wondering 
how something might be done” to repair “a rather strained relationship between 
Australia and the United Kingdom”.289
Because we face so many mutual problems across the Pacific, I think it would 
be most helpful if we might have a talk on the war situation ... I should be 
very glad to put at your disposal such transportation facilities as might render 
your voyage possible ... I should genuinely welcome an opportunity for such 
  In a separate telegram, FDR wrote to Curtin: 
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a discussion ... Any time will suit me if you will give me about a week’s 
notice.290
Curtin, however, viewed his main task as to remain in Australia to help fight 
Japanese forces.  He did not travel overseas until 1944, when he met Churchill in 
London, Mackenzie King in Ottawa and FDR in South Carolina, to be discussed in 
Chapter 8.  Due to his rhetoric of responsibility and his practice of economic 
austerity, journalists repeated his call to civic duty in their news reports, leader pages 
and editorial cartoons. 
 
 
Public opinion polls, private letters and anecdotal evidence suggested the 
Federal Government’s strategies were popular, as discussed in Chapter 3.  But the 
public’s confidence in Curtin did not extend to having faith in all Australian state 
governments, according to pollsters.  Sixty eight per cent of Sydney’s population 
wanted to abolish the conservative-controlled New South Wales Legislative Council, 
as announced in The Sydney Morning Herald on 24 June.  “Wealthy people” were 
more likely to favour retaining the upper house while lower income earners said, “the 
State Parliament was a luxury we couldn’t afford in wartime”.291  Abolition of state 
upper houses was also early Labor policy.  Another survey found that a majority of 
people in NSW, Queensland and Victoria would favour closing down their state 
governments.  The abolitionists said they would like to dismantle the ALP-led NSW 
Legislative Assembly and Queensland Parliament, as well as Alan Dunstan’s 
Country Party government in Victoria.  Interviewers asked: “Should the States hand 
over their powers to the Commonwealth, leaving minor matters to local councils, and 
State boards?”  Fifty four per cent of respondents answered “yes”.292
                                                            
290 Franklin D. Roosevelt to John Curtin, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and 
Museum, Hyde Park, 1 June 1942, retrieved on 28 September 2009 at 
<http://docs.FDRlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/a09a01.html>. 
  Although the 
result was not positive for state premiers, it was an indication of citizens’ trust in the 
federal administration, which had assumed greater power including the collection of 
income tax – formerly the states’ domain – because of the unprecedented war 
291 (Anon.), “Upper House unpopular”, SMH, 24 June 1942, retrieved on 28 September 2009 
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emergency.  Yet when a public referendum was held on this issue in 1944, WA and 
South Australia were the only states to record a majority of votes in favour of 
granting additional powers to the Federal Government; the result contrasted with the 
opinion poll findings two years earlier.293  The commonwealth retained the vital 
taxation role, which was alone sufficient to ensure federal domination of Australian 
political affairs.294
 
   
Likewise, the Curtin administration’s national policies extended to imposing 
liquor controls that were the result of intense lobbying, and not only by the clergy,295 
because The Daily News editor Geoff Burgoyne complained to Curtin about “the 
returned soldier drunkenness in Perth” in March 1942.296
There is the Federal Government, armed with full powers to order what is 
necessary for the nation’s safety.  Why does it not use its powers to keep 
liquor trading within the bounds of national security?
  About the same time, a 
Courier-Mail leader writer reported: 
297
Yet news reports suggested “Australia’s Austerity Campaign” appealed to the 
nation’s sense of civic duty and desire for social unity.
 
298
                                                            
293 Oliver, Unity is strength, pp. 163-166. 
  In November 1942, Curtin 
was sent the new lyrics of “The Austerity Song”, written and composed by the Royal 
Australian Air Force’s Aircraftman First Class Roy Sparks and Flying Officer Alan 
Morton.  In a letter, Sparks wrote that the song had received press publicity because 
“the number has a catchy tune and is being featured with great success by the Army 
294 Parliament of New South Wales, “1939 to 1965 – War and Post-War”, Sydney, 2008, 
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and R.A.A.F. at their Community Signing Sessions in this Area” in Darwin.299
 
  
Curtin’s slogans and keywords had become a part of the public dialogue. 
“Stirring Appeal”: Curtin’s Kokoda Track tribute, December 1942 
After the Battle of the Coral Sea disrupted Japan’s plans, the enemy forces began in 
July to attempt to advance overland along the Kokoda Track to reach Port Moresby, 
the administrative capital of the Australian external territory, Papua.  In the 
parliament on 10 December, Curtin praised the bravery of Australian troops, who 
had been fighting in atrocious conditions and against vastly superior enemy numbers 
in the Kokoda Track.300  About 625 Australians were killed along this track, although 
Curtin did not specify this in his speech.  Also more than 1,600 Australians were 
wounded there.301
I make these observations: it is a misrepresentation of the spirit of the 
Australian people and the Anzac tradition to cry out when things appear to be 
going against us.  It is premature for critics to rush in and criticize a phase of 
an operation as though it were the whole campaign that was being decided … 
I speak for the whole Parliament when I offer the tribute of the nation to those 
who gave their lives in its defence.  The same gratitude is due to the wounded 
and sick.
  During the same parliamentary speech, Curtin announced that 
Allied forces had completely occupied Gona, “pinned down” the Japanese in a 
narrow, coastal strip in the Buna area on the northern coast of Papua.  He said critics 
should not be too quick to judge this phase of battle as a defeat, adding:  
302
Curtin was proved correct in his assessment of the situation.  All Japanese resistance 
in Papua ceased on 22 January 1943.  Although his long address was more complex 
than his radio broadcasts, Curtin selected his words carefully and seemed to direct 
his “tribute of the nation” to the press gallery with the intention it would be 
 
                                                            
299 A.R. Morton and A.C.1 Sparks to John Curtin, NAA, Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 237, 16 
December 1942, p. 48; Roy Sparks to John Curtin, NAA, Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 237, 11 
November 1942, pp. 50-52. 
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publicised in shorter, simpler news reports across Australia.  The speech recorded a 
Flesch Reading Ease score of 45.2 and the Flesch-Kincaid grade was 12.6, indicating 
it was more complicated than prescribed public speaking standards.  Although Curtin 
used keywords about hope and the future, he concentrated on the need to defeat the 
enemy.303
 
 
 Leading with Curtin’s announcement on the next day’s front cover, The 
Sydney Morning Herald editors used more modern journalistic devices than they did 
in previous newspaper editions considered in this study.  Instead of the earlier page 
one summaries, the lead article resembled a modern press report dispatched from a 
battle scene, with sensational news, action-packed language and a rare byline for 
“war correspondent” Charles Buttrose.  After a “20-day battle for the beachhead” in 
Gona, as Buttrose reported, Australian troops “squeezed” Japanese forces into a 
“pocket” of land and “slaughtered” enemies.304  Buttrose portrayed this conflict as an 
Allied victory.305  Also the battle was the main lead of The Age front page.306  
Curtin’s address was reprinted in the inside pages of The Sydney Morning Herald 
and The West Australian, with his keywords turned into headlines, subheads and 
crossheads.307  The three newspapers’ editorial support continued to the leader pages, 
even though The West Australian focus was on the Australian guerilla campaign 
against Japanese forces in Timor due to that area’s relatively close geographical 
proximity to WA.308
 
   
 In The Age, the leading letter displayed the bold, block case headline, 
“Tribute From An Elector”, and it was written to praise Curtin’s war leadership.  
Mark Talpley of Ringwood asked how any Australian could be “unmoved” by 
Curtin’s “stirring appeal to the nation”.  Talpley wrote: 
                                                            
303 During his parliamentary address, Curtin referred three times to “hope” and “the future”, 
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“Papuan Campaign”, West, 11 December 1942, p. 5. 
308 (Anon.), “Australia’s Part In The World War”, SMH, 11 December 1942, p. 4; (Anon.), 
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I have listened to every Australian leader of note for half a century, and, in 
my opinion, this sincere, rugged orator has never been excelled ... Though in 
the past I generally regarded Labor politicians with disfavour, I am now right 
behind this great Australian and his capable team.  Winning the war is my 
only political faith for the duration.309
A similar expression of support was sent by a Sydney solicitor, J.J. Mulligan, later in 
1942.  In a letter to The Sydney Morning Herald, Mulligan wrote that while “always 
voting for the party officially opposed to Labour”, he defended “the consistent 
Curtin” for consulting his party’s “governing body” about conscription.  Mulligan 
passed on his note and his best wishes to Curtin that he would “continue the fight”.  
He added the newspaper’s editor had made “alterations and omissions” in his letter 
before publishing it.
 
310
 
  Letters sections had not yet become regular and prominent 
news pages.  In the absence of other interactive media, opinion poll newspaper 
reports and letters were valuable indicators of readership attitudes.  The survey 
sampling suggested Curtin persuaded many Australians to endorse his unified war 
effort and this was reflected in the 1943 election results.  The next chapter will 
examine the extent to which favourable press coverage may have influenced the 
election outcome. 
Although he set press agendas about the leading Pacific war news, less 
prominent articles focused on the “unanticipated” fighting within the ALP in 
December 1942 over compulsory military service.  The story was reported as a 
political “crisis” in The Canberra Times;311 it was a “delicate situation” in The 
Sydney Morning Herald;312 a “mischievous intrusion” in The Age;313 and a “bitter 
attack” in The West Australian.314
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  All four press organisations supported 
conscription.  Wartime Australia had the all-volunteer Australian Imperial Force 
(AIF) that was enlisted to serve outside the country; however, the Australian Military 
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on national soil, which included Papua and the Australian-administered Trust 
Territory of New Guinea.  One of the ALP’s central policies was opposition to 
conscription for military service overseas.315  The related news coverage focused on 
an independent MP, Maurice Blackburn, who called for his colleagues to affirm 
“opposition to any form of conscription outside of Australia and its territories”.  
Blackburn was supported by ALP Ministers Arthur Calwell and Eddie Ward.316  
Newspaper coverage included opposition members’ criticisms of the government’s 
limited Militia policy.317  For instance, Fadden reportedly commended other Allied 
nations for waging “total war”.318  Yet Curtin had been considering this question 
already.  In November 1942, one month before the parliamentary debate, he had 
sought authority from a special Labor federal conference for the Militia to serve in an 
expanded area of the South-West Pacific.  He told conference delegates that his 
proposal “amounted only to a modification of traditional [ALP] policy”.319  The 
Canberra Times leader writer described conscription as “the supreme issue 
confronting the country at this hour”.  As the journalist declared, “the matter should 
be forced to a vote” in the parliament because “[t]he safety of Australia thus hangs 
on the speed with which effect is given to this vital military necessity”.320  In the 
selected press coverage, this was the first time The Canberra Times publisher 
decided to allocate more space to independent and opposition views rather than to 
one of Curtin’s public addresses about an issue.321  While a few editors made 
scathing criticisms of anti-conscription politicians, they did not directly attack Curtin 
in their editorials.322
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received statements of support for his conscription position in such newspapers as 
The Courier-Mail,323 The Sun324 and The Argus.325
 
 
 Yet Murdoch had started publishing signed Herald editorials that criticised 
the government’s war conduct, particularly about the conscription question.  In 
October, F.T. Smith recalled Curtin’s “amazing outburst” at a confidential press 
gallery briefing after reading an editorial in which Murdoch portrayed the 
government as giving only half-hearted support to US forces.  Curtin said, “this 
attack … was silly and unfair.  The basis of it was all wrong … it is no good for 
public morale”, as Smith noted.  Also Curtin reportedly remarked he did not trust 
Murdoch.326
These long, boldly featured articles in ‘The Herald’ made a painful 
impression on me, because the country was at war and in grave danger, and 
certainly there was no one else who could conceivably be considered as 
taking Curtin’s place.
  The Herald’s Alexander recalled his embarrassment about the 
editorials: 
327
After Murdoch’s “particularly personal attack” against Curtin’s anti-conscription 
record in World War I, the prime minister said privately to Alexander: 
 
Tell Murdoch … that I have been advised that statements in his latest article 
are gravely libelous.  I want him to withdraw immediately and apologise in 
the next article.  If not, I shall at once institute a suit claiming £20,000 
damages for libel.328
The next day, Murdoch published a statement to retract the previous editorial and 
apologise to Curtin.
 
329
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no. 3, 11 December 1942. 
  Although he would continue to clash publicly with Murdoch 
during the next year, as described in Chapter 7, his honest news management style 
won sympathy from press gallery journalists such as Smith and Alexander. 
324 (Anon.), “Battle Of Words – Or Deeds?”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 3, 11 
December 1942. 
325 (Anon.), “The Task Defined”, The Argus, Melbourne, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 3, 11 
December 1942. 
326 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, pp. 99-100. 
327 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
328 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
329 Alexander, “Alexander interview”. 
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 The ALP’s conscription debate over compulsory military service was 
satirised in several press cartoons.  At the offices of The Argus and The Daily 
Telegraph, for example, cartoonists parodied Curtin’s efforts to cajole ALP members 
to support conscription.  Although a Sunday Telegraph opinion column conveyed 
impatience with the delay in resolving the compulsory service debate,330 Curtin 
“followed the correct ALP policy procedure” and sought a ruling by the party’s 
decision-making body, including state Labor executives, in January before 
introducing legislation.331
Each State – no matter how large or how small its A.L.P. membership – sends 
the same number of delegates to conference.  It now rests with Western 
Australia, which has comparatively few members, to decide the issue for 
Curtin.
  As The Sunday Telegraph opinion writer claimed: 
332
The writer expected that Curtin would demonstrate “courage and sincerity” when 
MPs met again to discuss the issue.
 
333  One day later, The Daily Telegraph’s Mahony 
depicted WA as a proud cat seated on a fence and needing to be coaxed to Curtin’s 
side (see Figure 13).334  In fact, the WA state executives were unambiguous in their 
support of his conscription policy, which was passed at a special conference in 
January 1943 and resulted in the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Bill.  While some 
anti-conscription politicians were increasingly subject to press criticism, Curtin did 
not move to repress the public debates over national defence.  A year after his 
declaration of war against Japan, newspaper editors published their confidence in his 
leadership.  According to The Sunday Telegraph writer, Curtin had proven to be “a 
master tactician” during the past year.335
 
  The nation’s undiminished “Australian 
spirit” resulted in “our strength increasing and the danger of invasion receding”, 
                                                            
330 (Anon.), “Opinion: You must face the issue, Mr. Curtin!”, The Sunday Telegraph, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 3, 13 December 1942. 
331 Black, In his own words, p. 217; Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 166. 
332 (Anon.), “Opinion: You must face the issue, Mr. Curtin!”, The Sunday Telegraph, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 3, 13 December 1942. 
333 (Anon.), “Opinion: You must face the issue, Mr. Curtin!”, The Sunday Telegraph, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 3, 13 December 1942. 
334 Figure 13 appeared in William Mahony, “Waiting For The Jump”, The Daily Telegraph, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no 3, 14 December 1942. 
335 (Anon.), “The Prime Minister: His Hair Was Thinner”, The Sunday Telegraph, Sydney, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/83, 27 December 1942. 
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Figure 13 
noted a Truth journalist.336
 
  The next year would bring fresh challenges as Curtin 
strove to end ALP divisiveness, to achieve an electoral mandate from the Australian 
people and to secure greater British Commonwealth collaboration. 
 
Conclusion 
As soon as Curtin was appointed to be the prime minister, major metropolitan 
newspaper owners published a strong endorsement of his leadership.  This example 
of government-media cooperation resembled the model of news in an administered 
society, developed by Ericson et al, as well as Foucault’s theories of 
“governmentality” that were discussed earlier in this chapter’s introductory 
section.337
                                                            
336 (Anon.), “War With Japan Is Just One Year Old”, Truth, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 
3, 6 December 1942. 
  As press proprietors and journalists promoted favourable images of the 
new prime minister seated next to the governor-general, the media appeared to be 
operating as an extension of government.  In the words of Ericson et al, they acted as 
337 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality”; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance. 
Chapter 6   The war comes home to Australia and the performance of “Curtin’s Circus”, 
1941-1942 
275 
 
“control agents” and “cultural workmen”, contributing to “the construction of social 
order” and a smooth transition of power by emphasising stability, propriety and 
cooperation in Australia during the escalating global war.338
 
  As the new theatre of 
war opened in the Pacific, Curtin was increasingly portrayed positively on the covers 
of The Age, The Canberra Times and The Sydney Morning Herald, as well as in The 
West Australian main news pages.  In each of the six selected public addresses, 
Curtin’s keywords and messages were repeated in the broadsheets’ reports the next 
day.  Through the limited content analysis, this study has found that Curtin adapted 
his speeches to appeal to different audiences, ranging from his accessible radio 
broadcasts to his relatively more complex parliamentary addresses that he expected 
would be disseminated by the press gallery.  Due to the Japanese bombing of Darwin 
on 19 February 1942, journalists decided to emphasise his keywords about enemy 
attacks more than his phrases about liberty and freedom.  Yet the press frequently 
included Curtin’s terms of “tradition”, “responsibility” and “austerity”.  By 
emphasising these keywords of nationhood, the Australian people and war, the press 
editors conveyed a sense of civic duty and desire for national unity; this 
demonstrated the theories of Ericson et al and Foucault about western liberal 
governments’ use of the media to contribute to the optimal development of 
populations and maintain social order. 
 Curtin’s original, rhetorical devices in his declaration of war broadcast were 
similar to those of FDR’s “date of infamy” speech and the “fireside chats”.  Both 
men made innovative use of radio and film to present themselves as strong, forceful 
and likeable leaders who communicated candidly with working people.  The ABC’s 
positive news coverage of Curtin demonstrated Foucault’s theory of “the art of 
government”.  According to Foucault, this concept of “governmentality” is 
constituted of political leaders and media institutions, working together to allow a 
“very specific albeit complex form of power” to disseminate knowledge to the 
public.339
                                                            
338 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 356. 
  Also Curtin developed a wide range of journalism strategies to persuade 
the media to support his war leadership.  His formal communication methods 
involved the establishment of Australia’s first prime ministerial press secretary, as 
well as informative, “sensational” press statements, dramatic newsreels and regular 
339 Foucault, “Governmentality”, pp. 102-103. 
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radio announcements of important war news.  Canberra’s senior reporters were 
impressed by his uniquely unguarded media conferences, where he would brief them 
on the latest Allied and military leaders’ private communications.  His informal talks 
extended to impromptu conversations during night walks and train journeys with 
journalists about the top-secret, controversial and precarious ocean voyage of the 6th 
and 7th Divisions returning to Australia.  Although conservative press proprietors 
welcomed his new prime ministership as a way to prevent internal chaos and focus 
on external challenges in October 1941, they became increasingly critical of the 
Labor administration by December 1942.  While he was still portrayed as a 
successful leader in terms of foreign policy, a “crisis” had reportedly emerged within 
the ALP over the conscription question.  Despite Murdoch’s “particularly personal 
attack” in The Herald, Curtin did not move to repress debates about issues in the 
public sphere.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, he overcame the political 
challenges to win resoundingly the 1943 federal election.  An analysis of relevant 
radio, film, press and parliamentary statements will be conducted in the next chapter 
to identify his news management strategies to win media and public support in 1943. 
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Chapter 7 
Curtin as a front-page personality: transforming Australia’s public sphere, 
1943 
 
 
During the Pacific war battles of 1941-1942, Curtin’s mass communication 
strategies, including his radio broadcasts, newsreel appearances, press statements and 
media interviews, were attracting prominent global news coverage.  While Chapter 6 
has dealt with Curtin as a prime minister appointed during a crisis, this chapter 
examines him as an elected national leader setting the media agenda during 1943, the 
year when he was re-elected with a resounding majority.  This chapter is aimed at 
understanding various aspects of Curtin’s performance as a media politician in the 
wartime public sphere.  The following sections will examine how Curtin employed 
media strategies to persuade journalists and public audiences to support his 
administration as the Allied nations began mounting an offensive against the Axis 
powers in 1943.  The first section examines Curtin’s parliamentary address in 
support of extended conscription and his ability to generate favourable news 
coverage for his endorsement of the Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Bill.1  As he 
sought to consolidate Australians’ support for his Bill, he increasingly promoted an 
image of a strong Allied partnership with Churchill and Roosevelt.  This first section 
engages with the liberalism theories of the political philosopher and historian of 
ideas, Isaiah Berlin,2 because they will inform this chapter’s evaluation of Curtin’s 
rhetoric of liberty to inspire Australian people to fight Axis fascist enemies.3
                                                            
1 John Curtin, Commonwealth of Australia: Parliamentary Debates [hereafter “Militia Bill 
speech”], vol. 173, 11 February 1943, pp. 592-596. 
  
Secondly the chapter will investigate Curtin’s attempts to cultivate relations with 
journalists and media owners leading to the election on 21 August.  The third section 
2 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty [hereafter Liberty], Oxford University Press, London, 
1969; Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty [hereafter 
Freedom and its betrayal], ed. Henry Hardy, Chatto & Windus, London, 2002; Isaiah Berlin, 
The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays [hereafter The proper study of 
mankind], Chatto & Windus, London, 1997. 
3 For example, Cinesound Productions and Cinesound Review (producers), Compiled 
speeches of John Curtin, 1941 – 1945 (newsreels) [hereafter Compiled speeches), JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00130/1, 1941-1945. 
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focuses on his use of radio, newsreels and the press during the “multimedia” election 
campaign; this includes a textual analysis of his election policy radio broadcast on 26 
July4 and the news coverage of this event.  Fourthly this chapter will investigate 
Curtin’s emphasis of the global public sphere; as part of this section, an analysis will 
be made of his international proposals to the ALP federal conference on 14 
December.5
 
  Through this chapter’s analyses of selected Curtin speeches, an 
assessment will be made of his ability to win journalists’ support, to persuade them 
to report his foreign policies positively and to reproduce his main messages 
prominently in the news. 
 
Political skills: appeals to the patriotic duty and commanding Allied approval 
As a vehement protester against conscription in World War I, Curtin had written a 
Westralian Worker editorial to urge that “conscription should be voted to oblivion”.6  
Later he faced the “greatest challenge” of his prime ministership when he embarked 
upon securing Labor’s acceptance of compulsory military service for Australians 
other than for the direct defence of their homeland.7
                                                            
4 John Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement” [hereafter “Election policy 
statement”], John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np. 
  He overcame his biggest hurdle 
when he introduced the issue at a special conference of the ALP in November 1942.  
Another Labor conference passed his proposal in January 1943.  As Curtin attempted 
to unite his colleagues, journalists and voters to support the introduction of the 
Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Bill in the parliament on 11 February 1943, press 
gallery members reported on his rhetoric to persuade politicians to agree that 
5 John Curtin, “State Of The War” [hereafter “State of the war”], Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
[hereafter DDA], no. 70, 14 December 1943, pp. 31-36. 
6 Cited in John Curtin, “Australia Keeps the Pact.  Everything Britain has Asked 
Voluntarism Has Accomplished”, Westralian Worker, Perth, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00302/40, 30 November 1917.  Similar Curtin editorials were published in The 
Westralian Worker on 16 and 23 November 1917. 
7 David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings [hereafter In 
his own words], Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 215; Bobbie Oliver, 
Unity is Strength: A History of the Australian Labor Party and the Trades and Labor 
Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999 [hereafter Unity is strength], API Network, 
Bentley, 2003, p. 166. 
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“members of the militia [including conscripts] could be required to serve in any area 
of General MacArthur’s command in the South West Pacific Zone”.8  To elicit the 
journalists’ support, he spoke of the need to wage war against fascism to preserve 
democracy.  As he used his powerful position to help Australians win their battles 
and plan for post-war society, he was closely aligned with the positive conception of 
liberty, as described by Berlin.  He defines positive liberty as the notion of the 
government using more power to help people to achieve self-mastery.  When Curtin 
advocated a war on Axis enemies, his rhetoric resembled Berlin’s conception of 
negative liberty, associated with non-coercion and freedom from government 
impositions.9  Berlin writes: “The fundamental sense of freedom is freedom from 
chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by others.  The rest is extension of this 
sense, or else metaphor.”10  Freedom is not simply about “the absence of frustration 
(which may be obtained by killing desires)”, but it is the result of “the absence of 
obstacles to possible choices and activities”.11  Individuals gain liberty when they are 
able to choose freely and stand up for their convictions.12  While Berlin supports the 
use of negative liberty, he writes that positive liberty has led to political doctrines in 
anti-liberal directions.13  As an Allied leader, Curtin reflected a sense of the negative 
conception of liberty by declaring he was fighting fascism to preserve “[t]he free 
institutions of democracy”.14  He was also aligned with a positive conception of 
liberty by supporting the role of a welfare state, unions15 and limited government 
censorship to prevent the possibility of vital information being disseminated to Axis 
enemies.16
 
  This chapter will examine his various persuasive techniques during his 
parliamentary speech in support of extending conscription. 
 
                                                            
8 Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 166. 
9 Berlin, Freedom and its betrayal; Liberty; The proper study of mankind; John Curtin, 
“Duty With Press” [hereafter “Duty with press”], DDA, no. 81, 19 April 1944, p. 46. 
10 Berlin, “Liberty”, p. 1vi. 
11 Berlin, “Liberty”, p. xxxix. 
12 Berlin, Freedom and its betrayal, pp. 103-104; Berlin, “From Hope and Fear Set Free”, in 
Berlin, The proper study of mankind, p. 109. 
13 Berlin, “Liberty”, p. x1vii; William A. Galston, “Moral Pluralism and Liberal Democracy: 
Isaiah Berlin’s Heterodox Liberalism”, The Review of Politics, vol. 71, 2009, p. 89. 
14 Curtin, “Duty with press”, p. 46. 
15 Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 169. 
16 Hilvert, Blue pencil warriors, pp. 197-203. 
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Emotive speech and gestures 
On 11 February, The Age news representative wrote Curtin “had spoken with 
emotion and had emphasised the points by striking the desk in front of him”.  The 
stirring tone of his address resulted in “an extraordinary spectacle in the House”, 
according to the unnamed Age reporter, because it triggered a heated debate and 
revealed deep divisions within the opposition.  In contrast, the UAP’s Percy Spender 
“faced a considerable amount of heckling from the Government benches and almost 
complete silence from members of the Opposition”, as reported in The Age17 and The 
Canberra Times.18  Since Curtin proposed that conscripts should fight in the South 
West Pacific, Spender unsuccessfully attempted to remove the territorial limitation 
for compulsory service; The Age portrayed him as a lone figure and quoted him as 
saying “the Opposition had differing views”19 on conscription.  Curtin’s gesture of 
striking a parliamentary desk resembled Churchill’s use of his walking cane as a 
pointing stick, as he was filmed in newsreels,20
 
 because both leaders communicated 
by emphasising their words with actions intended to show them as decisive.   
 
Inclusive language  
Mindful of the press gallery, Curtin repeatedly used “we” and “our” to convey he 
identified with Australian citizens, such as his statement: “I ask that we shall be more 
disposed to let the world know the magnificence of our achievements.”21
                                                            
17 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages”, The Age [hereafter Age], Melbourne, 12 
February 1943, p. 2. 
  Also he 
emphasised his government’s “duty” and its “deepest sense of responsibility” to 
“hold Australia” as a “base of the utmost strategic importance to the United 
18 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages In House”, The Canberra Times [hereafter 
Canberra], Canberra, 12 February 1943, p. 2. 
19 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages”, Age, 12 February 1943, p. 2. 
20 Derek Lukin Johnston, “Winston Churchill: Master of the English Language”, Finest 
Hour, no. 46, winter 1984-85, p. 9; Jonathan Sikorsky, “From British Cassandra to American 
Hero: The Churchill Legend in the World War II American Media”, Finest Hour, The 
Churchill Centre, no. 108, autumn 2000, pp. 30-36. 
21 He referred to such inclusive terms as “we”, “us” and “the people” 36 times.  Nationhood 
keywords appeared 22 times.  See Curtin, “Militia Bill speech”, pp. 592-596. 
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Nations”.22  Although the UN was officially established as an international 
organisation only in October 1945, he referred to the “United Nations” before this to 
indicate his solidarity with the major Allied powers.  Since Curtin was speaking 
directly to politicians, he aimed for journalists to publicise his main messages to 
public audiences.  His parliamentary address was more complex than his radio talks 
and registered as suitable for an audience with an eleventh-grade education.23  His 
messages of unity inspired “applause from both sides of the House”, The Age 
journalist noted.  “Many members from both the Government and Opposition 
benches came forward to congratulate him.”24
 
 
 
Marginalising critics 
In addition to his conservative opponents, Curtin was confronted by critics from the 
left who did not want any forced military service, such as his Labor colleague, 
Arthur Calwell, as well as the independent MP, Maurice Blackburn.25  Yet he 
branded them as “the mischief-makers outside” the government and the “abusers” 
whose “quarrelling” would not hinder “those who have the responsibility of 
conducting war”.26  This rhetorical technique was also used by Roosevelt when he 
“assailed his opponents … as often as he greeted his friends” in his “fireside chats”.27  
Newspaper editors copied selected extracts of Curtin’s speech, focusing on his 
description of “the mischief-makers”.28
 
   
                                                            
22 During this speech, Curtin spoke of “duty” once and referred to “responsibility” three 
times.  See Curtin, “Militia Bill speech”, pp. 592-596. 
23 This speech recorded a Flesch Reading Ease score of 55.5.  See Curtin, “Militia Bill 
speech”, pp. 592-596.  See Chapter 1 for more information on the readability statistics. 
24 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages”, Age, 12 February 1943, p. 2. 
25 Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 166. 
26 Curtin made seven references to the “enemy”, Japan and “they”, meaning his political 
opponents.  See Curtin, “Militia Bill speech”, pp. 592-596. 
27 Elvin T. Lim, “The Lion and the Lamb: De-mythologizing Franklin Roosevelt’s Fireside 
Chats” [hereafter “Fireside chats”], Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, p. 449. 
28 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages”, Age, 12 February 1943, p. 2; (Anon.), “Militia 
Bill Passes All Stages”, The Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter SMH], Sydney, 12 February 
1943, p. 4; (Anon.), “The Militia Bill”, The West Australian, [hereafter West], Perth, 12 
February 1943, p. 5. 
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The well-timed comeback 
Churchill was known for his quick, clever and well-timed rebuttals.  Although he 
appeared to be improvising, he was adept in “the loaded pause” and “the calculated 
use of interruptions”.  As the Churchill scholar, Graham Cawthorne, noted: 
Planning his speech, Winston thinks of everything.  He even, one suspects, 
looks ahead to see where he is likely to be interrupted.  Then, if the 
interruptions come, he is more often than not, ready for them with a telling 
reply.29
Similarly to Churchill, Curtin delivered quick replies to some parliamentarians’ 
interjections.  He responded to the opposition’s interruptions by saying: “He 
deplored the fact that the bill should be made the subject of any form of political 
partisanship.”
 
30  Such “recriminations”, Curtin said, were damaging Australia’s 
reputation, “which will be a shining light in the history of this war when the full story 
can be told”.31
 
  The poetic phrase was not included in his speech text, but Curtin 
might have planned to use the rejoinder during an anticipated parliamentary 
interruption.  The press gallery emphasised the exceptionally heated arguments that 
followed Curtin’s speech to convey his deft – and perhaps previously rehearsed – 
debating style.  He defeated proposed opposition amendments and ensured that the 
Militia Bill passed all stages with the aid of such rhetorical devices as: recurring 
appeals to patriotic duty, forceful hand gestures, an emotional delivery, inclusive 
words, a clever comeback and portraying his adversaries as undermining national 
security. 
 
 
                                                            
29 Graham Cawthorne, “The Fabulous Parliamentarian”, in Mr. Speaker, Sir, Hume Press, 
London, 1952, pp. 24-26, cited in Richard M. Langworth (ed.), Churchill by Himself, Ebury 
Press, St Ives, 2008, p. x. 
30 Curtin’s impromptu “political partisanship” remark was made in: (Anon.), “Militia Bill 
Passes All Stages”, Age, 12 February 1943, p. 2; (Anon.), “The Militia Bill”, West, 12 
February 1943, p. 5. 
31 (Anon.), “The Militia Bill”, West, 12 February 1943, p. 5. 
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Communicating to journalists 
Since Curtin’s language was accessible, press gallery reporters positively portrayed 
his oratory in the four selected newspapers the next day.32  As part of this content 
analysis, the news coverage of UAP divisiveness was calculated as being 
advantageous to Curtin.  For example, a discordant exchange involving Menzies and 
Spender was published in The Age.  Spender announced the opposition executive 
recommended supporting Curtin’s Militia Bill on “two occasions”.  Menzies 
interjected: “This happened on three occasions.”  Spender replied: “I don’t want to 
argue about that.”33  The two UAP politicians and their colleague, Eric Harrison, 
resigned from the opposition executive to protest the bill, prompting newspaper 
headline writers to declare an “Opposition Split” in the next day’s editions.34  Such 
press reports about weak rivals benefited Curtin by strengthening his stature and, as a 
result, The Age and The Canberra Times articles were resoundingly favourable 
towards him.35  This selected news coverage, which also included The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The West Australian,36 led with Curtin’s speech and the 
journalists repeatedly referred to him37
 
 to portray him as the agenda setter. 
 
Winning press approval through international backing 
Following the analysis of Curtin’s media communications, this section examines his 
“political” strategies and how he attempted to strengthen his relations with 
international leaders, particularly Churchill and Roosevelt, to gain more press gallery 
approval at home.  Within weeks of Curtin’s successful passage of the Militia Bill, 
                                                            
32 The selected news coverage related to The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning 
Herald and The West Australian issues on 12 February 1943. 
33 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages”, Age, 12 February 1943, p. 2. 
34 The same headline, “Opposition Split” appeared in The Age, p. 2, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, p. 4, and The West Australian, p. 5 on 12 February 1943. 
35 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages”, Age, 12 February 1943, p. 2; (Anon.), “Militia 
Bill Passes All Stages In House”, Canberra, 12 February 1943, p. 2. 
36 (Anon.), “Militia Bill Passes All Stages”, SMH, 12 February 1943, p. 4; (Anon.), “The 
Militia Bill”, West, 12 February 1943, p. 5. 
37 In the four press articles on 12 February 1943, references to “Mr. Curtin” and “the Prime 
Minister” were made eight times in The Canberra Times, ten times in The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 16 times in The West Australian, and 17 times in The Age. 
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anecdotal evidence conveyed Australians’ increasing optimism that they had met the 
invasion challenges of 1942.  ABC General Manager, Charles Moses, recalled by 
March 1943, “[i]t was obvious that the war in the Pacific had taken a turn for the 
better … [and] was moving to a conclusion, a favourable conclusion”.38  On 18 June, 
Curtin announced the nation was no longer in danger of an invasion.39  In a 
Movietone newsreel, he assured cinema audiences: “The Battle of Australia has 
assuredly been won just as the Battle of Britain has been won.”  As he made this 
declaration in the parliament, he read from his notes to announce the nation’s air 
force strength had increased by 60 per cent.  The filmmakers also portrayed Curtin’s 
public thanks to Roosevelt for sending more US planes to Australia, as well as his 
appreciation of Churchill’s support for “our case” in Washington DC.  By 
unobtrusively filming his speech to MPs, the Movietone producers created the 
appearance of a credible, authoritative news report about a strong Allied 
partnership.40
 
 
Private, informal communications revealed Curtin’s determination to build a 
friendship with Churchill in the lead-up to the Australian federal election.  His efforts 
to improve Anglo-Australian relations were not only connected to his need to win on 
21 August.  Curtin indicated his foreign policy vision to journalists that, “Britain, 
Australia and America should become the policemen of the Pacific”.41  To 
Australians, Churchill was a prominent personality whose image appeared in Labor 
and UAP advertisements.  For example, he had been pictured in Menzies’ patriotic 
1940 election poster.42  Sydney double-decker bus advertisements depicted Curtin 
and Churchill to promote the Third Liberty Loan from 15 March to 20 April 1943.43
                                                            
38 Charles Moses, interviewed for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation [hereafter 
“Moses interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00408/3, 27 May 1982, transcript np. 
  
Increasingly angered by the UAP’s public references to war secrets during the 
election campaign in early July, Churchill sent confidential, personal cablegrams to 
Curtin to criticise these indiscretions.  Churchill complained about Menzies’ public 
39 Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom briefings: John Curtin’s war [hereafter 
Backroom briefings], National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], Canberra, 1997, p. 159. 
40 Movietone News (producer), Prime Minister Tells House Of Evatt’s Mission (newsreel), 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00236, 1943. 
41 Frederick Thomas Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 160. 
42 Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 165. 
43 Black, In his own words, p. 229. 
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revelations of AIF manoeuvres and Spender’s discussion of evacuation plans from 
the Middle East.44  Menzies reportedly said in The Sydney Morning Herald on 14 
July, “when the Burma Road was in great danger … Australia [with Curtin as the 
prime minister] refused to divert its leading A.I.F. division to Burma to help keep the 
road open”.45  Although not specifically stated in the news report, Menzies was 
referring to Curtin’s dispute with Churchill over his determination to bring back 
Australian troops to defend the homeland in 1942, as discussed in Chapter 6.  In 
response to Menzies, the ALP Minister, J.A. Beasley, was quoted as saying: “These 
very A.I.F. men, instead, were used in the New Guinea operations which … stopped 
the downward trend of the Japanese towards our own shores”.46
 
  The report 
suggested that Menzies might have been trying to question Curtin’s loyalty to Britain 
and exploit divisions between the two Allied nations. 
The stories reached Churchill, who urged Curtin “to consider what can be 
done to prevent embarrassing and possibly dangerous disclosures”.47  As the election 
drew closer in early August, Churchill backed Curtin forcefully and appeared to 
endorse the Labor leader’s bid for a second term.  Both prime ministers agreed the 
Country Party leader, Fadden, had improperly alluded to one of Churchill’s secret 
cablegrams, which had been discussed in the bipartisan Advisory War Council 
(AWC).  On 13 August 1943, Curtin made the highly unusual decision of sending a 
draft media release to Churchill about the issue and asking him to review it.  In this 
press statement, Curtin accused Fadden of behaving improperly by divulging the 
contents of Churchill’s cablegram.  Since he sent the draft release to Churchill, 
Curtin was determined to avoid repeating Fadden’s mistake by giving away too 
much information about the secret cablegram to the media.48
                                                            
44 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 19 July 
1943, p. 10; Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 
21 July 1943, p. 11. 
  Three days later, 
Churchill wrote he agreed with the first three paragraphs of Curtin’s media release, 
which stated that Fadden had made “a gross breach of faith” and “a complete 
45 (Anon.), “Burma Road Decision” [hereafter “Burma”], SMH, 14 July 1943, p. 6. 
46 (Anon.), “Burma”, SMH, 14 July 1943, p. 6. 
47 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 17 July 
1943, p. 6. 
48 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 13 August 
1943, pp. 22-23. 
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distortion of the facts to serve his political ends”.  Moreover, Churchill urged Curtin 
to “refuse to follow Mr. Fadden’s bad example” and remove additional sentences 
about his cablegram.49  On 18 August, Curtin replied to Churchill that he would 
“gladly respect your wishes” by deleting the confidential material.50  The condensed 
media release, with Curtin’s criticisms of Fadden, appeared in The Sydney Morning 
Herald on the same day.  Readers were informed Curtin had consulted Churchill 
about the issue, indicating the British prime minister supported his charges against 
Fadden.51  According to F.T. Smith, Curtin had already told senior journalists that 
Churchill was “worried” about conservative Australian politicians’ references to top-
secret British policy and “snaky” about the opposition’s use of his speeches for its 
election campaign.52  Alexander’s diaries indicated Churchill commanded the press 
gallery’s respect.53
 
  Churchill’s avowed confidence in Curtin bolstered the Australian 
leader’s stature in the global media. 
The Australian-US alliance emerged as another challenging issue before the 
election because UAP politicians were calling for Curtin to visit Roosevelt.  At the 
beginning of 1943, a Sun editorial writer declared: “The time has come when the 
Prime Minister should serve his country best by a visit to Washington.”54
  
  In The 
Daily Telegraph, cartoonist William Mahony satirised Curtin’s long-distance  
                                                            
49 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 16 August 
1943, p. 26. 
50 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 18 August 
1943, p. 29. 
51 (Anon.), “Charge by Mr. Curtin: Secret Cables and Mr. Fadden”, SMH, 18 August 1943, 
p. 9. 
52 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 165. 
53 J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957” [hereafter “Papers”], NLA, Manuscript Collections, 
Canberra, NLA acc. no. MS 2389, 27 December 1941, transcript np. 
54 (Anon.), “Curtin Should See Roosevelt”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks compiled 
by the Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], JCPML, Bentley, no. 3, JCPML acc. 
no. 00297/3, 6 January 1943. 
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diplomacy with the burdened president (see Figure 14).55  Inside the AWC on 25 
January, the former Prime Minister and UAP member, William Morris Hughes, 
“urged” Curtin to make the trip that would “enable us to hold on” in the South-West 
Pacific area.56
 
  Yet Ezra Norton defended Curtin in a Daily Mirror editorial by 
Figure 14 
publishing the headline, “Curtin In Best Position To Judge Nation’s Requirements”.  
The editorial writer affirmed Curtin faced “great and important work” in the nation 
                                                            
55 Figure 14 appeared in William Mahony, “Get Together, Mr. Curtin”, The Daily Telegraph, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 8 January 1943. 
56 Department of Foreign Affairs, “Advisory War Council Minutes” [hereafter “AWC 
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“in the time of its greatest crisis”.  The two related photographs showed a beaming 
Roosevelt and cheerful Curtin; they were pictured together to indicate their 
friendship.57
 
 
Figure 15 
Although Curtin might not have known it, he received powerful support in a 
secret memorandum from the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to Roosevelt.  
After Curtin had declined FDR’s invitation to the White House in 1942, Hull sent 
some information to the president that sympathetically outlined the prime minister’s 
legitimate reasons for refusing to travel to Washington DC.  To his presidential 
memorandum, Hull attached a background briefing paper prepared by the American 
Legation in Canberra.58  The legation59
                                                            
57 Figure 15 appeared in (Anon.), “Curtin In Best Position To Judge Nation’s Requirements”, 
The Daily Mirror, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 14 January 1943. 
 affirmed: 
58 Cordell Hull to Franklin D. Roosevelt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00266/2, 22 
August 1942, p. 100. 
59 Although the author of this briefing paper was not named in the correspondence, he might 
have been Nelson T. Johnson, who led the American Legation in Canberra from 1941 to 
1945.  See: The Embassy of the United States of America, “History of the U.S. Embassy”, 
Yarralumla, 2010, retrieved on 27 January 2011 at 
<http://canberra.usembassy.gov/history/chiefsofmission.html>. 
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Mr. Curtin, as Prime Minister, has developed.  He is today, I believe, trusted 
and respected throughout the Commonwealth because of his obvious 
sincerity, directness and integrity of character.  No other member of the 
Cabinet has stood the test of recent months as well as John Curtin.60
In the unsigned briefing paper, the American Legation agreed with Curtin that he 
should remain in Australia because: 
 
We are now on the threshold of a great military movement … Australia is 
destined to play a very important part in that movement.  Prime Minister 
Curtin’s presence in Australia is essential to continuity of Australian policy in 
connection with this effort.61
The legation noted Curtin was obliged to stay in Australia due to his Cabinet 
“disunity”, chiefly caused by a Labor Minister, E.J. Ward, and the High Court 
proceedings over income tax proposals, which were unfolding when the Roosevelt 
briefing was prepared in July 1942.
 
62
 
   
US diplomats also observed that Curtin was seeking to avoid repeating the 
mistake of other Australian leaders who travelled to London during a national crisis.  
As prime ministers, Menzies and Scullin had returned from trips to England to find 
more dissension within their parties than before they had left.63
                                                            
60 American Legation to the US Secretary of State [hereafter “American Legation letter”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00266/2, 21 July 1942, p. 102. 
  While Churchill’s 
support was vital, Curtin did not want to be viewed as deserting the Australian 
people.  The following comments in the unsigned American Legation briefing paper 
indicated Curtin’s delicate balancing of the British relationship:  
61 “American Legation letter”, p. 103. 
62 “American Legation letter”, p. 102, 104. 
63 In 1930 Prime Minister Scullin visited London and sent secret cables revealing dissension 
within his Cabinet.  The cables were leaked to The Herald’s Joseph Alexander and the 
resulting press coverage contributed to the Scullin administration’s electoral defeat the next 
year.  See C.J. Lloyd, Parliament And The Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 
1901-88, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988, pp. 95-104.  Prime Minister Menzies 
returned to Australia on 25 May 1941 after a five-month trip that included England.  He 
faced a divided Cabinet, causing him to reflect privately that “my political leadership clearly 
rested upon nothing better than quicksands”, and resigned on 28 November.  See A.W. 
Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 Diary, NLA, 
Canberra, 1993, p. 142. 
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… it must also be remembered that, politically, one of the most dangerous 
things for an Australian Prime Minister to do is to visit London.  
Traditionally, these visits have marked the political eclipse of each Prime 
Minister that has undertaken them in the past, and Mr. Curtin could not visit 
Washington without visiting London, unless perhaps his visit could in some 
way be timed to coincide with a visit to Washington of Prime Minister 
Churchill.64
The legation concluded as a result of these “personal observations”, it would be 
unlikely that Curtin would travel to the US before September 1942.
 
65  When Curtin 
remained in Canberra in 1943, Roosevelt did not appear insulted.  Instead Eleanor 
Roosevelt prepared to meet him at Australia’s federal capital.  On 14 June 1943, 
Curtin tipped off the media about her imminent visit.  After the press conference, 
F.T. Smith noted: “There’s a good chance of Mrs Roosevelt coming to Australia but 
the Government doesn’t want to say much about it.”66  By 19 August, two days 
before the election, Alexander scribbled in his diary: “Mrs Roosevelt coming to 
Australia ... expected very soon.  This is important in relation to Curtin [Curtin’s] 
election.  He doesn’t seem that excited about it.”67  Although Curtin appeared 
nonchalant in the press interview, private communications showed he deeply cared 
about the bilateral alliance.  The military partnership was promoted in Queensland 
election posters, which featured General MacArthur’s statement: “No nation is 
making a more supreme war effort than Australia.”68
 
  Behind the scenes, however, 
Curtin’s news tip about Eleanor Roosevelt’s upcoming visit strengthened his position 
as a prime minister seeking a second term in office.  Curtin’s promotion of his 
associations with Churchill and US leaders showed his adeptness in utilising 
international authority to his electoral and political advantage. 
  
                                                            
64 “American Legation letter”, p. 104. 
65 “American Legation letter”, pp. 104-105. 
66 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 158. 
67 Alexander, “Papers”, 19 August 1943. 
68 Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 167. 
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Governing with the media: cultivating press barons and baiting the opposition 
Curtin’s close relationships with ABC General Manager, Charles Moses, in 1943 
demonstrated the theories of news in an administered society and governmentality 
discussed in Chapter 2.69  Media executives, including Moses, worked with Curtin to 
act as “control agents”, contributing to “the construction of social order”.70  Wartime 
news was subject to “immense diffusion and consumption” in diverse forms and it 
was disseminated by the “apparatuses of education and information”, including the 
radio media.71  In January Curtin intervened in ABC management to recall Moses, 
who was away on military leave and serving as a lieutenant-colonel in Port Moresby.  
In a private letter to Moses, Curtin wrote: “I believe it is in the best interests of 
Australia and its fighting effort that you should now resume your work as General 
Manager of the A.B.C.”  He continued that the general manager conducted a 
“national job”, whose “work is of such significance” that it “should not be left 
indefinitely in the hands of an acting officer”.  Moses was asked to use his army 
experiences when broadcasting Australian war programs.72  One month later, Curtin 
sent a press statement to notify journalists that the army had released Moses to 
resume his ABC position.  The prime minister added Moses’ return would be “highly 
advantageous to the Commonwealth war effort”.73  Forty years later, Moses 
described Curtin’s letter as “a mandate from the prime minister … to provide some 
programs directed to the Army”.  Although Curtin had not directly criticised the 
radio broadcaster in his media release, “the government was concerned that the ABC 
needed stronger leadership”, Moses recalled.74
                                                            
69 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies In 
Governmentality: With Two Lectures By And An Interview With Michel Foucault, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991; Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and 
Janet B. L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organizations [hereafter 
Visualizing deviance], Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987. 
  Curtin had been complaining about a  
70 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 356. 
71 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power” [hereafter “Truth and power”], trans. Colin Gordon, 
Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980, p. 
131. 
72 John Curtin to Charles Moses, National Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], Canberra, 
CA 12, M1415, 237, 22 January 1943, p. 77. 
73 John Curtin, “Australian Broadcasting Commission – Lt-Col. C.J.A. Moses”, NAA, 
Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 237, 11 February 1943, p. 70. 
74 Moses, “Moses interview”. 
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lack of Australian radio content on the ABC.75
 
  In his oral history, Moses stated, 
“Australians were rather out a bit” because they were not producing specialised, local 
radio entertainment for the nation’s troops.  After Moses returned, he initiated a new 
“victory show”, known as “The Army Hour”, consisting of light entertainment for 
Australian troops and based on similar US broadcasts. 
 Curtin’s attempts to influence the ABC were not as direct as those made by 
the previous Menzies Government.  The day after Menzies’ declaration of war in 
1939, an army officer strode into ABC headquarters and said he was taking over the 
news services, Moses remembered.  “The army was told to get out of it and they 
retired”, he said.76  Also Menzies ordered radio commentator E.A. Mann (of the 
popular program “The Watchman”) not to criticise the government.77  Moses was 
proud of the ABC’s “high reputation” as well as its “fair and objective” reports.78  
During the election broadcasting, the head of ABC news, Michael Francis (Frank) 
Dixon, sent frequent staff memos about how “we should not touch the political 
campaign at all” and directed journalists to “keep all political propaganda out of your 
State news bulletins”.79  When Fadden’s publicity secretary asked ABC Canberra 
reporter, Warren Denning, whether a staff member would join the opposition election 
campaign, he was told “there would be no political coverage whatsoever”.  Yet 
Denning said an ABC journalist would accompany Curtin in case he announced “a 
vital war development or a national emergency”.  Dixon recounted the episode in a 
memo to the ABC’s Controller of Public Relations on 8 July and he noted Fadden’s 
publicity secretary “seemed satisfied with this explanation”.80
                                                            
75 Alan Thomas, “Cleary, William James (1885 – 1973)” [hereafter “The government and the 
ABC”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
  On the surface, the 
ABC appeared impartial, but it was really giving more free airtime to Curtin and this 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 8, 1981, pp. 
21-22, retrieved on 28 November 2009 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A080022b.htm?hilite=William%3BJames%3BCle
ary>. 
76 Moses, “Moses interview”. 
77 Thomas, “The government and the ABC”. 
78 Moses, “Moses interview”. 
79 M.F. Dixon, “Federal Election Campaign (Memorandum To All States For Information 
News Department)”, NAA, Canberra, CA251, SP286/16, 5, 9 July 1943, p. 80.  The archives 
contained Dixon’s similar memoranda sent on 14 July, 15 July, 20 July and 5 August 1943. 
80 M.F. Dixon to Controller Of Public Relations, “Mr. Fadden’s Tour”, NAA, Canberra, 
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seemed to be a shift from the broadcaster’s previously conservative attitudes.81
The Labor Government had to devote itself with unflagging industry, and 
often with heart-breaking pains, to re-shaping the country’s war machine in 
all its components because of … war with Japan.
  He 
took advantage of this opportunity on 26 July by giving a highly political, innovative 
and detailed speech on his party’s policy, the first one to be broadcast by a prime 
minister through a radio hook-up from Canberra.  In stark contrast to Dixon’s 
internal memos, Curtin told ABC listeners:  
82
Despite Dixon’s calls for objectivity, Curtin benefited from the ABC’s pro-
government stance. 
 
 
Curtin’s relations with the press barons were much more complex, as 
revealed in his correspondence.  Although Murdoch publicly disagreed with Labor 
ideology, a biographer recalled his “tolerance” and he repeatedly made the light-
hearted comment, “any young man ought to be a socialist, at least until the age of 
25”.83
It was kind of you to write to me and send your good wishes.  I had a lucky 
escape from serious injury as at the end of a family outing my horse carried 
me at a good pace under a tree.  I trust that your health is good.  We have 
reached about the same age – I find it one at which it must be recognised that 
some things must be left undone and that 30 minutes of ‘feet up’ is a good 
thing.
  His relations with Curtin were informally friendly at times.  Murdoch wrote a 
casual note on “The Herald Offices Melbourne” letterhead stationery in response to 
Curtin’s enquiry about his health after he was involved in a minor accident.  As 
Murdoch told Curtin: 
84
                                                            
81 Neville Petersen, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, & Politics 1932-1947, Hale & 
Iremonger, Sydney, 1993, p. 130. 
 
82 Curtin, “Election policy statement”.  Curtin reportedly talked for 55 minutes, according to 
The Age.  See (Anon.), “Unique Speech”, Age, 27 July 1943, p. 2.  The entire broadcast was 
described as two hours in duration.  See Black, In his own words, p. 226. 
83 The Herald & Weekly Times, Keith Murdoch: Journalist, The Herald & Weekly Times 
Ltd., Melbourne, 1952, p. 22. 
84 Keith Murdoch to Curtin, NAA, Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 237, 1943, pp. 141-142. 
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Although the note was undated, it was filed among letters that Curtin received in 
April 1943.  Murdoch’s bright, relaxed tone conveyed the two men enjoyed friendly 
relations outside of the political arena.  For example, Murdoch worked with Hugh 
Paton’s advertisers to help promote Curtin’s Third Liberty Loan before the election.  
According to Ryan, Paton was known to be the founder of the modern Australian 
advertising industry, who was responsible for promoting the government’s 
“Freedom” and “Liberty” loans during World War I.85  In a telegram sent to Curtin 
on 16 April, the Paton Advertising Service stated its client, Murdoch, had devoted all 
advertising to the government loan during the popular, live Sunday night radio 
theatre that was broadcast on 2GB.86
 
   
As the election drew closer, however, Murdoch became more publicly 
partisan, publishing Herald editorials that caused “considerable dissatisfaction” 
among the newspaper’s senior journalists, according to Alexander.  As he noted in 
his diary: 
They say the paper has made enemies everywhere.  What I fear is that the 
Government if it gets back will be vindictive and set out to injure him 
[Murdoch] in many ways.87
Alexander was predicting an ALP election victory in Victoria.  Other newspaper 
editors published Murdoch’s anti-Labor views
 
88 and this sometimes provoked a 
fierce response from Curtin’s supporters.89
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troops’ voyage to defend Australia in 1942; however, he published this editorial as 
Churchill was complaining about the “embarrassing and possibly dangerous 
disclosures”.90  Murdoch argued: “To have held Burma would have been to shorten 
the war against Japan by years and to save a multitude of fine lives.”91  His view did 
not seem to resonate with the Australian electorate, perhaps because the Japanese had 
overrun all of Burma by the end of 1942.  In a letter to the editor, Ena Creelman of 
Camperdown described Murdoch’s editorial as a “remarkable piece of verbosity” and 
“arm chair criticism”.  She wrote the AIF men would have died in Burma because 
they had not been adequately equipped; Curtin had privately acknowledged this 
concern to Alan Reid and other reporters in 1942.92  She added: “The fact that 
Murdoch seeks to pour scorn on the head of the Prime Minister, Curtin, has in 
reverse ratio the effect of enhancing the latter’s popularity.”93
 
  Her letter conveyed 
that Australian citizens knew about the AIF controversy through word of mouth and 
they admired Curtin for his decision.  Despite Alexander’s foreboding, Curtin did not 
retaliate against Murdoch media organisations. 
Media revelations of opposition divisiveness also boosted Curtin’s electoral 
prospects.  The Sun News-Pictorial’s new federal political journalist, Frank 
Chamberlain, broke the story with his headline, “Menzies attacks Fadden”, about a 
UAP meeting at Camberwell City Hall in Melbourne.  Before the meeting, Menzies 
distributed his speech text in the form of a media release, “which every newspaper 
accepted as gospel”, Chamberlain recalled.  As a result, no reporter heard Menzies’ 
speech except Chamberlain, who arrived incognito at the City Hall.  A police 
constable told Chamberlain that: “The only hope you’ve got of getting in is to call 
yourself a Young Nationalist.”  Therefore he pretended to be a patriotic UAP 
supporter and party organisers led him through the back door to the stage, where he 
was seated directly behind Menzies, who did not recognise the journalist.  After his 
formal speech, Menzies “leaned over the front of the platform and saw that the Press 
table was quite empty”, Chamberlain remembered.  Then Menzies put his speech 
                                                            
90 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 17 July 
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91 Murdoch, “Overseas policies”, p. 1. 
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notes aside and said: “Ladies and Gentlemen, fellow electors, I want to take you into 
my confidence and tell you what I really think about Arthur Fadden.”  Menzies then 
proceeded to denounce Fadden’s post-war credit scheme as “completely alien to 
everything that we stand for and … an outrageous confidence trick upon the 
Australian people”.94  Fadden proposed to return one-third of wartime taxation to 
taxpayers in instalments after the war.95  Chamberlain said: “I thought I was 
dreaming, as most of the veterans in the audience did.”  Menzies “politically 
undressed” Fadden “in such a vigorous way that it had to be heard to be believed”.  
The Sun News-Pictorial photographer took a picture of the empty press table and 
Menzies with his arm upraised as he spoke.  Chamberlain rushed to phone his office 
and give a news update.  When Fadden was told of the news, he reportedly 
exclaimed: “This is a typical Menzian stab in the back.”  Chamberlain said Menzies 
was interviewed by other journalists later and did not deny the article, 
acknowledging it was uncovered by a “bright young reporter”.  Also Chamberlain 
remembered his employer, Murdoch, shook his hand for the “outstanding scoop” and 
gave him a £100 bonus.  Murdoch added: “It’s a scoop I would have preferred not to 
have had politically.”  Furthermore, Curtin praised Chamberlain in a personal 
telegram as he wrote: “Thank you, the name Chamberlain rings a bell in Australian 
history.”  The prime minister’s truncated but glowing tribute became one of his 
“treasured possessions”, Chamberlain said.96  One year later, the Australian 
Journalists’ Association (AJA) discouraged members from using dishonest tactics 
such as those adopted by Chamberlain at Camberwell City Hall.  The AJA 
established a code of ethics in 1944 that required each member “[t]o use only fair and 
honest means to obtain news, pictures and documents” and “[a]lways to reveal his 
identity as a representative of the press before obtaining any personal interview for 
the purpose of using it for publication”.97
                                                            
94 Frank Chamberlain, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Chamberlain interview”], 
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  Chamberlain’s reminiscence was 
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on the night of 24 July.98
 
  A combination of factors – including Chamberlain’s 
cunning, Menzies’ media naivety and his disagreements with Fadden – helped tip 
public opinion towards Curtin. 
The Labor prime minister’s adept media management was further evidenced 
in his handling of the contentious, so-called “Brisbane Line” strategy.  According to 
historian Lloyd Ross, the political debate in mid-1943 centred on Australian General 
Iven Mackay’s private government memorandum, dated 4 February 1942, where he 
stated “the principles of Australian defence” were to concentrate troops in these 
“vital” areas: Melbourne; Brisbane, as the city was an “essential” US base; and 
Newcastle, Sydney, Port Kembla and Lithgow, New South Wales, the centre of black 
coal and steel production, manufacturing and Australia’s “best equipped naval 
base”.99  Mackay recommended withdrawing or excluding troops from Darwin, 
South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia and from all Queensland areas that 
were north of Brisbane.100  Curtin said the Labor government rejected Mackay’s 
advice in favour of defending the whole country.101  At a press interview on 17 
March 1943, MacArthur referred to the Brisbane line as a “defeatist conception” that 
he “instantly changed” to ensure the Allied forces fought the Japanese in nearby 
islands north of the Australian mainland.102
 
   
The Minister for Labour and National Service, Eddie Ward, increasingly 
accused the Menzies and Fadden administrations of having developing the “Brisbane 
Line”.103
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  As The Daily Telegraph correspondent, Don Whitington, recalled, Ward 
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Company of Australia, South Melbourne, 1977, p. 309. 
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Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, pp. 79-80. 
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the staff of a former Minister for the Army”.104  Menzies and Fadden strenuously 
denied Ward’s claims.105  Private cables indicated that Churchill was pressuring 
Fadden, when prime minister, to keep Australian troops in Tobruk before the war 
against Japan.  In a cable on 30 September 1941, Churchill wrote to Fadden, “we are 
entitled to count upon Australia to make every sacrifice necessary for the 
comradeship of the Empire”.106  The next year, Churchill told Curtin that he would 
not divert the “continuous stream” of British troops, travelling around the Cape of 
Good Hope, to defend Australia if Japan made “localized attacks in the north or ... 
mere raids elsewhere”.  Churchill sent this cable about two months after Japan’s 
bombing of Darwin, when US forces were in Australia.  He added that he would send 
these British forces to Australia if “eight or ten” Japanese divisions “heavily 
invaded” the country.107  His messages implied that the Commonwealth Government 
should be not too concerned over “mere raids”.  During a parliamentary debate on 24 
June 1943, Ward claimed a crucial document was missing that would have linked the 
“Brisbane Line” to the former government.  Curtin, however, denied there was a 
missing document and Ward was relieved of his ministerial duties while a royal 
commission was set up to investigate the allegations.108  On the same day, The Daily 
Telegraph cartoonist, William Mahony, directed criticism at Ward, rather than 
Curtin, for discussing private policy (see Figure 16).109  Curtin told reporters, “[the] 
fact remained that he inherited all these things”, referring to the government 
documents on the military strategy.110
  
  Yet Curtin also “found Ward useful in the 
                                                            
104 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 80.  Later Whitington did not reveal this anonymous 
source’s identity. 
105 Department of Foreign Affairs, “AWC minutes at JCPML”, 3 June 1943, pp. 7-8. 
106 Winston Churchill to A.W. Fadden, Australian Government Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade [hereafter “Foreign affairs department”], Barton, vol. 5, 30 September 
1941, retrieved on 7 January 2011 at 
<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView>. 
107 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, “Foreign affairs department”, 30 March 1942. 
108 Black, In his own words, p. 224. 
109 Figure 16 appeared in William Mahony, “We’ll Hang Out Our Washing On The – 
Brisbane Line”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 24 June 1943. 
110 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 154. 
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Figure 16 
Brisbane Line controversy” because it allowed him to stress his position to defend 
the whole of Australia.111
 
 
Curtin survived the opposition’s vote of no-confidence in the government on 
24 June, a censure really directed at Ward, and proposed an election.112  A Daily 
Telegraph cartoon conveyed the view that the “Brisbane Line” debate was 
motivating Curtin and Fadden in their campaigns (see Figure 17).113
                                                            
111 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 80. 
  During his 
112 Ross, A Curtin biography, p. 317. 
113 Figure 17 appeared in George Edmond Finey, “The Road Back”, The Daily Telegraph, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 25 June 1943. 
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Figure 17 
radio election policy speech on 26 July, however, Curtin made only one allusion to 
this controversy when he said: 
… the Labor Government … rejected the concept that the little islands to the 
north of Australia would be taken, that upper Queensland and the Darwin 
area would be over-run by the enemy.114
He used keywords about “defence”,
 
115 safety and security116 in his broadcast and 
concentrated on his administration’s “positive record”, telling listeners: “The Labor 
Government has kept you safe … It won security for you”.117  The next section will 
elaborate on his radio talk.  Many reporters seemed to cooperate with his strategy 
because Curtin’s speech appeared prominently in the four selected newspapers the 
next day and the “Brisbane Line” was not the main issue.118
                                                            
114 Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
  Only The West 
Australian editorial writer referred briefly to the strategy by describing the speech’s 
115 Curtin talked about “defence” ten times.  See Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
116 He used keywords about safety and military security eight times.  See Curtin, “Election 
policy statement”. 
117 See Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
118 The selected news coverage related to The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The West Australian issues on 27 July 1943. 
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“less commendable feature” as Curtin’s “unwarranted support” of Ward’s 
insinuations.119  Ward claimed parliamentary privilege and refused to answer the 
royal commission inquiry, which resulted in inconclusive findings.  Although most 
criticisms of Curtin on this issue centred on the delay in disciplining his minister, it 
was impossible to dismiss him because the caucus had elected Ward.120  Whitington 
recalled, “it is indisputable” that Curtin used “the Brisbane Line affair” to his 
“political advantage” and “helped Labor win a record number of seats in Queensland 
in the 1943 election”.121
 
  This indicates Curtin’s ability to divert most media 
attention to the defence messages that he wanted to promote. 
In Queensland, for example, The Courier-Mail published only ten stories that 
focused on the “Brisbane Line” between 1 May 1943 and 1 September 1943.122  An 
unnamed Courier-Mail editorial writer urged politicians to focus on present 
circumstances, stating: “The people are not interested in fighting the war of the past.  
They are interested in fighting only NOW.”123  The statement was highlighted in 
bold type.  In a signed editorial, Murdoch levelled criticisms mainly at Ward for 
inventing a “discreditable story” to smear his conservative opponents.124  By the end 
of July, this issue ceased to be a story in The Courier-Mail.  In the election, the ALP 
candidates representing Queensland won all three Senate seats, previously held by 
the conservatives, and they maintained six out of the state’s ten seats in the House of 
Representatives.125
                                                            
119 (Anon.), “Labour’s Stewardship”, West, 27 July 1943, p. 4. 
  This was Labor’s greatest victory in Queensland since 1914, 
when the party held 13 federal parliamentary seats representing the state.  
Afterwards, a Courier-Mail leader writer declared:  
120 Ross, A Curtin biography, p. 314. 
121 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 80. 
122 These stories appeared in the following Courier-Mail issues: 28 May 1943, p. 3; 29 May 
1943, p. 1; 2 June 1942, p. 4; 4 June 1943, p. 1; 9 June 1943, p. 2; 24 June 1943, p. 1; 6 July 
1943, p. 1; 15 July 1943, pp. 2-3; 21 July 1943, p. 3. 
123 (Anon.), “Editorial: Brisbane Battle”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 29 May 1943, p. 1. 
124 Keith Murdoch, “Discreditable Story Of The Brisbane Line”, The Courier-Mail, 
Brisbane, 9 June 1943, p. 2. 
125 Parliament of Australia, “Federal election results 1901-2007”, Parliamentary Library, 
Canberra, research paper no. 17, 2008-2009, retrieved on 6 January 2011 at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2008-09/09rp17.htm#statistical>. 
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As the campaign proceeded the Prime Minister addressed his argument more 
directly to the middle voter by curbing excesses of party propaganda, by 
dwelling on the nation’s war necessities, and by acknowledging merit in the 
previous war administration.126
The Labor caucus re-elected Ward to the ministry. 
   
127  During this controversy, 
Curtin initially allowed Ward to publicise attacks against conservative opponents, 
while he focused on positive messages about defence, national security and safety.  
Some media and political critics largely directed their censures against Ward, rather 
than Curtin, for making allegations that he could not prove to be correct.  Since 
Curtin had developed positive relationships with senior press gallery journalists, they 
were willing to cover more favourable news about his administration and did not 
dwell on the “Brisbane Line”.128
 
   
Along with benefiting from the media coverage of an Allied advance, Curtin 
generated favourable press comments on Australia’s jobs growth during his election 
campaign.  The nation had emerged from the Great Depression and achieved full 
employment as it sent military supplies to faraway Nazi battles.129  With the opening 
of the Pacific war theatre, Curtin accelerated weapons production at “breakneck 
speed”, according to The Sydney Morning Herald, creating more jobs.130  To gauge 
the national mood prior to the election, Alexander travelled to the prosperous NSW 
town of Wagga Wagga to interview the local newspaper’s managing editor.131
                                                            
126 (Anon), “Editorial: The Job Ahead Of Mr. Curtin”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 23 
August 1943, p. 2. 
  
Alexander referred to the town’s economic boom, partly attributed to the 
127 Black, In his own words, p. 224. 
128 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, acc. no. 00551, 2 
March 1971, transcript np; Tom Mead, Breaking The News: The events which changed life in 
Australia through the eyes of a man who worked at the front line of journalism and politics, 
Dolphin Books, Sydney, 1998, p. 55; Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 78-81. 
129 Bruce Scates, “Unemployment”, in Graeme Davison, John Hirst and Stuart Macintyre 
(eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian History, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2001, retrieved on 28 January 2009 at 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Mai
n&entry=t127.e1492>. 
130 (Anon.), “Labour [sic] Party Policy”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks, 27 July 1943. 
131 Alexander did not clearly identify the name of the Wagga Wagga newspaper editor in his 
diaries.  See Alexander, “Papers”, 10 August 1943. 
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establishment in 1940 of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Wagga, 
which included a flying training school and aircraft depot.  This town would be 
declared officially to be a city in 1946.  The local newspaper editor told Alexander, 
“the people benefiting by the flow of easy money will vote for the ALP” because the 
large towns “are going through a wartime boom and they are unlikely to want to vote 
out Father Christmas [a light-hearted name for Curtin]”.132  As Alexander toured 
rural areas, he noticed “the flow of wartime paper money” because of the nation’s 
full employment, and he forecast Labor’s election victory on 21 August.133  Sun 
cartoonist, Stuart Peterson, wryly portrayed Curtin’s vision of abundance.134
 
   
Figure 18 
Although more Australians had returned to work, they still faced the grim, everyday 
realities of war shortages, according to a Time correspondent who reported:  
The Australian lines up for an hour or more to get a haircut, another hour for 
a crude ‘austerity’ meal at a restaurant … It takes six weeks to get shoes 
soled, five months to get a watch repaired.  If an Australian is lucky he gets 
                                                            
132Alexander, “Papers”, 10 August 1943. 
133 Alexander, “Papers”, 11 August 1943. 
134 Figure 18 appeared in Stuart Peterson, “Today’s Peterson …. Price One Vote”, The Sun, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 5 July 1943. 
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four gallons of gasoline a month.  Horse racing and all sports have been 
curtailed … There are not enough houses, apartments or even hotel rooms.135
When the government removed restrictions on night street lights, Alexander 
attributed this to a heightened sense of international security.  He noted in his diary, 
“[t]he best proof of the improvement in the war position” was the government 
announcement that street lights would be restored except those facing seawards.
 
136  
Due to Australia’s enhanced security, the previous “brown-out” was lifted for areas 
from Rockhampton on the eastern coast to a point just south of Exmouth Gulf on the 
western coast.137  On 4 July, Alexander wrote: “The lights are shining again in 
Canberra … This is evidence that the Japanese threat has receded, never to come 
again in this war.”138  The Allied victories were the main reason for the newly 
restored night-time lights and it was fortuitous for the government that military 
successes preceded the election.  The timing of the electricity restoration and the 
journalists’ repetition of the government’s key message about “Australia’s improved 
position”139
 
 strengthened the ALP’s electoral prospects. 
 
The multimedia election 
Curtin’s victory was also a testament to the success of his campaign policy speech, 
delivered by a national radio hook-up to reach about 100 ABC and commercial 
broadcasting stations as well as short-wave transmissions.  It was the first time that 
any party leader had announced his policy from the nation’s capital.  The broadcast 
was scheduled between 8pm and 9pm on Monday night, with the text printed in three 
army dailies as well as the RAAF newspaper “to ensure the widest possible 
coverage”, a government media release stated.  The press bulletin also emphasised 
Curtin’s reputation as an innovative strategist, noting that he had been the first party 
leader to announce his policy from Western Australia, where his Fremantle electorate 
                                                            
135 (Anon.), “Curtin and Poll”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01222/11, 23 August 1943, p. 34. 
136 Alexander, “Papers”, 2 July 1943. 
137 (Anon.), “Brown-Out Lifted South Of Rockhampton”, Canberra, 3 July 1943, p. 2. 
138 Alexander, “Papers”, 4 July 1943. 
139 Alexander, “Papers”, 2 July 1943; (Anon.), “Brown-Out Lifted South Of Rockhampton”, 
Canberra, 3 July 1943, p. 2. 
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was located, in 1937 and 1940.140  Curtin made his campaign speech in the presence 
of only the Canberra radio studio officials and a few press gallery journalists.141  He 
spoke 149 words a minute, slightly faster than the recommended rate,142 probably 
resulting from the nervousness that he complained of several times before making 
the speech.143  Curtin emphasised his keywords of nationhood, the people and the 
government’s wartime responsibilities.144  He adopted a hopeful tone as he talked 
about national unity, freedom, the future and used a new term, “cooperation”.145  He 
used rhetorical techniques favoured by charismatic leaders such as describing a 
positive vision of the next years, increasing references to the future, and referring to 
group values, freedom and cooperation, to attain goals.146  This chapter has shown 
that Curtin used a longer, more detailed and complex script than in his earlier radio 
talks to describe the increased economic and military production under his 
government.  Yet his election policy broadcast was still aimed at an audience with a 
secondary school education, and registered as suitable for a twelfth-grade reading 
level.147  Afterwards he gave more one-hour national radio talks: they were held in 
the Melbourne Town Hall on Friday, 6 August from 8pm to 9pm, and in the 
Fremantle Town Hall on Wednesday, 18 August from 7.15pm to 8.15pm.148  In 
addition to government advertisements, which focused on his personal popularity in 
an unprecedented way, state and federal Labor politicians gave “an extensive 
schedule” of speaking engagements and radio broadcasts.149
                                                            
140 Australian Commonwealth Government, “Prime Minister’s Itinerary” [hereafter “Election 
speech itinerary”], NAA, Canberra, CA12, A461, R4/1/12, 1943, p. 117. 
 
141 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Was Nervous”, SMH, 27 July 1943, p. 6. 
142 According to the JCPML, the prepared statement was 8,196 words.  The Age 
correspondent noted during the broadcast, “several unimportant deletions were made, but 
Mr. Curtin also made two additions”.  The reported additions were two brief phrases that 
encouraged voters to choose the ALP.  The Age journalist also wrote: “He read his speech in 
55 minutes.”  See (Anon.), “Unique Speech”, Age, 27 July 1943, p. 2; Curtin, “Election 
policy statement”. 
143 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Was Nervous”, SMH, 27 July 1943, p. 6. 
144 Nationhood keywords were used 22 times.  He also talked about “the people”, “we” and 
“us” 36 times.  Furthermore, he spoke about “duty” and “responsibility” four times and 
referred twice to “tradition”.  See Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
145 Curtin referred five times to Australia’s future; three times to cooperation; twice to 
freedom; and once to national unity.  See Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
146 Vivianne Seyranian and Michelle C. Bligh, “Presidential charismatic leadership: 
Exploring the rhetoric of social change”, The Leadership Quarterly, vol. 19, 2008, p. 67. 
147 The Flesch Reading Ease score was 40.3. 
148 Australian Commonwealth Government, “Election speech itinerary”, p. 117. 
149 Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 167. 
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Newsreels indicated that Curtin strove to appeal to mainstream voters; also he 
attracted support from the left and the right of the political spectrums.  Echoing the 
same words that the politically conservative Joseph Alexander had written in his 
diary, Communist Party film narrator, Max Julius, told cinema audiences: “The 
Curtin Government has done a splendid job.”150  The party had changed its tone 
remarkably since the beginning of the war, when communists were hostile towards 
both Menzies and Curtin.  They had denounced Australia’s role in the war against 
Germany, causing Menzies to ban the organisation’s activities in 1940.  By late 
1942, however, communists had joined the Allied cause and Curtin removed the ban 
on their party.151  In a variety of newsreels,152  close-up, eye-level images portrayed 
Curtin as an honest, hard-working war leader who was working “to keep [Australia] 
free”.153  Along with preparing for his direct-to-camera, election advertisements, 
Curtin rehearsed for a staged scene that was set up to look like a press conference.  
Cinema audiences watched him say, “the truth is if we do not strip ourselves to save 
for our country, the enemy will do it for us with ruthless efficiency, imposing upon 
us a maximum of misery”.  The filmmakers created the appearance of a factual news 
report as they showed eye-level images of the prime minister moving his head from 
side to side to speak to an assumed group of people, not pictured in the scene.154
                                                            
150 Communist Party of Australia (producer), Everything for the Victory of Democracy 
(newsreel) [hereafter Victory], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00242/1, 1943.  The same 
tribute, “Curtin has done a splendid job”, was written by Joseph Alexander.  See Alexander, 
“Papers”, 11 December 1941. 
  In 
fact, the unedited version showed the director tried medium and close-up shots while 
Curtin adopted a variety of speaking postures during “take three” of this scene.  
These moving images were finally screened as medium shots to show Curtin seated 
at a table, leaning forward, and to convey a personal relationship between him and 
his assumed audience, possibly reporters.  A narrator informed filmgoers, “the 
position is tense and the Prime Minister minces no words” and then the scene cut to 
151 David Black, “Menzies and Curtin in World War Two: A comparative essay”, [hereafter 
“Menzies and Curtin”], JCPML, Bentley, 2006, retrieved on 10 May 2008 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/ww2leaders>. 
152 Australian Labor Party (producer), The Man Of The Hour (newsreel) [hereafter Man of 
the hour], Australia, 1943; Cinesound Review (producer) “This Is Vital To You!”, in 
Compiled Speeches Of John Curtin (newsreels), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00130/1, 
1943; Communist Party of Australia, Victory. 
153 Australian Labor Party, Man of the hour. 
154 Cinesound Review and Movietone News (producers), “Two Years … Dec. 7 1941-1943”, 
in John Joseph Curtin 1885-1945, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 1943. 
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Curtin to create a sense of urgency.  Although the evidence suggests that he 
rehearsed meticulously to create the desired effect of seemingly spontaneous film 
scenes, the audience was unaware of the practice shots.155  Differing from the strong 
film focus on Curtin, there is an absence of preserved footage about Fadden and 
Menzies during the 1943 election.156
 
 
 Through his skilful use of the media and his wartime leadership, Curtin 
achieved the best federal election victory for the ALP at the time.  He won 66.9 per 
cent of the vote in his Fremantle electorate on 21 August.  Labor achieved substantial 
gains in NSW, South Australia and WA, along with gains in Tasmania and Victoria.  
The ALP won 49 of the 74 House of Representatives seats.  In the Senate, the ALP 
won all of the contested seats and increased its representation to 22 out of a total of 
36 members.157
You wear the best suit that you can buy and never come out here [to the 
electorate’s industrial area of Goulburn] without your shoes properly polished 
and the heels properly done, and yourself looking absolutely the best that you 
can look, because you’re our member and we want to be proud of you. 
  Due to the NSW “enormous swing” to the left, the new Labor 
candidate Allan Fraser – who had left his position as The Daily Mirror Canberra 
chief political correspondent to contest the election – won the “bellwether” seat of 
Eden-Monaro and held it for 23 years.  Fraser partly attributed his success to 
following a Labor branch secretary’s advice and adopting Curtin’s serious, 
conservative dress style.  This branch secretary, Bill Beasley, told Fraser:  
Fraser noticed that after the local railway men finished a day’s work, “once they 
were in their own time, they dressed magnificently, and they took great pride in their 
appearance”.  As soon as he was elected, Fraser began a weekly radio talk on 
                                                            
155 ScreenSound Australia, Parliament in Session (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00876/4, 1944. 
156 National Film and Sound Archive, “Prime Ministers of Australia” (fact sheets on Sir 
Arthur William Fadden and Sir Robert Gordon Menzies), Acton, 2008, retrieved on 29 
November 2009 at 
<http://www.nfsa.gov.au/the_collection/collection_spotlights/apms/index.html>. 
157 Black, “The election campaign”; Lesley Carman-Brown, “Parliamentary Power”, JCPML, 
Bentley, 2004, retrieved on 28 January 2009 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/aspirations/parliament.html>; Oliver, Unity is strength, pp. 167-
169. 
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Canberra station 2CA, broadcasting his views and available times to meet 
constituents.158
 
   
The election result was also unique in bringing the first female politician to 
each House.  Labor’s Dorothy Tangney of WA became the first woman senator, 
while Dame Enid Lyons, wife of the late Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, won the 
Tasmanian seat of Darwin.159  Curtin had pitched his radio policy speech to female 
voters when he talked about Labor initiatives towards “the betterment of the status of 
women” such as increasing maternity allowances, widow’s pensions and crèches for 
working mothers.160  When he visited the WA suburb of South Perth a few days 
before the election, Curtin “was given an excellent hearing by about 300 women” 
who “keenly questioned” him.161
 
  While a number of factors, such as divisiveness in 
the UAP-Country Party alliance and the “Brisbane Line” revelations played into 
Labor’s hands, Curtin’s media strategies – from his inclusive, public addresses to his 
choice of clothes – had influenced other ALP politicians to adopt similar techniques 
and contributed to the outstanding victory. 
This study conducted a limited content analysis of the selected four 
newspapers’ coverage of Curtin’s election policy speech to gauge whether journalists 
promoted his key messages.  The text of his radio broadcast was substantially 
reprinted in The Age,162 The Canberra Times,163 The Sydney Morning Herald164 and 
The West Australian.165
                                                            
158 Allan Fraser, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Fraser interview”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00550, August 1972-January 1973, transcript np. 
  In his newspaper, The Age editor, Oswald Syme, repeated 
Curtin’s quotation of one of his positive editorials.  During the radio talk, Curtin 
said: “In the words of the ‘Age’ newspaper, ‘it is a matter for gratitude that in virile, 
159 Black, In his own words, p. 228; Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 168. 
160 Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
161 (Anon.), “Women Questioners”, SMH, 18 August 1943, p. 9. 
162 (Anon.), “War And Peace Policy: Aims Of Labor Party Reviewed”, Age, 27 July 1943, p. 
3.  Curtin’s speech was reprinted in three broadsheet columns. 
163 (Anon.), “Bold Postwar Development of National Resources”, Canberra, 27 July 1943, p. 
2.  One hundred sentences of the speech appeared as direct quotations. 
164 (Anon.), “War-Time Record Emphasised”, SMH, 27 July 1943, p. 4.  Curtin’s address 
was reprinted on pages four, five and six. 
165 (Anon.), “Federal Elections”, West, 27 July 1943, p. 4.  The speech coverage expanded to 
three columns in the broadsheet newspaper. 
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statesmanlike form, national leadership is being provided’”.166  The same tribute 
appeared in the next day’s issue of The Age.167  The radio talk was framed as a 
serious, factual and prominent news report in all four metropolitan dailies.  Curtin’s 
stature was enhanced by the front-page news of the day, which included reports of 
the resignation of Italian Fascist Party dictator, Benito Mussolini, the news of 
“frantic Axis” troops fleeing Sicily, as well as the announcement of the heaviest 
bomb load ever carried by a striking force in the southern Pacific, with more than 
186 tonnes of bombs dropped by Allied aircraft onto Japanese defences at Munda, 
New Georgia.168  In a related leader, The Canberra Times editor, Arthur 
Shakespeare, endorsed Curtin’s re-election.  The editorial writer stated he was 
“entitled to undeniable credit” for national war victories and he had outlined “a great 
vision of post-war Australia”.  Also Curtin was praised for his “personal honesty”, 
his successful “counsels”, “word pictures” and “vigorous policy of Australian 
welfare after the war”.169  His appeals to a hopeful future were made frequently in 
The Canberra Times coverage.170  The other three newspaper editorials were 
calculated to be neutral.171  While this group of editors praised Curtin’s “creditable 
record of achievement”, they criticised his “unjust” disparagements of the previous 
conservative administrations and called for him to make “a pledge that socialism will 
not be enforced for any reason while the war continues”.172  Early in the campaign, 
Curtin insisted that socialism was a “dead tiger” and that “we have not socialised 
Australia, and we do not intend to do it just because we are at war”.173  Black wrote: 
“Three days before the election he [Curtin] reaffirmed this commitment.”174
                                                            
166 Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
  During 
Curtin’s nationwide radio broadcast at the Fremantle Town Hall on 18 August, he 
167 (Anon.), “War And Peace Policy: Aims Of Labor Party Reviewed”, Age, 27 July 1943, p. 
3. 
168 The Canberra Times, Canberra, 27 July 1943, p. 1.  Similar international news appeared 
in The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian on the same day. 
169 (Anon.), “Labour’s [sic] Vision of Australia’, Canberra, 27 July 1943, p. 2. 
170 Curtin used “hope” and “future” keywords 20 times; these terms were repeated 14 times 
in The Canberra Times.  See (Anon.), “Bold Postwar Development of National Resources”, 
Canberra , 27 July 1943, p. 2; (Anon.), “Labour’s [sic] Vision of Australia’, Canberra, 27 
July 1943, p. 2; Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
171 (Anon.), “Labour [sic] Party Policy”, SMH, 27 July 1943, p. 4; (Anon.), “Labour’s [sic] 
Record and Aims”, Age, 27 July 1943, p. 2; (Anon.), “Labour’s [sic] Stewardship”, West, 27 
July 1943, p. 4. 
172 (Anon.), “Labour [sic] Party Policy”, SMH, 27 July 1943, p. 4. 
173 Curtin, DDA, no. 61, 23 July 1943, pp. 28-29, cited in Black, In his own words, p. 227. 
174 Black, In his own words, p. 227. 
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said his government would not socialise any industry during the war and “the Labor 
Party had no affiliation with the Communist party”.175  His rhetoric was published in 
The Sydney Morning Herald the next day, assisting him to increase editorial 
support.176  On the eve of the election, Alexander wrote in his diary: “The most 
interesting feature of the last day of the campaign is the Sydney Morning Herald’s 
strong summing up against the opposition.  It has given the Government strong 
support.”177
 
  When the news coverage – including the editorial leaders and speech 
reports – was measured together, the ultimate result was a positive outcome for 
Curtin.  During the campaign, he kept refining his messages to appeal to the political 
centre. 
Curtin’s “extraordinary”178 press rapport might have persuaded traditionally 
anti-Labor journalists to support him electorally.  One of Perth’s Sunday Times 
publishers, Victor Courtney, was a former Nationalist state political candidate, who 
was also Curtin’s friend.  With his Sunday Times co-publisher, John J. Simons, a 
previous Labor candidate, Courtney approved favourable news about Curtin in his 
newspaper in 1943.179
                                                            
175 Black, In his own words, pp. 227-228; Heather Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man” for 
18 August 1943, JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 2 December 2009 at 
<
  Moreover, Sydney’s Daily Telegraph wartime correspondent, 
Edgar Holt, recalled his “tremendous admiration for Curtin” influenced him to vote 
for Labor in 1943.  In his oral history, Holt said he appreciated the two-way 
conversations at the frequent prime ministerial briefings, where he was impressed by 
http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1943.html>. 
176 (Anon.), “Labour’s Work Upheld”, SMH, 19 August 1943, p. 4; Black, In his own words, 
p. 228. 
177 Alexander, “Papers”, 20 August 1943.  Also see (Anon.), “The Opposition And Its 
Prospects”, SMH, 20 August 1943, p. 4. 
178 Edgar George Holt, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Holt interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01059, 23 May 1978, transcript np. 
179 As Chapter 3 discussed, John J. Simons and Curtin had been anti-conscription activists 
and prominent members of the WA Labor movement during World War I.  See Donald 
Grant, “Smith, James MacCallum (1868 – 1939)” [hereafter “James McCallum Smith”], 
Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 651-
652, retrieved on 21 January 2008 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A110671b.htm>; Lyall Hunt, “Simons, John 
Joseph (Jack) (1882 – 1948)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Melbourne University 
Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 608-609, retrieved on 22 January 2009 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A110624b.htm>; Norman E. Lee, John Curtin: 
Saviour of Australia, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 129. 
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Curtin’s “poise”, “calmness” and “patience” immediately before the Battle of the 
Coral Sea.  Moreover, Curtin used their mutual interest in literature to develop a 
positive relationship with Holt, who was a published poet.  On a lunch break during 
the campaign, Rodgers approached Holt to say that Curtin had invited The Daily 
Telegraph correspondent to talk about poetry.  Holt agreed to sit down with Curtin, 
Rodgers and a government chauffeur at a Sydney club.  He said:  
… Don and the driver had nothing to say, they knew what it was all about, 
and Curtin began to talk about Australian poets and poetry, and we did this 
probably for an hour.  There was not one word of politics, and at the end of it 
Curtin said ‘Well, thank you very much, Edgar.  I enjoyed that,’ and he got 
up and went away. 180
Afterwards Rodgers explained to Holt that the prime minister liked to relax by 
discussing Australian literature.  Holt recalled that this episode “made me realise 
what an unusual character he was as a politician”.  Previous prime ministers did not 
normally engage in one-hour talks with a journalist about poetry.  Curtin did not 
deliberately “set out to charm people”, but he was able to develop a warm rapport 
with reporters on the sideline of the election campaign.  Holt said as a result, he 
became “quite strong as a private citizen, private individual, in support of the Labor 
Party during the period of John Curtin.” 
 
181
 
  His friendships with Courtney and Holt 
suggested his ability to appeal to newsmen, who had not been traditional Labor 
supporters, by investing time to discuss their mutual interests and listen to their 
views. 
Similarly to Churchill and Roosevelt, Curtin experienced some media 
criticisms of his election policy speech.  In an undated letter to Churchill, FDR wrote 
his news coverage was generally “not so bad” but acknowledged both leaders were 
“menaced” by “a handful or two of gentlemen who cannot get politics out of their 
heads in the worst crisis”.182
                                                            
180 Holt, “Holt interview”. 
  In Australia, Murdoch and Packer influenced 
journalists to write positive reports about the opposition coalition.  Such senior 
Canberra correspondents as Alexander and The Daily Telegraph’s Don Whitington 
181 Holt, “Holt interview”. 
182 Roosevelt, cited in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1950, p. 200. 
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did not agree with their employers.183  While press proprietors welcomed Curtin’s 
appointment as the prime minister, negative editorials about his election campaign 
appeared in some newspapers.184  A few positive statements appeared in The Sun,185 
Frank Packer’s Daily Telegraph186 and Norton’s The Daily Mirror when an editorial 
writer declared: “This Labor Government can claim credit for a great many 
achievements, chief of which is Australia’s present comparative security”.187  Yet 
these press owners also emphasised their fears of communism and industrial anarchy.  
Immediately after the election, however, they recognised Curtin’s “prestige”.  In The 
Daily Telegraph, Whitington reported: “The Government’s sweeping victory at the 
polls was a vote of confidence in John Curtin”.188  A cartoonist conveyed him as a 
true victor in the Bulletin (see Figure 19).189  Also Stuart Petersen portrayed him as a 
heroic leader in a Sun cartoon (see Figure 20).190  Moreover, the election stirred US 
interest, with a Time Magazine journalist writing that “Honest John” had a 78 per 
cent approval rating in Australian public opinion polls.191
 
  Curtin did not retaliate 
against his press critics and Packer held his Allied Works Council position.  The 
Packer and Murdoch challenges were surmounted by Curtin’s extraordinary rapport 
with the ABC’s Moses, his positive radio coverage, his emphatic newsreel 
appearances and his ability to win the trust of senior journalists and other press 
owners. 
  
                                                            
183 Alexander, “Papers”, 21 August 1943; Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 88-89. 
184 Negative editorials appeared in the following newspaper issues on 27 July 1943: The 
Advertiser, The Argus, The Courier-Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Herald, The Mercury, The 
Sun and The Sun News-Pictorial, cited in Scrapbooks. 
185 (Anon.), “Curtin’s Two Voices”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 27 July 1943. 
186  (Anon.), “Who Will Be Labor’s Boss?”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited in 
Scrapbooks, 27 July 1943. 
187 (Anon.), “Some Things Mr. Curtin Did Not Say”, The Daily Mirror, Sydney, cited in 
Scrapbooks, 27 July 1943. 
188 Don Whitington, “Election Won On Curtin’s Prestige”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 
cited in Scrapbooks, 23 August 1943. 
189 Figure 19 appeared in (Anon.), “Knockout Scene From The Sensation Film Serial ‘Alone 
We Did It.’”, [cartoonist unknown], The Bulletin, cited in Scrapbooks, 23 June 1943. 
190 Figure 20 appeared in Stuart Peterson, “Today’s Peterson …. Key Of Destiny”, The Sun, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 24 August 1943. 
191 (Anon.), “Curtin and Poll”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01222/11, 23 August 1943, p. 34; (Anon.), “Curtin Up”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 01222/12, 30 August 1943, p. 28. 
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Figure 19 (above) and Figure 20 (below) 
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Curtin’s “global public sphere” 
After his decisive win, all of the major press proprietors cooperated with Curtin to 
portray him as an international statesman.  Due to his comfortable electoral margin, 
he was able to spend more time on foreign policy and give less attention to domestic 
issues.  In September, Eleanor Roosevelt’s visit to Canberra attracted media 
attention, including newsreel coverage of her address to parliamentarians.  In a close-
up shot, Curtin toasted her at a formal function, telling her:  
You have in Australia won a place, not only a place that causes us to admire 
you, but we have … formed an affection for you that I’m quite sure 
symbolises the real nature of the links that exist between Australia and the 
United States of America.192
Eleanor Roosevelt explained to the dignitaries – and cinema audiences – that she 
wanted: 
 
… to learn as much as I can of the work which your women have been doing 
in the war effort so that I may take home that knowledge and it may inspire 
our women in the United States.193
She described Australians and Americans as a “united people” and predicted “[m]any 
people will cross between our two countries”.  Although Curtin invited former Prime 
Minister Hughes to address the function as the UAP’s representative, the cameras 
turned away from the elder statesman to pan across the other guests during his brief 
speech.
 
194  These film techniques ensured the cinema audiences would not hear some 
of Hughes’ remarks that might have embarrassed Eleanor Roosevelt.  When talking 
of Australian-US relations, for example, he said: “Our beginnings were obscure; and 
some of us, perhaps, consider that they ought to remain in obscurity.”195
                                                            
192 ScreenSound Australia, Mrs Roosevelt’s Visit To Canberra, 1943 (newsreel) [hereafter 
Eleanor Roosevelt], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01049/1, 1943. 
  He told the 
guest of honour: “The Press has said that your coming here has no political 
193 ScreenSound Australia, Eleanor Roosevelt. 
194 ScreenSound Australia, Eleanor Roosevelt. 
195 William Morris Hughes, cited in Commonwealth Government, “Mrs. F.D. Roosevelt – 
Speeches At Official Welcome” [hereafter “Official welcome”], DDA, Canberra, no. 63, 4 
September 1943, p. 42. 
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significance.  A more utterly banal observation than that, I cannot conceive.”196  His 
comment did not accord with the media’s positive coverage of Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
Australian trip between 3 and 13 September; press photographers conveyed that 
Curtin developed a friendship with her.197
 
 
Figure 21 
After the election, he provided more confidential briefings to persuade 
journalists to support his foreign policy views.  On 6 September, F.T. Smith privately 
wrote that Curtin passed on a transcript of British Deputy Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden’s “[o]ff-the-record talk” to the press gallery.  In the transcript, Eden indicated 
the major Allied powers would refer to other UN members before reaching final 
decisions. 198
                                                            
196 Hughes, cited in Commonwealth Government, “Official welcome”, p. 43. 
  Eden’s statement helped to vindicate Curtin’s continued insistence that 
197 Figure 21 appeared in (Anon.), “Curtin and the guest of honor”, The Sun, Sydney, 5 
September 1943; similarly positive photographs appeared in The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 
on 4 and 5 September 1943, cited in Scrapbooks. 
198 Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 171. 
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Australia should participate in more Allied war planning.199  By November he was 
urging press editors to increase publicity of Australian forces in New Guinea.200
Many of the papers did not even publicise his communiques.  However, they 
gave great prominence to the reports of War Correspondents, who mostly 
gathered their information from talkative members of messes and who were 
not in a position to see the full picture.  The consequence was that the 
despatches did not present the operations in their right perspective.
  
About the same time, MacArthur privately complained about “the general attitude of 
the Australian press”.  Editors “sought to cry down the importance of the operations 
in the Southwest Pacific Area”, MacArthur asserted to Curtin privately.  The AWC 
minutes summarised MacArthur’s grievance: 
201
Curtin also initiated new media strategies to promote Australia’s role in Europe as he 
increased the RAAF’s public relations team in the United Kingdom from three 
employees to nine staff members.  He arranged with the UK Ministry of Information 
to produce a film about RAAF activities in Britain.
 
202  The Melbourne Herald 
pictured him at a civic reception to welcome four correspondents representing 
newspapers across Canada including Ontario, Quebec and Winnipeg (see Figure 
22).203  In a Department of Information newsreel, popular cameraman Damien Parer 
talked about the 3rd Australian Divison’s “bitterly contested battles” in the jungle of 
Salamaua, New Guinea, which fell to Allied control on 11 September.  Parer was 
filmed in a close-up shot as he said: “If these pictures can convey to you even a 
vague idea of their sacrifice … then the little that I’ve been able to do is more than 
worthwhile.”204
                                                            
199 Frederick Geoffrey Shedden, “Advisory War Council Minutes, Records of Frederick 
Shedden”, JCPML, Bentley, vol. 3, JCPML acc. no. 00928/4, 9 December 1941, p. 3. 
  Internationally recognised for his cinematography, Parer  
200 “Advisory War Council minutes” [hereafter “AWC Minutes at NAA”], NAA, Canberra, 
series no. A5954, control symbol 815/1, 25 November 1943, p. 4. 
201 “AWC minutes at NAA”, 9 December 1943, p. 5. 
202 “AWC minutes at NAA”, 14 October 1943, p. 3. 
203 Figure 22 appeared in (Anon.), “Press Visitors From Canada”, The Herald, Melbourne, 
cited in Scrapbooks, 15 November 1943. 
204 Department of Information (producer), “Assault On Salamaua”, in At The Front: 1939-
1945: Australia’s WWII Newsreels (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00441/2, 
1943. 
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Figure 22 
considerably aided Curtin’s efforts to boost Australian morale.  Thus after the 
election, Curtin increasingly developed initiatives in giving off-the-record press 
talks, promoting Australia to overseas media, attracting international correspondents 
to visit him and screening films about military victories. 
 
On 14 December, as the nation looked forward to a fresh Allied offensive, 
newspaper journalists endorsed Curtin’s proposals for greater British Commonwealth 
collaboration.205
                                                            
205 Curtin, “State of the war”, pp. 31-36.  His address received positive news treatment in The 
Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian, cited in 
Scrapbooks, 15 December 1943. 
  Several days earlier, he had announced a new phase of Australia’s 
war effort.  “The defensive stage, he says, has been passed”, The Courier-Mail editor 
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writer recounted.  “Now we are moving to the offensive.”206  Curtin made his 
international speech at the Labor Party’s federal conference in Canberra.  He 
emphasised the terms of peace and security along with familiar keywords about 
cooperation and a new world order as Australians recognised that the bomb threats 
were receding.207  As a result, he adopted a far more optimistic tone than in his 
parliamentary address on 11 February 1943, analysed earlier, with his increased 
references to freedom, liberty, ideals and independence.208  Since he was addressing 
his colleagues, the speech was more complex than his radio talks and registered as 
suitable for a thirteenth-grade reading level.209  The next day’s press coverage was 
positive in the four selected dailies.  The event was turned into front-page news in 
The Age210 and The Sydney Morning Herald,211 with the speech substantially 
reproduced inside the papers.  Curtin received three separate ovations at the ALP 
conference, according to The Sydney Morning Herald.212  His key messages and 
terms were also repeated in The Canberra Times213 and The West Australian.214
  
  
Among this newspaper sample, only one journalist referred to a negative aspect of 
                                                            
206 (Anon.), “From Defence To Offence”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in Scrapbooks, 
6 December 1943. 
207 In his address, Curtin referred 25 times to “peace” and “security”; 27 times to 
“cooperation”; and 14 times to a “new world order”.  See Curtin, “State of the war”,  
pp. 31-36. 
208 These keywords were mentioned 25 times in the address.  See Curtin, “State of the war”, 
pp. 31-36. 
209 The Flesch Reading Ease score was 36.9. 
210 The address was featured on page one and again in two full columns on the third page.  
(Anon.), “Australia’s Policy In The Pacific: Prime Minister Advocates Regional Co-
Operation”, Age, 15 December 1943, p. 3; (Anon.), “International & Empire Relations: Mr. 
Curtin’s Plan For Post-War Years”, Age, 15 December 1943, p. 1. 
211 Curtin’s speech was promoted on the front cover, the leader page and then was allocated 
four entire columns on pages seven and eight.  (Anon.), “Australia’s Place In A New 
World”, SMH, 15 December 1943, p. 6; (Anon.), “Australia’s Place In Peace Plan”, SMH, 15 
December 1943, pp.7-8. 
212 (Anon.), “Australia’s Place In Peace Plan”, SMH, 15 December 1943, p. 8. 
213 In the news coverage, 59 sentences of Curtin’s speech were repeated as direct quotations.  
(Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Calls For Peace-Treaty-Making Powers in Labour Platform”, 
Canberra, 15 December 1943, p. 2. 
214 One and a half columns were allocated to the speech coverage.  (Anon.), “Organising The 
Peace”, West, 15 December 1943, p. 3. 
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the event.  A small subhead in The Age was “Press Excluded”.  As the writer 
explained, delegates spent an hour debating a motion to admit journalists to the 
conference.  Although Curtin supported the motion, it was defeated by a large 
majority.215  As a result, the reporters were forced to rely on the prepared statement, 
but it did not seem to detract from Curtin’s reputation.  Even Murdoch’s Courier-
Mail featured the editorial headline, “Mr. Curtin’s Best Speech”, about the event.216
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Through Curtin’s leadership, Australians were looking forward to securing a pivotal 
position in the post-war world.  He increasingly promoted a shared sense of 
Australian nationhood in his media messages, which resembled Berlin’s views of 
liberty as being “freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by 
others”.217 Thus Curtin was able to transcend political partisanship and bridge the 
traditional divide between the left and right of the political spectrums.  Rhetorically 
he used an emotional speaking style, emphatic hand gestures such as striking a 
parliamentary table with his fist, and appeared to adopt the Churchillian “loaded 
pause” when he anticipated interjections and rebutted them with a well-timed, poetic 
comeback.  Curtin’s warm appeals to his friends and his derision of “mischief-
makers”218
                                                            
215 (Anon.), “Press Excluded”, Age, 15 December 1943, p. 3. 
 continued to resemble Roosevelt’s “fireside chats”.  These oratory 
techniques were particularly evident in the newspaper coverage of Curtin’s speech on 
the Militia Bill on 11 February.  As a result, he received positive press treatment in 
the four selected newspapers: The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning 
Herald and The West Australian.  To consolidate support for this Bill, he promoted 
an image of international unity with Churchill, MacArthur and Franklin Delano and 
Eleanor Roosevelt.  As Churchill protested conservative politicians’ “embarrassing 
216 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Best Speech”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, cited in Scrapbooks, 
16 December 1943. 
217 Berlin, “Liberty”, p. 1vi. 
218 Curtin, “Militia Bill speech”, pp. 592-596. 
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and possibly dangerous disclosures”,219
 
 Curtin distributed this statement to 
journalists to show that the British prime minister was backing him.  These Allied 
relations enhanced his stature as an international statesman leading to the election. 
Film and radio coverage were beginning to show signs they might eclipse the 
power of the press.  As Curtin had cultivated a friendly relationship with ABC 
General Manager Charles Moses, the national radio news was generally pro-
government in 1943.  The cooperation between the federal administration and ABC 
reporters was illustrative of the theories of governmentality and news in an 
administered society.  Furthermore by unobtrusively filming Curtin’s public 
addresses, newsreel companies cleverly created the semblance of factual, 
straightforward news reports.  He was often portrayed in close-up, eye-level shots 
that emphasised his image as “Honest John”.220
 
  The favourable broadcasts might 
have influenced voters more than the editorial criticisms appearing in some 
newspapers. 
Yet he strengthened his press relationships by providing newspaper 
correspondents with more tips about his close Allied communications, including 
Eleanor Roosevelt’s imminent visit and British secret cables.  Fortunately for Curtin, 
the press gallery reporters honoured the verbal confidentiality agreements and he did 
not provoke the other Allied leaders’ wrath.  Private correspondence showed that he 
enjoyed an informally friendly relationship with Murdoch at times.  He turned the 
“Brisbane Line” controversy to his positive advantage as ALP Minister Ward 
criticised the former government for neglecting less populated communities while he 
focused on his “positive record” of safeguarding national security.221
                                                            
219 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 17 July 
1943, p. 6. 
  Critics, such as 
Murdoch, mainly targeted Ward and Curtin diverted much media attention to his 
central messages.  Although he rejected the all-party national government advocated 
220 (Anon.), “Curtin and Poll”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01222/11, 23 August 1943, p. 34; (Anon.), “Curtin Up”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 01222/12, 30 August 1943, p. 28. 
221 Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
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by Murdoch, Curtin’s professional relations with the publisher survived the political 
turmoil. 
 
The press reproduced Curtin’s inclusive language.  His innovative campaign 
policy broadcast, directed to “men and women of Australia”,222 was substantially 
repeated positively in The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald 
and The West Australian.  This chapter’s study sample of Curtin’s speeches indicated 
he spoke slightly faster and used more complex scripts than in his earlier radio talks.  
Yet his election policy broadcast was still accessible and registered as suitable for a 
twelfth-grade audience.  This more detailed speech, with his discussions of economic 
policies, strengthened his media reputation as a candid communicator.  During the 
campaign, he publicly distanced himself from the Communist Party and attracted 
more support from mainstream news editors willing to replicate his new key terms of 
cooperation, peace and security, which he began emphasising in 1943.  After the 
election, Packer approvingly published the news that voters were attracted to 
Curtin’s “prestige”.223
 
  Other ALP candidates, such as Allan Fraser, adopted Curtin’s 
media techniques, including regular radio talks, and credited this to their electoral 
success.  Certainly the news companies were not monolithic and due to his skilful 
press rapport with journalists in private meetings, Curtin consolidated support from 
such normally conservative senior reporters as Joseph Alexander of Murdoch’s 
Herald and Edgar Holt of Packer’s Daily Telegraph.   
After the election, journalists readily portrayed his diplomatic efforts to reach 
out to Allied leaders and the global media.  He expanded the Australian air force’s 
public relations unit in the UK to promote their role in the war against Germany.  In 
the Pacific, the celebrated cameraman, Damien Parer, filmed more cinematic tributes 
to the heroism of Australian fighting forces in response to Curtin’s directive that their 
exploits be given more publicity.  As Curtin had secured a decisive election victory, 
he was able to set media agendas more easily.  The press owners generally reacted 
                                                            
222 Curtin, “Election policy statement”. 
223 Don Whitington, “Election Won On Curtin’s Prestige”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 
cited in Scrapbooks, 23 August 1943. 
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favourably to his proposals for a new world order, repeating his keywords and his 
message for closer British Commonwealth collaboration on 14 December.  
Journalists would increasingly describe him as an international statesman in 1944 
during his visits to London, Ottawa and the US, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
“A new world”: Curtin’s global communications, January - July 1944 
 
 
This chapter sets out to examine Curtin’s media initiatives to counter mounting 
economic, political and international challenges, to analyse his communication 
methods to different audiences, and to investigate resultant newspaper coverage of 
his selected speeches.  To achieve these objectives, the research methods include a 
textual analysis of Curtin’s radio broadcast, delivered in London on 8 May 1944,1 
and an examination of his Australian parliamentary address about his international 
mission on 17 July 1944.2
 
  Lastly this chapter will evaluate Curtin’s skills in 
generating favourable news coverage of his foreign policies, as elucidated in the 
selected sample of his speeches. 
 The Pacific war seemed increasingly burdensome as Australia deployed more 
than twice as many land and air troops to this zone as the United States by October 
1943.3  The extent of Australia’s overall wartime commitment can be seen by the 
fact that more than 993,000 Australians served in the armed forces4 at a time when 
the population was about seven million people, the equivalent to that of New York.5
                                                            
1 John Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London” [hereafter “London 
broadcast”], Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime 
Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) [hereafter DDA], no. 81, 8 May 1944, pp. 53-56. 
  
In the same period, 12 million United States men and women were in military 
2 John Curtin, “Meeting of Prime Ministers – Australian Prime Minister’s Report”, [hereafter 
“Prime ministers’ meeting], DDA, no. 84, 17 July 1944, pp. 28-44. 
3 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade [hereafter “Foreign affairs department”], Barton, vol. 6, 8 October 1943, retrieved 
on 10 January 2010 at 
<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView>; Jeffrey Grey, 
A Military History of Australia [hereafter Military history], Cambridge University Press, Port 
Melbourne, third edition, 2008, pp. 176, 178, 183-184. 
4 National Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], “Boer War to Vietnam”, Canberra, 2010, 
retrieved on 6 June 2010 at 
<http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/defence/conflicts.aspx#section3>; Parliamentary 
Library, “Anzac Day 2010”, Canberra, 1 April 2010, retrieved on 29 May 2010 at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/anzac/stats.htm>. 
5 John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Review, May, 1944”, DDA, no. 81, 4 May 1944, p. 30. 
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service.6  The US population was nearly 140 million people in July 1945.7
 
  Curtin 
created new mass media strategies to gain journalists’ support for his reassessment of 
Australia’s heavy wartime commitments in 1944.   
 This investigation of Curtin’s media relations was informed by archival 
research including confidential Allied memoranda, the secret prime ministerial 
diaries of Menzies and Canada’s Mackenzie King, Advisory War Council (AWC) 
minutes, and the private notes of the journalist, Frederick Thomas Smith.  This 
chapter has also drawn upon Harold Cox’s letters to his employer, Murdoch, about 
Curtin’s interviews from 1944 to 1945.8  Smith’s transcripts of the same interviews 
often corroborated Cox’s summaries.9  Unlike in previous chapters, Joseph 
Alexander’s diaries were not used as a reference in this chapter because Curtin 
agreed to his wish to be appointed as the first secretary at the Australian legation in 
Moscow in 1944.10
 
  Therefore this study used other journalists’ observations to 
compare Curtin’s media image, as shown in his film appearances, radio broadcasts 
and international interviews, with his private statements.   
 
Economic challenges 
Curtin’s major economic challenge was the acute labour shortage.  By 1944 
journalists were reporting on a lack of Australian workers to produce food for Allied 
troops.  The former press gallery journalist, Allan Fraser, who was the new Labor 
                                                            
6 Kenneth Paul O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons, “Introduction: The Home-Front War”, in 
Kenneth Paul O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons (eds), The Home-Front War: World War II 
and American Society, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1995, p. 4. 
7 See Appendix 1 and U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical National Population Estimates: July 
1, 1900 to July 1, 1999”, Washington DC, 28 June 2000, retrieved on 29 May 2010 at 
<www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt>. 
8 Harold Cox, “Typescript reports, 1944-1964” [hereafter “Typescript reports”], National 
Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA MS acc. no. 
4554, 1944-1945, transcript np. 
9 Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom briefings: John Curtin’s war [hereafter 
Backroom briefings], NLA, Canberra, 1997. 
10 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library 
[hereafter JCPML], Bentley, acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np; J.A. Alexander, 
“Papers 1833-1957” [hereafter “Papers”], NLA, Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA 
acc. no. MS 2389, 1941-1943, transcript np. 
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member for Eden-Monaro, invited The Daily Telegraph correspondent, Tom Mead,11 
and Alan Reid of The Sun to tour the neglected Bega Valley dairy country in New 
South Wales.  As Mead observed, conscription had caused agricultural communities 
to become “stripped of manpower”, resulting in elderly people, women and children 
struggling to supply Allied forces’ milk and butter requirements.  Consequently he 
reported on “a growing danger that Australia might not continue to be ‘a land of 
plenty’” and publicised Fraser’s “damning report” about this area of his electorate.  
Published on 10 January 1944, the headline was: “Shortage of food amid abundance 
– Shameful waste in Bega Valley”.12  Fraser released his report in accordance with 
ALP media statements on the need to accelerate agricultural production.  Curtin had 
said that at the beginning of the war against Japan, “The Labor Government had to 
devote itself with unflagging industry, and often with heart-breaking pains, to re-
shaping the country’s war machine” because the previous administration had not 
planned for this conflict.13  The Minister for Munitions, Norman J.O. Makin, 
announced that weapon production had peaked in March 1943; afterwards, men and 
women were being transferred from government factories to “high priority classes” 
of rural production.14  As the Allies recorded more crucial Pacific military victories 
in the Solomon Islands in October 1943, the Cabinet authorised the release of 20,000 
men from the army and 20,000 people from munitions and aircraft production to 
work in the agricultural sector.15  Food rationing remained for Australians and local 
mills re-opened to export flour and fulfill more British Ministry of Food contracts.16  
Curtin urged Australians to “make our maximum contribution” to help fortify “[t]he 
people of the United Kingdom”.17
                                                            
11 Mead later became a Liberal parliamentarian, representing the seat of Hurstville in the 
New South Wales Legislative Assembly from 1965 to 1976. 
  Mead did not blame Labor for this agricultural 
downturn and seemed to share Curtin’s view that the administration had taken over 
12 Tom Mead, Breaking The News: The events which changed life in Australia through the 
eyes of a man who worked at the front line of journalism and politics [hereafter Breaking the 
news], Dolphin Books, Sydney, 1998, pp. 68-69; Grey, Military history, pp. 183-184, 186. 
13 John Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement” [hereafter “Election policy 
statement”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np. 
14 Norman J.O. Makin, “Review Of War Commitments-Man-Power, Release To Rural 
Production, Munitions ‘Bloc’”, DDA, no. 73, 25 January 1944, p. 21. 
15 David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings [hereafter In 
his own words], Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 231; John Curtin to 
Douglas MacArthur, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 8, 15 February 1945. 
16 William J. Scully, “Exports to Britain-Flour”, DDA, no. 73, 24 January 1944, p. 13. 
17 Curtin, cited in Black, In his own words, pp. 232-233. 
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an inadequate defence system, the result of years of neglect. 18
 
  Curtin might have 
helped to initiate Mead’s Daily Telegraph report because he needed public support 
for the transfer of military personnel to rural industries to achieve food production 
targets. 
When he turned 59 on Saturday, 8 January 1944, Curtin promoted his 
austerity message by foregoing celebrations, presents and a birthday cake, as 
reported in The West Australian.  The article featured a close-up photograph of a 
smiling Curtin, who reportedly enjoyed a “usual” Saturday in Perth by gardening, 
meeting friends and attending to a “few routine official matters”.19
 
  Journalists 
conveyed that Curtin was a likeable politician determined to make personal sacrifices 
to help win the war.   
Secret cables revealed the severity of Australia’s food shortages, a fact that 
Curtin omitted from his media statements.  After he brought back the 6th and 7th 
Divisions in early 1942, he negotiated with Roosevelt and Churchill for the return of 
the 9th Division from the Middle East to Australia in April 1943.20  Despite the 
increased home defence, Curtin warned Churchill on 8 October 1943 that Australians 
had “overreached” themselves and lacked “the capacity” to help provide food and 
other necessities for Allied forces.  He advised Churchill of his government’s 
decision to transfer troops to food production and limit new military recruitments.21  
In response, Churchill invited Curtin to a meeting of commonwealth prime ministers, 
scheduled in December 1943.22
                                                            
18 Curtin, “Election policy statement”; Grey, Military history, pp. 168-169; Mead, Breaking 
the news, pp. 50, 68-69. 
  Curtin, however, asked to defer the meeting until 
April 1944 because “[t]his food problem has become very acute here”.  He added: “I 
19 (Anon.), “Curtin has Austerity 59th birthday”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks 
compiled by the Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], JCPML, Bentley, no. 4, 
JCPML acc. no. 00297/4, 9 January 1944. 
20 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, 24 July 1942; John Curtin to Winston Churchill, 
“Foreign affairs department”, vol. 6, 16, 30 July 1942; Grey, Military history, p. 184; 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00719/1/12, 
26 March 1942. 
21 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 6, 8 October 1943; 
Grey, Military history, p. 186.  
22 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 6, 21 October 1943. 
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am fearful of serious breakdown in our industries and primary production systems 
unless I give it my personal attention until [a] better position has been reached.”23
 
  
While Curtin avoided making such strong statements in public, ALP politicians were 
persuading journalists to support their plans for troop reductions. 
Once Curtin notified Churchill of these “acute” problems, Roosevelt used his 
media conferences to praise Australian efforts to provide meat to US forces.  When 
FDR met White House reporters on 29 October 1943, he announced: “We have been 
receiving from Australia enough beef and veal, practically, to feed all of our troops 
that are based in Australia.”  He explained “the reverse lend-lease process”, which 
enabled US meat producers to send about the same amount of beef and veal to troops 
in Europe.  “I didn’t know it until this morning”, he told journalists.  “I grabbed hold 
of it and said that’s the thing that has been overlooked.”  He also encouraged them to 
publish the news by saying: “That is a real headline.  In the long run that is 
something that the country doesn’t know.”24  In an interview on 24 March 1944, 
Roosevelt added that New Zealand was also providing meat to US troops.25  He 
might have been referring to the “U.S.-Australia Reciprocal Aid Agreement”, which 
was endorsed on 3 September 1942.26
 
  FDR promoted the agreement because he was 
keen for Australia to keep supplying the US military in the Pacific. 
Yet Roosevelt did not focus on Australian troop reductions when he invited 
Curtin to Washington DC again.  In his letter on 3 January 1944, FDR wrote to 
Curtin: “I feel that there is a real void which can only be filled by a meeting between 
you and me.”  He wanted to discuss Australian defence, Japanese-controlled islands 
and “the future policing” of the Asia and Pacific areas.  Also he tried to persuade 
                                                            
23 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 6, 23 October 1943. 
24 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Excerpts from the Press Conference” [hereafter “Press 
conference”], in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project 
[hereafter American presidency project], Santa Barbara, 29 October 1943, retrieved on 11 
February 2009 at 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16334&st=press+conference&st1=>. 
25 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 24 March 1944. 
26 J.B. Brigden, “Australia’s Economic Future” [hereafter “Australia’s economic future”], 
Pacific Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3, September 1944, p. 326; Grey, Military history, pp. 188, 195. 
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Curtin to visit London even though he had not raised “the matter in any way” with 
Churchill.  Curtin would receive “a very warm welcome” in London, Roosevelt 
wrote.  He added: “As we used to say in my rowing days, Australia is ‘pulling its 
weight in the boat.’”27  Curtin accepted Roosevelt’s repeated invitation in 1944 when 
his political circumstances had improved considerably because of his landslide 
election victory.28  By January, Curtin achieved the AWC’s bipartisan support for 
reducing the army to address labour shortages, which were also “gravely prejudicing 
food production” in Queensland.29  On 27 January, Curtin announced: “There’s a 
limit upon man-power in this country and all demands cannot be met”; however, he 
assured audiences that he would not “weaken” the army.30  Confidentially, Curtin 
told Canberra reporters the lack of “manpower” was a problem in all countries and 
would be the main topic at the London prime ministers’ meeting, which was 
postponed to April.31  A close Roosevelt aide, Lauchlin Currie, sent a memorandum 
to FDR to confirm on 4 February 1944: “After long negotiation, the Australians have 
decided not to extend us reverse lend lease in raw materials.”32  Despite trade 
disagreements, Curtin publicly explained Australians needed to maintain “a 
minimum” military effort to ensure “an effective voice in the peace settlement”.33  
By 9 March 1944, the Minister for External Affairs, Herbert Vere Evatt, announced 
the completion of the “U.S.-Australia Reciprocal Aid Agreement” to the 
parliament.34
                                                            
27 Franklin D. Roosevelt to John Curtin, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 7, 3 January 
1944. 
  Curtin increasingly proclaimed his nation’s significant wartime 
investment while privately renegotiating Australia’s commitments with other Allied 
nations. 
28 John Curtin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 7, 2 February 
1944.  Roosevelt’s first invitation was sent on 1 June 1942, as discussed in Chapter 6.  See 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to John Curtin, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and 
Museum, Hyde Park, 1 June 1942, retrieved on 28 September 2009 at 
<http://docs.FDRlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box2/a09a01.html>. 
29 Frederick Geoffrey Shedden, “Advisory War Council Minutes, Records of Frederick 
Shedden” [hereafter “AWC minutes”], JCPML, Bentley, vol. 7, JCPML acc. no. 00928/8, 20 
January 1944, p. 4. 
30 John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Review, January, 1944”, DDA, no. 74, 27 January 1944, p. 
10. 
31 Black, In his own words, pp. 240-246; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 196. 
32 Lauchlin Currie, “Memorandum For The President”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00269/3, 4 February 1944, p. 11. 
33 John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Statement, February, 1944”, DDA, no. 75, 9 February 
1944, p. 19. 
34 Brigden, “Australia’s economic future”, p. 327. 
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After an 18-day voyage from Sydney, he arrived in San Francisco on 
Wednesday, 19 April 1944 at 10am and held a hastily organised, crowded media 
conference two hours later in the luxurious Fairmont Hotel.35  Curtin talked to 
journalists and confirmed the Australian army would not reduce its “compact 
strength”; however, fewer “ancillary forces” would be deployed at bases and a “wide 
stretch of coast”, which “until recently was vulnerable to the enemy”.  The released 
men would help produce food, which was “getting scarce in certain other 
countries”.36  On 31 May, US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, wrote a memorandum 
to Roosevelt on how they had unsuccessfully “tried for two years to push” for a trade 
agreement with Australia.37  After Curtin returned to Australia on 26 July, F.T. Smith 
noted privately that he said: “He had seen no country where the manpower problems 
were as acute as in Australia.  All that they had maintained here were the spinal 
columns of basic industries.”38  Although such concerns persisted in 1945, new 
President Harry Truman announced on 17 April that the US Congress had extended 
the Lend-Lease Act for a third time, allowing Allies to mount “a combined attack 
which is now beating at the doors of Tokyo”.39  The US-Australian alliance appeared 
solid when 238 war correspondents and photographers reported on the subsequent 
peace settlement; newsreels showed MacArthur and Australia’s General Blamey at 
the 37-minute ceremony on board the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 
1945.40
                                                            
35 Heather Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man” for 19 April 1944 [hereafter “Diary”], 
JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1944.html>; Great Britain Foreign Office, 
“Political situation: consular reports, 1944” [hereafter “Political situation”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00779/13, 28 April 1944, pp. 1-3. 
  The global media images of a bilateral partnership were the result of 
Curtin’s intense, diplomatic negotiations and his candid discussions with journalists.  
36 John Curtin, “Review Of War Commitments: Prime Minister’s Statements”, DDA, no. 81, 
19 April 1944, pp. 18-19. 
37 Cordell Hull, “Memorandum for the President” [hereafter “Memorandum”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 31 May 1944, pp. 32-33.  I referred to Cordell Hull as the 
author of this presidential memorandum because it was typed on the Department of State 
letterhead in Washington DC and it was signed by “C H”.  
38 Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 213. 
39 Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Lend-
Lease Act” [hereafter “Statement”], Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Independence, 17 
April 1945, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=3&st=&st1=>. 
40 Cinesound Review (producer), “War’s Last Drama”, in At The Front: 1939-1945: 
Australia’s WWII Newsreels (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00441/2, 1945. 
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They cooperated to support his plans to reduce Australian troops, transfer more 
military personnel to rural industries and increase food production.  At the same 
time, the Australian media promoted the nation as a strong US ally to help fulfil the 
government’s objective to secure a role in the peace negotiations. 
 
 
Asserting “sovereignty” in the ANZAC Pact 
As Curtin enlisted journalists’ support for his economic policies, he developed media 
strategies to divert attention from political and international challenges.  He used 
press conferences to generate journalists’ support for the Australia-New Zealand 
Agreement and mask the controversy it was causing in the US.  The agreement, also 
known as the ANZAC Pact, was signed on 21 January 1944.  Curtin and NZ Prime 
Minister, Peter Fraser, declared their nations’ rights to establish “a regional zone of 
defence” and other initiatives. 41  On 19 January, Curtin privately told reporters about 
a “move” to try to transfer NZ forces to join Australian troops in the South-West 
Pacific.  At the time, NZ troops were engaged in separate Pacific Ocean Areas from 
the Australians.  At an interview on 3 February, Curtin was asked about “complaints” 
relating to the pact in US newspapers.  He replied the agreement had been reported 
positively in the US and British media.42  Confidentially, Hull stated in a 
memorandum to Roosevelt on 31 May, “we have been considerably shocked by the 
attitude of the Australian Government”.  Hull accused Australian politicians of 
“behaving outrageously” regarding a number of issues including the ANZAC Pact, 
“parts of which were aimed at the United States”, and the stalled trade agreement.43  
Yet Curtin managed to achieve his aim to strengthen the war zone defending 
Australia.  After a press gallery briefing on 3 July, Cox wrote that NZ air forces were 
transferred to MacArthur’s command in the South-West Pacific.44
                                                            
41 Black, In his own words, pp. 239-240; Brigden, “Australia’s economic future”, pp. 325-
326; Commonwealth of Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australian 
Treaty Series: Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944”, Canberra, 1944, retrieved on 13 
January 2010 at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1944/2.html>. 
  The next year, the 
42 Frederick Thomas Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, pp. 189, 195. 
43 Hull, “Memorandum”, pp. 32-33. 
44 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944.  This information was corroborated by Smith in 
Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 213. 
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Australian Minister to China, Sir Frederic William Eggleston, noted he found “a lot 
of support” for the pact among “Canadians, French and others”.45
 
  At his news 
conferences, Curtin deftly avoided reporters’ questions on “complaints” about the 
pact; instead he attempted to generate favourable publicity, which helped him to 
fulfil his objective: securing more NZ forces to protect Australia. 
In film and press images, Curtin tried to gain public enthusiasm for his pact 
by appealing to Australia’s traditional ties to British political ideals.  Some unedited 
film footage of Curtin showed him patiently rehearsing his words and hand gestures 
in a variety of close-up and longer camera angles.  He seemed to be prepared to be 
directed by professional film crews.46  When he signed the ANZAC Pact with Peter 
Fraser in Canberra, a newsreel close-up shot emphasised his declaration that the two 
nations would “contribute to the peace, welfare and good government of the whole 
Pacific”.  A long shot showed the two leaders and their national flags to reinforce 
Curtin’s statement that the policy was “not narrow”.  The camera zoomed closer as 
he explained the agreement served “a global ideal” that was “good for us” and, 
during another long shot, “good for civilisation”.  Audiences were told the pact 
would enhance the two countries’ “authority” to “speak to the world” and it was 
signed on the same table used by Queen Victoria to give her assent to the 
Commonwealth of Australia, inaugurated in 1901.  Through his rhetoric and the film 
director’s calculated camera angles, Curtin established a close relationship with 
Australian cinema audiences as well as evoking the sense of an active British 
partnership.47  Since he did not signal his government’s objective to reorganise the 
Pacific war zones, this cinematic depiction accomplished Foucault’s theory of 
masking national power.  As Foucault stated, “it was necessary for power to be self-
effacing, for it not to show itself as power”.48
                                                            
45 Frederic William Eggleston to Herbert Vere Evatt, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 8, 15 
January 1945. 
  The film signs, or meaning, of Queen 
46 ScreenSound Australia, Parliament in Session (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00876/4, 1944. 
47 ScreenSound Australia, “Anzac Agreement Signed At Canberra”, in John Joseph Curtin 
1885 – 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 1944. 
48 Teresa Bergman, “Can Patriotism Be Carved In Stone?: A Critical Analysis Of Mt. 
Rushmore’s Orientation Films” [hereafter “Can patriotism be carved in stone?”], Rhetoric & 
Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 1, spring 2008, p. 96; Michel Foucault, “Film and Popular 
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Victoria’s table, Commonwealth flags and the eloquent, democratic oratory belied 
the US Secretary of State’s privately expressed astonishment at Australia’s assertive 
new treaty with NZ. 
 
 
The “war brides” strategy 
After the ANZAC Pact was signed, Curtin developed a new media tactic to ease 
tensions with the US before his ocean voyage to San Francisco.  When John and 
Elsie Curtin sailed from Sydney on the US naval transport, Lurline, on 5 April 1944, 
their fellow passengers included 76 Australian brides of US servicemen.  Newsreels 
showed the cheerful young wives as they prepared to board the ship with their 
children.49  While archives revealed British, Canadian and US leaders’ desires to 
maintain secrecy during their journeys,50 Curtin announced his plans about ten days 
before his trip.  Several newspaper reports conveyed “goodwill” and bipartisan 
support for his “statesmanlike grasp of the mission”.51  At Curtin’s San Francisco 
media conference, he answered a journalist’s question on whether American soldiers 
were hindering the Australian Government’s population expansion plans by marrying 
local women and taking their brides to the US.  The inquiry generated the “[f]irst 
laugh of the interview” and “pressmen” reportedly applauded when Curtin joked that 
neither he nor Roosevelt “could get outside of the law of natural attraction”.52
                                                                                                                                                                        
Memory: An Interview with Michel Foucault” [hereafter “Film and popular memory”], trans. 
Martin Jordan, Radical Philosophy, vol. 11, summer 1975, pp. 25, 27. 
  
49 Campbell, “Diary”, 5 April 1944; Movietone News (producer), Departures: Curtin And 
Blamey For America (newsreel) [hereafter Curtin And Blamey for America], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01051/1/7, 1944; ScreenSound Australia, Visit to England: Prime 
Minister John Curtin goes overseas (newsreel) [hereafter Visit to England], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01023/1, 1944. 
50 William Lyon Mackenzie King, “The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King”, Library 
and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 21 March 1944, p. 3, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html>; Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00796/3, 14 October 1943. 
51 These statements appeared in The Age, The Argus, The Courier-Mail and The Sydney 
Morning Herald, cited in Scrapbooks, 25-27 March 1944. 
52 John Curtin, “American Servicemen Marrying Australians”, DDA, no. 81, 19 April 1944, 
p. 35; Theo Moody, “Mr Curtin Parries Tricky Questions” [hereafter “Curtin parries tricky 
questions”], The Argus, Melbourne, 21 April 1944, p. 16. 
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Consequently US journalists reported on “the war brides”,53 but this type of romance 
was not as well-received in Australia, as conveyed by The Bulletin cartoonist, Norm 
Rice.54
 
  Also Eleanor Roosevelt recalled receiving an “amusing letter” from a NZ  
Figure 23 
serviceman, who asked her to tell US troops to leave “their girls alone”.55
                                                            
53 (Anon.), “Australian Leader’s Wife Real Person”, Republican, Waterbury, JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/124, 5 May 1944; (Anon.), “Impression of U.S.A.: Mrs 
Curtin Interviewed”, The West Australian, Perth, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00964/119, 28 April 1944; (Anon.), “Not Like Movies”, Valley News, Tarentum, JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/127, 6 May 1944; Associated Press, “War Brides Arrive In 
U.S.”, 21 April 1944, retrieved on 13 January 2010 at 
<http://www.uswarbrides.com/newsarticles/440420.html>. 
  In fact, 
between 12,000 and 15,000 Australians, at least 50,000 British, and some 1,500 New 
54 Norm Rice, “Look, Bert; and no Yanks about!”, The Bulletin, 23 December 1942, 
retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/education/cartoonpd/index.html>. 
55 Public Broadcasting Service Online, “Eleanor Roosevelt’s tour of the South Pacific”, 
Washington DC, 1999, retrieved on 13 January 2010 at 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/eleanor/maps/tour.html>. 
Chapter 8   “A new world”: Curtin’s global communications, January - July 1944 
334 
 
Zealanders married US servicemen during the war.56  Despite the light-hearted tone 
of the mainstream media coverage, some Australian troops’ “rage”, “jealousy” and 
“simmering resentment” over the sight of American men romancing Brisbane 
women had led to “widespread violence” and rioting in the city in late 1942.57  The 
three-day “Battle of Brisbane” began on US Thanksgiving Day, 26 November.  The 
next day, The Courier-Mail cartoonist only alluded to multicultural tensions by 
depicting a US serviceman who did not share his turkey dinner with an Australian 
colleague during American Thanksgiving celebrations.58  After the weekend, the 
newspaper’s military commentator, Paul Goldenstedt, wrote government authorities 
“have declared war on reckless drivers of army vehicles” by making them pay for 
damages when “furious driving is proved”.59  During the Pacific war, almost one 
million US servicemen were based in Brisbane, with a population of fewer than 
330,000 people.60  In accordance with censorship policies, The Courier-Mail did not 
directly report on the fights during the riot61 and to date, there is no official record of 
fatalities.  Likewise, the government censored an official report on the “great 
increase” in pregnant, single, Australian servicewomen “because of its possible 
effect on enlistments to the women’s services”, according to F.T. Smith.62
 
  Despite 
these tensions, Curtin approved the “war brides” newsreel to promote a harmonious 
alliance in the US media and mask more controversial aspects of the military 
partnership. 
 
“Blue pencil” briefings 
                                                            
56 Robyn Arrowsmith, “Travelling for love: journeys of WWII war brides”, State Library of 
Queensland, South Brisbane, 2008, retrieved on 13 January 2010 at 
<www.slq.qld.gov.au/__.../SLQ_-_Travelling_for_Love_-_War_Brides_talk_-
_Robyn_Arrowsmith.pdf>; History Group of the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and 
Heritage, “Yankee boys, Kiwi girls - US Forces in New Zealand”, Wellington, 2010, 
retrieved on 30 May 2010 at <http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/us-forces-in-new-
zealand/yankee-boys-kiwi-girls>. 
57 Raymond Evans and Jacqui Donegan, “The Battle of Brisbane” [hereafter “Battle of 
Brisbane”], Politics and Culture, no. 4, 2004, retrieved on 11 January 2011 at 
<http://www.politicsandculture.org/issue/2004-issue-4>. 
58 (Anon.), “Thanksgiving Dinner”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 27 November 1942, p. 2. 
59 Paul Goldenstedt, “Reckless Army Drivers To Pay For Damage”, The Courier-Mail, 
Brisbane, 30 November 1941, p. 4. 
60 Evans and Donegan, “Battle of Brisbane”. 
61 The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 26-30 November 1942. 
62 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 188. 
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Censorship was a prominent topic at Curtin’s first US media conference as 
Australian newspaper publishers challenged his policies on suppressing information 
during his absence.63  Reporters asked him whether Australian censors enabled US 
correspondents to present “a fair picture” of his nation.64  He responded by 
emphasising his journalism background to create a collegial atmosphere, saying he 
had been a “newspaperman” with “a little editorial experience”, whose reporting was 
affected by “years of [censors’] blue pencil” during World War I.  Moreover, his 
administration was open, approachable and provided correspondents with “facilities 
rather than hindrance”.  He persuasively explained the government only imposed 
censorship due to the “overriding consideration of security”, adding: “You cannot 
allow the enemy to know lots of things that would be helpful to him.”  Appealing to 
journalists’ sense of integrity, Curtin said they were in an “honourable” profession 
that necessitated a “high degree of responsibility” and upholding a “code”.65  He 
might have been referring to the new Australian Journalists’ Association (AJA) code 
of ethics, endorsed by Labor but unpopular among the nation’s newspaper 
publishers, who deemed it to be an imposition.66  Cox said the “honour” self-
censorship system was effective because it withheld vital military information from 
the enemy, did not undermine public morale and preserved positive relations with 
Allies.67  Curtin persuaded unenthusiastic journalists to accept censorship by 
accentuating their shared experiences, establishing an egalitarian relationship and 
delegating “blue-pencil” tasks, as did Roosevelt.68
 
 
                                                            
63 Ron Davidson, “John Curtin: From Revolutionary Firebrand to Journalist in Spirit”, 
JCPML, Bentley, 2000, retrieved on 19 June 2009 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/journalist>; 
Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography [hereafter Strive to be fair], 
Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 77. 
64 Campbell, “Diary”, 19 April 1944. 
65 John Curtin, “Communiques–Prime Minister’s Statement”, DDA, no. 81, 19 April 1944, p. 
44.  See also John Curtin, “Chief Publicity Censor–Prime Minister’s Statement On Action 
Against Newspapers”, DDA, no. 81, 19 April 1944, pp. 43-44; John Curtin, “Duty With 
Press”, DDA, no. 81, 19 April 1944, p. 45. 
66 Clem Lloyd, Profession: Journalist, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1985, p. 229; Media 
Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Australian Journalists’ Association, “Ethics Review 
Committee Final Report”, November 1996, retrieved on 26 November 2009 at 
<http://www.gwb.com.au/99a/ethics.html>. 
67 Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01060/1, 6 April 
1973, transcript np. 
68 William H. Hammond, “Book review: Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and 
the US Press and Radio in World War II” (Michael S. Sweeney), The Journal of Military 
History, vol. 65, no. 3, 2001, pp. 840-841; Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 8 December 1941. 
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US public spheres, April 1944 
Despite controversial issues, such as censorship and “war brides”, Curtin generated 
positive news coverage about his US trip.  Reports varied on the estimated number of 
journalists who attended his first US news conference, held in San Francisco on 19 
April.  According to the British Consul-General in San Francisco, Godfrey Fisher,69 
61 journalists and five newsreel operators saw Curtin at the interview.70  Yet a 
special Argus correspondent, Theo Moody, wrote, “there were 19 pressmen, 10 
newspaperwomen, nine Press photographers, and three newsreel men”.71  Once 
Curtin and his team had safely arrived in San Francisco, Australian newspapers 
published photographs of the smiling prime minister as he left his country with Elsie 
Curtin and General Blamey.72  “That Gen Blamey would travel with Mr Curtin was a 
very close secret”, Moody confined to his newspaper readers on 21 April.73  While 
the film footage was not preserved, The Argus report suggested that the news 
conference was covered widely and broadcast extensively.  Curtin spent 90 minutes 
with the journalists and this included newsreel filming under “strong arc lights” for 
15 minutes, as well as an impromptu, “off-the-record” discussion for another 20 
minutes.  Columbia Broadcasting System commentator, William “Wynter” (Winter), 
was quoted as saying Curtin’s interview “was the most comprehensive ever held in 
San Francisco” because his answers “were the frankest we have ever had”.  Even 
though jostling photographers pushed over the arc lights twice, Curtin “joked easily” 
with them and agreed to their various requests to pose in front of the cameras.74
                                                            
69 Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political situation”, pp. 1-3.  This report was sent by 
“Consul-General Fisher (San Francisco)”.  The Online Archive of California refers to 
“Consul Godfrey Fisher of Great Britain” in September 1944.  See Online Archive of 
California, “Guide to the San Francisco News-Call Bulletin Newspaper Photograph 
Archive”, retrieved on 15 January 2011 at 
<http://www.oac.cdlib.org/view?docId=tf338n99v6&view=dsc&style=oac4&dsc.position=4
2501>. 
  John 
70 Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political situation”, pp. 1-3. 
71 Theo Moody, “Triumph For Mr Curtin At Press Talk” [hereafter “Triumph for Curtin”], 
The Argus, Melbourne, 21 April 1944, p. 1. 
72 These photographs appeared in The Sun News-Pictorial and The Sydney Morning Herald, 
cited in Scrapbooks, 21 April 1944. 
73 Moody, “Curtin parries tricky questions”, p. 16. 
74 Moody, “Triumph for Curtin”, p. 1.  This Argus article referred to “William Wynter”.  Yet 
the correct spelling was Winter, according to the Los Angeles Times.  See Myrna Oliver, 
“William Winter: Foreign Affairs Commentator”, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, 9 
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and Elsie Curtin’s arrival in the US coincided with the visits of Peter Fraser, Costa 
Rican President-elect Teodoro Picado and their wives.75  At Curtin’s interview, “the 
press showed very great interest in his coming”, as Fisher wrote to Nevile Butler of 
the British embassy in Washington DC.76  The media conference was reportedly “the 
biggest and best ever held in San Francisco”.  Fisher added: “Mr. Curtin made an 
excellent impression.” 77  This observation was supported by The New York Times 
and The Washington Star.78  In contrast, Fraser “preferred to pass through here – as 
he has done in the past – without any publicity”. 79  Due to their differing media 
approaches, Curtin was more well-known in the US because Americans were 
familiar with his radio broadcasts, independent media statements and newsreel 
appearances.80  In Australia, The Daily Telegraph cartoonist, William Mahony, 
characterised him as a personable figure in the international media (see Figure 24).81  
Later the Sydney Sun published an official photograph of a jovial Curtin walking 
with Hull in Washington DC; this signified a partnership had replaced a sense of 
Australian isolation.82
                                                                                                                                                                        
November 1999, retrieved on 10 June 2010 at 
<http://articles.latimes.com/1999/nov/09/news/mn-31605>. 
 
75 General Watson to Stephen Early, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 16 April 
1944, p. 21. 
76 This report was addressed to “N.M. Butler” of the British Foreign Office.  Nevile Butler 
often corresponded with Roosevelt.  See “Diplomatic Correspondence. Great Britain: 
Military Situation”, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library & Museum, Hyde Park, 1940, retrieved 
on 14 January 2011 at <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/britain>. 
77 Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political situation”, pp. 1-3. 
78 (Anon.), “Curtin, In Capital, Is Greeted by Hull; Lord Halifax Also Welcomes Australian 
Leader, Here For War Conferences”, The New York Times, New York, 24 April 1944, p. 11; 
(Anon.), “Hail Curtin’s Reception; Australians Are Gratified by U.S. Greeting of Prime 
Minister”, The New York Times, New York, 22 April 1944, p. 7; Lawrence E. Davies, 
“Curtin On Coast; To See Roosevelt”, The New York Times, New York, 20 April 1944, p. 3. 
79 Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political situation”, pp. 1-3. 
80 E.g. Curtin delivered radio talks to Americans on 14 March 1942, 26 January 1943, 5 July 
1943 and 17 March 1944.  Cited in JCPML, “Index to John Curtin’s speeches in the Digest 
of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister, 1941-
1945” [hereafter “Index to John Curtin’s speeches], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01148/1, 2007. 
81 Figure 24 appeared in William Mahony, “Personal Representative”, The Daily Telegraph, 
Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 21 April 1944. 
82 Theo Moody, “Curtin In U.S.A.”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 27 April 1944. 
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Figure 24 
While Allied officials remarked on Curtin’s skills in generating US publicity, 
he worked hard to look like a natural communicator.83
                                                            
83 Department of External Affairs, “Visit of Mr. Curtin to USA & UK in connection with 
Prime Ministers’ Conference London” [hereafter “Curtin’s visit”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00768/2, June 1944; Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political situation”, pp. 1-3. 
  One month before the San 
Francisco conference, a Cinesound team filmed Curtin’s formal dinner to honour 
MacArthur during the general’s second year at his Australian base.  Although the 
film was titled MacArthur Speaks, Curtin’s three-minute opening speech was almost 
as long as the general’s four-minute address.  The two men were pictured together in 
medium camera shots as Curtin delivered his oratory while standing and using 
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forceful gestures, such as leaning forward, shaking his head to emphasise his words 
and placing his hands on the table to indicate his open manner.  He asserted that 
MacArthur’s leadership “enables us to say to the world that this Australia still stands 
a free nation able to play its part in the cause of freedom throughout the whole 
world”.  Newsreel images,84 press photos85 and archival research86 indicated the two 
men liked and respected each other.  Filmed rehearsals of other speeches showed 
Curtin’s determination to perfect his messages as he uncomplainingly waited for the 
director’s clapperboard and the call for “action!”  During his stand-up in “take 
three”, Curtin pointed his finger, moved his head from side to side, looking like he 
might be addressing an unseen audience, and said: “We know that our destinies will 
go forward hand-in-hand and we are proud and confident in that association.”  The 
camera zoomed in closer during “take four” as he embellished his statement to add, 
“we will stand or fall together” and “we are proud and happy in that association 
[emphasis added]”.  As in MacArthur Speaks, he did not refer to notes.87  Yet his 
practice film scenes indicated he refined his memorised rhetoric, gestures and camera 
delivery to build “a closer relationship between the Australian and American 
peoples”, as he declared in a public statement.88
 
 
Yet Roosevelt was keen to prevent undue media attention of Curtin’s visit 
because he was secretly resting at his advisor Bernard Mannes Baruch’s hunting and 
fishing lodge in Hobcaw Barony, South Carolina.  Before the meeting, Eleanor 
confided to Elsie: “The President may still be away on an enforced holiday due to 
complete weariness.”89
                                                            
84 Cinesound Review (producer), MacArthur Speaks (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 01050/1, 1944. 
  Documentary evidence indicates that Fraser, Picado and 
their wives were also invited to see FDR, but the NZ Prime Minister did not join the 
85 E.g. these photographs were published in The Age, The Sun News-Pictorial and The 
Sydney Morning Herald, cited in Scrapbooks, 18 and 20 March 1944. 
86 E.g. AWC, “Discussions with General MacArthur”, NAA, Canberra, CA495, A2684, 967, 
26 March 1942; Douglas MacArthur to George C. Marshall, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, 31 March 1942, retrieved on 11 February 
2010 at <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/PSF/BOX3/T43nn04.html>. 
87 ScreenSound Australia, Parliament in Session (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00876/4, 1944. 
88 John Curtin, Untitled, DDA, no. 81, 24 April 1944, p. 33. 
89 Eleanor Roosevelt to Elsie Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00330/1, 17 April 
1944, p. 24. 
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group at Hobcaw Barony on 25 April.90  Roosevelt’s press secretary, Stephen Early, 
relayed his concerns of a potential news leak to General Watson, who was staying at 
the retreat.91  Early needed to send a telegram because Baruch’s residence lacked 
telephones.92
I feel very certain, knowing something of the desire of these people [the 
Australian officials] for publicity, that unless a brief statement … is made, 
much more will come out through your visitors or their contacts in 
Washington.
  He stated on 22 April:  
93
Allied leaders seemed accustomed to releasing terse, prepared statements quickly to 
prevent unwelcome journalist enquiries.
 
94
 
 
Despite Early’s foreboding, John and Elsie Curtin kept Roosevelt’s secret.  
Curtin did not give details of his forthcoming trip when he spoke to 80 leading 
journalists at the stately Blair House, Washington DC on 24 April.  Instead, 
correspondents positively portrayed his views on peace talks and post-war 
immigration to Australia.95  While detailed records do not exist, FDR seemed to have 
enjoyed Curtin’s visit because on the same day, he cabled Churchill to confirm: 
“Everything goes well here in my vacation residence.  The doctor agrees with me 
that I am better.”96
                                                            
90 Stephen Early, “Draft Of Proposed Release” [hereafter “Proposed release”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 22 April 1944, p. 15; General Watson to Stephen Early, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 16 April 1944, p. 21. 
  Early’s draft media release indicated only that the Curtins had 
91 Stephen Early to General Watson, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 22 April 
1944, p. 14. 
92 Belle W. Baruch Institute For Marine & Coastal Studies, “History and Structure”, 
University of South Carolina, Columbia, 2009, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://links.baruch.sc.edu/history.html>. 
93 Stephen Early to General Watson, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 22 April 
1944, p. 14. 
94 E.g. Roosevelt had authorised an “immediate joint press release” to announce MacArthur’s 
Australian arrival in March 1942.  Cited in Roosevelt to Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00719/1/14, 17 March 1942. 
95 E.g. (Anon.), “Curtin Puts Aside Questions Of Bases; Reciprocal Matter Best Left to 
Peace Conference, Says Australian Premier”, The New York Times, New York, 25 April 
1944, p. 5; (Anon.), “Curtin Wants Yank Settlers in Australia”, The Washington Post, 
Washington DC, 25 April 1944, p. 2; Heather Campbell, “Diary”, 24 April 1944. 
96 Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00796/4, 
25 April 1944. 
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accompanied Eleanor on a one-day return trip to Roosevelt’s “vacation residence in 
the South”.97  This abstruse message was repeated in newspapers and an official 
photograph of the cheerful visitors was published.98  In fact, Roosevelt revealed his 
“vacation hide-out” to White House correspondents only when he invited them to an 
interview at Hobcaw Barony on 6 May.  Imploring them to maintain confidentiality, 
he said: “I have been very comfortable down here.  I want to come back.”99
 
 
A day after his presidential meeting, Curtin gave an evening radio broadcast 
at his Blair House suite to confirm his “consultation” with Roosevelt had reinforced 
“complete harmony between our views”.  Also he assured US listeners of Australia’s 
“responsibility” to “feed” Allied “fighting forces” in the South-West Pacific.  He 
emphasised, “Australia, has, and can have, much in common with America” and 
repeated his well-known statement that his nation “will look to the United States in 
the future”.100  His radio messages, delivered by the National Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC), were favourably repeated in The New York Times.101  As a result 
of the strengthened bilateral relations, on 29 April the Australian Government 
announced lower prices to send telegrams between Australia and the US;102
 
 this 
initiative facilitated more international journalism.  Through Curtin’s balancing of 
secret diplomacy and public egalitarianism, his enthusiastic use of new media and his 
repetition of appealing messages, he secured the support of FDR and US journalists 
for his policy on a post-war military security alliance between the two nations. 
                                                            
97 Early, “Proposed release”, p. 15. 
98 (Anon.), “Australian Leader’s Wife Real Person”, Republican, Waterbury, 5 May 1944, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/124; (Anon.), “Brief Stay In U.S.A.”, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 25 April 1944; (Anon.), “P.M. Flies To Meet 
President”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 27 April 1944.  Their 
photograph was published in The Daily Mirror, 1 May 1944, and The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 27 June 1944, cited in Scrapbooks. 
99 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 6 May 1944. 
100 Campbell, “Diary”, 26 April 1944; John Curtin, “Broadcast in America”, DDA, 26 April 
1944, no. 81, pp. 49-52. 
101 (Anon.), “He And President Agree, Says Curtin; Australian Finds Full Harmony on 
Pacific Strategy and Post-War Problems”, The New York Times, New York, 27 April 1944, 
p. 4. 
102 DDA, Untitled, no. 86, 29 April 1944, p. 31. 
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Furthermore, Elsie Curtin became a popular media personality, who assisted 
her husband’s US mission.  Shortly after Curtin announced his overseas trip, The 
New York Times and The Washington Post publishers praised Elsie’s decision to 
“break a tradition” and accompany her husband.103  Eleanor promoted a firm 
friendship with Elsie.  She sent flowers, along with a note of “warm congratulations 
and best wishes”, to the Curtins because they were celebrating their twenty-seventh 
wedding anniversary on 21 April.  In her telegram, Eleanor seemed to attempt to 
cajole Elsie to remain in Washington DC instead of joining Curtin in London.  “If 
you stay here while your husband goes to London, I hope you will let me help you in 
any way possible”, Eleanor wrote.104  One day after the South Carolina meeting, 
Elsie returned to Blair House to conduct her first US news conference, where she 
accentuated her husband’s themes of kinship by saying Australian and American 
women had “a good deal in common” and she would continue to support their 
“prominent” work in “public affairs”.105  After her interview with about 20 of 
Washington DC’s leading female journalists, she was praised for her “honest 
opinions of matters American and Australian”.106  Elsie extended her US visit, 
resulting in Washington Post stories about her “busy time” as an “honor guest at 
luncheons” and her speech at the American Association of University Women 
(AAUW).107
                                                            
103 (Anon.), “Curtin’s Wife Breaks a Tradition To See U.S., Britain With Premier”, The New 
York Times, New York, 4 April 1944, p. 14; (Anon.), “Mrs. Curtin to Accompany Husband 
Here”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 6 April 1944, p. 9. 
  Later she addressed a Canberra Parliament House function, where she 
explained Curtin’s aides decided “[t]here were seven men in the plane” leaving 
Washington DC to fly to London “and they didn’t want me just because I was a 
woman”.  She was “very cross” about being “dumped”, as she was quoted in The 
104 Eleanor Roosevelt to Elsie Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00330/1, 17 April 
1944, p. 24. 
105 Elsie Curtin, “Press Statement by Mrs Curtin” [hereafter “Press statement], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00652/1/3, 26 April 1944. 
106 This phrase was quoted from: (Anon.), “Mrs. Curtin Buys Gloves, No Nylons; Prime 
Minister’s Wife Compares Shopping Conditions Here and in Australia”, The New York 
Times, New York, 26 April 1944, p. 20.  Positive US press statements also appeared in: 
(Anon.), “Australian Leader’s Wife Real Person”, Republican, Waterbury, JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00964/124, 5 May 1944; (Anon.), “Impression of U.S.A.: Mrs Curtin 
Interviewed”, The West Australian, Perth, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/119, 28 
April 1944; (Anon.), “Not Like Movies”, Valley News, Tarentum, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00964/127, 6 May 1944. 
107 (Anon.), “Mrs Curtin Honor Guest At Luncheons”, The Washington Post, Washington 
DC, 12 May 1944, p. 12; (Anon.), “Shepherdstown AAWU Hears Mrs. Curtin and Lady 
Dixon”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 15 May 1944, p. 3. 
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Argus.  Her daughter recalled the aircraft passengers wanted Elsie to stay in the US 
because “[i]t was an army type plane with rather primitive toilet facilities”.108  
Subsequently she pioneered direct relationships between a prime minister’s wife and 
international journalists.109
 
 
 
“Mr. Curtin’s Success In London”, April-May 1944 
Differing from Roosevelt’s secret meeting, Churchill endorsed widespread publicity 
of Curtin’s one-month stay in London.  Curtin’s frequent media statements, 
interviews and film appearances masked the earlier controversies that had 
characterised his relations with Churchill.110
The first thing I would like to say is to express the unbounded admiration and 
gratitude of the people of Australia to the people of Britain for having stood 
alone as the rampart of civilisation and held the fort … for all the hopes of the 
  For example, after he arrived at the 
Croydon aerodrome, south of London, on 29 April, a newsreel team filmed his 
enthusiastic exchange with reporters.  Clad in a light-coloured, herringbone overcoat, 
he removed his hat and smiled as he directly addressed the British Movietone 
camera.  His jovial appearance contrasted with his stern look in earlier newsreels and 
differed from other commonwealth prime ministers, filmed at the same aerodrome, 
because they wore dark hats shading their faces.  He changed his central message on 
the Pacific war and adopted a patriotic theme targeted to London audiences as he 
seemed to remark spontaneously: 
                                                            
108 (Anon.), “Mrs Curtin’s Racy Story Of Her Trip”, The Argus, Melbourne, 21 July 1944, p. 
8. 
109 There is a lack of scholarly publications about Australian prime ministerial wives’ 
relationships with journalists, from the first person in this role, Jane Barton, until Elsie 
Curtin.  Research suggested that correspondents were interested in their public roles.  
Margaret Cook was “interviewed at every public event”; Ethel Bruce was photographed for 
the British Daily Graphic in 1923; and Sarah Scullin participated in a lunch hosted by the 
NSW Institute of Journalists.  Cited in NAA, “Australia’s Prime Ministers”, 2009, retrieved 
on 12 February 2010 at <http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers>. 
110 E.g. (Anon.), “The Facts Of Power”, Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, 6 May 1944, p. 10; 
British Movietone (producer), “Empire Premiers Assemble” [hereafter “Empire premiers”], 
in Newsreels of Curtin, 1942-1945 (newsreel) [hereafter Newsreels of Curtin], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 1944; John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Review”, DDA, no. 
81, 4 May 1944, p. 21. 
Chapter 8   “A new world”: Curtin’s global communications, January - July 1944 
344 
 
future.  When I speak of Australians, I would like it to be understood that I 
speak for seven million Britishers.111
His message was carefully planned to interest British “people” by focusing on their 
heroic fight against Nazis.  Also Curtin hoped to attract their attention to Australia’s 
plight by emphasising the historic links between the two nations.  The same newsreel 
included long shots of the prime ministers’ meeting at 10 Downing Street, London, 
which showed Curtin seated next to Churchill, as he is in a number of photographs of 
his visit,
 
112 to suggest a close friendship that disguised previous frictions.113
 
 
 During his radio broadcast to British people, Curtin shifted his emphasis on 
foreign policies by saying he accepted the “strategy of beat Hitler first” and a 
“minimum” effort in the Pacific.114
… the Pacific was the real centre … Australia must stand firmly by its view 
that the Pacific is the predominant theatre … The Commonwealth 
Government must stand up to their views on the Pacific situation against 
opposing views which might be held by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt.
  This speech marked a departure from the 
confidential views evidenced in an Australian AWC transcription in March 1942.  
According to the transcription, MacArthur advised the war councillors: 
115
This transcription did not refer to any AWC objections to MacArthur’s views and it 
seemed to suggest that the Australian Government had agreed with the general in 
1942.  As the war tide increasingly turned to the Allies’ favour, Curtin seemed to 
stress his approval of the “beat Hitler first” strategy to gain Britons’ support for his 
radio talk on 8 May 1944.  Speaking into the microphone at the BBC studio, he tried 
to captivate his “gallant” listeners by depicting Australia as a “bastion” of democratic 
ideals, institutions and “the British way of life”.
   
116
                                                            
111 British Movietone, “Empire premiers”. 
  Moreover, he appealed to the 
112 (Anon.), “John Curtin at the Empire Conference, London, May 1944”, JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 01125/1; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin In London”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
Sydney, 8 May 1944; Picturegram, “Curtin And Churchill”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 
10 May 1944.  The latter two photographs were cited in Scrapbooks. 
113 British Movietone, “Empire premiers”. 
114 Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
115 AWC, “Discussions with General MacArthur”, NAA, Canberra, CA495, A2684, 967, 26 
March 1942, pp. 1-2 (the online page numbers are pp. 8, 12-13). 
116 Cited in Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
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empire’s familiar, noble and endearing images of Australia, including their mutual 
relatives and shared wartime victories, as well as koalas and kangaroos.  In his radio 
talk, Curtin used “nationhood” keywords 43 times and referred to Britain 31 times, in 
contrast to only one mention of the US. 
 
Figure 25117
Curtin also used the political device of referring to cricketer Donald 
Bradman, a symbol of national “resilience and identity” for many Australians, who 
had been mainly unaware that the ABC’s popular “synthetic cricket” broadcasts were 
“an elaborate pretence” during the 1930s.
 
118
                                                            
117 The photograph in Figure 25 is courtesy of the State Library of Western Australia, The 
Battye Library, records of the J S Battye Library of West Australian History, Perth, 
BA499/22, 53436P, 1944. 
  Following the controversial “Bodyline” 
118 ABC commentators would play gramophone recordings of cheering crowds and tap a 
pencil on a hollow piece of wood to imitate the sound of a batsman striking a cricket ball in 
front of appreciative spectators.  See Brett Hutchins, Don Bradman: Challenging The Myth, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 17; K. S. Inglis, This is the ABC: The 
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tour, when English fast bowlers targeted their deliveries at Bradman’s small 
physique between 1932 and 1933, British cricket fans appeared to focus on the 
importance of “[s]hared values of sportsmanship” and “fair play”, instead of 
“winning at all costs”.  According to sports historian, Richard Holt, the boom in 
radio broadcasting and cinema newsreels benefited Bradman because the media 
coverage generated “a new public enthusiasm” for the cricketer among British 
audiences.119  In May 1944, The Argus reported that during Curtin’s “morning 
shave”, he chatted amiably with his London-based barber on Bradman’s future; the 
story enhanced his egalitarian appeal.120
 
   
After referring to popular images in his radio talk, Curtin then concentrated 
on Australia’s battle to preserve “liberty”, “freedom” and “civilisation” in “the 
southern world”.121  He elaborated his nation’s labour, food and clothes rationing 
commitments to emphasise the “terrific strain on Australia’s manpower pool”.  It was 
not until the middle of his radio talk that he referred generally to the true objectives 
of his London mission: to resolve Australia’s production shortages and galvanise 
British support for maintaining Allied defence forces in his country during the war.  
He explained to “the people of Britain” that “[s]ince Pearl Harbour, Australia has 
been almost completely preoccupied with the war against Japan”.122  Yet “while 
recognising and accepting the strategy of ‘beat Hitler first’”, he said “a certain 
minimum effort must be maintained in the Pacific”.  In his conclusion, he reiterated, 
“we Australians are proud to be of the stock which populates the British Isles”.123  
Also he focused on previous themes of a “grave responsibility” as he said: “There 
can be no going back to the good old days.”124
                                                                                                                                                                        
Australian Broadcasting Commission 1932-1983, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 
1983, p. 37. 
  Due to his elucidation of detailed 
119 Richard Holt, “Bradman and the British”, ESPNcricinfo, London, 2002, retrieved on 21 
July 2010 at <http://www.cricinfo.com/wisdenalmanack/content/story/154886.html>. 
120 David McNicoll, “Mr Curtin’s Barber Talks Of Cricket”, The Argus, Melbourne, cited in 
Scrapbooks, 20 May 1944. 
121 Curtin used the keywords of “freedom” and “free” six times.  He referred to “liberty” 
twice and also mentioned “civilisation” once.  Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
122 He mentioned ten “war” keywords.  Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
123 This speech included 30 keywords about “the people”, “we” and “us”.  Curtin, “London 
broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
124 “Responsibility” keywords appeared twice and “tradition” once.  Curtin, “London 
broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
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Australian wartime production statistics, the speech was slightly more complicated 
than the recommended levels.  Curtin’s radio talk registered a Flesch Reading Ease 
score of 50.4 and it was suitable for an eleventh-grade audience.125
 
  Through his 
frequent appeals to “civilized”, democratic ideals, as well as his repetition of 
common bonds between Australians and Britons, he attempted to deliver an 
accessible, inspiring radio talk that would persuade embattled people to continue 
their war against Japan. 
Although Curtin was courting the British, it was possible that he became 
more acutely aware of their suffering after visiting London’s bombed areas, the result 
of Germany’s “Blitz” campaign that killed about 30,000 of the city’s residents.  
Curtin wrote to his wife that “the buildings are just ruins & the scarred city has a 
queer impression”.126  Also during the prime ministers’ conference, he might have 
developed more esteem for Churchill because it was more than two years after their 
heated cable exchanges over the deployment of the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions.  
Following Curtin’s return from London, he held a Canberra press conference on 3 
July, where he reportedly praised Churchill to Harold Cox and other Australian 
journalists.  Afterwards Cox wrote in a letter to Murdoch that: “Mr. Curtin described 
Mr. Churchill as the most important single person in the world at present opposed to 
the Axis.”  Curtin appeared to be impressed with Churchill’s personal commitment to 
the success of the Allied “D-Day” landing in Normandy, France, on 6 June.  
According to Cox, Curtin told the journalists: “I know that on D Day he [Churchill], 
in imagination, fired every shot and suffered every wound that was inflicted.”127  
Curtin’s first-hand observations might have deepened his appreciation for the British 
“fighting fortress” and perhaps compelled him to broadcast assurances that Australia 
remained a “proud” part of the empire.128
 
 
                                                            
125 As discussed in Chapter 6, the recommended Flesch Readability score was 60 to 70.  
Elvin T. Lim, “Roosevelt’s fireside chats”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 
445-446. 
126 John Curtin to Elsie Curtin, London, cited in Campbell, “Diary” for 30 April 1944. 
127 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944. 
128 Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
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Australian newspaper publishers responded positively to Curtin’s BBC 
broadcast.  His speech was substantially repeated in the four newspapers in this 
survey: The Age,129 The Canberra Times,130 The Sydney Morning Herald131 and The 
West Australian.132  Furthermore in a front-page bulletin, The Sydney Morning 
Herald informed readers that Curtin’s London objective “appears to have been 
achieved”.133  The newspaper’s page three lead headline, in bold, block case, was: 
“Mr. Curtin’s Success In London”.  Readers were told Curtin had secured 
commonwealth support for the redistribution of Allied forces to ensure “a lively war 
effort against Japan” and to allow more Australian workers to increase food 
production.  In the article, the journalist alluded to Curtin’s proposal to establish an 
“empire secretariat”, although this was not specified in the broadcast. 134  Under 
Curtin’s plan, a permanent secretariat would represent the British Commonwealth 
and oversee close international collaboration.135  Moreover, the reporter referred to 
his London newsreel and public appearances, including a lunch-time visit to RAAF 
members, who “cheered” him at the Boomerang Club.136  While The Age, The 
Canberra Times and The West Australian publishers endorsed his “readiness” to 
“accept the strategy of ‘Beat Hitler First’”, they also welcomed news of Britain’s 
commitment to send “ships and aircraft” to the South-West Pacific.137
                                                            
129 (Anon.), “British Aid In The Pacific”, The Age [hereafter Age], Melbourne, 9 May 1944, 
p. 3.  Curtin was quoted directly in three sentences and his speech was paraphrased in 
another 12 sentences. 
  The Canberra 
130 (Anon.), “Australia Has British Mandate In The Pacific”, The Canberra Times [hereafter 
Canberra], Canberra, 9 May 1944, p. 2.  This article included eight sentences that were 
direct and indirect quotations made by Curtin. 
131 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Success In London”, The Sydney Morning Herald [hereafter 
SMH], Sydney, 9 May 1944, p. 3.  His speech was directly quoted in 41 sentences and 
another sentence paraphrased his words.  Furthermore, a positive summary appeared on page 
one of the same issue. 
132 The address was covered in three articles in The West Australian [hereafter West] in Perth 
on 9 May 1944.  The articles were (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Broadcast”, p. 2; (Anon.), “Pacific 
War: Mr. Curtin’s Assurance”, p. 3; (Anon.), “Press Comment: ‘Need Have No Doubt’”, p. 
3.  In the “Pacific War” article, he was directly quoted in 52 sentences and his words were 
paraphrased in another seven sentences. 
133 (Anon.), “Summary Of To-Day’s News”, SMH, 9 May 1944, p. 1. 
134 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Success In London”, SMH, 9 May 1944, p. 3. 
135 Black, In his own words, pp. 240-242; John Curtin, “Empire Council–Prime Minister’s 
Statement”, DDA, no. 81, 24 April 1944, p. 9. 
136 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Success In London”, SMH, Sydney, 9 May 1944, p. 3. 
137 (Anon.), “Australia Has British Mandate In The Pacific”, Canberra, 9 May 1944, p. 2; 
(Anon.), “British Aid In The Pacific”, Age, 9 May 1944, p. 3; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s 
Broadcast”, “Press Comment: ‘Need Have No Doubt’”, and “Pacific War: Mr. Curtin’s 
Assurance”, West, pp. 2-3. 
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publisher revealed an imperial attitude by referring to Britain as “the mother 
country”; this term was not used by Curtin in his broadcast.138  A Perth leader writer 
likened Curtin’s radio talk to Churchill’s House of Commons speech on 22 February 
1944, when he also emphasised ideals of freedom, responsibility and the need for 
“resolve”.139
 
  Curtin’s democratic rhetoric was consistent with his open, friendly 
associations with the media, Australian air force fighters and commonwealth leaders, 
generating favourable news coverage.   
His radio messages were strengthened by London press tributes, which were 
reported in the Canberra and Perth dailies.  A leader writer for London’s 
conservative Evening Standard reportedly enthused over “[t]he fresh mind and 
language” conveyed in Curtin’s speech because his “demands” that the “beat Hitler 
first strategy” should not “stultify” the Japanese war were “of service to us all.”  In 
England’s popular Daily Telegraph, a lead story emphasised the unity of Australians 
and Britons, restating Curtin’s words that they were “determined never to return to 
the bad old ways of the ‘good old days’”.  The labour-oriented Daily Herald 
reportedly declared Britain sympathised with Australia’s plight in the Pacific.  
Moreover, radio reporters in Ankara, Turkey, described the prime ministers’ 
conference as a “great success”.140
 
  Thus Curtin attracted support from diverse 
political spectrums of the mass news media. 
Although he was unable to achieve his “permanent secretariat” proposal, 
Curtin gained media attention for his empathy with Londoners.  Mackenzie King did 
not support an empire council and associated secretariat because of his nation’s 
relations with the US.141
                                                            
138 (Anon.), “Australia Has British Mandate In The Pacific”, Canberra, 9 May 1944, p. 2. 
  Also Canada had adopted a much more independent stance 
139 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Broadcast”, West, 9 May 1944, p. 2; Winston Churchill, “War and 
International Situation”, Hansard, London, 22 February 1944, retrieved on 12 February 2010 
at <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1944/feb/22/war-and-internationa-
situation#S5CV0397P0_19440222_HOC_342>. 
140 (Anon.), “Australia Has British Mandate In The Pacific”, Canberra, 9 May 1944, p. 2; 
(Anon.), “Press Comment: ‘Need Have No Doubt’”, West, 9 May 1944, p. 3. 
141 (Anon.), “Curtin Opens Fight for Empire Bureau”, The New York Times, New York, 5 
May 1944, p. 8; (Anon.), “End Of Conference”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, cited in 
Scrapbooks, 20 May 1944; Black, In his own words, p. 242. 
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than Australia since the 1920s.142  Despite these disagreements, Curtin reiterated his 
message of unity. This seemed popular because he and Peter Fraser were awarded 
the honorary degrees of Doctor of Laws at Cambridge University;143 then he lunched 
with King George VI at Buckingham Palace.144  Moreover, British Movietone 
focused on Curtin and Fraser when they were presented with the “Freedom of the 
City of London” at Guildhall.  Leaving aside his notes, Curtin spoke of Britain’s 
“pledge of honour” to defeat Nazi Germany.  “That pledge was expressed and 
supported by the people of Australia”, he declared to an applauding audience.  In like 
manner to his previous London addresses, he emphasised Europe’s conflict, rather 
than Pacific battles, to engage British audiences.145  Correspondent David McNicoll 
noticed his informal relations with ordinary Britons: his politeness was 
incomprehensible to “two pleasant-faced, elderly English maids”; he invited his 
driver to share tea at Ye Abbott’s Kitchen in Guildford; and he was “quite 
unimpressed” with the “almost royal” procession of “bowing waiters and bellboys” 
at his hotel.146  In a newsreel released on 1 June, British Movietone portrayed him as 
a celebrity at Lords cricket ground, where he talked with schoolboys, clamouring for 
his autograph, as well as servicemen and women.  Although the narrator explained 
this was “[a]n exciting match with cricket stars old and new”, Curtin was the leading 
figure; his twofold strategy, interacting with dignitaries and working people, was 
successful.147
  
  In Murdoch’s Herald, for instance, a cartoonist good-naturedly  
                                                            
142 Bobbie Oliver, “Shaping the Nation: John Curtin and Australia” [hereafter “Shaping the 
nation”], JCPML, Bentley, 2001, retrieved on 4 June 2008 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/shapingthenation/index.htm>. 
143 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin At Cambridge”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks, 19 May 1944. 
144 Campbell, “Diary”, 5 May 1944. 
145 British Movietone, “Commonwealth Premiers Honoured”, in Newsreels of Curtin, 1944. 
146 David McNicoll, “Curtin’s Informality Embarrasses Servants”, The Daily Telegraph, 
Sydney, 21 May 1944; David McNicoll, “Mr Curtin’s Barber Talks of Cricket”, The Argus, 
Melbourne, 20 May 1944.  Both articles were cited in Scrapbooks. 
147 British Movietone, “Lord’s”, in Newsreels of Curtin, 1944. 
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caricatured Curtin’s consonance with Churchill (see Figure 26).148
 
  Norman Lindsay 
of The Bulletin indicated Curtin was outshining, or perhaps taking credit from, 
extremely different national identities, ranging from veteran politician, Billy Hughes,  
 
Figure 26 
                                                            
148 Figure 26 appeared in (Anon.), “The Harmony Boys”, The Herald, Melbourne, 20 May 
1944.  Similar cartoons, indicating goodwill between the prime ministers, appeared in 
(Anon.), “At The Ringside”, The Herald, Melbourne, 2 May 1944; (Anon.), “Canada, 
Australia Shakes Hands – With A Proviso”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 20 May 1944.  
All three cartoons did not clearly identify the illustrators and were cited in Scrapbooks. 
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to athletes (see Figure 27).149
Figure 27 
 Later at an Australian interview, Curtin said he and  
 
                                                            
149 Figure 27 appeared in Norman Lindsay, “Who Put Australia On The Map?”, The Bulletin, 
cited in Scrapbooks, 24 May 1944.  The caption states: “Even his bitterest political 
opponents will have to admit that Mr. Curtin has done a good job for Australia at the Empire 
conference … He has put Australia on the map … from London to the Sydney ‘Sun.’” 
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Churchill “had got on handsomely” in London.150
 
  The pictorial, cinematic and press 
representations of strong Anglo-Australian relations were consistent with his private 
comments at his news briefings. 
 
“A very favourable impression on Canadian newspaper men”, May-June 1944 
When Curtin arrived in Ottawa on his return from Britain, he generated resoundingly 
positive film images, radio reports and press statements that masked Mackenzie 
King’s disagreement with the Australian Government’s “empire council” proposal.  
At 10.15pm on 30 May 1944, King met John and Elsie Curtin at Union Station, 
Ottawa, where they were greeted by reporters, photographers and a film crew, as 
well as a large crowd that gave “a spirited ovation”.151  Curtin and King used the 
mass media to support their international partnership because Canadian and 
Australian troops shared experiences in the wars on Germany and Japan.  More than 
37,000 Australian airmen had participated in the Empire Air Training Scheme during 
the war and this involved travelling to Canada for advanced instruction.152
  
  Likewise, 
Canada supported Australians in the Pacific theatre.  In October 1941, two months 
before the Japanese war, about 1,975 Canadian soldiers had sailed from Vancouver 
to defend Hong Kong.  In addition, about 8,000 Canadians served in South East  
                                                            
150 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 210. 
151 Campbell, “Diary”, 30 May 1944; Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s visit”, pp. 
10-22; ScreenSound Australia, Prime Minister Welcomed In Canada (newsreel) [hereafter 
Prime minister welcomed in Canada], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01052/1, 1944. 
152 Also Australians were crew members of landing craft to take Canadians to the beaches of 
Normandy.  See Australian War Memorial, “Australia, Britain & Canada In The Second 
World War”, Canberra, 2005-2006, retrieved on 5 June 2010 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/sharedexperience/index.asp>; Australian War 
Memorial, “Empire Air Training Scheme”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 5 June 2010 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_14939.asp>. 
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Asia.153  To promote his nation’s war effort, King had invited Australian journalists 
to visit his nation in March 1944; in response, Curtin sent three senior Canberra 
correspondents.154
 
 
In the Ottawa newsreel, Curtin delivered a targeted message when he spoke 
about the “successful prime ministers’ conference”, as well as Australian airmen 
training in Canada for “a common cause”.  Both nations would “stand side by side” 
to “represent free people” fighting for a “victory” against “aggressors”.  He added: 
“Never again will evil rear its head in the world.”  Likewise, King emphasised terms 
of “unity”.155  The next day at the Canadian House of Commons, Curtin held an 
informal interview to answer reporters’ questions; however, King appeared to 
discourage impromptu queries and Ottawa correspondents noticed this difference.156  
While focusing on Australia’s battles and labour challenges, Curtin spoke of the need 
for a world organisation and post-war planning.  As he sought to persuade journalists 
to accept his foreign policies, he tried to establish a link with them by saying “the 
press and parliament are the two great institutions that have a trusteeship in the 
service of men”.157
Mr Curtin made a very favourable impression on Canadian newspaper men, 
many of whom have expressed the opinion that it was one of the most useful 
conferences ever held in the Ottawa [Press] Gallery.
  Australian High Commissioner to Canada, Sir William Glasgow, 
a former conservative politician, wrote: 
158
                                                            
153 (Anon.), “Canada To Play Big Role In Pacific”, Canberra, 6 April 1945, p. 2; The Battle 
for Australia Commemoration National Council, “Battle for Australia”, National Council 
Newsletter, Evatt, 2008, retrieved on 6 June 2010 at 
<http://www.battleforaustralia.org.au/2911/Latest_News>; Veteran Affairs Canada, “Canada 
and the Second World War 1939-1945”, Ottawa, 1998, retrieved on 6 June 2010 at 
<http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=history/secondwar/canada2/intro>. 
 
154 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 92. 
155 ScreenSound Australia, Prime minister welcomed in Canada. 
156 (Anon.), “Canada At War”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01222/15, 12 June 1944, p. 16; Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s visit”; Roosevelt, 
“Press conference”, 16 September 1944. 
157 (Anon.), “Curtin Hails M’Arthur; Says Allies Now Hold Initiative In Every Theatre”, The 
New York Times, New York, 1 June 1944, p. 7; Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s 
visit”, pp. 10-22. 
158 Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s visit”, pp. 10-22. 
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On 1 June, a day after the news briefing, Curtin spoke for 45 minutes without notes 
to both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, where he affirmed, “the struggle to 
preserve Australia was a struggle to be of service to the world”.  Possibly aware of 
media microphones, he made “a plea for the average citizen, for the shopkeeper, for 
the mother of forty years of age”.  He exhorted Canadians to work with Australians 
in “fraternity and association and collaboration”.159  Curtin received standing 
ovations and mainly favourable news coverage,160 while press photographs conveyed 
his friendly relations with Canada’s Government.161
 
 
 
Revisiting Roosevelt, June 1944 
During his return trip to the US, Curtin skilfully raised journalists’ awareness of his 
foreign policies while avoiding questions about his second meeting with FDR on 5 
June.  During his blunt talk to the National Press Club luncheon, three hours before 
he saw Roosevelt, he focused on “the problems of Australia”.  He explained, “I 
resolved that America should not go to sleep on its responsibility” in the Pacific.  
Emphasising Australia’s role, he asserted: “You must not get it into your head that 
Douglas MacArthur is an American commander … he is the Allied commander … 
and, during the greater part of his leadership, the major part of his forces have not 
come from the United States”.  Referring to the US government’s previous 
neutrality, he told journalists that no country should “isolate itself from the 
influences of another”.162  He might have intended his message to be heard by some 
isolationist US politicians and press owners, such as Colonel Robert McCormick, 
Chicago Daily Tribune proprietor, who had reportedly complained of Australia’s 
“insufficient war effort”.163
                                                            
159 John Curtin, “Speech To Canadian Parliament”, DDA, no. 81, 1 June 1944, pp. 75-84.  
Also see King, “Diaries”, 1 June 1944, pp. 564-565. 
  Curtin said the “present problem” was that Australia had 
“worn out a great part of our capital equipment” by supplying most requirements of 
160 (Anon.), “Curtin Urges Unity Of Allies After War”, The New York Times, New York, 2 
June 1944, p. 3; Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s visit”, pp. 1-3. 
161 E.g. (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin In Canada”, The Argus, Melbourne, 5 June 1944; (Anon.), “Mr. 
Curtin In Ottawa”, The Argus, Melbourne, 23 June 1944; Canadian Wartime Information 
Board, “Mr. Curtin Addresses Canadian Parliament”, The Sun News-Pictorial, Melbourne, 5 
June 1944.  Articles cited in Scrapbooks. 
162 John Curtin, “Speech to National Press Club, Washington” [hereafter “Press club 
speech”], DDA, no. 81, 5 June 1944, p. 90. 
163 (Anon.), “McCormick Answers Some Questions: Complains of Lag in Australia’s War 
Effort”, The Argus, Melbourne, 6 July 1944, p. 2. 
Chapter 8   “A new world”: Curtin’s global communications, January - July 1944 
356 
 
the Allied forces based in the nation.164  As a result, Australia’s lend-lease 
commitments would amount to one-sixth of its war expenditure in 1944.  Balancing 
his sharp rhetoric with appeals to democracy, “a high sense of national duty” and a 
global “good neighbour policy”,165 he sought to prepare US journalists to accept their 
nation’s increasing fight in the Pacific as more Australian troops were transferred to 
wartime industries.  Afterwards the Associated Press and The Christian Science 
Monitor reported positively on Curtin’s statement that Australia was supplying 95 
per cent of US forces’ food requirements in the South-West Pacific.166
 
   
Differing from his talk at the National Press Club luncheon, Curtin did not 
publicise a detailed account of his discussion with Roosevelt for one and a half hours 
on 5 June.167  His itinerary and appointment book indicated only that he left the 
Shoreham Hotel in Washington DC to see Roosevelt at 3.30pm and then took a train 
bound for New York at 8pm.168  On the same day, he also wrote a letter to FDR on 
the need to adjust Australian military levels to cope with food production 
requirements; he emphasised, “the Government and people of Australia are anxious 
that the strength of the fighting forces should not be permitted to fall below a certain 
minimum point”.169  After his meeting, he simply advised the media: “Events will 
indicate what we talked about”.170  Perhaps Curtin was referring to Roosevelt’s 
“fireside chat” that evening, when he announced that “Rome fell to American and 
Allied troops”,171 and his next day’s White House press conference, where he talked 
good-humouredly with 181 correspondents about the “D-Day” landing on 6 June.172
                                                            
164 Curtin, “Press club speech”, p. 89. 
  
During the Normandy invasion, Curtin continued to generate favourable publicity as 
165 Curtin, “Press club speech”, p. 90. 
166 (Anon.), “Lend-Lease Helps Yanks in Australia”, The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 
6 June 1944, p. 7. 
167 (Anon.), Untitled, DDA, no. 81, 5 June 1944, p. 35. 
168 Frederick McLaughlin, “Prime Minister's visit to England via USA, Itinerary and 
engagements 1944” [hereafter “Travel itinerary”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00129/1, pp. 10, 23 (online page numbers have been cited). 
169 John Curtin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 7, 5 June 1944. 
170 John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Meetings With President Roosevelt”, DDA, no. 81, 5 June 
1944, p. 35. 
171 Roosevelt, “Fireside chat”, in Woolley and Peters, American presidency project, 5 June 
1944. 
172 Roosevelt, “Press conference”, 6 June 1944. 
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he met New York Mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, resulting in The New York Times 
publishing a headline that “they think alike”;173 then he boarded a ship with Elsie in 
San Francisco to return to Australia on 11 June.174
 
  
Figure 28175
Uncharacteristically, he adopted other leaders’ travel policies and censored 
the press from reporting on his return journey until his official entourage safely 
 
                                                            
173 (Anon.), “Curtin Visits La Guardia; Australian Premier and Mayor Find They Think 
Alike”, The New York Times, New York, 8 June 1944, p. 10. 
174 Heather Campbell, “Diary”, 11 June 1944. 
175 Figure 28 shows a Time magazine cover that was illustrated by Boris Artzybasheff and 
published on 24 April 1944.  JCPML, “Time magazine, vol. 43 no. 17, 24 April 1944”, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00953/1, 1944. 
Chapter 8   “A new world”: Curtin’s global communications, January - July 1944 
358 
 
reached Australia.176  Journalists remarked on his unusual decision to travel without 
a bodyguard.177  While Curtin did not employ a bodyguard, his travel itinerary 
showed that he paid $US 105 in gratuities to “plain-clothes police”, “motor-cycle 
police” and detectives, assigned to him in New York and Washington DC.178
Although every man can be forgiven for loving his own country best, I 
believe it is an impartial assessment of the facts to say that I have not seen 
any country or any people better than my own.
  Upon 
his arrival in Brisbane on 26 June, a newsreel team filmed his patriotic, targeted 
greeting to Australian reporters.  During his stand-up, he smiled and said:  
179
Returning to his regular Canberra press gallery interviews on 3 July, he seemed 
“initially querulous” but “warmed to the talk” and his two-hour discussion was one 
of his “best and most interesting” conferences, Cox noted.
 
180  Curtin confirmed, “the 
tempo of the Pacific operations was satisfactory”;181 later he informed journalists, 
“the immediate future had been settled by his talks in Washington”.182  Curtin even 
appeared to praise McCormick’s Chicago Daily Tribune.  In his regular letter to 
Murdoch, Cox wrote of Curtin’s appraisal that the Tribune was “well conducted and 
efficient”, but “it went astray only when its proprietor himself wrote its leading 
articles”.  Curtin apparently added that this problem occurred in other newspaper 
organisations, “when people on the management undertake themselves a task for 
which they pay competent journalists”.183
                                                            
176 Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 9 June 1944, p. 4. 
  Perhaps he was commenting on 
Murdoch’s editorials, although he did not directly name any Australian press 
proprietor.  On the whole, Curtin generated favourable news coverage in The New  
177 (Anon.), “John Curtin gets ready for London trip”, The Australian Women’s Weekly, 
Sydney, 1 April 1944, p. 9; Alan Reid, “Plain John Curtin Who Led Australia Through 
Darkest Days”, The Sun, Sydney, in JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. JCPML00964/165, 5 
July 1945. 
178 McLaughlin, “Travel itinerary”, pp. 3-4. 
179 This newsreel scene was shown in: ScreenSound Australia, “A Great Australian Passes”, 
in John Joseph Curtin 1885 – 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 
1944. 
180 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944. 
181 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 210. 
182 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 17 February 1945. 
183 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944. 
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York Times, The Washington Post and Time magazine.184
 
  His sharp words to the US 
National Press Club appeared to increase international correspondents’ 
understanding of his foreign policy priorities.   
 
Curtin and Menzies: Dissonant styles 
In contrast to Menzies’ prime ministerial overseas press interactions, Curtin made 
frequent and enthusiastic use of the mass media during his time in Britain, Canada 
and the US.  A comparison was made of the media strategies adopted by Curtin and 
Menzies when each prime minister travelled to these Allied areas.  Menzies spent 87 
days in these countries from 20 February to 17 May 1941.  According to his detailed 
diary notes, he directly associated with the media 15 times then, including his radio 
broadcasts (see Appendix 10).185  In his 54 day trip in 1944, Curtin had 17 media 
associations including newsreel appearances, interviews and broadcasts (see 
Appendix 11).186  Although Curtin and Menzies made other public statements, they 
were not included in this comparison.  Thus Curtin interacted with the media at least 
once every three days while overseas.  In contrast Menzies talked with the media 
slightly less than once every six days.  Therefore Curtin directly interacted with the 
media twice as much as Menzies in Britain, Canada and the US.  Moreover, Menzies 
seemed reluctant to talk with journalists.  After he arrived in England, he was 
“forced” to speak to a “movie-camera man” and give interviews; it was “the kind of 
thing I shy at very much”, he wrote.187  In newsreels, Menzies addressed overseas 
press conferences, but did not take any questions;188
                                                            
184  This study included the following issues: The New York Times on 5, 20, 22 and 24-27 
April 1944, 5, 19, 22 and 31 May 1944, 1, 2 and 8 June 1944; The Washington Post on 26 
December 1941, 6 and 25 April 1944, 12 and 15 May 1944, 18 July 1944; Time on 13 
October 1941, 5 and 12 January 1942, 2 and 23 March 1942, 12 October 1942, 23 and 30 
August 1943, 31 January 1944, 17 April 1944, 12 June 1944. 
 Curtin answered journalists’ 
185 A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 Diary 
[hereafter Dark and hurrying days], NLA, Canberra, 1993, pp. 60-132. 
186 Campbell, “Diary”, April to June 1944; JCPML, “Index to John Curtin’s speeches”.  For 
a more detailed account, see Appendix 11. 
187 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 60. 
188 British Movietone News (producer), Mr. Menzies On Eve Of Sailing Reviews War 
Situation, England, 8 May 1941; Movietone News (producer), Mr. Menzies In New York, 
New York, 19 May 1941. 
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queries.189  Menzies told reporters that he returned home “with just one sick feeling 
in my heart” because he was forced to “play politics”.190  US diplomat, Averell W. 
Harriman, informed Roosevelt that Menzies’ “nose was a bit out of joint in London 
as he wanted to be made a member of the [British] War Cabinet”.191  Curtin, 
however, quickly denied media rumours that he wanted to remain in England, telling 
Canberra journalists on 4 July that although these untruths were “a fantastic piece of 
nonsense”, it “could do much harm” to his reputation in Australia.192  The positive 
relationship that he forged with the journalists was reflected in their treatment of the 
information that he provided to them, irrespective of policy.  No evidence has been 
found to show that Curtin intended to stay in Britain.  In fact, a journalist noted that 
he was probably the first Australian prime minister to have packed so lightly for an 
overseas trip.193  In London, he had reportedly appeared “tired after almost non-stop 
conferences and negotiations” to achieve his “major aim” of securing British support 
for more resources in the Pacific after Hitler’s fall.194  Across Australia, newspaper 
correspondents wrote that he was happy to return home.195
 
  Curtin’s international 
strategies differed remarkably from those developed by Menzies in terms of their 
approaches to journalists, the frequency of their interviews and their attitudes 
towards their prime ministerial roles in Canberra. 
 
                                                            
189 (Anon.), “Canada At War”, Time, New York, cited in JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01222/15, 12 June 1944, p. 16; Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s visit”, pp. 10-22; 
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190 Robert Menzies, “Transcript of Press Conference Film” [hereafter “Film transcript”], 
Menzies Virtual Museum, East Melbourne, 1941, retrieved on 18 May 2009 at 
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Robins (executive producer), The Prime Ministers’ National Treasures: Robert Menzies’ 
Camera (television broadcast), Film Australia, Old Parliament House and the Australian 
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Sydney, 1 April 1944, p. 9. 
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195 E.g. (Anon.), “Mr Curtin Back In Australia”, The Mercury, Hobart, 27 June 1944, p. 12; 
(Anon.), “Mr Curtin Home”, The Cairns Post, Cairns, 27 June 1944, p. 2; (Anon.), “Prime 
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“Mr. Curtin’s announcement was cheered by members”, July 1944 
In the Federal Parliament, Curtin explained his international mission objectives, 
including planning for the Pacific conflict to be “prosecuted with the same vigour as 
the war in Europe” and ensuring the nation “can most influentially express itself” in 
a post-war “world organization”.  During his speech on 17 July, he introduced a new 
keyword about a national “purpose” to bolster enthusiasm for a prolonged war and 
more international collaboration.196  He spoke of “our purpose” to “influence” world 
decisions and fulfil the “ideals” of “fair play, fair dealing, tolerance and justice, and 
the right of each to live their lives equally freely”.197  Along with his increased 
appeals to egalitarian ideals, he announced that British “large and powerful forces” 
would become available later in 1944 to contribute to “the ultimate defeat of 
Japan”.198  At the same time, he said: “I offer no opinion on the speedy end of the 
struggle in Europe.”199  As a result, he had arranged “to re-allocate the man-power 
resources of Australia”.  While the nation intended to make “a fighting contribution”, 
more Australians would be transferred from the military to work in “economic 
services” that would supply Allied troops.200  Since he did not deliver his speech 
directly to public crowds, it was more complex than his radio broadcasts.  The text of 
his address registered a Flesch Reading Score of 42.8, meaning it was suitable for 
readers with 13 years of education.  Yet his repetition of inclusive terms, such as 
“we”, “us” and “the people”, indicated his messages were intended for a wider 
audience.201  Also he carefully selected words calculated to inspire Australians, such 
as his tributes to their “war effort”, which had “evoked the highest praise” from 
Allied leaders.202
                                                            
196 Curtin, “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44.  He referred to a national “purpose” seven 
times. 
 
197 Curtin made 24 references to hope, the future, vision and unity.  Furthermore, keywords 
of freedom, liberty and independence were mentioned ten times.  Curtin, “Prime ministers’ 
meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
198 Emphasising a British orientation, he made 47 references to this region; in contrast, the 
US was mentioned only 17 times.  Also he spoke of the “war” 85 times and “enemy” nations 
46 times.  Curtin, “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
199 He increased his references to “peace” and “security” terms, mentioning them 49 times, 
contrasting with his 1941 addresses.  Curtin, “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
200 He used “economy” keywords 12 times.  Curtin, “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
201 In fact, Curtin spoke of “we”, “us” and “the people” 138 times.  Curtin, “Prime Ministers’ 
Meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
202 Curtin used “nationhood” keywords 42 times.  Curtin, “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 
28-44. 
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As a result, his parliamentary speech received mainly positive press coverage, 
with several journalists promoting his cleverly constructed word-picture of British 
“large and powerful forces” moving into the Pacific to help defend Australia.  The 
speech text was prominently displayed and substantially repeated in The Age,203 The 
Canberra Times,204 The Sydney Morning Herald205 and The West Australian.206  For 
example, Curtin’s new keyword about “purpose” appeared six times in the related 
Canberra Times coverage, including the leader headline, “Australian Purposes and 
Method”.  Indicating the newspaper’s endorsement, a Canberra Times journalist 
wrote, “Mr. Curtin’s announcement was cheered by members” in the parliament.  
Furthermore as the tide of global battles continued to turn in favour of the Allied 
advance, reporters increasingly referred to his idealistic rhetoric of hope, freedom, 
the future, cooperation and “a new system of world security”.207  While The West 
Australian and The Age editorials focused on other subjects, the publishers’ 
reprinting of a considerable part of his speech conveyed their approval.208  Likewise, 
Curtin’s message of “large and powerful British forces” attracted US media 
attention; The Chicago Daily Tribune and The Washington Post publicised his 
speech.209
 
 
                                                            
203 (Anon.), “British Forces In The Pacific This Year: London Conference Survey by Prime 
Minister”, Age, 18 July 1944, p. 3.  Curtin’s speech was quoted directly in 17 sentences and 
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(Anon.), “Man-Power Review Promised: Parliament Hears Prime Minister’s Report”, p. 1; 
(Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Review”, p. 2; (Anon), “Review Of London and Washington Talks: 
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206 (Anon.), “Mr Curtin’s Mission: Statement To House: British Forces: In Pacific This 
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207 Curtin referred nine times to a “world organization”; seven times to “world security”; also 
he spoke of a “world of collaboration”, “world peace” and a “world council”.  See Curtin, 
“Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
208 Please refer to footnotes 203 and 206. 
209 (Anon.), “British Aid Assured in Pacific in ‘44”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 
18 July 1944, p. 2; (Anon.), “British To Send Army To Pacific In 1944-Curtin”, Chicago 
Daily Tribune, Chicago, 18 July 1944, p. 6. 
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The Sydney Morning Herald leader writer adopted a more neutral tone when 
writing that a “disappointing feature of the Prime Minister’s otherwise excellent and 
exhaustive report” was the “vagueness of his references to the reallocation of 
Australian man-power”.  The journalist continued that the parliament was “entitled to 
an outline of official plans”.210  At his press conference a few days earlier, Curtin had 
asked reporters to tell newspaper editors not to be “too impatient” about the 
“manpower” question because the government was still ascertaining “a proper 
balance” between their army and food export commitments.211  Also The Sydney 
Morning Herald leading news story was a favourable summary of Curtin’s speech 
and continued to page five.212  Overall the newspaper’s coverage was positive, 
similar to the other three dailies, because it fulfilled this study’s criteria that two-
thirds of the statements needed to support Curtin.  His public assurances that Britain 
would strengthen the military fight against Japan appeared to be evidenced by some 
tangible results.  By November 1944, the British Pacific Fleet was formed213 and also 
British forces had superior numbers, weaponry and air cover to the Japanese in 
Burma.  The British 14th Army helped to achieve a victory in the Battles of Mandalay 
and Meiktila in central Burma from February to March 1945.  As a result, the British 
4th Corps, the 33rd Corps, elements of the 15th Corps and the Gurkhas entered the 
capital city of Rangoon and assisted in effectively liberating Burma on 6 May 
1945.214
 
 
Yet in his private news briefings, Curtin appeared to play down Britain’s 
commitment to fighting in the Pacific.  On 3 July, Curtin reportedly said: “Any idea 
that millions of men might be based in Australia was poppycock.”215
                                                            
210 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Review”, SMH, 18 July 1944, p. 2. 
  While the 
211 Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, pp. 212-213. 
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(Anon.), “Review Of London and Washington Talks: Mr Curtin’s Speech to Parliament: 
Report On Conference of Empire Leaders”, SMH, 18 July 1944, pp. 1, 5. 
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Canberra, 2011, retrieved on 13 January 2011 at 
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214 Helen Cleary, Phil Edwards, Bruce Robinson and Victoria Cook, “WW2 People’s War”, 
BBC, London, 2003-2005, retrieved on 6 June 2010 at 
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Chapter 8   “A new world”: Curtin’s global communications, January - July 1944 
364 
 
“British flag will be shown in the Pacific”, the Churchill administration planned “a 
huge demobilisation of forces” with victory in Europe.216  This view appeared to be 
consistent with Churchill’s description of his Japan strategy in his volume, Closing 
the Ring.  Reflecting on his decisions, Churchill wrote he was “against sending” his 
country’s forces “to play a minor role in MacArthur’s [Pacific] operations”, adding 
that making “a mere minor contribution to the Americans … was not likely to appeal 
to the British people”.217  He was committed, however, to “build up a fleet in the 
Pacific” that would be active after Hitler’s defeat.218  Curtin confided to the press 
gallery that the Allies’ planned liberation of Normandy was “going slower than was 
expected”.  By 10 July, Cox commented that Curtin seemed “in a despondent mood 
about Allied progress in Europe”.  Moreover, he was scathing about “the ballyhoo” 
of exaggerated US reports while praising the more reserved British news coverage.  
His discouragement deepened with the news of more Allied shipping losses from 
Nazi U-boat submarine attacks, along with official, confirmed reports of new 
German “rocket bombs” and suicide “human torpedoes”.219  The disturbing news did 
not appear in Curtin’s parliamentary speech or in the selected newspapers’ resultant 
coverage.  The sense of gloom was privately shared by the Allies, who were fighting 
inshore and encountering difficulties in Normandy’s dense hedgerow country, known 
as the bocage, during the stalemate in June and July.  The Axis defence weakened to 
such an extent that Hitler permitted a Nazi withdrawal from Normandy on 16 
August, paving the way for the German surrender to the Allied French Resistance on 
25 August.  As Curtin balanced his publicly stated idealism with confidential war 
assessments, he maintained the support of the major dailies for his foreign 
policies.220
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Conclusion 
Through Curtin’s media strategies, he initiated public talks on his policies to reduce 
Australian troops; transfer released servicemen to remedy “acute” labour 
shortages;221 promote the nation’s heroic sacrifices, minimise damaging assessments 
of the heavy casualties, and assert Australia’s regional and global roles.  Curtin was 
particularly candid to the Canberra press gallery, using the AWC as a 
communications tool to pass on important information to journalists and provide 
them with unbiased, logical reasons for his policies.  Through a semiotic analysis of 
available newsreels, it was revealed that Curtin approved close-up, eye-level film 
images of himself and carefully rehearsed his rhetoric and gestures, as well as using 
different signs that linked him to esteemed Allied leaders, democratic institutions and 
working citizens.  The signified meaning was that he was able to connect closely to 
diverse cinema audiences and communicate effortlessly with them.  His film rhetoric 
conveyed that he delivered targeted messages to suit different audiences, but 
preferred to emphasise keywords of “free people” fighting for a “common cause” 
and “victory” against the “aggressor”.222  He received support from the media 
messages delivered by Churchill,223 Mackenzie King,224 Roosevelt225 and Truman.226  
Yet film audiences were not told of private tensions between Australia and the US 
over war brides, renegotiated lend-lease commitments and the ANZAC Pact.  This 
cinematic depiction of Allied unity accomplished the Foucault task of masking 
national power and governmental struggles.227  Although he cultivated an austere 
media image, appealing to the wartime mood of civic responsibility, he appeared 
more cheerful, confident and relaxed in newsreels228 and photographs of his 1944 
overseas mission.229
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In 1944, Curtin increasingly expanded conventional views of the public 
sphere, using the mass news media to encourage more citizens to participate in 
political discussions, and overturning the “masculine, elite and exclusive world” of 
the traditional domain.230  As stated in Chapter 3, Elsie and John Curtin made public 
statements to encourage more women to enter prominent careers.231  Their socially 
progressive attitudes, along with the deployment of young male journalists into 
military service, might have influenced Australian media owners, who hired more 
female correspondents than ever before, although the number was still relatively 
small.232  During their visit to the US, John and Elsie Curtin developed media 
strategies that revealed their support for women in the public sphere.  The positive 
experiences of Australian “war brides” were publicised in newsreels and press 
reports;233 at the same time, the “Battle of Brisbane” riot was censored to achieve 
Curtin’s aim of increasing media images of a strong Allied partnership.  At her first 
US media conference, Elsie generated favourable news coverage for her activities to 
promote the roles of women in public affairs.234  Curtin held unprecedented news 
conferences in terms of their frequency and openness in San Francisco, Washington 
DC, England and Ottawa.  This research suggested that Curtin directly associated 
with the media twice as much as Menzies during their respective prime ministerial 
visits to Britain, Canada and the US.235  While Menzies was “forced” to talk to the 
media,236 Curtin enthusiastically sought opportunities to promote his nation.  
Menzies informed journalists he was upset about leaving England “to play politics” 
in Australia.237
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to remain in London and instead, they welcomed his return to Australia.238
 
  Thus 
Curtin set precedents for an Australian leader to engage in open-ended conversations 
with journalists at international media conferences, while Elsie Curtin initiated direct 
relationships between an Australian prime minister’s wife and international 
correspondents. 
A textual analysis of two of Curtin’s 1944 speeches revealed his balancing of 
idealism and realism.  While he increased his appeals to “liberty”, “freedom” and 
“civilisation”, he shifted the tone of his rhetoric from focusing on the Pacific war to 
emphasising the Allies’ “Beat Hitler first” strategy.  In his BBC broadcast on 8 May, 
he used keywords and imagery to emphasise British values of freedom, liberty and 
fairness and common bonds with Australians.  Through this radio talk, he tried to 
persuade his listeners to accept Australia as a bastion of venerable empire ideals that 
deserved to be defended from aggressive enemies.  His speech was still aimed at a 
secondary-school level and was favourably presented in diverse international media 
outlets across the political spectrum.239  In his parliamentary address on 17 July, he 
introduced the keyword of a “national purpose”, indicating his commitment to build 
a strong Australia.  As a result of his negotiations with Churchill, he was able to 
announce to the parliament the next month that “large and powerful” British forces 
would be available to help defeat Japan.240  Although he later appeared to play down 
this UK commitment in his private press briefings, saying it would not mean 
“millions of men”,241
                                                            
238 E.g. (Anon.), “Mr Curtin Back In Australia”, The Mercury, Hobart, 27 June 1944, p. 12; 
(Anon.), “Mr Curtin Home”, The Cairns Post, Cairns, 27 June 1944, p. 2; (Anon.), “Prime 
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 Churchill was planning a Pacific fleet and British forces had 
gained superiority over the Japanese in Burma by November 1944, leading to its 
liberation in May the next year.  Curtin’s parliamentary speech was aimed at a higher 
level than his BBC broadcast.  Yet both addresses received mainly positive news 
coverage in The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The 
West Australian.  His announcement of Britain’s role in the war against Japan was 
tempered with confidential, realistic assessments that he shared with Australian 
239 Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56. 
240 Curtin, “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
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journalists and he was able to maintain the major dailies’ support for his foreign 
policies.  Although he had addressed the national food shortages by transferring more 
military personnel to agricultural production, he faced fresh political and 
international challenges in late 1944 and early 1945 as Australians sought to secure a 
role in international peace negotiations and post-war planning.  Curtin also 
experienced health problems that eventually led to his death in July 1945.  The next 
chapter examines how he managed to secure news reporters’ consensus to portray 
him as the nation’s representative from mid-1944 to 1945. 
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Chapter 9 
Curtin’s final year, July 1944 – July 1945 
 
 
As Curtin increasingly struggled with personal health problems, he attempted to 
focus media attention on Australia‟s military role in the Pacific war leading to 
Japan‟s surrender.  By publicising that Australians were fighting alongside other 
Allies in the final conflict, he aimed to secure an “effective voice”1 for the nation in 
world peace talks, post-war planning and the United Nations.  During the Allied 
advance towards Germany and Japan, he was frequently absent from the parliament 
due to illness from November 1944 until his death on 5 July 1945.  Although 
research suggested that he was still able to release statements, announcements and 
three radio messages during the early half of 1945, he did not give another major 
broadcast on foreign policy, as he had in 1944.2  To ascertain the level of press 
support for Curtin during the final year of his prime ministership, this chapter 
examines selected news coverage of two significant events in Australia in 1945: the 
press reports about his return to the parliament on 22 January after he was away on 
sick leave for about two and a half months, and the media‟s portrayal of his death. 
 
 
Managing news on a national referendum 
Curtin achieved his goal of focusing media attention on his foreign policy priorities, 
despite the failure of the Federal Government‟s referendum.  When confronted by the 
                                                            
1 John Curtin, “Prime Minister‟s Statement, February, 1944”, Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
[hereafter DDA], no. 75, 9 February 1944, p. 19. 
2 John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], “Index to John Curtin‟s speeches 
in the Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime 
Minister, 1941-1945” [hereafter “Index to John Curtin‟s speeches”], Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 01148/1, 2007.  According to this source, Curtin released three radio messages in 1945.  
The first two broadcasts focused on the “Third Victory Loan” and were delivered on 12 
March and 22 April.  The other radio talk was a recorded message on Empire Day on 24 
May. 
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losing political battle of the so-called “Fourteen Powers” Referendum, Curtin 
managed his press relations to avoid the appearance of a personal defeat.  Labor had 
initiated debates on the legislative proposals in 1942.  If passed, the referendum 
would have granted 14 powers, normally held by the states, to the Commonwealth 
Government for a temporary five-year period from the end of the war.3  Former ALP 
politician, Fred Daly, recalled separate proposals might have been successful; 
however, many Australians withdrew their support because all 14 provisions were 
grouped together in the ballot.4  Aware of the public mood, Curtin began to distance 
himself from the referendum campaign at his press conferences, telling reporters he 
would not allow it “to interfere” with his war initiatives.5  In The Sydney Morning 
Herald on 6 July 1944, he was quoted as saying: “The referendum is no longer my 
referendum.”  He added: “It is the referendum of the Commonwealth Parliament and 
of the State Premiers and leaders of the Opposition.”6  Although he delivered three 
national broadcasts to persuade voters,7 he became ill and needed to cancel his media 
interviews for ten days in August 1944.8  Only Western Australia and South 
Australia recorded a majority of votes in favour of the government proposals on 19 
August.9  Curtin did not elaborate on the results at his interview on 21 August, except 
                                                            
3 The Commonwealth Government was seeking powers over the following areas: 
rehabilitation of ex-service personnel; employment and unemployment; marketing of 
commodities; companies; trusts and monopolies; production and distribution; overseas 
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security; and indigenous Australians.  See Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom 
Briefings: John Curtin’s war [hereafter Backroom briefings], NLA, Canberra, 1997, p. 219; 
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and Labor Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999 [hereafter  Unity is strength], API 
Network, Bentley, 2003, pp. 164-165. 
4 Fred Daly, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Daly interview”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00494/1, 26 August-25 November 1976, transcript np. 
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to say “the whole matter would go to the Cabinet”.10  The widespread rejection of the 
domestic proposals did not affect Curtin‟s agenda for foreign policy. 
 
Around this time, he gave a news tip to journalists on Australia‟s confidential 
uranium agreement, arranged while he was in London.  Harold Cox and F.T. Smith 
privately wrote about plans to develop SA uranium deposits and export this “vital 
material” to Britain for “scientific purposes associated with the war”.11  According to 
Smith, Curtin asked reporters if they had leaked the uranium deal after the SA 
Premier, Thomas Playford, had complained that the prime minister made “derogatory 
remarks” about him in a media “background statement about uranium”.  Cox said he 
had passed on Curtin‟s news tip to Murdoch, “but had been informed there was no 
leakage” from his news organisation.  Curtin replied that “he gave off-the-record 
information to political roundsmen for the guidance of offices”.  He expected editors 
to maintain their verbal confidentiality deals to protect national security.  
Furthermore, he took “a serious view of the leakage”, implying that someone in the 
media had talked about the uranium development to Playford, “and if there were 
similar incidents in the future he would have to stop giving off-the-record 
information”.12  Although research suggested Curtin did not know of the top-secret 
US “Manhattan Project”, the code name for research involving the use of uranium to 
develop the atomic bomb, it was unusual for him to threaten to cancel his briefings.13  
Journalists seemed to have heeded his warning and the exceptionally candid 
interviews continued. 
 
 
                                                            
10 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 21 August 1944. 
11 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944; Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom 
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Reviving war morale 
While many Australian journalists welcomed Curtin‟s reassessment of foreign policy 
priorities, including troop reductions and transfers of military personnel to revitalise 
food production industries, they increasingly published reports that the nation‟s 
wartime sacrifices were being overlooked.  When Curtin visited two RAAF 
squadrons in London, some men asked him why they were accused of “dodging” 
battles against Japan.  “That is not the case,” he replied, but continued: “If there are 
any such foul aspersions, I will take immediate steps to stop it.”  Consequently 
newspaper headlines proclaimed Curtin‟s defence of the airmen.14  Also a Sydney 
Morning Herald photograph conveyed his strong support of Australian pilots about 
to leave England for a bombing mission over Vichy France.15  When he returned to 
his daily Canberra news conferences, he urged journalists to give a “complete 
picture” of Australian troops in Europe.  Moreover, he criticised North American 
journalists for their “misleading one-eyed and jaundiced picture of the war”, 
according to Cox and Smith.  Yet he praised “objective” Australian and British 
correspondents, who understood “reasons of diplomacy” and reported on other Allied 
nations‟ vital contributions.16  In August 1944, The Argus published an article about 
a British official war pamphlet that “omits to mention” other commonwealth nations.  
The pamphlet was originally sponsored by the Australian and NZ Governments to 
“dispel a widespread American impression that US forces are the only ones doing 
anything in the Pacific”, an Argus journalist wrote.  “The outcome is a purely British 
pamphlet”.  As a result, Australian News and Information Bureau director, David 
Bailey, lodged a “protest” to the British Information Service about the pamphlet, 
titled Britain v Japan.17  Although Allied leaders claimed to value Australians‟ 
fighting abilities, Curtin began recognising that some British and US publicists  
  
                                                            
14 (Anon.), “Curtin Defends RAAF: Australian Fliers in Atlantic Zone Resent Tag of „Jap 
Dodgers‟”, The New York Times, New York, 22 May 1944, p. 10; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Told 
Grievances: Airmen Resent Term „Jap-dodgers”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks compiled by the 
Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], JCPML, Bentley, no. 4, JCPML acc. no. 
00297/4, 22 May 1944. 
15 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Farewells Bombers”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks, 20 June 1944. 
16 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944; Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom 
briefings, p. 208. 
17 (Anon.), “Our Role In Pacific Overlooked”, The Argus, Melbourne, 5 August 1944, p. 3. 
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seemed to diminish Australia‟s role in the Pacific war.18 
 
Curtin presided over an AWC meeting that recommended a global publicity 
campaign to promote Australia‟s contribution towards helping to defeat Japanese 
forces in the Philippines.19  After he returned from his overseas trip, the Cabinet 
directed the release of another 30,000 army troops and 15,000 airmen to help 
produce food supplies for Britain and Allied forces in the Pacific.20  He also agreed 
to use the nation‟s military to fight the Japanese in islands that were previously 
Australian and British territory and mandates;21 this enabled MacArthur to withdraw 
all US forces from these areas to mount his offensive campaign against the 
Philippines and fulfil the pledge that he had made two years earlier, “I shall return”.22  
The Allies‟ Leyte Gulf invasion to recapture the Philippines began on 20 October 
1944 and it was the largest single RAN operation ever undertaken.23  In a private 
interview, Curtin asserted: “It‟s all flapdoodle to say that Australia is not going to be 
in the final stages of the war.”  Also, he added, Australian troops would be involved 
in “a lot of difficult cleaning up work” in “plenty of places south of the equator”.24  
He publicly stated that Australian and US forces would “share a comradeship in 
                                                            
18 Winston Churchill to John Curtin, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade [hereafter “Foreign affairs department”], vol. 7, 24 July 1944, retrieved on 10 
January 2010 at 
<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView>; John Curtin, 
“Meeting of Prime Ministers – Australian Prime Minister‟s Report”, DDA, no. 84, 17 July 
1944, pp. 32-33; Sumner Welles to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, 11 February 1942, retrieved on 15 February 
2010 at <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/PSF/BOX4/A50B01.TXT>.  To this 
memorandum, Sumner attached a message from the New Zealand Chief of Air Staff to the 
Chief of the Air Staff in Australia, retrieved on 15 February 2010 at 
<http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/PSF/BOX4/A50D03.TXT>. 
19 Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 28 September 1944, p. 3. 
20 John Curtin to Douglas MacArthur, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 8, 15 February 
1945. 
21 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 8, 14 February 1945. 
22 Cinesound Review (producer), MacArthur Speaks (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 01050/1, 1944. 
23 The invasion fleets included the following Australian ships: the heavy cruisers, Australia 
and Shropshire (a former British ship gifted to the Australian navy), the destroyers, Arunta 
and Warramunga, as well as the landing ships, Kanimbla, Manoora and Westralia.  See 
Robert Nichols, “The first kamikaze attack?” [hereafter “Kamikaze”], Wartime, Australian 
War Memorial, Canberra, no. 28, 2004, retrieved on 7 June 2010 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/wartime/28/index.asp>. 
24 Cox, “Typescript reports”, circa September 1944. 
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arms” during the Philippines invasion, “the greatest operation in the Pacific war so 
far”.25  A US Army Signal Corps newsreel celebrated the “Allied boomerang” of 
MacArthur‟s US and Australian forces as the general returned to the Philippines.  A 
narrator referred to HMAS Shropshire as being among the “600 ships and 250,000 
men” who were “hurtling” to Leyte and Palo in the Philippines.  This was “[t]he 
greatest Armanda ever seen in the Pacific war” because previously, “Aussies and 
Yanks have fought mainly over primitive and undeveloped islands”, the narrator 
said.26  To raise awareness of Australia‟s role, ABC journalist H.B. Graves 
conducted a 1945 interview with 28-year-old Lieutenant W.N. Swan of the HMAS 
Westralia, which had participated in the Leyte operations.  When Graves asked about 
“air attacks”, Swan talked of a suicide kamikaze pilot who unsuccessfully tried to 
“dive bomb” his ship.  Australia was also attacked and, according to Robert Nichols, 
historians have debated whether this was the first Allied ship to be hit by suicide 
aircraft.27  Swan told radio listeners the Leyte landing on 20 October was “our 
greatest day”, with “hundreds” of Filipinos “streaming down” the hilly country and 
boarding canoes to meet and thank the Australian navy.28  Even while he criticised 
“misleading” US news coverage, Curtin cooperated with MacArthur‟s 
communications bureau to sponsor films that reinforced his message of “a 
comradeship in arms”.   
 
Other patriotic films and radio broadcasts helped to counteract some global 
media messages that Australian troops were in a subordinate role.  Late in 1944, 
Australian forces relieved US garrisons at Aitape in New Guinea, Bougainville in the  
  
                                                            
25 John Curtin, “Allied Offensive–United States Forces Leave Australia” [hereafter “Allied 
offensive”], DDA, no. 91, 23 October, 1944, p. 35. 
26 US Army Signal Corps (producer), “MacArthur Returns!”, in At The Front: 1939-1945: 
Australia’s WWII Newsreels (newsreel) [hereafter At the front], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00441/2, 1944. 
27 Nichols, “Kamikaze”. 
28 Australian Broadcasting Commission, “Scripts of talks broadcast by the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission (ABC) Brisbane - War Time Recordings 1939 to 1945 - Interview 
with Lt W N Swan by N B Graves on HMAS Westralia”, [hereafter “Radio script”], National 
Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], Canberra, BP257/1, 73/2, 14 March 1945, pp. 1-7. 
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Solomons and in New Britain.29  On 15 November, the War Cabinet approved the 
posting of 500 volunteers from the Australian Women‟s Army Service to New 
Guinea.30  The RAAF reached its peak strength on 29 November, when there were 
183,822 airmen and airwomen.31  To produce one newsreel, the Australian 
Department of Information (DOI) teamed up with the US Army Signal Corps.  The 
fade-in depicted “an Australian job” as “the diggers” scoured the “bomb-blasted 
shore of stripped and tattered palms” in Madang, Western New Guinea.  Australians 
captured Madang, an important Japanese air base, on 24 April 1944.  A narrator 
explained these troops had advanced nearly 400 miles from Milne Bay.  To 
emphasise a significant Australian victory, the narrator said Japanese fighters had 
“gone bush”, leaving behind two anti-aircraft guns and a “big stock of fuel” for “our” 
patrol torpedo boats.  The camera operator panned across wrecked buildings, 
abandoned stores and old, Japanese “picture postcards”, but did not show any injured 
Australians.  Then the film cut to “the Yanks” in “Attape” on the east coast of 
Hollandia, where US warships fired on Japanese forces.  In this brief scene, the 
narrator simply said, “[t]he Yanks are ashore” and “flushing out Attape [Aitape] 
village with Tommy gun and tank” to “crush” enemy forces, without commenting on 
Allied casualties there.32  Moreover, Cinesound Review filmed the Australian 
Women‟s Army Service in New Guinea in 1945;33 while moviegoers also learned of 
the RAAF “Black Cats”, Catalina flying boats painted black because they were 
mostly used at nights.34  Further, reporters were advised on 16 January 1945 that the 
government was providing “a suite of rooms in Sydney” to 25 army officers and staff 
to help prepare scripts for the ABC‟s “Army Hour” broadcasts, which provided light 
national entertainment to Australian troops.35  Although fewer Australian servicemen 
                                                            
29 Roland Wilson, Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1944 and 1945 
[hereafter Year book 1944-45], Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, 
no. 36, 1947, p. 1019, retrieved on 16 January 2010 at 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/1301.01944-
45?OpenDocument>. 
30 Wilson, Year book 1944-45, p. 1020. 
31 Wilson, Year book 1944-45, p. 1030. 
32 Australian Government Department of Information and U.S. Army Signal Corps, “Allies 
Thrash Japs At Attape”, in At the front, circa 1944.  The film referred to “Attape”, but it was 
also spelt as “Aitape”. 
33 Cinesound Review (producer) “AWAS Enjoy New Guinea Life”, in At the front, 1945. 
34 Cinesound Review (producer) “Black Cats of RAAF”, in At the front, 1945. 
35 Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 235. 
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were in “an active operational role”,36 the national census recorded 727,152 army 
troops and 36,257 naval personnel at the end of the war; also there were 489 RAAF 
aircraft, compared with only 22 units in September 1939.37  Curtin tried to prevent 
the possibility of Americans saying “they won the Pacific war by themselves”38 
through magnifying the role of Australia‟s remaining combatants in his off-the-
record interviews, media statements and government newsreels. 
 
Although Australia‟s wartime media colluded with Curtin‟s political rhetoric 
to emphasise the significance of their nation‟s role in the Japanese retreat, some 
historians provided a more nuanced assessment of the “tenuous relevance” of the 
military tactics.  According to military historian, Jeffrey Grey, six Australian 
divisions39 were “actively engaged with the enemy” in the last months of the Pacific 
war and this was “a greater proportion than at any other time in the war”.40  As the 
Curtin administration planned to participate in the peace negotiations, they were able 
to prove that the nation had made a sustained fighting contribution.  Also, the 
government wanted to show to New Guinea‟s indigenous people that the “Australian 
imperium” had been restored in its territories.  Furthermore, parliamentary members 
were influenced by “compassionate arguments for freeing Australian prisoners of the 
Japanese as quickly as possible”.  Yet as Grey noted, Australian soldiers were 
involved in final campaigns that “made no difference to the outcome of the war” 
from a military perspective.  For example, nearly 1,000 Australians were killed in the 
fighting on Bougainville, New Guinea, and Aitape, but these two operations yielded 
“negligible strategic advancement”.  While the RAAF played a “significant role”, the 
Australian forces were “an adjunct” of US airpower.  Even though the RAN was 
“vital”, the navy‟s performance was “disappointing”41 because it lost many ships in 
                                                            
36 Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 7, JCPML acc. no. 00928/8, 20 January 1944, p. 3. 
37 Wilson, Year book 1944-45, pp. 1020, 1026, 1030. 
38 John Curtin to Winston Churchill, “Foreign affairs department”, vol. 7, 12 August 1944. 
39 These divisions were: 3rd Division; 5th Division; 6th Division; 7th Division; 9th Division; 
11th Division.  See Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia [hereafter Military history], 
Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, third edition, 2008, p. 190; Wilson, Year book 
1944-45, pp. 1019-1020. 
40 Grey, Military history, p. 190. 
41 Grey, Military history, p. 192. 
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action42 and did not sink any German or Japanese surface warships.  Overall 
Australia‟s military strategy was shaped by “the very real considerations of national 
interest” in needing to claim a place in the peace talks, to be recognised as a loyal 
ally and to back MacArthur‟s forces.43  Thus Curtin used the media to support these 
objectives and to boost citizens‟ morale during the protracted Pacific battles. 
 
 
Curtin’s return to parliament, January 1945 
While Australia‟s mass media professionals responded positively to Curtin‟s 
directive to publicise national military achievements, and they promoted detailed 
accounts of victories, they were given little information about his health problems in 
late 1944.  The government released a concise public statement about his admission 
to an unnamed hospital on 6 November 1944, foreshadowing his prolonged absence 
from war negotiations.  Similarly to the official US statements about Roosevelt‟s 
health,44 journalists were told only that Curtin needed “complete rest” and would not 
“resume his official duties for some weeks”.45  War councillors were given little 
information too.  On 30 November, the Acting Prime Minister, Francis M. Forde, 
informed the AWC that Curtin “was making satisfactory progress” and was expected 
to return in mid-January 1945.46  He was portrayed in the press as a longstanding 
leader.  Murdoch and Packer published the news that Curtin was setting records “for 
continuous service as a Labor Prime Minister” and for “the longest term as leader of 
                                                            
42 The RAN ships lost in action include: the corvette Armidale; the heavy cruiser Canberra; 
the hospital ship Centaur; the naval depot ship Kuttabul; the destroyer Nestor; the sloops 
Paramatta and Yarra; the light cruisers Perth and Sydney; the destroyers Vampire, Voyager 
and Waterhen.  See Wilson, Year book 1944-45, pp. 1023-25. 
43 Grey, Military history, pp. 190-196; Peter Stanley, Tarakan: An Australian Tragedy, Allen 
& Unwin, St Leonards, 1997. 
44 Eleanor Roosevelt to Elsie Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00330/1, 17 April 
1944, p. 24; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Excerpts from the Press Conference” [hereafter “Press 
conference”], in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, 
Santa Barbara, 6 May 1944, retrieved on 16 January 2011 at 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/news_conferences.php?year=1944&Submit=DISPLAY>. 
45 McLaughlin to Defence Secretariat, NAA, Canberra, A461, R4/1/12, 6 November 1944, p. 
65. 
46 Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 30 November 1944, p. 1. 
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the Labor Party” on 2 December 1944.47  During Curtin‟s absence, Fadden 
reportedly complained on 10 January 1945 about the “inadequacy” of MacArthur‟s 
US-oriented communiqués.48  Forde also publicised the “representations” made by 
the Australian Newspapers Proprietors‟ Association regarding these communiqués.49  
While prominent conservatives criticised MacArthur during Curtin‟s absence, the 
prime minister strongly defended the general when he returned to his work on 22 
January. 
 
Curtin generated favourable news headlines when he resumed his media 
conferences.  Within a day, Arthur Shakespeare‟s editorial tone in The Canberra 
Times shifted from cautious optimism to enthusiasm for his policies.  On the morning 
of his return to the prime ministership, Shakespeare published a leader on how this 
might relieve “[t]he national anxiety that Mr. Curtin‟s illness caused in the minds of 
many Australians”.  Also the editorial writer noted, “it is desirable that Mr. Curtin 
should on this occasion give his party a lead” because “Cabinet strength has been at 
its lowest point” due to his illness and some other members being away overseas.50  
The next day, Curtin‟s name appeared in four positive headlines in the newspaper‟s 
page two.51  Readers were informed that at his interview, he answered journalists‟ 
questions about government policy “formulated while he was away” and 
demonstrated “he had kept closely in touch with all developments”.52  He 
immediately issued a media statement to declare his “deep admiration for General 
MacArthur for the extraordinary success that has attended the carrying out of his  
  
                                                            
47 (Anon.), “Curtin In Sight Of Record For Labor P.M.”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 14 
November 1944; (Anon.), “Mr Curtin‟s Record Term Of Office”, The Herald, Melbourne, 2 
December 1944, cited in Scrapbooks. 
48 F.M. Forde, “Allied Offensive–War Communiques”, DDA, no. 93, 10 January 1945, p. 24. 
49 F.M. Forde, “Allied Offensive–War Communiques”, DDA, no. 93, 23 November 1944, p. 
24. 
50 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin‟s Silence”, Canberra, 22 January 1945, p. 2. 
51 The four articles were: “A.I.F. Activities Endorsed: Mr. Curtin Says Hazards Reduced”; 
“Air Control To Follow On Canadian Model: Mr. Curtin Makes Clear Approval Of Policy”; 
“Mr. Curtin Finds Cleared Desk”; “Mr. Curtin Sees Preference As Labour [sic] Policy”. 
Cited in Canberra, 23 January 1945, p. 2. 
52 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Finds Cleared Desk”, Canberra, 23 January 1945, p. 2. 
Chapter 9   Curtin‟s final year, July 1944 - July 1945 
379 
 
plans”.53  This press release was published in newspapers across Australia.54  At his 
briefing, he reportedly defended MacArthur‟s war communiqués for their “reticence” 
on top-secret offensives against Pacific enemies.  Nevertheless he announced a new 
communication method for the Australian army public relations unit to issue 
“supplementary information” about the nation‟s troops, in consultation with 
MacArthur.55   
 
Also The Canberra Times featured Curtin‟s decisions to give “some form of 
preference” to “discharged servicemen”56 and to support government control of 
interstate airlines, which he denied was “socialisation”.57  Likewise, The Age58 and 
The West Australian coverage59 were resoundingly favourable.  According to Oswald 
Syme at The Age, Curtin‟s recovery was “welcomed with sincere satisfaction by 
Australian people of all shades of political thought”.  Furthermore, “the Australian 
people” missed his radio talks.  The Age editorial writer called on Curtin:  
… to resume periodical talks to the nation so that the people may hear his 
voice, weigh his words and generally maintain that personal contact with the 
head of the Government which is eminently desirable.60 
Similarly The West Australian editor, H.J. Lambert, praised his decision to give 
“fuller and more frequent indications of what the Australians are doing” in the 
                                                            
53 John Curtin, “War Communiqués”, DDA, no. 94, 22 January 1945, p. 10. 
54 E.g. (Anon.), “Activities Of A.I.F.”, SMH, 23 January 1945, p. 4; (Anon.), “A.I.F. 
Activities Endorsed: Mr. Curtin Says Hazards Reduced”, Canberra, 23 January 1945, p. 2; 
(Anon.), “A.M.F. Publicity”, The West Australian, Perth, [hereafter West], 23 January 1945, 
p. 3; (Anon.), “Mr Curtin Praises MacArthur‟s Skill”, Army News, Darwin, 23 January 1945, 
p. 1; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Resumes Duty”, The Advertiser, Adelaide, 23 January 1945, p. 5; 
(Anon.), “S.W. Pacific News System To Stay”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 23 January 
1945, p. 3. 
55 (Anon.), “A.I.F. Activities Endorsed: Mr. Curtin Says Hazards Reduced”, Canberra, 23 
January 1945, p. 2. 
56 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Sees Preference As Labour [sic] Policy”, Canberra, 23 January 
1945, p. 2. 
57 (Anon.), “Air Control To Follow On Canadian Model: Mr. Curtin Makes Clear Approval 
Of Policy”, Canberra, 23 January 1945, p. 2. 
58 (Anon.), “The Steersman Returns To The Helm”, The Age [hereafter Age], Melbourne, 
cited in Scrapbooks, 22 January 1945.  Also see (Anon.), “News Of The Day: P.M. On 
Duty”, Age, 23 January 1945, p. 2. 
59 (Anon.), “A.M.F. Publicity” and “Army Plan”, West, 23 January 1945, p. 3. 
60 (Anon.), “The Steersman Returns To The Helm”, Age, cited in Scrapbooks, 22 January 
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Pacific war.61  While Cox observed Curtin seemed “generally washed out” at the 
interview on 22 January, this private misgiving did not appear in the Canberra, 
Melbourne and Perth newspapers.62  In like manner to Roosevelt‟s media image, 
Curtin was portrayed as a charismatic speaker able to connect to national audiences, 
who needed to hear his reassuring, inspiring and inclusive messages.63  The press in 
both countries willingly self-censored news about the health of a popular leader.64 
 
In Sydney, Fairfax adopted a more positive attitude as a result of Curtin‟s 
first media conference after his absence.  On 22 January, a Sydney Morning Herald 
leader writer acknowledged the government‟s “political trouble”, including people‟s 
growing war fatigue, but stated Curtin‟s “return to duty” would be “warmly 
welcomed throughout Australia” because he was “the country‟s trusted war leader”.  
Since this editorial writer supported Curtin, but commented on other ministers‟ 
policy struggles, the article‟s overall tone was neutral.65  The next day, the 
newspaper‟s political correspondent, Ross Gollan, noted voters “trusted” Curtin‟s 
deeds and sayings, including his promise to “push domestic political considerations 
back into days of peace”.  On the whole, Gollan‟s article was positive about Curtin‟s 
“war-time Government”, but called on him to keep “avoiding issues which divide a 
nation”.66  Also The Herald cartoonist Samuel Wells depicted Curtin‟s choice 
between “a united war effort” and “nationalisation” that would result in “political 
disunity”.  Although the signalman figure in The Herald appeared indecisive (see 
                                                            
61 (Anon.), “Army Plan”, West, 22 January 1945, p. 3. 
62 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 22 January 1945.  Also see Age and Canberra, 23 January 
1945; West, 22 January 1945. 
63 Granada Media (producer) Roosevelt: Men Of Our Time (documentary), JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00813/1, 1990. 
64 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 22 January 1945; Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt 
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transcript np; Hugh Gallagher, “The Politics of Polio” [hereafter “Politics”], Social 
Education, vol. 60, no. 5, 1996, pp. 264-266. 
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Phase Or A Fixed Policy?”, SMH, 23 January 1945, p. 2. 
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Figure 29), Murdoch did not brand Curtin as a socialist.67  As they conveyed their 
opposition to some Labor policies, Murdoch and Fairfax still affirmed Curtin was the 
legitimate, national leader. 
 
 
Figure 29 
 Through his relationships with journalists, he increased global interest in 
Australian combatants.  As he expanded the number of media statements about 
Australian fighting forces, he also attracted British support when he greeted the 
newly appointed Governor-General, the Duke of Gloucester, who was the brother of 
King George VI.  Departing from his party‟s policy of preferring an Australian 
governor-general, Curtin announced the choice of Gloucester on 15 November 1943 
and won “surprised approval” in the press.68  Through long-shot newspaper 
photographs, a jovial atmosphere was conveyed at Curtin‟s reception for the Duke 
                                                            
67 Figure 29 appeared in Samuel Wells, “It‟s Up To Him”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in 
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and Duchess at the Parliament House on 30 January 1945.69  British Movietone 
showed John and Elsie Curtin seated directly behind the Gloucester family at the 
swearing-in ceremony.  While the film narrator did not refer to Labor concerns over 
the appointment, he explained to British moviegoers that “[t]here is usually more 
pomp and pageantry” on such occasions, but Australia‟s war necessitated fewer 
festivities.70  Recognising Australia needed London‟s continued support, Curtin told 
reporters to discount “nonsense” about British forces being only “minor” in the 
Pacific zone.  Cox relayed Curtin‟s message to Murdoch: 
He said „you can [tell] all your editors not to take any notice of these 
statements that there is dissatisfaction with the role assigned to the British 
Fleet in the Pacific‟.71 
After the successful landings at Normandy and the advance towards Germany, 
Churchill had formed the British Pacific Fleet on 22 November 1944; but he also 
planned for “a huge demobilisation of forces” once Germany surrendered, as Curtin 
had privately mentioned to reporters (see Chapter 8).72  Headed for Australia, aircraft 
from the British fleet successfully attacked two oil refineries at Palembang in eastern 
Sumatra and inflicted heavy losses on Japanese fighter planes.  The British fleet 
arrived at its main Sydney base in February 1945.  Yet the US navy was “somewhat 
reluctant” to include the British fleet “in the forefront” of operations against Japan 
because it was viewed as “largely untried”.  Due to political pressure from London, 
the US navy allocated the British fleet to the invasion of Okinawa and the subsequent 
advance directly upon Japan.73  Curtin supported Churchill‟s insistence to have 
British forces “flying the Union Jack” in Pacific operations.  Both leaders attempted 
to limit opportunities for Americans to claim they won the Japanese war “relatively 
unaided” because Australia and Britain were keen to build post-war military alliances 
                                                            
69 For example, these photographs appeared in The Argus, The Sydney Morning Herald and 
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70 British Movietone (producer), “Australia‟s New Governor-General”, in Newsreels of 
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with the US.74  By May 1945, Curtin‟s administration was releasing more 
“operational reports” to highlight Australian troops‟ achievements such as their 
pioneering of the technique of jungle fighting in New Guinea.75  His strategy seemed 
successful as he struck a balance between generating patriotic messages and 
developing media messages linking him to Britain‟s royal family and Pacific fleet.  
 
 
Mediating prisoner of war images 
As Australian troops found more prisoners of war (POWs), the government gradually 
released news of Japanese war crimes.  On 23 June 1943, the Curtin administration 
commissioned the Chief Justice of Queensland, Sir William Webb, to prepare a 
report on whether the Japanese military had committed atrocities or breaches of 
warfare.76  Webb presented the report summary to the government on 15 March 
1944.  Curtin told journalists that he had suppressed news of specific atrocities 
because it would antagonise Japanese captors and result in “the worsening of the 
victims‟ conditions”.77  Likewise, the British and US administrations agreed that 
news “leakages” might prejudice future legal proceedings against war criminals.78  
On 19 November 1944, the Australian and British Governments announced Webb‟s 
preliminary findings, including evidence of some Japanese soldiers and officers 
exhibiting “chivalry and decent conduct”.79  Around the same time, the AWC began 
allowing journalists to interview survivors, whose names were to be kept confidential 
and the stories were to be vetted by censors.80  In 1945 Cinesound Review released a 
graphic newsreel on Japanese war crimes that was a distinct departure from the 
previous “blanket censorship” of these atrocities.  The film focused on Private 
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75 DDA, no. 99, 5 April 1945, p. 13; Department of External Affairs, “Binder of cables 
outward from Australian Delegation, San Francisco (and London)” [hereafter 
“Correspondence to the Australian delegation”], NAA, Canberra, series no. A4764,7, 1 May 
1945, p. 287. 
76 Australian War Memorial, “Guide to the papers of Sir William Webb”, Canberra, 
collection no. 3DRL/2481, 2004, retrieved on 29 January 2010 at 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/findingaids/private/webb.xml>; Department of External Affairs to 
Legation in Washington, “Foreign Affairs Department”, vol. 8, 10 September 1945. 
77 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 217. 
78 Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 19 October 1944, pp. 4, 8. 
79 H.V. Evatt, “Atrocities In Pacific Area”, DDA, no. 93, 30 November 1944, p. 12. 
80 Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 16 November 1944, p. 4. 
Chapter 9   Curtin‟s final year, July 1944 - July 1945 
384 
 
William Cook, who had survived a Japanese-led massacre in New Britain‟s “Toll 
[Tol] plantation” in which some 145 Australian soldiers had been killed.  Cook had 
served with the 2/22nd Battalion AIF in the town of Rabaul, New Britain.  Defeated 
by the Japanese navy in 1942, Cook‟s team had sought sanctuary with missionaries, 
who turned them over to the enemies.  Film audiences were told he was bayoneted 
11 times before escaping the area; it was captured by the Australian 5th Division on 
23 March 1945.81  In a stand-up, Cook declared “every war criminal must be brought 
to trial”.  The newsreel narrator said his account was part of a war crimes report, 
presumably from Webb‟s investigation, which “shocked and horrified the world”.82  
Of the more than 993,000 Australians in military service, some 14,519 were 
imprisoned by the Japanese and a third of those captured died in captivity.  In 
contrast during the European conflict, 8,540 Australian service personnel became 
prisoners in the war against Germany, with the death rate being about five per cent 
among these POWs.83  At the end of the war, newsreels and photographs appeared 
that showed emaciated Australian soldiers, who had been captured and forced into 
slave labour by the Japanese; due to these visual images, the POWs became the 
nation‟s “iconic figures” of the era.  In the Pacific, journalists reported on the release 
of women from Japanese camps; newspaper interviews extensively repeated 
Australian nurses‟ stories that they were not used as “prostitutes” during their 
internment.84  Subsequently, the media messages were designed to raise public 
awareness of the POWs‟ mistreatment and assist the government‟s crusade for justice 
at the UN War Crimes Commission. 
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“Australia’s very independent thinking” at the United Nations, April-May 1945 
Given Curtin‟s objective to ensure Australian participation in peace talks, he 
persuaded journalists to publicise his government‟s viewpoints at a global conference 
on the UN Charter.  Forty-six nations sent delegates to the San Francisco meeting, 
which convened on 25 April.  According to Harold Cox, it was the first major 
international conference at which Australia was represented in its own right.85  In 
February 1945, Curtin reportedly informed journalists that “a reasonably good press 
delegate” should attend the conference to help promote “a proper pageant of 
Australia” and “educate the other delegates”.  Furthermore, the San Francisco venue 
was significant because “[i]t would focus attention on the Pacific war”.86  Curtin 
prepared a strong government team to advance Australia‟s proposals including the 
removal of the veto allotted to the small number of powerful nations comprising the 
Security Council.87  During a radio broadcast, he urged Australians to support his 
government‟s “world-wide advertisement at San Francisco”.88  Although Curtin did 
not attend the conference, his delegation included at least four Australian news 
representatives and five MPs, as well as Labor publicity officer, Charles Buttrose 
(who had been a Sydney Morning Herald correspondent).89  Curtin‟s interviews, 
media statements and the government‟s invitation to selected delegates indicated his 
direct attempts to influence journalists to portray his UN mission positively. 
 
During this conference on 26 May, the BBC‟s Alistair Cooke told listeners “a 
theatre was filled” as delegates listened to Evatt‟s speech on the “Big Power Veto”, 
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which exemplified “Australia‟s very independent thinking”.  Cooke said Evatt 
“minces no words and yet wins the confidence of the press” because “it is no secret 
by this time that Australia has known its mind and spoken without ambiguity”.90  
Several days later, a New York Times correspondent affirmed “the validity of the 
position” taken by Evatt and New Zealand‟s Peter Fraser on the veto.91  Buttrose 
wrote to Australia‟s DOI director-general, Edmund Garnet Bonney, about the 
“enormous press and radio attention” given to the nation‟s delegation team and this 
included favourable coverage in every US newspaper.  Buttrose added that 
Australian journalists contacted him three times a day while many international 
correspondents visited his office daily.92  Later the former US delegate, Theodore 
Achilles, recalled “a good many” had agreed with Evatt.93  Joseph E. Johnson, who 
had also been a US delegate, remembered Evatt‟s frequent interviews were unusual 
because Roosevelt‟s team did not give media briefings at first.  Evatt‟s openness with 
journalists influenced the Roosevelt administration to initiate press background 
briefings on the UN negotiations.94  Although the Curtin Government did not manage 
to block the veto, they achieved other aims such as stronger roles for smaller 
nations.95  Moreover, they set a number of important precedents in fostering direct, 
positive media relationships that contributed to the US Government‟s initiation of 
press briefings on the UN Charter. 
 
 While the Australian Government representatives attracted favourable news 
coverage, only one journalist, Harold Cox, criticised them at the UN conference, 
according to Buttrose.  The Labor publicist accused Cox of biased reporting in a 
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letter to Australia‟s chief censor, Bonney.96  Cox denied this allegation in his oral 
history, but recalled the “terrific row” over a negative news article he had filed 
during the conference‟s conclusion.  Evatt and his wife, Mary Alice, returned to 
Australia while Cox remained in the US.  Since Mary Alice Evatt had inadvertently 
left her clean laundry at a San Francisco hotel, an official gave her washed clothes to 
Cox to bring back to Australia.  Reluctantly Cox agreed to take the parcel; in 
Canberra, he posted it and his “extremely stiff note” to Evatt.  During his first family 
dinner in Canberra after his trip, Cox received a telephone call from Evatt, who said: 
“Look, old boy, I don‟t like bad feeling … I want you to come down this evening and 
have a yarn with me.”  Finally Cox agreed and stayed with Evatt until 2am.  “I 
couldn‟t have had a more pleasant, gracious host”, Cox remembered.  Their mutual 
“goodwill” developed and Cox said later, he “really liked Evatt”.97  Their 
relationship seemed to resemble Curtin‟s associations with Murdoch; although the 
conservative journalists publicly disagreed with Labor policies, neither of the two 
politicians remained bitter and thus they maintained positive media associations.98 
 
 
“V-E Day”, May 1945 
While Curtin was again ill as the Allies advanced to victory in Europe, Australian 
journalists appeared to follow his wish to portray a “solemn” occasion.  On 4 
October 1944, a Daily Telegraph journalist noted the Federal Government would 
discourage “[j]oyful celebrations” over Germany‟s defeat because it was “premature” 
while Australia was fighting Japan.99  Contrasting with British media images of “V-E 
Day” revelry,100 a Canberra Times front page headline referred to “Solemn Scenes In 
Parliament” on 9 May 1945, two days after the German High Command authorised 
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the Nazi surrender.  The Canberra Times publisher, Shakespeare, allowed only a 
brief statement on Curtin‟s absence, avoiding an in-depth discussion on this topic.  It 
was reported that radio listeners heard Australia‟s House of Representatives 
broadcast proceedings for the first time.  Acting Prime Minister Joseph Benedict 
(“Ben”) Chifley‟s speech was positively represented while less newspaper space was 
allocated to the opposition leader, Menzies.101  Mindful of the fierce Japanese 
counterattacks on Okinawa,102 The Canberra Times writers stressed the prime 
ministerial keywords of “war”, “the enemy” and “sacrifice” more times than the 
ideals of “hope”, “freedom” and “peace”.103  Readers were warned “we are in danger 
that the blessings of peace may be one day made a mockery”.104  Instead of devoting 
an entire page to European celebrations, The Canberra Times continued to reflect 
Curtin‟s earlier media messages regarding Pacific war priorities. 
 
 
“His service to this country deserves to stand as a model for men”, July 1945 
With increasing concerns over Curtin‟s health, Fairfax and Murdoch began departing 
slightly from the newspaper publishers‟ earlier consensus to portray him as the 
nation‟s legitimate leader.  Cox was providing confidential updates to Murdoch 
about Curtin‟s physical appearance and condition.105  Acting Prime Minister Chifley 
advised that Curtin had left hospital and returned to The Lodge on 22 May, reported 
Fairfax‟s Sydney Morning Herald.  The House of Representatives granted a two-
month leave of absence to Curtin, beginning in early June.  In the brief news article, 
NSW Labor Senator, John Ignatius Armstrong, was quoted as saying “there was little 
hope of his ever being properly restored to health”.  Also The Sydney Morning 
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Herald quoted anonymously “[i]nformed quarters” as saying that Curtin‟s “complete 
recovery” might take longer than two months.  Chifley, however, reportedly rejected 
“unfounded rumours” that Curtin “was in hospital again”.106  Clive Turnbull, a staff 
writer for Murdoch‟s Herald,107 acknowledged Curtin was determined to remain the 
prime minister.  Turnbull added if Curtin resigned to become “a more or less non-
combatant backbencher”, this would evoke: 
… the general regret of the Parliament at the personal misfortune of a highly 
respected leader who, in any event, must take his place in the forefront of 
Australia‟s Prime Ministers. 108 
The related photograph showed a smiling Curtin, signifying he was still healthy.109  
On 4 July, the AWC extended “its sincere hope that he may be restored to health”.110  
Former ALP politician, Fred Daly, remembered being told that Curtin “was getting 
on better” around the same time.111  Although Fairfax and Murdoch questioned 
Curtin‟s health, they acknowledged his strong leadership skills and did not demand 
his resignation.  
 
As US correspondents had portrayed Roosevelt‟s death as a shock to 
Americans,112 similarly many Australians were reportedly astonished by the loss of 
Curtin.113  Both nations‟ citizens seemed genuinely surprised by the news because 
journalists had cooperated with the two leaders and avoided publishing detailed 
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medical diagnoses.114  Curtin had written to Eleanor Roosevelt and Truman that 
Australians were deeply “shocked” by the news of FDR‟s death at the presidential 
health spa resort in Warm Springs, Georgia, on 12 April 1945.115  Similar statements 
were made about Curtin after he died in Canberra at 4am on 5 July 1945.  The 
Sydney Morning Herald correspondent wrote most city workers were notified by “the 
monotonously strident cry of the corner newsboys” on the same morning.  Few 
Sydneysiders “were prepared” for the tragedy, with people reportedly saying they 
“didn‟t think it was so near”.116  Likewise, Sydney citizens were quoted as saying 
they were “shocked” in The Daily Mirror.117  A memorial broadcast was delivered 
from King‟s Hall in the Parliament House at 2pm on 6 July.118  These journalists did 
not criticise Curtin‟s earlier resolve to remain as the prime minister to help achieve 
an Australian war victory. 
 
His funeral became an exceptional media event and he received tributes on 
newspaper front pages around the world.  It was the first time that journalists, 
photographers and camera crews travelled from the eastern states to report on a WA 
funeral.  Held on 8 July, this event was the largest funeral gathering in the state‟s 
history at the time.119  Between 20,000 and 30,000 people attended the service; while 
nearly 100,000 people, comprising one-third of Perth‟s population, stood along the 
route of the funeral procession.120  Curtin was the first prime minister (and so far, 
only) to be buried in WA, and in another media first, his funeral service was 
                                                            
114 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin‟s Health: Longer Rest Likely”, SMH, cited in Scrapbooks, 14 June 
1945; O‟Shaughnessy, “FDR‟s health”; Turnbull “Curtin”. 
115 John Curtin, “Death Of President Roosevelt”, DDA, no. 99, 13 April 1945, p. 34. 
116 (Anon.), “A People‟s Judgement”, SMH, 6 July 1945, p. 3. 
117 (Anon.), “Opinion-He Was A Good Man”, The Daily Mirror, Sydney, cited in 
Scrapbooks, 5 July 1945. 
118 (Anon.), “Body To Lie In State”, The Daily Mirror, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, 5 July 
1945. 
119 Australian Prime Minister‟s Department, “Prime Minister – Rt. Hon. J. Curtin” [hereafter 
“Curtin”], NAA, Canberra, series no. A461, R4/1/12, 11 July 1945, p. 8. 
120 (Anon.), “Perth Throngs Weep As Curtin Is Buried”, The New York Times, New York, 9 
July 1945, p. 11; David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and 
Writings [hereafter In his own words], Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 
255; Tom Mead, Breaking The News: The events which changed life in Australia through the 
eyes of a man who worked at the front line of journalism and politics [hereafter Breaking the 
news], Dolphin Books, Sydney, 1998, p. 73. 
Chapter 9   Curtin‟s final year, July 1944 - July 1945 
391 
 
broadcast across the nation.121  Curtin‟s death was announced on the front pages of 
The Age,122 The Canberra Times123 and The Sydney Morning Herald124 on 6 July.  
The West Australian led with classified advertisements as usual, and the 
announcement was published on page seven on 5 July.125  Similarly to these four 
Australian dailies‟ favourable reports, the international press emphasised the “global 
proportions” of his career that “ended on a note of triumph”.126  Front-page tributes 
appeared in The Chicago Daily Tribune, The New York Times and The Washington 
Post.127  At London‟s Times, a correspondent wrote in the “British estimation he 
stepped at a single stride into the first rank of Imperial statesman”.128  The New York 
Times leader writer declared, “he was an outspoken advocate for world organisation” 
and his death was “a loss to this country [the US] and to the world as well as to his 
own land”.129  The remarkable breadth of media coverage indicated Curtin‟s ability 
to connect to diverse global audiences. 
 
Along with publishing Allied leaders‟ accolades, Australian newspaper 
journalists interviewed working citizens about their opinions of Curtin‟s legacy.  
Press photographs ranged from close-ups, signifying he spoke with a “typical 
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Figure 30130 
„fighting‟ attitude”131 and “never used written notes”,132 to longer shots, suggesting 
his warm relationships with dignitaries and unionists.133  The reports conveyed that 
he had been the “executive head of state”, even though the Australian Constitution 
formally vested “executive power” with the British monarch.  According to The 
Sydney Morning Herald, the white ensign was lowered at the RAN headquarters and 
on British Pacific Fleet ships as a tribute to Curtin‟s leadership; previously this 
practice occurred only to commemorate the British monarch‟s death.134  The 
Canberra Times cover featured messages of sympathy from “ordinary people”.  A 
reporter declared: “These were the real tributes of the common people, amongst 
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whom John Curtin was perhaps at his happiest.”135  The same statement appeared in 
The Age.136  He was characterised as “Honest John”,137 a “lovable personality”,138 
who had “greatness” thrust upon him.139  Leader writers remembered he was a 
“brilliant editor”, who had befriended journalists during his prime ministerial trips.  
They focused on his individual qualities such as his “humanity”; being “a master of 
debate” who “brought hope to the masses”; his “boldness of national and 
international vision”; and his economic reorganisation that helped “to meet the threat 
of invasion”.  The editorials did not focus on his specific policies.140  Along with 
emphasising his sense of “duty”, “sacrifice” and the war,141 The Canberra Times 
increased references to “hope”, “freedom” and “peace” in comparison with its 
coverage of “V-E Day”.142  The war outlook was not covered in the tributes in The 
Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian on 5 and 6 July.  The 
Canberra Times leader noted Curtin‟s public “service to this country deserves to 
stand as a model for men”.143  Thus Australian newspaper publishers perpetuated 
Labor legends of him as a natural communicator, a humble politician and a common 
man.  These popular symbols belied his striving to maintain power; his self-educated 
rhetoric; his intense film rehearsals; and his calculated managing of his relationships 
with journalists. 
 
Australian and US film companies generated similar iconic images that 
masked Curtin‟s power struggles as a national leader.  H.G. Guiness‟ Movietone 
production showed “a simple service for a simple man”.  Wilfred Thomas‟ 
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commentary resembled the Australian newspaper coverage when he said Curtin was 
“a master of debate”, known for his “realism and forthright courage”, as well as his 
“austerity” for walking to his prime ministerial office in the mornings.  The newsreel 
incorporated previous footage of Eleanor Roosevelt‟s visit to Canberra and a close-
up shot focusing on Curtin‟s smiling face when he arrived in England, where he 
revealed his true “statesmanship”, Thomas said.144  Likewise, an Australian newsreel 
signified that Curtin connected to working people.  In the fade-in, he was shown at 
his Cottesloe house, “just a home like so many others in the towns and cities of 
Australia”, the unnamed narrator said.  Film audiences watched a scene of him 
opening his front door and walking past his garden to his white picket fence, then 
striding along the footpath.  As well as showing Curtin with international dignitaries, 
other film signs included images of him seated with contented children and his first 
Australian media conference after his overseas trip, where he said jovially, “I have 
not seen any country or any people better than my own”.  He was repeatedly 
described as “plain John Curtin” and a “man of the people”.  The narrator likened 
him to Roosevelt because both leaders made a “sacrifice of health and strength” to 
help win the war.145  More egalitarian signs appeared in a Movietone special, Peace, 
to commemorate the end of the Pacific war.  The film footage showed returned 
servicemen waving a sign announcing the “Rats of Tobruk”, a name that Curtin 
helped to popularise; other exuberant Australian crowds; and an anonymous 
“dancing man” in Sydney, who might have represented many high-spirited people.  
In his voice-over, Jack Davey paid “homage” to Churchill, Roosevelt and to 
“Australia who helped others in their hour of need”.  Curtin‟s image appeared during 
the praise of Australia; the scene conveyed that he represented all selfless 
Australians.146   
 
  
                                                            
144 20th Century Fox-Movietone News (producer), Nation Mourns John Curtin (newsreel) 
[hereafter Nation mourns Curtin], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00033/1, 1945. 
145 ScreenSound Australia, “A Great Australian Passes …”, in John Joseph Curtin 1885 – 
1945 (newsreel) [hereafter “Great Australian”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 
1945. 
146 Movietone (producer), “Peace”, in At the front, 1945. 
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Conclusion 
Despite the political setback of the “Fourteen Powers” Referendum, Curtin based the 
success of his prime ministerial career on helping Australia to win the war and he 
generated largely positive news coverage of his foreign policies in his final year.  He 
managed to divert much media attention from the failed referendum to the need to 
publish Australian military achievements.  For this purpose, he initiated a media 
campaign to promote the nation‟s role in MacArthur‟s Philippines offensive;147 the 
promotions included collaborative Australian-US newsreels for international 
audiences,148 a radio interview with a RAN lieutenant,149 press talks150 and media 
statements.151  Reporters‟ notes indicated he continued his off-the-record briefings, 
although he threatened to cancel them over news leaks of Australian uranium 
exports, which assisted the atomic bomb project.152 
 
During Curtin‟s absence from the parliament between November 1944 and 
January 1945, journalists still portrayed him as the nation‟s representative.  The 
Herald published a favourable photograph of him, taken during his international trip 
earlier in 1944, signifying he was still healthy.153  Murdoch and Packer published 
reports that he was setting his party‟s record for continuous service as a Labor prime 
minister at the time.154  Similarly to US press reports about Roosevelt‟s health in 
early 1945, the Australian media cooperated with the government to assure citizens 
that Curtin would recover from his illness.  When Curtin returned to the parliament 
on 22 January, he immediately resumed his media conferences and the press gallery 
wrote favourable reports about this event.  Across Australia, newspaper publishers 
approved of Curtin‟s decision to release “operational reports”,155 focusing on the 
                                                            
147 Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 28 September 1944, p. 3. 
148 Australian Government Department of Information and U.S. Army Signal Corps, “Allies 
Thrash Japs At Attape”, in At the front, circa 1944; US Army Signal Corps, “MacArthur 
Returns!”, in At the front. 
149 Australian Broadcasting Commission, “Radio script”, pp. 1-7. 
150 Cox, “Typescript reports”, circa September 1944. 
151 E.g. Curtin, “Allied offensive”, p. 35. 
152 Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 228. 
153 Turnbull, “Curtin”. 
154 (Anon.), “Curtin In Sight Of Record For Labor P.M.”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 14 
November 1944; (Anon.), “Mr Curtin‟s Record Term Of Office”, The Herald, Melbourne, 2 
December 1944.  Cited in Scrapbooks. 
155 John Curtin, “War Communiqués”, DDA, no. 94, 22 January 1945, p. 10. 
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nation‟s troops, which supplemented MacArthur‟s US-oriented communiqués.156  
They respected his initiatives to give more credit to the nation‟s fighting forces. 
 
 He used other media strategies to project an image of Allied unity with 
Britain and the US, masking tensions over the nations‟ military roles in the final 
Pacific battles.  He appeared to link himself closely to the new Governor-General, 
the Duke of Gloucester, in a British Movietone newsreel;157 in a press briefing, he 
praised the British Pacific Fleet.158  He did not mention to journalists that the British 
government exerted pressure on US military officials, who had viewed the fleet as 
“largely untried”, to elevate the white ensign of the Royal Navy to a prominent role 
in the direct advance towards Japan.159  At his confidential news briefings, he 
rejected suggestions that MacArthur had assigned Australian forces to a minor 
role.160  These correspondents willingly cooperated with his directive to censor news 
on released prisoners of war because of the government‟s concerns that reports of the 
atrocities might embolden their enemies.161  At the 1945 UN meeting in San 
Francisco, Evatt successfully replicated Curtin‟s relationships with the media by 
giving frank, off-the-record press talks and frequent on-the-record media 
conferences.  Since Evatt generated prominent, positive news coverage of the Allies‟ 
policies in the international media, the Roosevelt administration decided to hold 
media briefings to attract more publicity of US views of the UN meeting.162 
Although the Murdoch news group opposed some Labor policies, neither Curtin nor 
Evatt remained bitter.163  When Curtin became ill again during Germany‟s surrender, 
the acting Prime Minister Chifley continued his policy of using the radio, rather than 
the press, to communicate directly to Australian audiences and involve them more in 
                                                            
156 E.g. (Anon.), “Activities Of A.I.F.”, SMH, 23 January 1945, p. 4; (Anon.), “A.I.F. 
Activities Endorsed: Mr. Curtin Says Hazards Reduced”, Canberra, 23 January 1945, p. 2; 
(Anon.), “A.M.F. Publicity”, West, 23 January 1945, p. 3; (Anon.), “Mr Curtin Praises 
MacArthur‟s Skill”, Army News, Darwin, 23 January 1945, p. 1; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin 
Resumes Duty”, The Advertiser, Adelaide, 23 January 1945, p. 5; (Anon.), “S.W. Pacific 
News System To Stay”, The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 23 January 1945, p. 3. 
157 British Movietone, “New governor-general”. 
158 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 10 March 1945.  
159 Gilbert, “British Pacific fleet”; Sarantakes, “Short but brilliant life”, pp. 85-91. 
160 Cox, “Typescript reports”, July 1944-March 1945. 
161 Cox, “Cox interview”; Shedden, “AWC Minutes”, vol. 8, JCPML acc. no. 00928/9, 16 
November 1944, p. 4. 
162 Department of External Affairs, “Correspondence from the Australian delegation”, p. 20; 
Johnson, “Johnson interview”. 
163 Cox, “Cox interview”. 
Chapter 9   Curtin‟s final year, July 1944 - July 1945 
397 
 
political discussions.  As Chifley broadcast his parliamentary speech on the 
European victory, radio listeners heard the House of Representatives proceedings for 
the first time.164  Through a wide range of media strategies, including the expanded 
use of radio, off-the-record briefings, frequent media conferences and wartime 
censorship, Canberra press gallery journalists generally agreed with his policies to 
focus on Australians‟ heroic role in Pacific fighting, fight for justice for the nation‟s 
POWs and present a strong voice in the UN. 
 
 Thus Curtin‟s death, as well as Roosevelt‟s passing, was reported as a 
“shock” to citizens because journalists had not published detailed reports about their 
health-related struggles.  Since the media did not openly challenge the two men‟s 
physical capacity to lead their countries, Allied news reporters generally upheld the 
prevailing wartime censorship systems regarding this matter.  Harold Cox was able 
to file confidential updates to Murdoch about the prime minister‟s “washed-out 
appearance” because Curtin was so accessible to the media.165  In contrast, 
journalists never knew that Churchill and Roosevelt were ill on occasions because 
they did not hold daily press conferences and they were more distant from reporters, 
as discussed in Chapters 4 and 8.166  Thus Australia‟s most experienced political 
journalists agreed to a conspiracy of silence on Curtin‟s health problems and this was 
enforced by national security requirements.  Many wartime Australians were 
surprised by the strident cries of “corner newsboys” when they announced his death, 
which received worldwide, front-page tributes because his frequent, two-way media 
communications had made him a well-known leader to the Allied press.  His funeral 
became a media event because it was the first service of this kind that was broadcast 
to Australian listeners.  The national press coverage was positive; for example, 
Curtin‟s optimistic keywords were repeated by The Canberra Times’ publisher, 
                                                            
164 (Anon.), “Solemn Scenes In Parliament”, Canberra, 9 May 1945, p. 1. 
165 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 22 January 1945. 
166 Richard Moss, “Curtain goes up on new £6 million Churchill museum”, Culture 24, 
Brighton, 9 February 2005, retrieved on 9 December 2008 at 
<http://www.24hourmuseum.org.uk/nwh_gfx_en/ART26042.html>; Roosevelt, “Press 
conference”, 6 May 1944; Eleanor Roosevelt to Elsie Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00330/1, 17 April 1944, p. 24; Jackie Storer, “Churchill‟s bunker revealed”, BBC News 
Online, London, 8 April 2003, retrieved on 12 May 2008 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2929063.stm>; Simon Tait, “A war leader‟s 
love affair with the press”, The Times, London, 8 March 2008, p. 80. 
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Shakespeare, as Australians looked forward to a victory.167  The mass media showed 
Australia‟s “executive” as a natural communicator, a “simple man” and a humble 
politician, who related well with working-class people.168  Moreover, as we have 
seen in this chapter, Curtin had an important role in the industrial process of 
“manufacturing the news” as described by Hall (see Chapter 2).169  Further, it is 
tenable to argue that regular, in person, conversational radio broadcasts constituted 
an expansion of the Australian public sphere in Habermas‟ sense of a domain of 
rational discussion among informal citizens.170 
 
 
                                                            
167 Canberra, 6 July 1945, pp. 1, 3. 
168 (Anon.), “Shattering Blow to Empire” – Duke‟s Tribute”, “Navy Honours Mr. Curtin”, 
SMH, 6 July 1945, p. 2; 20th Century Fox-Movietone News, Nation mourns Curtin; 
ScreenSound Australia, “Great Australian”. 
169 Stuart Hall, “The determinations of news photographs”, in Stanley Cohen and Jock 
Young (eds), The Manufacture of News: Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media, 
Constable and Co, London, 1973, p. 182; Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John 
Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order, The 
Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1981, p. 61. 
170 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989. 
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Chapter 10 
Survey of the contemporary Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery 
 
 
As the preceding chapters have argued, John Curtin developed innovative mass 
communication strategies to persuade the predominantly conservative Australian 
media to promote his wartime views.  Curtin’s initiatives included the following: the 
creation of a full-time prime ministerial press secretary role; the regular practice of 
twice-daily, informative, interactive news conferences; the use of a combination of 
formal, informal and confidential interviews; the installation of a shortwave 
transmitting station to connect Australia and international radio networks; more 
direct film and radio broadcasts to home and overseas audiences; as well as 
sponsoring the national radio, film and creative arts sectors.  This thesis has thus far 
demonstrated the uniqueness of Curtin’s journalism strategies by comparing them 
with the media techniques used by other World War II Allied leaders, and by the 
Australian prime ministers who led the country before him.  It has been argued that 
Curtin conducted more frequent, informal and confidential news interviews than did 
the other major Allied leaders or previous Australian prime ministers.  Moreover, 
this research suggested that Curtin expanded the prime ministerial use of relatively 
new media technology. 
 
This chapter seeks to extend our knowledge of Curtin’s news media strategies 
by evaluating their durability following his prime ministerial term, their validity for 
political communications today and the extent of his legacy for the mass media.  For 
the purpose of testing this thesis, a survey has been developed to determine whether 
modern news reporters are aware of the communication methods that Curtin 
instigated and whether they still use these practices.  One of the ways to demonstrate 
his legacy is to ask contemporary journalists whether they are aware that current 
media practices originated with the strategies that he instituted.  Therefore this study 
invited senior contemporary news reporters to contribute their views on the 
significance of the prime ministerial news media strategies that Curtin initiated.  
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These methods included the use of news conferences, confidential briefings, 
audiovisual communications and information provided by full-time government 
media advisors.  The survey findings are presented in the next section.  This thesis 
posits that Curtin was a brilliant media strategist, who provided valuable lessons for 
managing information needs during global conflicts extending well beyond World 
War II.  It is the argument of this chapter that Curtin made a lasting impact on 
political communications.   
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Foucault’s concept of governmentality and Ericson, 
Baranek and Chan’s theories of news in an administered society are relevant to 
Curtin’s use of the media.  By means of working with Canberra journalists, 
expanding his radio addresses and sponsoring newsreels about a united Allied 
leadership, Curtin’s media relations illustrated Foucault’s theories of 
governmentality and the “politics of truth”.  According to Foucault, liberal 
democratic leaders have used modern technologies and worked closely with the 
media to manage their nation and imprint images of reality in the public 
consciousness through an “immense diffusion and consumption” of information in 
diverse forms.1
 
  Also Ericson et al’s study of news and government helps us to 
theorise Curtin’s interactions with journalists and to understand how he developed 
mutually beneficial relations with the press gallery.  Reporters cooperated with him 
to relay media messages that “visualised deviance” in the form of Axis enemies and 
to appeal for public support in the war against Japan.  In turn, Curtin elevated the 
role of press gallery correspondents; he viewed them as his colleagues and shared 
government intelligence with them as no other prime minister had done before him.  
As this chapter’s concluding section will discuss, these theories help us to understand 
the significance of the contemporary journalists’ survey responses about prime 
ministers’ media strategies to communicate with public audiences. 
 
                                                            
1 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power” [hereafter “Truth and power”], trans. Colin Gordon, 
Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper in C. Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980, p. 
131. 
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Prime ministerial journalism strategies: From John Curtin to Julia Gillard  
According to the political scientists, Barabas and Jerit, it is vital for leaders to 
communicate clearly their key messages to citizens, who “can and do learn about 
important political developments”.  They found that citizens were most 
knowledgeable about those events that were being covered widely by a number of 
distinct news outlets.2  Since this research suggested that media coverage increased 
people’s knowledge, it would appear to be in a political leader’s interest to talk 
openly and frequently to journalists to support a well-informed citizenry.  As 
Huckfeldt et al ascertained, “relatively few individuals hold such strong opinions and 
attitudes regarding the full range of political topics”.  They suggested that while 
“some individuals hold strong opinions about some issues”, still other people had 
neither strong opinions nor accessible points of political orientation.3  Ericson et al 
argue that in liberal democracies, journalists have become an extension of 
governments as they order, shape and distribute information to public audiences.4  
While a number of scholars5 and journalists6
                                                            
2 Jennifer Jerit and Jason Barabas, “Surveillance Knowledge and the Mass Media” [hereafter 
“Mass media”], Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington 
DC, 2005, pp. 1-36, retrieved on 22 March 2010 at  
 have focused on the Churchill and 
Roosevelt communication strategies, this study investigates Curtin’s legacy for 
governments’ relationships and the Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery. 
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41558_index.html>. 
3 Robert Huckfeldt, Jeffrey Levine, William Morgan and John Sprague, “Accessibility and 
the Political Utility of Partisan and Ideological Orientations”, American Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 43, no. 3, July 1999, p. 909. 
4 Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A 
Study of News Organization [hereafter Visualizing deviance], Open University Press, Milton 
Keynes, 1987, p. 356. 
5 For example, Jonathan Sikorsky, “From British Cassandra to American Hero: The 
Churchill Legend in the World War II American Media”, Finest Hour, The Churchill Centre, 
no. 108, autumn 2000, pp. 30-36; Betty Houchin Winfield, F.D.R. and the News Media 
[hereafter F.D.R.], University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1990. 
6 For example, Robert Hardman, “Winston Churchill’s extraordinary relationship with the 
founding fathers of the Mail” [hereafter “Churchill’s relationship with the Mail”], Daily 
Mail, London, 8 February 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-512982/Winston-Churchills-extraordinary-
relationship-founding-fathers-Mail.html>; Katherine Santiago, “Newark Mayor Cory Booker 
rapidly gains following on Twitter”, The Star-Ledger, New Jersey, 21 May 2009, retrieved 
on 21 March 2010 at 
<http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/newark_mayor_booker_increases.html>; Barry 
Saunders, “Fireside chats in the 21st century” [hereafter “The 21st century”], ABC News, 19 
November 2008, retrieved on 24 March 2010 at 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/11/19/2423615.htm>. 
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 Although a number of scholarly researchers conducted surveys of press 
gallery members, it seemed that none published findings specifically on reporters’ 
views of Curtin and his influence on contemporary political journalism.7  Research 
indicated that after Curtin, Australian prime ministers recognised the need to interact 
with the mass media more frequently and this trend continued in the twenty-first 
century.  As the federal treasurer in the Curtin administration, Ben Chifley would 
meet journalists to provide background information for their news reports.8  Chifley 
continued the routine of providing confidential information to senior journalists 
when he was the nation’s leader from 1945 to 1949.9  In their oral histories, 
correspondents remembered Chifley as “very kindly”,10 “affable”11 and “friendly”,12 
with a “great sense of humour” and “terrific charm”.13  Although he held prime 
ministerial media conferences regularly, he conducted them less frequently than did 
Curtin when Australia was most vulnerable to Allied attacks in 1942.  Chifley 
scheduled separate, weekly interviews for the morning and evening news 
representatives.14
 
   
 According to press secretary, Don Rodgers, Curtin would talk with journalists 
twice a day “for a long, long time” to provide news updates that coincided with their 
deadlines.  Yet Rodgers said the interviews caused “a tremendous strain” on Curtin 
                                                            
7 For a short bibliography of some of these surveys, see Helen Ester, “Who’s Been Watching 
The Watchers? Australian Political Journalism” [hereafter “Australian political journalism”], 
ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-7, retrieved on 15 May 2010 at 
<ejournalist.com.au/v1n2/ESTER.pdf>.  Also see John Henningham, “Political Journalists’ 
Political Preferences and Professional Values” [hereafter “Political journalists”], The 
Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no. 2, 1995, pp. 321-334; C.J. Lloyd, 
Parliament And The Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 1901-88 [hereafter 
Parliament and the press], Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988; Julianne Schultz, 
Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability, and the Media, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
8 Frank Chamberlain, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Chamberlain interview]”, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00552, 
August 1972-January 1973, transcript np. 
9 Clem J. Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 169. 
10 W. J. Bridgman, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00499, 17 
November 1976, transcript np. 
11 Irvine Douglas, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Douglas interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01061/1, 15-19 June 1972, transcript np. 
12 Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Cox interview”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 01060/1, 6 April 1973, transcript np. 
13 Edgar George Holt, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Holt interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01059/1, 23 May 1978, transcript np. 
14 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 169. 
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and as a result, “finally I was able to reduce the number of press conferences in the 
latter years of his prime ministership”.15  Rodger’s oral history suggested that 
perhaps Curtin communicated more often to journalists during the early years of his 
prime ministership because he recognised the importance of securing media support 
for his war strategies.  Official minutes did not exist that might have provided the 
exact number of Curtin’s secret news briefings throughout his five-year prime 
ministership.  While some of the “Circus” recognised the historical significance of 
Curtin’s interviews by lodging their reporters’ notes at the National Library of 
Australia, their transcriptions were not comprehensive.  For instance, F.T. Smith did 
not write about Curtin’s talks between 16 October and 19 November 1942 because at 
this time, the journalist might not have accompanied him on his one-month visit to 
Perth, Adelaide and Melbourne.16  While Curtin was away from Canberra during this 
time, he still interacted with the media as he visited his “mates” at The Westralian 
Worker offices, addressed a “Journalists Club” luncheon in Melbourne, delivered 
two radio broadcasts and distributed press statements.17  Alexander’s diaries covered 
only the period from Curtin’s appointment as prime minister in 1941 until 1944.18  
Cox’s bulletins to his employer, Murdoch, were based only on Curtin’s Canberra 
conferences during 1944, the year when the prime minister was away overseas for 
almost three months, and his interviews from 22 January to 9 April 1945, a period 
punctuated by absences due to his illness.19
                                                            
15 Donald Kilgour Rodgers, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Rodgers interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00497, 29 April 1971, transcript np. 
  My research indicated that Curtin made 
fewer recorded national radio broadcasts during his final year.  Archival records 
indicated that he delivered at least five broadcasts as prime minister from October to 
December 1941, ten radio talks in 1942, ten in 1943, 18 in 1944, and he made only 
16 Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s war [hereafter 
Backroom briefings], National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], Canberra, 1997, pp. 
101-105. 
17 Helen Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man” for 1942 [hereafter “Diary”], JCPML, Bentley, 
2008, retrieved on 15 June 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1942.html>; JCPML,“Index to John Curtin’s 
speeches in the Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the 
Prime Minister, 1941-1945 [hereafter “Index to John Curtin’s speeches]”, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 01148/1, 2007. 
18 J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957”, NLA, Canberra, Manuscript Collections, NLA MS 
2389, 1833-1957. 
19 Harold Cox, “Typescript reports, 1944-1964” [hereafter “Typescript reports”], NLA, 
Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA MS acc. no. 4554, 1944-1964.  
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three broadcasts during his final months between January and July 1945.20  This 
evidence suggested he might have held fewer press conferences during his final year 
because of his illness and the nation’s comparatively greater security since the 
Allies’ military offensives.  Even so, Rodgers added in 1971 that he did not know of 
any prime minister who had given as many news conference as Curtin.21
 
 
 Since Curtin, Australia’s prime ministers have pursued positive mass media 
coverage in different ways.  When Menzies returned to government in 1949, he was 
committed to the same pattern of news briefings as Chifley.  Menzies improved his 
method of communicating to journalists, compared with his first term, because he 
was more prepared to engage in a two-way discourse at his interviews.  By July 
1951, he was giving background talks for senior journalists; but he increasingly 
replaced his media conferences with the system of releasing “handouts”, or printed 
material.  He still provided confidential information to well-known reporters.22  The 
origins of the professional media release have been traced to Ivy Lee, arguably the 
United States’ first true public relations practitioner, who gave instructions on how to 
write a “statement from a public service corporation” in 1917.23
                                                            
20 For a full list of Curtin’s recorded radio talks, see Appendix 12.  Also, Australian 
Commonwealth Government, “Prime Minister’s Itinerary” [hereafter “Election speech 
itinerary”], National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CA12, A461, R4/1/12, 1943, p. 117; 
British Movietone (producer), “Commonwealth Premiers Honoured”, in Newsreels of 
Curtin, 1942-1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 1944; Campbell, 
“Diary”, 19 and 30 April, 7, 10 and 30 May, 1 and 26 June 1944; John Curtin, Digest of 
Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. 
John Curtin), no. 81, 19 April 1944, p. 18; Department of External Affairs, “Visit of Mr. 
Curtin to USA & UK in connection with Prime Ministers’ Conference London”, JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00768/2, May 1944, pp.10-22; Great Britain Foreign Office, 
“Political situation: consular reports”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00779/13, 28 April 
1944, pp. 1-3; JCPML, “Index to John Curtin’s speeches”; William Lyon Mackenzie King, 
“The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King” [hereafter “Diaries”], Library and Archives 
Canada, Ottawa, 30 May 1944, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<
  Afterwards 
Australian prime ministers used the “handout” to supplement interviews with 
reporters, but this type of media release “evolved as a major news system” only 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html>; ScreenSound Australia, 
“A Great Australian Passes”, in John Joseph Curtin 1885 – 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 1944; ScreenSound Australia, Prime Minister Welcomed 
In Canada (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01052/1, 1944. 
21 Rodgers, “Rodgers interview”. 
22 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 174-177. 
23 Shirley Harrison and Kevin Moloney, “Comparing two public relations pioneers: 
American Ivy Lee and British John Elliot”, Public Relations Review, vol. 30, 2004, pp. 205-
215. 
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under Menzies during the 1950s and early 1960s.  After he retired in 1966, his 
Liberal successors, Harold Holt, John Gorton and William McMahon, did not hold 
regular media conferences; however, this changed with Gough Whitlam’s victory.  
Promoting a wide-ranging Labor reform program in 1972, Whitlam made a 
commitment to weekly interviews and this “was largely honoured” during his prime 
ministership.24  Whitlam’s rapport with journalists was praised by the later Liberal 
Party leader and Prime Minister, John Howard.  While Howard described Whitlam’s 
“practice of regular, sit-down press conferences” as “quite an innovation”,25 they 
were actually instituted by Curtin.  Yet Whitlam made “little use of background 
briefings” after some confidential information was published from an off-the-record 
interview that he conducted early in his term.26  Labor was supported by Sir Keith 
Murdoch’s son, Rupert, in 1972; however, after the Governor-General, Sir John 
Kerr, dismissed Whitlam on 11 November 1975 due to a parliamentary deadlock 
over the passage of the federal budget, Murdoch rewrote the political news in his 
nascent flagship, The Australian, to add “a strong anti-Whitlam flavour”, which 
caused journalists to strike during the 1975 election campaign.27
 
  With Murdoch’s 
support, the Liberal leader, Malcolm Fraser, won the election on 13 December, and 
he moved away from his predecessors’ emphasis on the press to redefine prime 
ministerial journalism strategies. 
 Fraser began a trend of favouring electronic media conferences over press 
interviews.  Often he prevented newspaper journalists from attending his 
conferences, when he made statements that were recorded by television cameras and 
tape recorders.  Afterwards he released the recorded transcriptions and this 
“effectively stalled print journalists from probing contentious issues”.28  Although 
his successor, Robert Hawke, granted interviews “irregularly”, he “maintained close 
links” with press proprietors, according to Lloyd.29
                                                            
24 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 176, 244-250. 
  The three prime ministers 
25 John Howard, “John Howard Public Lecture – Politics and the Media: the Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly” [hereafter “Politics and the media”], The University of Melbourne, 
Melbourne, 10 August 2009, retrieved on 24 June 2010 at 
<http://newsroom.melbourne.edu/news/n-103>. 
26 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 251. 
27 Nick Economou and Stephen Tanner, Media, Power and Politics [hereafter Media], 
Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, 2008, p. 218. 
28 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 251. 
29 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 253-254. 
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following Hawke – Paul Keating, John Howard and Kevin Rudd – were not as 
regular with their media conferences as Curtin.30  An entourage of journalists always 
accompanied Keating during his increasingly frequent prime ministerial trips to Asia 
to discuss mutual trade and security interests and other issues, resulting in more news 
coverage of this world region at these times.31  In a 1998 address, the Australian 
political journalist, Michelle Grattan, reflected that in comparison, World War II 
journalists were given “loads of first-hand prime ministerial time and attention”.  
Also they “were accorded prime ministerial confidence to a degree that is staggering 
to anyone covering politics today”.32
 
  Increasingly prime ministers turned to 
relatively new media to broadcast messages directly to public audiences. 
During 2000, Howard conducted 234 radio, television and “door stop” 
interviews, where he spoke briefly with reporters.33  The scholars, Nick Economou 
and Stephen Tanner, credited Howard with developing talkback radio skills because 
he was not as well-suited to television appearances.34
                                                            
30 For example, Ester, “Australian political journalism”, p. 6; Helen Ester, “The media” 
[hereafter “Media”], in Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison (eds), Silencing Dissent: How 
the Australian Government is controlling public opinion and stifling debate, Allen & Unwin, 
Crows Nest, 2007, pp. 117-118. 
  Even when electronic media 
became more “participatory” such as with talkback radio, critical engagement was 
compromised.  Furthermore as Steve Mickler argued, talkback radio became a 
significant political medium during the 1998 and 2001 federal election campaigns.  
In the lead-ups to the two elections, Howard appeared to prefer conservative, 
commercial talkback radio, perhaps because this medium was less likely to broadcast 
serious criticisms of his policies.  He and his frequent talkback radio host, Alan 
Jones, shared a “particularly well-honed political skill” of presenting themselves as 
“non-elites”, even though they were “two of the nation’s most powerful social 
31 Caryn Coatney, Australian Media Coverage of Asia: The Need to Exist and to Have a 
Name [hereafter Australian media coverage], MA thesis, Curtin University of Technology, 
Bentley, 1997. 
32 Michelle Grattan, “The Prime Minister and the Press: A Study in Intimacy”, JCPML, 
Bentley, 1998, retrieved on 15 May 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/events/speeches/grattanlecture.html>. 
33 Ester, “Australian political journalism”, p. 6. 
34 Economou and Tanner, Media, p. 145. 
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elites”.35  Although talkback radio listeners were informed that “anybody can ring in 
and have their say”, the presenters controlled and filtered the broadcasts.36  Later 
Howard explained that he used talkback radio “a lot” because his messages were not 
edited.  He added, “it is the one medium where you are guaranteed that if you’ve got 
something to say, somebody will hear it in its entirety if they want to sit and 
listen”.37  By October 2007, a range of mainstream media reported that the Labor 
opposition leader, Rudd, had won the only televised debate with Howard during the 
election campaign.  Afterwards journalists wrote that Rudd was “generally more 
positive” in front of the cameras;38 he “appeared more concise and got his message 
across more clearly”.39
 
  The reporters’ perceptions of the debate confirmed scholarly 
views that Howard was more comfortable with talkback radio than television.  While 
prime ministers have continued Curtin’s practice of broadcasting media messages 
directly to audiences, they may avoid certain media if they deem them to be too 
interrogative, critical or difficult to control. 
Although Howard disliked most journalists’ practice of editing his messages, 
he spoke of political leaders’ “need” to develop “goodwill” with news 
correspondents.  As an opposition politician, he had written a regular Friday column 
for The Australian and, when the prime minister, he assiduously developed 
friendships with particularly influential journalists.  Two years after his 2007  
  
                                                            
35 Steve Mickler, “Talkback Radio, Anti-elitism And Moral Decline: A Fatal Paradox?” 
[hereafter “Talkback radio”], Southern Review: Communication, Politics & Culture, vol. 37, 
no. 3, 2005, p. 30, retrieved on 9 April 2010 at 
<http://search.informit.com.au.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/documentSummary;dn=990068020742
095;res=IELHSS>. 
36 Mickler, “Talkback radio”, p. 44. 
37 Howard, “Politics and the media”. 
38 Phillip Coorey, “Rudd’s night in election debates”, Brisbane Times, Brisbane, 22 October 
2007, retrieved on 24 June at 
<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/articles/2007/10/21/1192940904007.html>; Malcolm 
Farr, “Rudd beats Howard in federal election debate”, The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 22 
October 2007, retrieved on 24 June 2010 at 
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/classmate/rudd-wins-debate-worm-burns-9/story-
e6frewti-1111114695103>. 
39 (Anon.), “Most observers believe Rudd won debate”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
Sydney, 21 October 2007, retrieved on 24 June 2010 at 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/Howard-Rudd-face-off-in-election-
debate/2007/10/21/1192940904527.html>. 
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electoral defeat, he explained: 
Whatever may be the attitude of journalists towards politicians, they need to 
cultivate them; whatever may be the attitude of politicians towards 
journalists, we need their engagement, hopefully their goodwill, and desirably 
their objectivity and their faithful reporting in order to transmit our 
message.40
According to the politics scholar, Greg Barns, prime ministers have increasingly 
invested in efforts to manage the news and they have relied upon expanding 
government media offices to communicate regularly with journalists.  Although their 
official bulletins might appear “supposedly apolitical”, often these would be 
influenced by “blatantly party political” purposes.
 
41  Politicians have benefited from 
Curtin’s decision to employ a full-time prime ministerial press secretary; they have 
considerably expanded this position by employing “a range of personnel to manage 
their public communications” with varying degrees of sophistication and 
partisanship.42
 
 
 Julia Gillard broadened prime ministerial strategies to communicate with 
journalists.  When she became the nation’s leader in June 2010, she quickly 
responded to reporters’ queries at a televised press gallery conference;43 shortly 
afterwards, an unnamed senior Labor representative was quoted as saying that the 
“centre ground” of her media strategies would be to give interviews to the nation’s 
top-selling women’s magazines.  Previously the ALP usually paid for advertising 
features in women’s titles.44
  
  According to the prime minister’s media centre, Gillard 
conducted at least 130 interviews with a wide range of news and social media  
                                                            
40 Howard, “Politics and the media”. 
41 Greg Barns, Selling the Australian Government: Politics And Propaganda From Whitlam 
To Howard, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2005, p. 10. 
42 Geoffrey Craig, The Media, Politics and Public Life [hereafter The media], Allen & 
Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004, p. 130. 
43 ABC Television (producer), National Press Club Address – Julia Gillard (Prime Minister) 
(television program), Canberra, 15 July 2010. 
44 Sally Jackson, “Glossies to play a key part in Gillard crusade”, The Australian, Surry 
Hills, 5 July 2010, retrieved on 17 January 2011 at 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/glossies-to-play-a-key-part-in-gillard-
crusade/story-e6frg996-1225887766253>. 
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between 24 June 2010 and 12 January 2011.45  Yet it would likely be very difficult 
for a modern leader to replicate Curtin’s style of spontaneous press interactions 
because he was “probably the only democratic leader in the wartime world to travel 
without a body guard”, an incredible security risk by today’s standards.46
 
  Since 
researchers documented a decline in the use of the Curtin style of press gallery 
conference and off-the-record briefings, this study has conducted a survey of senior 
political journalists to investigate their views of these media strategies.  The results 
of this survey will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Another aim of this chapter was to investigate the long-term impact of 
Curtin’s strategies in radio and visual media.  As part of his broader media vision, 
Curtin envisaged an “independent” national radio news service and a first-class, 
internationally renowned film industry.47  Curtin and other Australian leaders 
recognised the power of radio early in the development of this medium, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3.  While the first US political broadcasts included the Democratic Party’s 
1928 dramatisation of the life of the presidential nominee, Al Smith, Australian radio 
emerged as a “major force” during the 1931 election campaign involving Labor 
Prime Minister, James Scullin, and United Australia Party leader, Joseph Lyons.48
  
  
This thesis has demonstrated that by 1941, Curtin used innovative media strategies to 
focus on his leadership, popularity and his “plain”, “honest” image in an  
                                                            
45 Prime Minister of Australia, “Media Centre”, Canberra, 2010-11, retrieved on 17 January 
2011 at <http://www.pm.gov.au/media_centre>.  The media centre did not list Gillard’s 
interviews in August 2010 such as her talks for: 702 ABC Radio Sydney (2 August); The 
Courier-Mail (circa 2 August); 3AW Radio in Melbourne (6 August); the Australian 
Christian Lobby website (6 August); Mark Latham for Nine Network’s 60 Minutes (7 
August); ABC TV’s Insiders (8 August); Channel Ten News (10 August); Nine Network’s 
Today on Sunday (15 August); Clara Bowditch for MySpace (16 August); Sky News (20 
August). 
46 Alan Reid, “Plain John Curtin Who Led Australia Through Darkest Days”, The Sun, 
Sydney, cited in the JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/165, 5 July 1945. 
47 Neville Petersen, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, & Politics 1932-1947 [hereafter 
News not views], Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1993, pp. 121-122. 
48 Ian Ward, “The early use of radio for political communication in Australia and Canada: 
John Henry Austral, Mr Sage and the Man from Mars” [hereafter “The early use of radio”], 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, pp. 316-322. 
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unprecedented way.49  Moreover, he encouraged public participation in political 
events by instigating the first radio broadcasts of the House of Representatives 
proceedings, when the parliamentarians solemnly celebrated the 1945 European 
victory.50  After Chifley was returned to power in 1946, Labor members welcomed 
the first broadcasts of parliamentary debates, which began in July of the same year.51  
Liberal politicians recognised they needed a “sophisticated publicity machine” 
similar to the one that Curtin and Rodgers had established for the ALP.52  Therefore, 
the Liberals persuaded the long-time ALP publicist, Solomon “Sim” Rubensohn, 
who had run Chifley’s 1946 campaign, to work for them.  During the 1949 election 
campaign, the Hansen-Rubensohn agency released a series of radio programs to 
construct a positive, accessible image of Menzies as an average, hardworking family 
man, who was keen to address citizens’ everyday problems.53  Although Chifley 
gave regular Sunday evening broadcasts on commercial radio, he did not use all of 
his free, available ABC air-time during the campaign.54  Menzies’ advertisements, 
which were portrayed as newsworthy commentaries, marked “a new high point in the 
cult of personality in Australian politics” as he governed for the next 17 years.55
                                                            
49 (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin’s Tragedy”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 6 July 1945, p. 2; 
(Anon.), “Publicity: Relations with America: Australia Expands”, The Canberra Times, 
Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4; (Anon.), “Opinion-He Was A Good Man”, The Daily 
Mirror, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s office, no. 4, JCPML 
acc. no. 00297/4, 5 July 1945, JCPML, Bentley; David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John 
Curtin’s Speeches and Writings, Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 226; 
Bobbie Oliver, Unity is Strength: A History of the Australian Labor Party and the Trades 
and Labor Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999 [hereafter Unity is strength], API 
Network, Bentley, 2003, p. 167; ScreenSound Australia, “A Great Australian Passes …”, in 
John Joseph Curtin 1885 – 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 
1945. 
  He 
seemed to have changed his views since 1941, when he wrote in his diary that he 
50 (Anon.), “Solemn Scenes In Parliament”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 9 May 1945, p. 
1. 
51 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 164. 
52 Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling and the professionalization of public 
relations: Keith Murdoch, Robert Menzies, and the Liberal Party of Australia” [hereafter 
“Political opinion polling”], Australian Journalism Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2002, p. 46. 
53 Robert Crawford, “Modernising Menzies, Whitlam, and Australian Elections” [hereafter 
“Modernising Australian elections”], The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public 
Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3, March 2004, pp. 142-143; Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling”, 
pp. 54-55. 
54 Ward, “The early use of radio”, p. 326. 
55 Griffen-Foley, cited in Robert Crawford, “Modernising Australian elections”, p. 144. 
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would “shy at” a broadcast interview.56
 
  By 1949 Menzies used similar radio 
techniques to those of Curtin and his advertising campaign arguably assisted him to 
set the record for being Australia’s longest serving leader. 
While Curtin was quick to use the relatively new media of radio in the 
1930s,57 the development of professional televised news was fairly slow in the 
country after the first transmissions in 1956.58  In the US, television was a factor in 
influencing voters’ attitudes during the 1960 election campaign.  On 26 September 
1960, US audiences watched the country’s first televised debate between the 
Republican nominee, Vice President Richard Nixon, and Democratic Senator, John 
F. Kennedy.  Many viewers regarded Kennedy as “the outright winner” because he 
appeared “tanned, confident and well-rested after campaigning in California” during 
the summer.  In contrast, audiences described Nixon as looking “underweight with a 
pallid complexion”, because he was recovering from a knee operation and he refused 
to wear any make-up for his television appearance.59  As political scientist, James N. 
Druckman, wrote: “Television images matter in politics, and may have indeed played 
an important role in the first Kennedy-Nixon debate.”60  In Canberra, Menzies’ final 
press conference in January 1966 was televised.  While audiences noticed “obvious 
evidence of inebriation and incompetence” among some of the journalists,61 
Alexander said he was surprised that Menzies did not greet them and appeared 
“abrupt and aloof”.62
                                                            
56 A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 Diary, 
NLA, Canberra, 1993, p. 60. 
  Although Australia’s first televised current affairs show, the 
ABC’s Four Corners, began to air in 1962, electronic media studios and permanent 
staff television correspondent positions were established in the press gallery only in 
the 1970s.  Prime ministerial strategies became more sophisticated in the use of 
57 Ward, “The early use of radio”, p. 322. 
58 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 210. 
59 (Anon.), “Kennedy and Nixon clash in TV debate”, BBC News, London, 26 September 
1960, retrieved on 21 June 2010 at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/26/newsid_3104000/3104393.stm>. 
60 James N. Druckman, “The Power of Television Images: The First Kennedy-Nixon Debate 
Revisited”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 65, no. 2, May 2003, p. 559. 
61 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 211. 
62 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Alexander interview”], 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np. 
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audiovisual media, and Gorton was credited as being “a better television performer” 
than his immediate predecessors, Holt and Menzies.63
 
   
Due to television’s rise to prominence, Labor Party leader Whitlam was 
viewed as more telegenic than Prime Minister McMahon during the 1972 
campaign;64 this dissonance in visual imagery between the two party leaders 
resembled the first Kennedy-Nixon debate.  Labor’s polished television commercials 
featured a slogan about positive change, “It’s Time”, a “song with hit qualities”, and 
“favourite TV stars” to underscore the popularity of Whitlam and his cause.  He 
appeared as a “man of the people”, who was dedicated to public service.  His 1972 
victory, similar to Menzies’ 1949 win, indicated the importance of a well-
orchestrated campaign that used the electronic media to focus on a seemingly 
unpretentious political leader, who appeared to be communicating closely with 
voters.65  These campaign skills were developed by Curtin in the lead-up to the 1943 
election, when he gave at least three nationwide radio talks to communicate with 
voters.66  The historian, Robert Crawford, wrote that by 1972, the electronic media 
had clearly relegated press advertising to a subordinate position during Australian 
political campaigns.67
 
   
As a result, televised debates have been screened more regularly and this 
medium has become an important site of federal political conflict.   The major party 
leaders have engaged in at least one televised debate during every federal election 
campaign since 1984, with the exception of 1987.  Politics scholar, Philip Senior, 
likened the Australian debates to those televised in the US because journalists widely 
reported on them and their coverage could influence voters, including those who 
watched the verbal repartee and those who were not spectators.  In both countries, 
the news coverage emphasised the results of studio audience polls, conducted after 
                                                            
63 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, pp. 237, 240, 245, 250-251, 253. 
64 Economou and Tanner, Media, p. 145. 
65 Crawford, “Modernising Australian elections”, pp. 149-55. 
66 Australian Commonwealth Government, “Election speech itinerary”; JCPML, “Index to 
John Curtin’s speeches”. 
67 Crawford, “Modernising Australian elections”, p. 155. 
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the debate to identify a winner.68  Australia adopted the American “made-for-TV” 
arrangement more quickly than Britain.  In April 2010, the world’s journalists 
publicised Britain’s “first presidential-style TV debates”, a series of three events that 
involved Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Conservative Party leader David Cameron 
and the Liberal Democrats’ Nick Clegg before the election on 6 May.69  Later, the 
Australian media seemed to emphasise entertainment programs instead of the 
televised debate on 25 July 2010 between the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, and the 
Liberal opposition leader, Tony Abbott, a former journalist with connections to 
metropolitan broadsheets and tabloids.70  Channel Seven and Ten Network 
executives forced the evening debate to be postponed for one hour because the 
original timeslot interfered with popular cooking and dance competition shows.71  In 
Perth newspapers, front-page photographs advertising the MasterChef television final 
overshadowed the debate reports.72  As more television programs have blended 
information and entertainment, politicians have “hit the talk show circuit” to reach 
wider audiences and discuss aspects of their lives often neglected by traditional 
media.73  Researchers have noted the tendency of television to “limit opportunities 
for critical engagement”,74 condense important messages to a snappy “sound bite”75 
and reduce coverage of parliamentary proceedings.76
                                                            
68 Philip Senior, “Reporting the Great Debate: Press Coverage of Australian Televised 
Leaders’ Debates” [hereafter “The great debate”], Australian Political Science Association 
Conference, Melbourne, 24-26 September 2007, retrieved on 29 January 2011 at 
<arts.monash.edu.au/psi/news-and-events/apsa/...and.../senior.pdf>. 
  Although some media scholars 
69 Ben Quinn, “British election: Nick Clegg wins UK’s first presidential-style TV debates”, 
The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 16 April 2010, retrieved on 21 June 2010 at 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/295037>. 
70 Malcolm Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
71 Amanda Meade and Sally Jackson, “Worm returns as MasterChef cooks up a heated 
debate”, The Australian, Surry Hills, 22 July 2010, retrieved on 29 August 2010 at 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/worm-returns-as-masterchef-cooks-up-a-
heated-debate/story-fn59niix-1225895503476>. 
72 The Sunday Times, Perth, 25 July 2010, p.1; The West Australian, Perth, 24 and 26 July 
2010, p. 1. 
73 Frédérick Bastien, “Beyond Sex and Saxophones: Interviewing Practices and Political 
Substance on Televised Talk Shows” [hereafter “Televised talk shows”], The Canadian 
Political Science Review, vol 3, no. 2, June 2009, p. 70. 
74 Craig, The media, p. 15. 
75 Economou and Tanner, Media, p. 32. 
76 Rachel K. Gibson, Wainer Lusoli, Andrea Römmele and Stephen J. Ward, “Introduction: 
Representative democracy and the Internet”, in Rachel K. Gibson, Andrea Römmele and 
Stephen J. Ward (eds), Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, organisation and participation 
via new ICTs [hereafter Electronic democracy], Routledge, London and New York, 2004, p. 
2; Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 183. 
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have criticised this form of political communication, the “infotainment” programs, 
like the televised debates, “may be important sources of information about 
substantive policies”.77
 
 
Just as Australia’s leaders seemed initially reluctant to adopt the American-
style “made for TV” political debates, their use of internet strategies has developed at 
a slower pace than US online media trends.  America’s two major political parties 
used a wide range of websites that encouraged young people to vote in the 2000 
election involving the Democratic nominee, Vice President Al Gore, and the 
Republican candidate, George W. Bush, as well as in 2004, when President Bush was 
being challenged by the Democratic Party’s John Kerry.  Although Howard had been 
Australia’s leader since 1996, his advisors created the nation’s first prime ministerial 
website to communicate to constituents and uploaded his first political video on 
YouTube only in 2007.  In reaction, opposition leader Rudd implemented digital 
strategies that sparked the “YouTube Election” campaign in the same year.78  
According to public relations scholars, Howell and Da Silva, the Labor digital 
campaign attracted more interest and visitors because the party’s use of YouTube, 
MySpace and Facebook “held greater potential to influence the decision-making 
process of first time voters”.79  In contrast, many young voters found “a lack of 
online credibility” in the Liberals’ tactics.80  Howell and Da Silva concluded that 
differing from the US political sphere, Australian first time voters seemed “sceptical” 
about the “sincerity” of online techniques to communicate policies and information 
in 2007.81  Soon afterwards, academics noted Prime Minister Rudd’s early adoption 
of social media technologies and the Federal Government’s expanded use of Twitter 
and Facebook.82
                                                            
77 Bastien, “Televised talk shows”, p. 84. 
  The use of Twitter and other social media played an important role 
in the relatively quick leadership change from Rudd to Gillard as the new prime 
78 Gwyneth Howell and Bruce Da Silva, “New media, first time voters and the 2007 
Australian federal election” [hereafter “New media”], Public Communication Review, vol. 1, 
2010, pp. 27-28. 
79 Howell and Da Silva, “New media”, p. 32. 
80 Howell and Da Silva, “New media”, p. 32. 
81 Howell and Da Silva, “New media”, p. 33. 
82 Saunders, “The 21st century”. 
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minister in June 2010.83
 
  The extensive Rudd and Gillard online strategies are 
comparable with Curtin’s innovative national and international radio broadcasts 
because these prime ministers implemented the same principle of embracing new 
media to connect to a wider audience.   
The “intense media focus” on prime ministers enhanced their role as “the 
national opinion leader and mobiliser”, according to Curran.84  Moreover, the 
proliferation of new technologies might diminish the power of major media owners.  
Online media offered “greater potential for interactivity” with audiences; 
consequently the relations between media producers, public figures and the public 
might “change fundamentally”, Craig wrote.85  Even though “it was not possible to 
specify any one universal type of internet effect on participation”, Gibson et al 
commented on the possibilities of information communication technologies to 
mobilise people and involve them in the political process.86  News consumers can 
become active “citizens of the media”, according to Hartley, in an “emergent, 
globalizing, postmodern public sphere”.87
 
  Although there might be a risk of 
trivialising important political debates, the current prime minister’s technique of 
using relatively new audiovisual media, such as the latest online communications, 
could be beneficial when engaging citizens in an informed, interactive dialogue 
about the nation. 
Thus since Curtin’s prime ministership, Australian political leaders have used 
relatively new media to increase journalists’ coverage of their objectives and to 
connect to younger audiences.  Although historians have debated exactly when the 
concept of a distinctive generation of young adults began to emerge, the US 
                                                            
83 Courtney Trenwith, “Social networking spills the beans”, brisbanetimes.com.au, Brisbane, 
25 June 2010, retrieved on 30 July 2010 at 
<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/technology/social-networking-spills-the-beans-
20100624-z2v0.html>. 
84 James Curran, The Power Of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National 
Image, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2004, p. 15. 
85 Craig, The media, pp. 10, 17. 
86 Gibson, Lusoli, Römmele and Ward, Electronic democracy, pp. 2-4. 
87 John Hartley, Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity, Popular Culture [hereafter 
Popular reality], Arnold, London and New York, 1996, pp. 71-72. 
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sociologist, Talcott Parsons, was believed to have coined the term, “youth culture”, 
in 1942.  Youth has been categorised as extending from the ages of 13 to 30.  
According to some scholars, the World War II sub-cultures represented a clash 
between totalitarianism and creativity, ranging from the anti-fascist German “swing 
kids” to the Nazi Hitler Youth and from the jazz-oriented European underground to 
Frank Sinatra fans.88  Through Curtin’s use of the popular culture of films and radio 
to broadcast his media messages and peacetime agenda, he deliberately attempted to 
appeal to young Allied servicemen and women.  He seemed to understand the need 
to win their support at a time when the voting age threshold was 21 years old.  
During the 1940 campaign, for example, Curtin realised that he had “barely retained 
his seat” of Fremantle because the soldiers’ votes “pushed him ahead in the race”.89  
Similarly to Curtin, Whitlam made a concerted effort to attract first time voters with 
his 1972 campaign television commercials and “popular” theme tune.  Account 
executive Paul Jones, of the Hansen-Rubensohn-McCann-Erikson advertising 
agency, developed Whitlam’s “It’s Time” slogan.90  After Rubensohn’s “brief 
dalliance” with the Liberals during Menzies’ 1949 election campaign,91 Labor 
managed to persuade the agency to resume ALP publicity in 1951.92  When 
publicising Whitlam in 1972, Jones reasoned colloquially about the importance of 
attracting the youth vote: “The kids are the fashion leaders.  If they dig, a lot of older 
groups dig.”93  Furthermore, Whitlam lowered the franchise to 18 year olds.  In 
contrast, Howard did not seem to be as attuned with youth culture because he often 
chose to discuss his policies on Alan Jones’ talkback radio program with audiences, 
who mainly included listeners more than 40 years old.94
                                                            
88 Oded Heilbronner, “From a Culture for Youth to a Culture of Youth: Trends in the 
Historiography of Western Youth Cultures”, Contemporary European History, vol. 17, no. 4, 
2008, pp. 575-580. 
  During the televised 2007 
election debate, an ABC commentator observed that Rudd’s appeal seemed “better 
89 Kim C. Beazley, “Curtin as Leader of the ALP”, JCPML, Bentley, 1997, retrieved on 22 
June 2010 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/jcmemlect/beazley1997.html>; Oliver, Unity is 
strength, p. 154. 
90 Crawford, “Modernising Australian elections”, p. 148. 
91 Crawford, “Modernising Australian elections”, p. 143. 
92 Murray Goot, “Rubensohn, Solomon (Sim) (1904 – 1979)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 16, Melbourne University Press, 2002, pp. 144-146, retrieved on 17 January 
2011 at <http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A160171b.htm>. 
93 Robert Crawford, “Modernising Australian elections”, p. 149. 
94 David Salter, “Who’s for Breakfast, Mr Jones?”, The Monthly, Collingwood, May 2006, 
retrieved on 22 June 2010 at <http://www.themonthly.com.au/monthly-essays-david-salter-
whos-breakfast-mr-jones-sydney039s-talkback-titan-and-his-mythical-power>. 
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suited” for people under the age of 28, while Howard targeted “the older, more 
conservative voter”.95
 
  Also Rudd appeared on the youth entertainment program, 
Rove Live, and adopted media strategies instituted by Curtin to engage and involve 
more young audiences in politics.   
Likewise, Curtin was keen to extend the public sphere by involving the press 
gallery in confidential war decisions on an egalitarian, professional basis, and also 
through his wife Elsie’s encouragement of female reporters.  Their initiatives were 
evidenced in modern political journalism.  Through Curtin’s union leadership in 
1919, for example, the nation’s first university courses were held for working news 
correspondents.96  As this thesis has argued, this was the first attempt to 
“professionalise” journalism in the nation.  The program initiated the development of 
an Australian journalism profession, whose members resembled the concept of a 
“knowledge class”, as discussed in Chapter 2.97  Despite Curtin’s support for tertiary 
journalism programs, education opportunities seemed to increase slowly, because 
several Australian World War II journalists indicated that they did not attend 
university.98  Although many women reporters relinquished their jobs to male 
employees immediately after the war, the Australian Journalists’ Association has 
become more active in supporting female news correspondents since the 1970s.99
                                                            
95 Allan Pease, “TV debates: showbiz politics in action”, ABC News, 22 October 2007, 
retrieved on 21 June 2010 at 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10/22/2066346.htm>. 
  
Strong and Hannis wrote that, even though women comprised half of Australia’s 
96 Lloyd Ross, John Curtin: A Biography, The Macmillan Company of Australia, South 
Melbourne, 1977, p. 77; Clem Lloyd, Profession: Journalist [hereafter Journalist], Hale & 
Iremonger, Sydney, 1985, pp. 165-167. 
97 John Frow, Cultural Studies & Cultural Value, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995; 
Hartley, Popular reality, p. 241; Andrew Milner, Literature, culture and society, Routledge, 
New York, 2005, pp. 37-41; Joe Moran, Interdisciplinarity, Routledge, London and New 
York, 2002, pp. 75-81. 
98 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Chamberlain, “Chamberlain interview”; John 
Commins, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01092/1, 22-26 May 
1971, transcript np; Cox, “Cox interview”; Frank Davidson, interviewed by Isla Macphail, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00127/1, 24 January 1996, transcript np; Douglas, 
“Douglas interview”; Peter Ewing, interviewed by Bill Bunbury, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00492/2, 15 December 1999, transcript np; Allan Fraser, interviewed by Mel Pratt, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00550, August 1972–January 1973, transcript np; Alan D. 
Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00501, 4 October 1972 
and 28 February 1973, transcript np. 
99 Lloyd, Journalist, p. 305. 
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population in 2005, their research indicated that female journalists accounted for 
only 34 per cent of bylined stories.100  Advancements had been made, but women 
were still underrepresented among senior editorial positions.  Also Errington and 
Miragliotta noted a growing “professionalization of journalistic standards”.  Their 
research showed that the proportion of journalists entering the Federal Parliament 
had been steadily declining, beginning initially in the 1910s and especially since the 
1930s.  The professional boundaries between Canberra-based reporters and federal 
politicians appeared “robust” and might help to strengthen media independence in 
the future.101  Thus Curtin’s vision of tertiary trained professional journalists seems 
to have been partially fulfilled.  Although he and his wife aimed to involve more 
working male and female journalists in political and public spheres, his democratic 
goals have remained partially unachieved because Australians are still engaged in the 
“incomplete project of democracy”, as Mickler and Lucy have written.102
 
  While 
today’s journalism workforce is better educated, compared with the 1940s, John and 
Elsie Curtin’s ideals of liberty, freedom and democracy have not been fully achieved. 
 
Curtin’s influence on Australia’s international news reporting 
As part of his vision of an expanded public sphere, Curtin encouraged more 
Australian journalists and editors to visit and report on Allied war zones; likewise, he 
facilitated more overseas correspondents’ trips to his nation.  His sponsorship of 
cross-national correspondent exchanges was discussed in Chapter 8.  This thesis 
argues that Curtin’s international news priority made a lasting impact on Australian 
reporting.  In 1961 a visiting US journalism professor, W. Sprague Holden, 
commented, “Australian newsmen must be among the most peripatetic in the world” 
because their wartime experiences had highlighted the importance of foreign news 
                                                            
100 Cathy Strong and Grant Hannis, “The visibility of female journalists at Australian and 
New Zealand newspapers: the good news and the bad news”, Australian Journalism Review, 
vol. 29, no. 1, 2007, p. 115. 
101 Wayne Errington and Narelle Miragliotta, “From the Gallery to the Parliament: 
Journalists in the House of Representatives and Senate, 1901-2007” [hereafter “Journalists”], 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 55, no. 4, 2009, pp. 542-543. 
102 Niall Lucy and Steve Mickler, The War on Democracy: Conservative Opinion in the 
Australian Press [hereafter The war on democracy], University of Western Australia Press, 
Crawley, 2006, p. 98. 
Chapter 10   Survey of the contemporary Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery 
419 
 
gathering, meaning “the tradition of distant and frequent travel seems a built-in part 
of Australian newspapering”.103  While the Australian Associated Press had been 
established in 1935 to provide “basic news”,104 the nation’s metropolitan dailies 
increasingly maintained London offices, stationed journalists in New York and 
Washington DC, sent correspondents to Asia and the Middle East, and used Britain’s 
Reuters and the US Associated Press by the 1960s.105
 
 
As part of my Master’s research, I interviewed senior editors of eight daily 
Australian newspapers about their views of foreign news coverage in 1996.106  The 
editors agreed the quantity of foreign news items had increased substantially in the 
Australian press, as well as in their particular newspapers.  They said they had 
allocated more space for overseas news because readers were increasingly interested 
in current world events and also advanced technology made it easier to publish 
international updates.  The survey responses indicated a move away from the 
traditionally strong interest in Britain and the US, and a trend towards more Asian 
coverage because of the increasingly interlinked economies in the region.107
We regarded ourselves as British subjects.  Many Australians, including 
Menzies, called Britain “home”.  They regarded it as odd if a newspaper set 
up in Australia did not have news about “home” – home being Britain.
  The 
Australian deputy editor, Paul Austin, explained news attitudes had shifted 
dramatically since Menzies’ first prime ministerial term from 1939 to 1941, when: 
108
Austin explained that in 1996: “Our readers … particularly have an interest in more 
than just Australia, more than just the traditional Anglo-Saxon world”.  Austin added 
that although overseas news bureaus were expensive enterprises for The Australian 
and similar news organisations in the 1990s, they maintained these offices to enhance 
 
                                                            
103 W. Sprague Holden, Australia Goes To Press [hereafter Australia goes to press], 
Greenwood Press, Westport, 1961, p. 127. 
104 Holden, Australia goes to press, p. 127. 
105 Holden, Australia goes to press, pp. 121-128. 
106 The surveys and interview respondents included senior newspaper editors from the 
following eight newspapers: The Advertiser; The Age; The Australian; The Canberra Times; 
The Courier-Mail; The Northern Territory Times; The Sydney Morning Herald; The West 
Australian. The editors’ responses were included in: Coatney, Australian media coverage. 
107 Coatney, Australian media coverage, pp. 31-35. 
108 Paul Austin, cited in Coatney, Australian media coverage, p. 45. 
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their reputations for providing comprehensive international news.109
 
  Thus Curtin’s 
insistence that Australian wartime editors publish more world news reports made an 
impact on the nation’s media profession as they shifted from their pre-war 
parochialism and opened more overseas bureaus. 
In 2008, I conducted a follow-up interview with The Age news editor, Tom 
Ormonde, who had participated in my 1996 survey.  Ormonde said the quantity of 
international news had continued to increase, although he was uncertain whether the 
quality had similarly improved.  He asked: “[H]ave we become more or less 
culturally sensitive and tolerant in our coverage of other nations?  And I’m not sure.  
But more sophisticated?  I would say yes.”  Ormonde added that, “[s]ome Western 
bias is inevitable in our coverage of the world” because “it is inevitably coloured by 
the cultural prism through which we view it”.110
 
  The quality of foreign news 
coverage was influenced by the mainstream Australian media’s use of narrow 
sources, their preference for Anglo-Saxon news agencies, such as Reuters and the 
Associated Press, and their exclusion of other English-language reports, such as 
those produced by Antara in Indonesia, Agence France-Presse and Itar-Tass in 
Russia. 
While the overseas bureaus were prestigious, their high maintenance costs 
also hampered international news reporting.  For example, The Age and The Sydney 
Morning Herald – both owned by Fairfax Media Limited – decided to close their 
shared Japanese bureau that was being operated by a full-time correspondent.  
Ormonde explained this decision was “partly a reflection of the massive costs of 
sustaining a bureau there, as well as the relative decline in the importance of Japan” 
to Australian trade.111
  
  Research revealed that the factors limiting Australian 
newspapers’ international coverage were also common problems that inhibited other  
                                                            
109 Austin, cited in Coatney, Australian media coverage, pp. 41, 42. 
110 Tom Ormonde, personal communication, 24 September 2009. 
111 Tom Ormonde, personal communication, 24 September 2009. 
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western media organisations’ portrayal of developing nations.112  Although some of 
the more “serious” daily newspapers, such as The Age, The Australian and The 
Sydney Morning Herald, still supported international news, many regional papers 
lacked world sections.  The Australian Press Council found that foreign affairs 
comprised only 2.33 per cent of all of the nation’s metropolitan and regional papers 
in 2005.113  Three years later, the Australian Press Council stated the nation’s media 
were relying increasingly upon press release material and news agency feeds from 
affiliated overseas newspapers.114  In the same report, Castillo wrote of an emphasis 
on US events to the detriment of coverage of Asian natural disasters in selected 
Sydney Morning Herald issues in 2008.115
 
  While shortcomings have remained in the 
Australian media’s portrayal of the world, Curtin’s active support of foreign news 
correspondents, both at home and abroad, arguably set in motion an increasing 
interest in world events among the nation’s metropolitan broadsheet dailies. 
 
Survey results 
As twenty-first century British journalists commended Churchill’s “rapport with the 
media”116
                                                            
112 Leen D’Haenens, Nicholas Jankowski and Ard Heuvelman, “News in online and print 
newspapers: differences in reader consumption and recall”, New Media & Society, vol. 6, no. 
3, 2004, pp. 363-382; Maria M. Garcia and Guy J. Golan, “Not Enough Time to Cover all 
the News: An Analysis of International News Coverage in Time and Newsweek”, Journal of 
Global Mass Communication, vol. 1, nos 1-2, 2008 pp. 52-53; Mike Gasher, “Researchers 
explore the geography of online news”, The Canadian Journalism Project, 18 June 2008, 
retrieved on 7 March 2009 at <
 and contemporary commentators praised Roosevelt’s radio broadcasts for 
http://jsource.ca/english_new/detail.php?id=2560>; Mike 
Gasher and Sandra Gabrielle, “Increasing circulation? A comparative news-flow study of the 
Montreal Gazette’s Hard-copy and On-line Editions”, Journalism Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 
2004, pp. 311-23. 
113 Australian Press Council, The State of the News Print Media in Australia Report 2006, 
Sydney, 2006, retrieved on 7 November 2009 at <http://www.presscouncil.org.au>. 
114 Ken McKinnon, “Trends”, The State of the News Print Media in Australia Report 2008, 
Australian Press Council, Sydney, 2008, pp. 1-1–1-6, retrieved on 7 March 2009 at 
<http://www.presscouncil.org.au>. 
115 Antonio Castillo, “Four weeks in the World of The Sydney Morning Herald”, The State of 
the News Print Media in Australia Report 2008, Australian Press Council, Sydney, 2008, pp. 
6-14 – 6-16, retrieved on 7 March 2009 at <http://www.presscouncil.org.au>. 
116 Hardman, “Churchill’s relationship with the Mail”.  Also see Simon Tait, “A war leader’s 
love affair with the press”, The Times, London, 8 March 2008, p. 80. 
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their “emotional appeal to the US people”,117 this study set out to examine Australian 
reporters’ views of Curtin.  Since he initiated a number of journalism precedents, I 
sent a questionnaire to news correspondents in 2009-10 to ascertain the extent of his 
legacy for the press gallery and political journalism.  As I outlined in Chapter 1, a 
majority of journalists in my survey did not know about Curtin.118  Responses 
included the following:  “Unfortunately I don’t know enough about John Curtin to 
respond in any meaningful sense to the questions you have posed.”119  “I know I’m 
no spring chicken, but I was not around in Curtin’s day.  Nor have I made a study of 
Curtin’s relations with the media.”120  Although World War II correspondents 
emphasised Curtin’s greatness as a prime minister,121 there does not appear to have 
been a tradition in Australian news offices of passing these stories to younger 
colleagues.  As Mickler and Lucy have argued, an understanding of the nation’s past 
is essential for Australians to make progress in the future.  “History, in short, 
matters”, they wrote.122  While many of the survey respondents seemed generally 
indifferent towards Curtin’s wartime role, other government and media initiatives 
have promoted his achievements.  The John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, which 
was Australia’s first prime ministerial library, opened at Curtin University in 1998 to 
recognise his memory by facilitating research and providing educational and public 
outreach programs.  Also some decades after his death, two film tributes focused on 
his leadership during the 1942 Japanese attacks.123  Over time, more Australian 
filmmakers moved away from the “simple man” legend,124
                                                            
117 Public Broadcasting Service (producer), The Online NewsHour (television program – 
transcript),Washington DC, 27 November 2008, retrieved on 12 December 2008 at 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec08/historians_11-27.html>.  Also 
see Edward Rothstein, “F.D.R. and the Stuff of His War”, The New York Times, New York, 
6 February 2006, retrieved on 19 January 2011 at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/arts/design/03fdr.html>. 
 which was promoted in 
the wartime media coverage of his funeral, and preferred to remember him as a 
118 See Appendix 8 for the survey methodology, questionnaire and related material. 
119 Personal communication, 11 November 2009. 
120 Personal communication, 14 December 2009. 
121 For example, Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Douglas, “Douglas interview”; Holt, 
“Holt interview”.  Also see Appendix 13. 
122 Lucy and Mickler, The war on democracy, p. 147. 
123 Apollo Films (producer), Curtin (telemovie for Australian Broadcasting Corporation) 
[hereafter Curtin], Australia, 2007; ScreenSound Australia, John Curtin, Memoirs 
(documentary) [hereafter Memoirs], JCPML, JCPML acc. no. 00791/1, Bentley, 1965. 
124 20th Century Fox-Movietone News (producer), Nation Mourns John Curtin (newsreel), 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00033/1, 1945. 
Chapter 10   Survey of the contemporary Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery 
423 
 
tough, self-assured leader, who helped to save the nation.125  The survey 
respondents’ seeming lack of knowledge about Curtin and his journalism strategies 
contrasts with contemporaneous British and US media images of Churchill’s famous 
wartime newsreels and patriotic broadcast speeches, along with Roosevelt’s popular 
“fireside chats”.126
 
 
This finding underscores Australian journalism’s lack of knowledge about 
itself.  Indeed, “there is not much of a history of journalism” in the nation, according 
to Curthoys et al.127  Journalism scholar Henningham agrees: “After 200 years of 
Australian history, we have not produced a comprehensive study of Australian 
journalism.”128  Furthermore, previously published research suggested that many 
recently graduated Australian news journalists did not know about their 
contemporary history.  Some news editors have described these younger employees 
as being “relatively oblivious to historic events”.  For example, one newly employed 
journalism graduate asked colleagues in a television newsroom: “Who’s Gough 
Whitlam?”129
 
  This thesis aims to contribute to solving part of the problem by adding 
to our knowledge of Curtin and his mass communication strategies.  The following 
section focuses on the findings of my survey.  For the actual questions asked, see 
Appendix 8d. 
 
                                                            
125 Apollo Films, Curtin; ScreenSound Australia, Memoirs. 
126 Caryn Coatney, “John Curtin and Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Cross-National Case 
Study of Media Agenda Setting in the U.S.-Australian Alliance, 1941-1945”, Midwest 
Political Science Association: 68th Annual National Conference, Chicago, 22 April 2010, 
retrieved on 15 May 2010 at 
<http://conference.mpsanet.org/Online/Search.aspx?section=27&session=21>. 
127 Ann Curthoys, Julianne Schultz, and Paula Hamilton, “A history of Australian journalism, 
1890 to the present: report on a research project” [hereafter “A history of journalism”], 
Australian Studies in Journalism, no. 2, 1992, p. 45. 
128 John Henningham, cited in Denis Cryle, “Australian newspaper industry: Intercolonial 
perspectives” [hereafter “Australian newspaper history”], Australian Studies in Journalism, 
no. 1, 1992, p. 101. 
129 Margaret Van Heekeren, “Who’s Gough Whitlam? What journalism graduates don’t 
know about the past and what news editors want them to know” [hereafter “Who’s Gough 
Whitlam?”], Australian Journalism Review, vol. 27, no. 1, 2005, pp. 209-218. 
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Findings of the survey: A Curtin legacy? 
While only a small minority of those surveyed had something to say about Curtin’s 
legacy, the interesting points that they did make were that they viewed him as being 
more than only a wartime leader.130
You could call Curtin’s policy one of shrewdly keeping the door open: ‘keep 
talking, don’t be bluffed and be prepared to change focus and direction at any 
time in the national interest’.
  All three respondents focused on Curtin’s 
stature in international relations.  Referring to scholarly assessments of his role, 
former ABC Radio news editor, Bob Wurth, said: “Primarily, his legacy 
demonstrates a very ‘hands on’ approach to international relations by an Australian 
leader.”  He added: “This is a lesson for modern leaders to take heed of.”  He cited 
the example of Curtin’s initiation of “long, private conversations” with the Japanese 
envoy to Australia, Tatsuo Kawai, “in an effort to prevent war” in mid-1941.  “Curtin 
was prepared to sound out, while deeply suspicious of Japan, the possibility of 
reaching some sort of agreement to prevent the two countries from going to war.”  
As a result, he and Kawai “spoke to each other from the heart” and “[t]he 
relationship was becoming personal”, Wurth observed.  After the Pearl Harbor 
bombing on 7 December 1941, Curtin abandoned negotiations with Japan and 
decided to “to act in the immediate interest of Australia’s survival”.  Wurth 
explained: 
131
Curtin emphasised secret diplomacy with the enemy, until it was no longer possible 
to avoid a war. 
 
 
This approach contrasted with Menzies’ strategies in Vietnam, where the 
scale of Australian military involvement was greater than anything encountered since 
World War II.  According to historian Jeffrey Grey, the US Government requested 
                                                            
130 Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010; Shane Wright, 
personal communication, 27 December 2009; Bob Wurth, personal communication, 24 
November 2009. 
131 Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009.  His observations were based on his 
research and publications including Bob Wurth, “Menzies, Fadden, Curtin and the Japanese 
Envoy”, JCPML, Bentley, 2009, retrieved on 16 May 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/envoy/index.html>; Bob Wurth, Saving Australia: Curtin’s secret 
peace with Japan, Lothian Books, South Melbourne, 2006. 
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Australian military aid to help assist the South Vietnamese to overcome the Viet 
Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese troops.  For this purpose, Menzies offered 
Australian troops to the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, on 7 April 1965 before a 
request was made by the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Phan Huy Quat.  On 29 April, 
the Australian and US ambassadors in Saigon “engineered” the Vietnamese 
Government’s appeal for Menzies’ support.  As part of the request, Vietnamese 
officials stated they had received details of Australia’s offer of troops and were 
pleased to accept this proposal.  Grey wrote, “the question of the ‘request’ … was to 
play an important part in the parliamentary debate in Australia over the commitment 
of troops to Vietnam”.  Instead of pursuing diplomacy as Curtin did in the lead-up to 
World War II, Menzies embarked on his Vietnam commitment in the expectation 
that this would “bind the Americans more closely to Australia” and he would receive 
“reciprocal support from the US in Australia’s hour of need”.132
 
  Although Curtin 
had adopted the innovative strategy of trying first to reason with an enemy, his 
successors did not always follow this policy during major conflicts. 
Moreover another survey respondent, The West Australian economics editor 
Shane Wright, noted Curtin’s achievements in foreign relations, particularly in 
focusing on Australia’s alliances with Britain and the US, but also his economic 
policy in the 1942 “change” in the “financial relationship between Federal and State 
Governments”.133  He was referring to the commonwealth acquiring all income tax 
as revenue.134  A Canberra press gallery journalist, Correspondent A, explained: “He 
was one of the few [prime ministers] who earned respect across the political divide.  
He is remembered as an astute wartime leader, standing up for Australia’s 
interests.”135
                                                            
132 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Port 
Melbourne, third edition, 2008, pp. 236-250. 
  All three respondents indicated that Curtin did not only react to crises 
of the times.  They observed that he made a lasting impact on Australia’s relations 
with the world through his development of respectful relationships with potential 
adversaries, his success in protecting the national interest, and his alliances with 
Britain and the US.  It seemed to be ironic that most of the journalists said they knew 
133 Wright, personal communication, 27 December 2009. 
134 Oliver, Unity is strength, p. 163. 
135 Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010. 
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little about Curtin during the survey, but they benefited from the strategies that he 
had put in place. 
 
Although none of the journalists surveyed knew about Curtin’s radio and film 
strategies, a minority of this group focused on his innovative press conferences.136
The press gallery in Canberra often knew more about what was going on in 
the war than some of Curtin’s own ministers … there was an unprecedented 
level of trust between the prime minister and the press at that time.
  
Wurth spoke of Curtin’s ability “to speak secretly, but freely and very frankly, to 
representatives of the Australian press and news agencies during the war years”.  
Wurth said:  
137
Wurth’s comment was corroborated by wartime journalist, Don Whitington, who 
reflected that “a select band” of reporters attended Curtin’s briefings and as a result, 
they “knew more about the secret history of the war than most Members of 
Parliament excepting the War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council”.
 
138  While this 
type of briefing would not be conducive to the good management of government 
today, Curtin was “aided” by “fairly strict censorship”, as Wurth noted.  He said 
Curtin’s most significant legacy for modern political communications was “building 
and maintaining trust with senior journalists in Canberra”, thereby providing “some 
lessons on how a prime minister can relate with the media”.139  Wright (The West 
Australian) agreed that Curtin’s “use of ‘off-the-record’ discussions with journalists 
was an important development in the government-press relationship”.  Wright wrote: 
“Curtin’s relationship with the gallery was an intimate one – they were almost as 
equals.”140
                                                            
136 Michael Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Editor B, confidential 
personal communication, 24 March 2010; Wright, personal communication, 27 December 
2009; Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009. 
  ABC Radio Australia correspondent, Michael Cavanagh, suggested that 
Curtin’s relationships with journalists were “probably more personal” than the 
current government-media associations.  During Curtin’s terms, the parliament and 
137 Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009. 
138 Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An unfinished autobiography [hereafter Strive to be 
fair], Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 77. 
139 Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009. 
140 Wright, personal communication, 27 December 2009. 
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the press gallery were smaller with fewer members “and it was possible to know 
each other”, Cavanagh wrote.  He added, “Canberra was also smaller and included 
more interactions between staff, politicians and the media” during the wartime 
years.141
 
 
Perhaps too, there were fewer incentives for journalists to publicise 
politicians’ private lives back then; legal scholars noted that modern advancements in 
electronics and microprocessing have encouraged some contemporary journalists to 
pursue tactics more akin to intrusive espionage.142  Another journalist, Editor B, also 
referred to Curtin’s confidential office briefings, when he “operated on a great deal 
of trust with journalists and this was mostly not breached”.143  In his autobiography, 
Whitington recalled that the “Circus” of select journalists “never” publicised a 
security secret because they respected Curtin and understood “the enormity of 
breaching the confidence he had reposed in them”.144  Although Whitington might 
have been exaggerating slightly, given Packer’s attempts to defy censors when 
publishing The Daily Telegraph in 1944145 and Curtin’s warning that he might cancel 
his briefings due to a news leak about Australia’s uranium agreement in the same 
year,146 other wartime reporters testified that they voluntarily upheld the unwritten 
confidentiality codes.147  Correspondent A returned a completed questionnaire, 
indicating that she did not know about Curtin’s use of films, radio broadcasts and a 
full-time press secretary.  She wrote the following answer: “Sorry, I wasn’t aware of 
these developments under the Curtin Government.”148
                                                            
141 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010. 
  The questionnaire results 
indicated that a small minority of survey participants praised Curtin’s “off-the-
record” press gallery interviews for developing “trust” and relating well with 
journalists. 
142 Joseph Fernandez, Media Law Handbook [hereafter Media law], Network Books, 
Australia Research Institute, Perth, fifth edition, 2007, p. 105. 
143 Editor B, confidential personal communication, 24 March 2010. 
144 Whitington, Strive to be fair, p. 78. 
145 Holt, “Holt interview”. 
146 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings,  
pp. 213-214, 228. 
147 E.g. Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Cox, “Cox interview”. 
148 Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010. 
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When asked to compare the current prime minister’s press gallery 
relationships with those of John Curtin, a small group of senior journalists stated that 
interactions with the government had become more official since 1945.149  While 
Wright (The West Australian) described Curtin’s press gallery associations as 
“intimate” because journalists were treated “almost as equals”, he added there was 
“no such relationship now” between the prime minister and the media.  Wright 
noted: “There remains a degree of trust, but it is a highly conditioned version.”150  
Cavanagh (ABC Radio) and Correspondent A described current government-media 
relationships as “more distant”.151
I can’t see any evidence of the sort of situation of genuine across-the-board 
trust that occurred in the war years, when senior journalists in the press 
gallery were called into the prime minister’s office as a group and were given 
a damned good briefing of what was likely to happen.
  Also Wurth explained: 
152
Editor B asserted, “there is no prime minister [now] who would give that level of 
confidential information” that Curtin had provided to journalists.  “I’m sure you 
wouldn’t have a comparable situation now”, she added.  Governments had developed 
“more of an arm’s length relationship” with reporters.  “Perhaps I’d say that it’s a 
less intimate relationship than it was”, she noted.
 
153  These survey participants talked 
about a relative decline in trust generally between politicians and journalists.  This 
finding resonates with previously published research on the “more distant” 
relationship between contemporary journalists and politicians, compared with their 
“reasonably civilised” associations in “the early days of federal politics”.154
 
 
Historical, technological and social conditions contributed to more aloof 
relationships between the press gallery and the parliament, according to the survey 
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respondents.  They said such diverse factors as Australia’s involvement in 
controversial wars, parliamentary expansion, technological advancements and 
modern newsroom practices had created more barriers between politicians and 
journalists.  Editor B explained, “there has been a bit of a sea change” in 
government-media relationships since the Curtin era.  Immediately after the war, 
conservative politicians had dismantled a symbol of bipartisanship, the Advisory 
War Council (AWC), which Curtin had instigated in 1940 when, as the Labor 
opposition leader, he had suggested to Menzies to form this organisation.155  Almost 
two months after Curtin’s death, the Country Party’s Arthur Fadden told war 
councillors there was no need to maintain the organisation.  Prime Minister Chifley 
objected, recalling Curtin’s “advice” to establish “a peacetime counterpart” of the 
AWC to ensure continuity of defence policy; however, he reluctantly acceded to the 
conservatives’ request.  The AWC was disbanded on 30 August 1945 and this might 
have contributed to the increasingly adversarial tone of parliamentary debates in the 
next decade.156  Editor B recalled that during the Cold War era of the 1950s, “a bitter 
type of politics” between left-wing and right-wing parties influenced the press 
gallery.157  An example of this was the Liberal-Country Coalition’s federal election 
campaign in late 1955, which has been described by historian Bobbie Oliver as being 
“particularly vitriolic”,158 as well as “the birth of a conservative party”159 that 
adopted the title, Democratic Labor Party (DLP), in 1957.  Some Labor members 
decided to join the DLP, which developed slowly and mainly recruited Roman 
Catholics, who believed the nation was in danger of communism threats.160
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reformist and inspiring” leader, an indication that his enduring appeal transcended 
partisan divisions.161
 
   
Moreover, Editor B said the 1960s Vietnam War protests “divided the 
community more” and affected journalists’ interactions with politicians.162  
According to Bobbie Oliver, 1966 was a “turbulent year for anti-war 
demonstrators”.163  While protest rallies attracted large attendances, police officers 
reacted violently when several young men burned their draft cards during a public 
demonstration in Forrest Place, Perth, on 11 June.  Labor’s anti-war stance might 
have contributed to the party’s “crushing defeat” in the 1966 federal election.164  
Editor B said this divisive atmosphere adversely affected journalists’ relations with 
the Federal Government; they became more guarded towards each other and “there’s 
not as much trust”.165  The media scholar, Rodney Tiffen, wrote that beginning in the 
1966 election campaign, journalists increasingly emphasised politicians’ “gaffes”, 
“mis-statements” and “their lack of mastery of detail” when giving television and 
radio interviews.166  News audiences seemed more likely to be aware of these gaffes 
during election campaigns, when politicians increasingly talked in front of radio 
microphones and television cameras; this subjected them to “extra scrutiny and 
intensity” and opponents seized opportunities “to embarrass” them.167  As a result, 
successive prime ministers were not as casual as Curtin at his press interviews, when 
he was usually “relaxing in a swivel chair … leaning back and ‘thinking out loud’, to 
use his own phrase”.168
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As journalistic competition intensified among an increased number of media 
outlets, reporters became more reluctant to withhold information from their 
audiences.169  After the press gallery’s relocation to the new and more spacious 
Federal Parliament House in 1988, it was “unusual to bump into the [prime minister] 
in corridors”, as Correspondent A stated.  She suggested the government-media 
“relationship is more distant given the increasing number of reporters in the gallery 
and press secs [secretaries]”.  Furthermore, the Federal Government’s media office 
“has become more professionalised” with “more people, who act as a go-between 
and in some cases, a barrier between senior politicians – the ministers – and 
journalists”, Correspondent A wrote.170  Some survey participants referred to the 
extra pressures associated with an accelerated news cycle including 24-hour online 
media networks.171  Wright stated more media outlets “demand something every day.  
The size of the [media] corps, scope and timeliness of [news] coverage mean a focus 
on television identities”.  As the Australian Government generally became more 
complicated, politicians increasingly released targeted messages to niche news 
markets, resulting in a “move from broadcasting to ‘narrowcasting’ for both media 
and government”, Wright explained.172  The growth of “narrowcasting” meant that 
political candidates increasingly relied on personalised appeals to limited segments 
of their electorates.173  Cavanagh agreed that politicians aimed for “more controlled 
use of different [media] outlets for specific means”.  The reporting trend was a 
“greater turnover of news”; since “the cycle is faster”, journalists were finding there 
was “not the time to consider” complex issues, Cavanagh wrote.174
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enlarged press gallery and divisive politics, had contributed to more impersonal 
associations between journalists and Australian national leaders. 
 
In answering the survey question about relationships with the prime minister 
outside of the press gallery, a few journalists focused on changes in the nature of the 
prime minister’s media interactions.  Wright (The West Australian) stated that away 
from Canberra, Curtin’s relationships with journalists were “very restricted because 
of the communications system” that limited media associations in the 1940s, whereas 
the “current [prime minister] is much more aligned with individual media markets 
and this is much broader – including FM radio, current affairs television and 
entertainment TV”.175  Correspondent A compared the professional associations 
between contemporary politicians and reporters with those of World War II.  She 
wrote: “I think that the [prime minister] is more guarded now, which is only to be 
expected.  I’ve been to the [prime minister’s residential] Lodge a few times; he has 
always been welcoming, but gives nothing of note away.”176  Cavanagh (ABC 
Radio) observed that different journalists had developed varied relationships and 
access to the national leader. “Most of the access is largely often due to the 
organisation, and how the [prime minister] and minders view it, and what audience it 
will reach”, he noted.177
 
  While respondents seemed to view the wartime era as one 
of technological limitations that posed challenges for journalists outside of Canberra, 
they also indicated Curtin provided more confidential, newsworthy information to 
senior press gallery reporters.  They did not refer to Curtin’s overseas radio 
broadcasts or to his media conferences in Britain, Canada and the US in 1944.  This 
chapter has so far considered respondents’ answers to the historical questions about 
Curtin.  The next sections will focus more on journalists’ views of more 
contemporary government-media relationships. 
When asked about their professional relationships with the prime minister, 
two senior federal journalists said their political associations seemed to have 
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diminished since the opening of the new Federal Parliament House in 1988.178  
Although 1920s journalists complained about the cramped press facilities in the first 
Canberra Parliament House,179 a later generation of correspondents saw advantages 
in working in such close proximity to parliamentarians.  The Daily Telegraph chief 
political reporter, Malcolm Farr, recalled, “there was a very communal atmosphere in 
the mid-1970s in the old parliament house”.  The interior was “much smaller so that 
you couldn’t avoid people”, he explained.  “Back then, MPs would leave home and 
not see it again for quite a while.  Air travel was still a luxury.”  At the time, 
Canberra’s “limited bars and restaurants” facilitated “more unstructured mingling” 
between journalists and politicians, Farr said.180
In the old parliament house, people lived by a cheek by jowl existence.  It 
was crowded and there was a very active non-members’ bar, where you 
mingled with politicians who had nowhere to go, except the non-members’ 
bar.  There was a lot of intermingling with parliamentarians and press 
secretaries.
  The political editor for News 
Limited’s Sunday newspapers and The Australian columnist, Glenn Milne, agreed: 
181
The “vast new building” seemed be “very isolating”, Milne remembered.  He said: 
 
… every MP had their own facilities, their own bar ... and this affected the 
interaction with the press gallery to the prime minister.  People needed to 
walk vast distances to see a politician, so there was a lot more reliance on 
phones.182
Farr stated, “now, there’s a different approach ... you have to make an appointment to 
go out to dinner with a MP or to have a drink with him”.  He often saw 
parliamentarians with their young families and “we’re familiar with each other”.  He  
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added, however: 
“I don’t think any journalist has any friendships with politicians these days ... 
Some MPs see me more socially – it’s not a great friendship, but it’s a matter 
of respect and enjoying people’s company.” 
According to Farr, more social meetings with MPs would be helpful because “[i]f I 
know more about them … then it’s more likely that I won’t make incorrect 
assumptions about them”.183
 
  Both Canberra journalists indicated they would like to 
see a restoration of informal associations that would assist their professional news 
reporting. 
Other respondents suggested that politicians had become more cautious 
towards the media.  ABC Radio “AM” host Tony Eastley said:  
From a historic point of view, the contacts between the political apparatchiks, 
ministers and their officers, reporters in Canberra and elsewhere, is that it has 
been more at arm’s length.184
Chief of Staff C said prime ministers had progressively become “more controlling of 
the message of the day”.  He explained: “There is always an element of separation in 
how much information that governments and journalists want made public.”
 
185
I would attend politicians’ Christmas parties on either side of politics.  Once 
upon a time they always had Christmas parties, but it doesn’t happen so much 
now, perhaps because of the drink-driving laws.
  
Outside of Canberra, Curtin FM news editor, Les Welsh, noticed a trend away from 
socialising between politicians and journalists in Western Australia.  He recalled:  
186
Perhaps politicians had distanced themselves from journalists because they were 
more concerned that an “off-the-record remark” might become front-page news the 
next day.  Welsh said that more recently: “We hear about the politicians’ formal 
functions and a lot of the time, we will go there to ask them about something else, to 
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ask the hard questions.”  Respondents indicated that due to a decline in professional 
interactions with politicians, journalists were finding mobile telephones and the 
internet to be helpful tools to gather information.  Les Walsh explained that he 
conducted more mobile telephone interviews and frequently used the internet for 
research purposes: 
Certainly mobile phones have changed the nature of journalism.  We do a lot 
of phone interviews because it can be the only way we can get to some people 
and this is used widely.187
Before the internet’s advent, “it was much more time-consuming to find out about 
politicians’ backgrounds”, he said. 
 
We use the internet to find out the backgrounds of politicians and we find all 
sorts of things that people really didn’t know about them before.  Some of the 
things are quite interesting.  It gives us more of an understanding of a 
politician’s experience and beliefs.188
Although scholars have noted journalists’ intrusive use of instantaneous 
communications,
 
189
 
 online research tools also allowed reporters to gain more of an 
understanding about politicians’ careers, objectives and views. 
Two senior television correspondents said new government administrations 
tended to be friendly to journalists, but their attitudes changed later.190
As journalists, we want to get all of the information, the truth and the whole 
story.  Politicians are keen for us to get only part of the story that’s good for 
  WA ABC 
Television political journalist, Peter Kennedy, referred to “plenty of examples where 
politicians and the media get along famously early on and then it all fell apart at the 
end”.  He explained the reason for the “tension between politicians and journalists” 
was that “we have significantly different interests”. 
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them, or that’s best for them.191
Likewise, Curtin attempted to persuade journalists to promote the positive aspects of 
his foreign policies and he was mostly successful because he developed friendships 
with press gallery correspondents, rather than taking into his confidence only one 
selected, favoured reporter.  The competitive pressures on contemporary journalists 
made it harder to keep a politician’s secret.  According to Kennedy, more recent 
government-media relationships followed a similar pattern because: 
 
… both sides have effectively competing interests; and almost inevitably it’s 
only a matter of time when there’s a breakdown and that souring of 
relationships occurs; and sometimes it can be a very serious souring of 
relationships, from which some people don’t recover.192
As Network Ten Parliament House bureau chief and political editor, Paul Bongiorno, 
explained, some prime ministers “will choose at various times to invite various 
journalists to dinner” because “they are looking for journalists they want to 
influence, people viewed as being pacesetters or trendsetters”.  Once a governing 
party had won successive elections, however, a prime minister might “miss the fact 
that the message they have been putting out there is no longer as relevant to the 
majority of the electorate”, Bongiorno said.  “Credibility and being relevant are very 
important in politics.”
 
193
 
  Although a long-term governing party may show a 
tendency to neglect relationships with journalists, experienced politicians would be 
well advised to communicate media messages that signify their responsiveness to 
new community concerns. 
While most of the survey respondents indicated there had been a shift in their 
professional relationships with governments,194
                                                            
191 Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009. 
  a few reporters stated their political  
192 Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009. 
193 Bongiorno, personal communication, 15 December 2009. 
194 They were Bongiorno, personal communication, 15 December 2009; Correspondent A, 
confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010; Eastley, personal communication, 9 
December 2009; Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010; Kennedy, personal 
communication, 18 December 2009; Milne, personal communication, 17 November 2009; 
Welsh, personal communication, 4 December 2009. 
Chapter 10   Survey of the contemporary Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery 
437 
 
associations generally had not altered.  Sky News political editor, David Speers, said:  
There are not many changes in terms of journalists dealing with politicians ... 
The relationship is fairly cordial, even friendly; it’s also guarded and 
politicians are cautious about not revealing too much information.195
Also Wright (The West Australian) and Cavanagh (ABC Radio) stated their 
government associations had not changed since they began reporting on Australian 
politics.
 
196  Wright wrote that the government-media relationships were “still 
adversarial; still a system of give and take; still circumspect”.197  In an anonymous 
response, only one journalist said that her relationships with the government had 
improved.198
 
 
Several press gallery journalists suggested it was more likely for reporters to 
develop close, informal relationships with politicians other than the prime minister.  
For instance, Milne said some federal opposition politicians had attended his 
wedding and his children’s christenings.  After these opposition members formed a 
government, however, they became more distant.  “Due to the constant pressure in 
[government] office, legitimate relationships get changed in nature,” Milne said.199
The opposition is a bit more relaxed and less restrained about following the 
leader’s direction … Once politicians are in government, more discipline is 
applied; in an election year too, the discipline clicks in.  When an opposition 
party is not performing well in the polls, then the discipline breaks down; 
politicians will spend more time talking about what’s on their minds to 
journalists.
  
Speers noted that: 
200
Likewise, Welsh (Curtin FM) indicated that after a politician’s party was elected to  
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be a governing majority, he or she might treat journalists differently.  Welsh said: 
“When politicians are in opposition, they are very helpful because they’re trying to 
get their message across; this can change if they are in government.”201  Chief of 
Staff C said journalists tended to develop “more close professional relationships” 
with politicians representing their local areas.  He added: “It is still likely that 
journalists will get along with local politicians in the same ways that they always 
have.”202
 
  Thus these respondents conveyed that struggling opposition parties and 
local MPs might be more interested in cultivating positive journalism associations 
than a governing administration. 
Herald Sun political columnist, Andrew Bolt, commented that journalists 
tended “to be tougher on conservatives than on politicians of the ‘left’”.  He 
indicated that reporters seemed to be “on the political left of their audiences” and 
added that:  
Canberra journalists can be turned off the tap if they criticise the government 
… it’s much easier for a Labor Government to freeze out critical journalists 
because such journalists are relatively few.  And that kind of punishment 
works.  You see, if there are 50 Canberra journalists that are competing and 
45 give the government an easy ride and five didn’t, then you are vulnerable 
if you are one of the five.  You would want to be with the other 45 journalists 
because it is safer.203
Bolt was referring to John Henningham’s press gallery surveys and his 1995 finding 
that Canberra political journalists were more likely to vote Labor and more left-
leaning than the political journalists from other areas of Australia.
 
204
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eliminated individual journalists’ views.205  Indeed professional journalists viewed 
most Australian newspapers as “leaning a little towards the Liberal Party” and most 
mainstream press owners as being conservative.206  During the questionnaire 
implemented for this thesis, other respondents said that irrespective of ideologies, 
some politicians seemed to favour journalists deemed to be fairly uncritical.207
Sometimes journalists won’t get a response at all from the government.  They 
will be helpful if they think they will have favourable publicity … if it’s a 
controversial subject, they will put us off; they’re not available.  It does vary 
and it doesn’t matter which side of politics – the WA Government or the 
Federal Government, Liberal, Labor – they’re all the same.
  
Welsh explained: 
208
The majority of journalists surveyed talked about tensions between contemporary 
news correspondents and politicians;
 
209 this finding resonates with previously 
published research.210  Despite these frictions, several reporters referred to friendly 
aspects of the relationships.211
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The accessible prime minister? 
When asked whether they were satisfied with general media access to the prime 
minister, some respondents said politicians were fairly approachable.212
With improvements in information technology, broadband and more news 
bulletins that need to be updated by emails, the [prime ministerial overseas] 
trips changed from being leisurely to more intensive.  We are sending 
pictures by the internet and satellite and this is one of the major things that 
have changed in 22 years.
  Bongiorno 
(Network 10) noted: “The media have changed and the prime minister has adapted to 
this.”  He recalled his first Federal Parliament House news assignment was 
accompanying Prime Minister Hawke on a visit to the Soviet Union in 1987.  
Bongiorno described Hawke as “a media-savvy prime minister with an excellent 
press office”.  During this trip and similar overseas visits about 20 years ago, 
Bongiorno filed a report once a day for the 6pm television news.  Later Network 10 
expanded its political coverage to four major daily bulletins “with news that needs to 
be filed; this creates more demands on the journalists and more demands on who we 
are filing about”.  Bongiorno added:  
213
During his prime ministerial term, Rudd was attuned to a sophisticated media, 
according to Bongiorno.  Speaking in December 2009, he said: “The Rudd media 
office … is pretty accessible and fairly well-organised.”
 
214
We do get more access to politicians, senior ministers and the prime minister 
than we get in most other countries.  Almost daily, we hear from the prime 
minister in a press conference or in a radio interview.  We have fairly open 
dealings with our leaders.
  Likewise, Speers (Sky 
News) stated Australian Government leaders were relatively open: 
215
Welsh (Curtin FM) observed that politicians had generally become “more aware of 
the media”.  He explained that ministers’ availability was affected by their busyness, 
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the extent to which a journalist might ask controversial questions and whether an 
interviewer’s newsroom was deemed to be “important” to the government.216
 
 
Furthermore, Kennedy (ABC Television) and Farr (The Daily Telegraph) 
talked about an expansion of political interviews, their rising number of news sources 
and fewer obstacles to reporting on governments.  Kennedy said: 
The demand for information, and access to politicians and the government, is 
greater than ever.  The news is less controlled than it used to be; for 
politicians, this puts them at a disadvantage because the less control on the 
information gathering, the more difficult it can be for them.217
While some survey participants focused on politicians’ restrictions to information, 
Australian Governments might have reduced the number of interviews because more 
journalists have become intrusive in people’s private lives and “peculiarly vulnerable 
to confusing the public interest with their own interest”.
 
218
Politicians used to be able to make a statement one day and then think they 
didn’t have to deal with an issue for the rest of the day ... There is a much 
faster flow of information [now], particularly during election campaigns in 
regard to the control of the news flow … A minister will speak to journalists 
for the television in the morning, then speak on radio information and news 
programs during the day and will be interviewed again for the television 
evening bulletins.  Then journalists will be writing for their websites 
continuously.
  Kennedy suggested 
contemporary politicians were more responsive to journalists’ increasing demands 
for information than in the past.  He explained: 
219
Similarly Farr said that since he had been reporting on politics for the past 25 to 30 
years, he had noticed the most significant difference was “the massive increase in  
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information that’s available” now than in the past.  He described that: 
Today in Canberra, sitting in my office, I frequently consult a huge range of 
information sources including: universities; think tanks; specialist 
consultants; public relations departments; ministerial offices; parliamentary 
special committees; industrial organisations and the bigger ones that have 
their own research bodies; the Reserve Bank and the individual banks.  
There’s a huge flow of information and a swirl of information out there that 
journalists can hook into.220
For journalists, an everyday problem was “keeping in touch with those sources”, Farr 
added.  He said his “primary contact” had not changed because his main priority was 
still to consult individual MPs, “who give the important steer, the important 
information that leads to a story”.
 
221
 
  Farr and Kennedy indicated that despite a faster 
flow of news, they maintained close relations with parliamentarians as their main 
news sources. 
A minority of journalists stated they were not satisfied with the level of media 
access to Australian politicians.222  They and other journalists talked about the 
increasing frequency of “doorstops”, with reporters quickly interviewing politicians 
as they entered or left the Federal and State Parliament Houses.223  Cavanagh noted 
that media access to politicians had become “increasingly controlled – most are 
staged doorstops and so-called picture ops [opportunities].”224  Correspondent A 
wrote in her questionnaire that she was “particularly” dissatisfied with the media 
accessibility of the “PM, Opposition Leader and most senior members of their 
Cabinets”.225
                                                            
220 Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
  Milne (The Australian) noticed a trend towards more restricted 
221 Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
222 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Correspondent A, confidential 
personal communication, 30 March 2010; Wright, personal communication, 27 December 
2009 
223 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Correspondent A, confidential 
personal communication, 30 March 2010; Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 
2009; Welsh, personal communication, 4 December 2009; Wright, personal communication, 
27 December 2009. 
224 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010. 
225 Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010. 
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political interviews during a 20-year period because “each successive [prime 
minister] has understood the idea of controlling the media agenda”.226  Eastley (ABC 
Radio) referred to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Commonwealth) and related 
state legislation, for which “journalists have been pushing for so long”.  He said this 
Act, also known as “FOI”, was an “an example of the tight control that has caused 
the need for freedom of information ... the FOI does allow us to access that 
information”.227  While more of the journalists surveyed seemed concerned over an 
increasing number of restrictions that inhibited news coverage,228 some of the 
respondents conveyed they were generally satisfied with the level of access to 
government and opposition sources.229
 
 
Survey responses and research indicated that since Curtin’s leadership, 
successive Australian prime ministers had expanded their journalism strategies, with 
less focus on regular news conferences and more use of relatively new media to 
communicate directly to voters.230  Some respondents praised various prime 
ministers’ abilities to develop a good rapport with the press gallery during 
interviews.231
It was terrific covering them because he [Keating] was good at explaining 
things.  It wasn’t snobbery.  He wouldn’t talk about an esoteric issue to get 
  Farr (The Daily Telegraph), for example, described Keating as a 
“wonderful communicator” at media conferences and added: 
                                                            
226 Milne, personal communication, 17 November 2009. 
227 Eastley, personal communication, 9 December 2009. 
228 Bolt, personal communication, 19 December 2009; Cavanagh, personal communication, 
27 January 2010; Chief of Staff C, confidential personal communication, 23 March 2010; 
Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010; Eastley, personal 
communication, 9 December 2009; Editor B, confidential personal communication, 24 
March 2010; Milne, personal communication, 17 November 2009; Wright, personal 
communication, 27 December 2009; Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009. 
229 Bongiorno, personal communication, 15 December 2009; Farr, personal communication, 
12 March 2010; Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009; Speers, personal 
communication, 30 March 2010; Welsh, personal communication, 4 December 2009. 
230 Ester, “Media”, p. 117; Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 252; Saunders, “The 21st 
century”. 
231 Bongiorno, personal communication, 15 December 2009; Farr, personal communication, 
12 March 2010; Milne, personal communication, 17 November 2009; Speers, personal 
communication, 30 March 2010. 
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more power over it [the press gallery].232
Also Farr said Howard “was extremely good at communicating the issues”.
 
233
 
  All of 
the journalists surveyed indicated they preferred to engage in open exchanges with 
national leaders.  Curtin’s briefings were a forerunner for these types of prime 
ministerial discussions with press gallery members. 
Several journalists stated they would like more regular prime ministerial 
news conferences; the press gallery seemed to have expressed the same view after 
Whitlam’s general interviews ended in 1975.234  Cavanagh (ABC Radio) and Wright 
(The West Australian) stated they were “not satisfied” with the frequency of media 
conferences.235  Cavanagh noted that most politicians’ interviews were “mainly 
doorstops with a backdrop to highlight their message.  Few [are] free-ranging and 
open-ended”.236  Some other journalists noticed fewer “one-on-ones” with the prime 
minister, meaning a single reporter speaking directly with Australia’s leader.237
There are not full conferences with the press gallery every day, every week or 
even every month.  We in the press gallery would like to see more of this 
happen.
  
Another survey respondent, Speers (Sky News), said: 
238
Eastley (ABC Radio) and Milne (The Australian) spoke of Howard’s enthusiastic use 
of talkback radio.  Eastley described Howard as “a great proponent of using local 
radio” because his messages were immediately “picked up” by television journalists 
and then reported in the next day’s newspapers.
 
239
                                                            
232 Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
  According to Milne, Howard 
“liked talkback radio because he could talk directly to the public and it was unfiltered 
233 Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
234 Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 252. 
235 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Wright, personal communication, 
27 December 2009. 
236 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010. 
237 Chief of Staff C, confidential personal communication, 23 March 2010; Editor B, 
confidential personal communication, 24 March 2010; Milne, personal communication, 17 
November 2009; Welsh, personal communication, 4 December 2009. 
238 Speers, personal communication, 30 March 2010. 
239 Eastley, personal communication, 9 December 2009. 
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by the journalists”.240  Milne and Bolt (Herald Sun) commented on Rudd’s use of 
Twitter and Facebook as well as his appearances on Rove Live.241  Rudd extended the 
prime ministerial radio strategies to holding interactive discussions with diverse 
internet audiences.242
 
 
Chief of Staff C said mid-level politicians continued to grant a personal 
interview with a single reporter.  He explained: “Journalists are still able to get more 
involved in ‘one-on-ones’ at the mid-level of politics and further down.”243  Welsh 
(Curtin FM) noted that politicians were generally more likely to call “off-the-cuff” 
interviews instead of planning scheduled, formal conferences.244
Sometimes on big stories, politicians might find the media camped outside 
their houses when they walk outside at half-past seven in the morning ... 
Some days if they don’t want to speak to you, they will say they have 
continuous meetings and you have to cajole them perhaps, or even lie in wait 
for them … If they’re at [the WA] Parliament House and they don’t want to 
talk, then you have to try to ambush them perhaps as they are leaving or 
coming into the building.
  According to 
Kennedy (ABC Television), reporters had developed techniques to interview less 
talkative ministers.  He said: 
245
It seemed that as Australian leaders developed new ways to communicate to voters, 
the press gallery became increasingly inventive, skilful and adept in persuading 
politicians to talk with them. 
 
 
The number of high-level, confidential press gallery briefings has diminished 
since Curtin’s talks with wartime journalists.  Wright (The West Australian) and 
Correspondent A indicated they were “neutral” about the confidential talks held by 
                                                            
240 Milne, personal communication, 17 November 2009. 
241 Bolt, personal communication, 19 December 2009; Milne, personal communication, 17 
November 2009. 
242 Barry Saunders, “The 21st century”. 
243 Chief of Staff C, confidential personal communication, 23 March 2010. 
244 Welsh, personal communication, 4 December 2009. 
245 Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009. 
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politicians.  Correspondent A wrote of her “mixed” feelings about off-the-record 
briefings because they generally “depend on the politician and circumstances”.246  
Cavanagh (ABC Radio) added that private interviews were influenced by “how well 
you are entrenched in the [news] round and how the ministers want it [a news report] 
to be treated”.247
There are much fewer confidential briefings now.  I’m not aware of any 
confidential briefings except on overseas trips by Kevin Rudd because … he 
is relying on the media to get his message out.
  Speaking of prime ministerial communications, Milne (The 
Australian) said:  
248
Talking of other MPs as well as the prime minister, Eastley (ABC Radio) observed 
that in Canberra, politicians and journalists “are on first-name terms and information 
is passed between them rather freely – some on the record, some off the record”.  He 
added these types of informal interactions have been a standard practice for many 
years.
 
249
The best thing you can hope for is that a politician can respect you in your 
work.  For example, if he has told something to you in confidence, then you 
keep the confidence.  You don’t exaggerate …. You accept responsibility for 
whatever you’ve written.
  Similarly Farr indicated that some politicians still provided off-the-record 
information.  He said:  
250
In WA, a politician’s personal preference for a news outlet often determined whether 
he or she would release an exclusive media statement, according to Kennedy (ABC 
Television).  He explained: 
 
Some politicians like the morning newspaper [The West Australian].  They 
still like to give an exclusive story if they can get it on the front page of the 
paper and they think this is an advantage for them.  Others aren’t really 
fussed and they’ll say: ‘We’ll announce this at midday.  All of the media will 
be there and let’s see how it’s reported after that’ … Perhaps the newspaper 
                                                            
246 Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010; Wright, personal 
communication, 27 December 2009. 
247 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010. 
248 Milne, personal communication, 17 November 2009. 
249 Eastley, personal communication, 9 December 2009. 
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mightn’t report it as prominently as if it were on an exclusive basis … These 
are the sorts of things that get taken into account when announcements are 
made by politicians … They are more aware of these sorts of things than in 
the past.251
As many professional journalists have indicated that Perth’s only daily newspaper, 
The West Australian, shows a “more serious commitment to the Liberals”,
 
252
 
 perhaps 
WA Labor politicians have been less likely to give exclusive news tips to this media 
organisation because they have been concerned their stories might be portrayed more 
negatively to readers.  While private prime ministerial briefings seemed more likely 
to occur during overseas trips, some other politicians still provided exclusive news 
tips and off-the-record information as an accepted practice to alert journalists to 
selected issues. 
Journalists provided a wide range of opinions, from the positive to negative, 
regarding the quality and quantity of politicians’ media statements.  A minority of 
respondents indicated they were satisfied with Australian Government media 
releases.253
There is now a rolling deadline with continuous stories that have to be filed.  
This adds extra pressures, not only for reporters, but also for politicians as 
they try to keep ahead of the media cycle and find a new angle for 
journalists.
  Speers (Sky News) commented that the Howard and Rudd bulletins 
“show they are very sophisticated in their approach and they target the media with 
their messages”.  For example, economic and political statements were released to 
the appropriate “serious” media; while family-related issues with widespread appeal, 
such as childcare or parental leave, would be publicised on talkback radio “when 
people will hear about them directly”, Speers explained.  Referring to the expansion 
of news websites, Speers said:  
254
                                                            
251 Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009. 
 
252 Henningham, “Journalists’ perception of bias”, p. 29. 
253 Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010; Speers, personal 
communication, 30 March 2010. 
254 Speers, personal communication, 30 March 2010. 
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Correspondent A agreed that most politicians “have effective means to distribute 
statements and transcripts”.255
 
  These two journalists indicated Australian 
Governments were adept in releasing targeted information to news organisations. 
Farr (The Daily Telegraph) said as a result of the “massive increase in 
information”, contemporary reporters were more educated, sophisticated and well-
informed than the journalists of 50 years ago.  He observed: “We need the young 
journalists, who have the nous and training to be able to absorb all of the 
information.”  Yet Farr also stated, “[t]he major issue for us is media management” 
because “[s]o much information is withheld merely to suit the political strategy of the 
government – and this applies to all governments”.  He added: “We’re there to 
inform readers and there’s a contest, a daily battle, with the [political] press 
secretary.”256  Cavanagh (ABC Radio) described government media releases as 
“bland” and “uninteresting” because they lacked detailed “background” 
information.257  Despite the “plethora of written material” provided to journalists, 
“[t]he quality of information could be questioned”, according to Eastley (ABC 
Radio).  He said some politicians focused too much on style rather than substance.  
“The message giving is truly important,” he explained.  “When people say politicians 
are ‘on message’, it means that we are bored senseless by hearing the same 
message.”  Eastley added: “There is a particular spin put on every story by every 
apparatchik and every politician.”258  Australian and US politicians’ television 
“soundbites” seemed to be shrinking at about the same rate.  During the 1960s 
election campaigns, politicians’ soundbites were an average of more than 40 
seconds; however, these “quotable bites” fell to less than ten seconds in the 1990s.259
  
  
A 2007 Australian study concluded that the soundbites were an average length of  
                                                            
255 Correspondent A, confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010. 
256 Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
257 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Wright, personal communication, 
27 December 2009. 
258 Eastley, personal communication, 9 December 2009. 
259 Guido H. Stempel III and Jacqueline Nash Gifford, Historical dictionary of political 
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seven seconds.260
… [i]t would be better if politicians are a bit more open in their 
communications to journalists.  There needs to be a balance, but the more 
information that is out there, the better it is for journalists.
  Chief of Staff C observed that as politicians became more 
knowledgeable on how to manage the media, “they are continuing the trend of trying 
to condense information to a five-second sound bite”.  He suggested: 
261
Wright (The West Australian) wrote that he was “neutral” about prime ministerial 
media statements.
 
262  While some respondents indicated they would prefer to receive 
more substantive government bulletins,263 Farr noted that the increased number of 
media statements was contributing to more professionalism in Australian journalism 
because skilled, educated reporters were needed to interpret the messages.264
 
 
 
A founding father? 
To assess Curtin’s mass media legacy, this thesis evaluated not only his innovative 
techniques that have endured, but also attempted to ascertain the level of modern 
journalists’ knowledge about him and his impact.  One of the most significant 
purposes of the survey was to discover what journalists thought about Curtin.  If 
Curtin had a legacy, what did this look like in the minds of contemporary reporters?  
Overall, most journalists were not aware of Curtin and did not know about his mass 
media strategies.  Many of his journalism precedents survived to this day such as his 
creation of a full-time prime ministerial press secretary, his initiation of confidential 
briefings and interactive media conferences, where he answered correspondents’ 
questions, as well as his use of relatively new visual and electronic media.  In these 
                                                            
260 Sally Young, “Political discourse in the age of the soundbite: The election campaign 
soundbite on Australian television news”, Australian Political Studies Association 
Conference, Brisbane, 6-9 July 2008, p. 19, retrieved on 19 January 2011 at 
<www.uq.edu.au/polsis/apsa2008/Refereed-papers/Young.pdf>. 
261 Chief of Staff C, confidential personal communication, 23 March 2010. 
262 Wright, personal communication, 27 December 2009. 
263 They were Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Chief of Staff C, 
confidential personal communication, 23 March 2010; Eastley, personal communication, 9 
December 2009; Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
264 Farr, personal communication 12 March 2010. 
Chapter 10   Survey of the contemporary Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery 
450 
 
areas, Curtin bestowed a significant legacy for successive prime ministers, political 
communicators and the press gallery, but this bequest was largely unknown to 
journalists.  Among a small minority of respondents, who were the more senior 
editors, Curtin was a former journalist and a founding father in their profession.265  
Yet many contemporary journalists do not see Curtin as being one of them and he 
was not a giant figure in the mass media.  The survey findings indicated that most 
journalists are not conscious of their own history and of their leading lights in the 
profession.  These findings support previously published research that there has not 
been much of a history of Australian journalism.266  Also it seems consistent with 
some prevailing news values that appear to emphasise entertainment rather than the 
impact of federal politics on people’s lives.267
 
  Thus this thesis contributes towards 
the development of this needed history. 
In terms of modern government-media relationships, overall the journalists’ 
responses seemed to be consistent with Foucault’s theories of governmentality and 
the model of news in an administered society developed by Ericson et al.  According 
to Foucault, liberal democratic leaders will attempt to master new technologies to 
enable an “immense diffusion and consumption” of government information and to 
establish their power in political institutions, practices and rules.268  Ericson et al 
wrote that journalists’ most significant role was to be “knowledge linkers” and 
“information brokers” between the government and public audiences.269
 
  By 
developing Curtin’s journalism strategies, successive leaders have secured news 
reporters’ cooperation to support the prevailing government systems. 
                                                            
265 Editor B, confidential personal communication, 24 March 2010; Wright, personal 
communication, 27 December 2009; Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009. 
266 Cryle, “Australian newspaper history”; Curthoys, Schultz and Hamilton, “A history of 
journalism”; Van Heekeren, “Who’s Gough Whitlam?”. 
267 The Sunday Times, Perth, 25 July 2010, p.1; The West Australian, Perth, 24 and 26 July 
2010, p. 1. 
268 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self” [hereafter “Technologies”], in L.H. Martin, 
H. Gutman and P.H. Hutton (eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault, Tavistock Publications, London, 1988, p. 18; Foucault, “Truth and power”, p. 131. 
269 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 11; Stephen Brent Mickler, 
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The Curtin model for prime ministerial journalism strategies 
The findings of the survey, together with the observations and insights from previous 
scholarly works, have enabled this thesis to build a picture of the legacy left by 
Curtin.  Based on my survey responses, this chapter has contributed to ascertaining 
Curtin’s journalism legacy for contemporary government-media relationships.  This 
thesis thereby fills existing gaps in the academic literature about this former prime 
minister’s influence on political journalism today.  While only a small minority of 
respondents knew about his legacy, they suggested that his associations with 
Canberra-based correspondents were “intimate” because he treated reporters as his 
“equals” and provided confidential, detailed, off-the-record briefings.  These current 
senior journalists described his development of news conferences, background 
briefings and personal press gallery relationships as being significant achievements 
in the area of prime ministerial communications.270  The responses were consistent 
with this thesis’ earlier findings.  Yet the survey respondents seemed unaware of 
some other Curtin initiatives such as his creation of the role of a full-time press 
secretary, as well as his extensive use of the relatively new media of war newsreels 
and radio broadcasts.  Also they did not discuss any of his journalism strategies that 
extended beyond Canberra.  It appeared that although Curtin set many precedents in 
political communications, his creative use of fledgling electronic and visual media 
was not as well-known as his press strategies.  While there has not been a single 
comprehensive publication on past and present prime ministerial journalism 
methods, different case studies reveal that there has been a continuous history of the 
national leaders’ use of the electronic media since Curtin.271
 
  As a former journalist, 
Curtin seemed to enjoy revolutionising the ways that prime ministers interacted with 
reporters and, although his successors’ use of new media did not develop evenly, 
some of his initiatives were vital strategies used by political leaders to communicate 
with national audiences today. 
                                                            
270 Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Correspondent A, confidential 
personal communication, 30 March 2010; Editor B, confidential personal communication, 24 
March 2010; Wright, personal communication, 27 December 2009; Wurth, personal 
communication, 24 November 2009. 
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While many respondents spoke of changes in their relationships with 
successive Australian leaders,272 the majority of this group also discussed favourable 
aspects of prime ministerial communications.273  For example, Speers (Sky News) 
said reporters’ general associations with politicians were “fairly cordial, even 
friendly”.274  Correspondent A commented that her parliamentary relationships had 
improved.275  The two reporters also approved of the quantity and content of 
government media statements; more respondents indicated they were generally 
satisfied with politicians’ accessibility.276  Some respondents discussed the 
continuing practice of honouring confidential agreements with politicians.277  During 
my telephone interviews, several press gallery members praised individual prime 
ministers for their communications skills, well-managed press offices and 
sophisticated use of the media.278
 
  
At the same time, many survey respondents indicated their preference for 
politicians to hold more news conferences, provide more informative briefings and  
  
                                                            
272 They were Bolt, personal communication, 19 December 2009; Bongiorno, personal 
communication, 15 December 2009; Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; 
Chief of Staff C, confidential personal communication, 23 March 2010; Eastley, personal 
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become more accessible to reporters.279  Some senior journalists said the 
relationships with the prime minister had grown increasingly distant because of 
historical, social and technological conditions that might have been beyond the 
leader’s control.  Such factors included the bitter politics resulting from Australia’s 
role in the Cold War and the Vietnam War, which sharpened divisions between the 
left and right factions and created more barriers between journalists and 
politicians.280  The opening of the new Federal Parliament House in 1988 and the 
accompanying expansion of the press gallery had contributed to more reserved 
associations between MPs and correspondents.281  Another factor has been the 
increase in a presidential-style government with a greater focus on a popular 
personality such as Curtin (from 1941 to 1945) and Menzies (from 1949 to 1966), the 
use of US-style televised debates and a proliferation of online communications.  
With the intensified competition among new media outlets, the pressure of rolling 
deadlines reduced the opportunities for leisurely interviews;282 consequently 
journalists were less likely to withhold information from audiences.283  As a result, 
the prime ministers’ media officers were more sophisticated, knowledgeable and 
skilled in using new communication technology to influence news agendas.284  
Journalists provided mixed responses about the effects of the accelerated media 
cycle.  For example, Peter Kennedy said correspondents’ increasing information 
demands left politicians “at a disadvantage”;285 while Chief of Staff C stated the 
prime minister was better able to control “the message of the day”.286
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In sum, these survey results indicated that modern political communications 
and news media coverage owed much to Curtin’s journalism strategies.  Yet it seems 
to have been a relatively unknown legacy.  His innovations in media conferences, 
news briefings, confidential interviews, as well as the use of new audiovisual 
technology have become accepted conventions practised by politicians to 
communicate with journalists from his time to the present day.  Although some 
contemporary journalists indicated they would like improvements in the quality of, 
and access to, political statements, they also indicated that a relationship, such as the 
friendships that Curtin developed with the 1940s press gallery members, would not 
be at all possible today and perhaps not even desirable in the present competitive 
journalism profession.  During the survey, not a single journalist indicated a 
preference to return to the voluntary self-censorship system that was upheld by 
“Curtin’s Circus” to guard wartime secrets and protect national security.   
 
Successive Australian leaders have continued to use and develop many of 
Curtin’s journalism initiatives to communicate more directly to public audiences.  
The central theories of Foucault’s “governmentality” and Ericson et al’s model of 
news in an administered society help us to interpret the significance of the survey 
responses.  When some journalists talked about the “massive increase” in politicians’ 
media statements,287 their comments illustrated Foucault’s view of liberal 
democracy.  He observed that leaders attempt to master new technologies to enable 
an “immense diffusion and consumption” of government information and to establish 
their power in political institutions, practices and rules.288  Ericson et al’s point that 
journalists have been “knowledge linkers” has been reflected in the survey responses.  
They showed that journalists can operate as “information brokers” between the 
government and public audiences.289
                                                            
287 E.g. Eastley, personal communication, 9 December 2009; Farr, personal communication, 
12 March 2010; Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009. 
  Many of the survey respondents indicated that 
they have cooperated with politicians and reported on them to support liberal 
democratic government systems.  Curtin provided valuable contemporary lessons on 
how politicians might successfully create egalitarian, open and well-informed 
288 Foucault, “Technologies”; Foucault, “Truth and power”. 
289 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing deviance, p. 11; Mickler, Visualising 
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relationships with journalists, as well as on the importance of using new media to 
communicate directly and frequently to public audiences. 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion: John Curtin’s legacy for the Australian mass media, 1941-2011 
 
 
This thesis sought to determine how successful John Curtin was in persuading the 
predominantly conservative news media to promote his wartime views.  It set out to 
accomplish the following objectives: to identify Curtin’s journalism strategies as 
well as his use of mass media strategies that have overlapped to a significant extent; 
to demonstrate his success for initiating, developing and overseeing innovative mass 
communication strategies that made the best use of the latest media technology; and 
to argue that he bestowed a powerful legacy for political journalism, government-
media relations and the current Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery.  This chapter 
will summarise the main findings of these research objectives. 
 
As the nation’s leader, Curtin created many precedents in the political use of 
media in Australia and other Allied countries.  As prime minister, he elevated the 
press gallery from the political margins.  As a result, the senior wartime journalists of 
“Curtin’s Circus” became crucial allies in his fight to secure international support for 
defending Australia against Axis attacks.  From the beginning of his leadership, 
Canberra reporters reacted positively to the collegial tone of his news conferences;1 
they were familiar with his unique background as the former newspaper editor and 
Western Australian press union president who, in 1919, organised Australia’s first 
university classes for professional journalists.2
                                                            
1 Supportive press editorials were published to announce Curtin’s prime ministerial 
appointment in Australian metropolitan dailies including the following: The Advertiser, The 
Age, The Argus, The Brisbane Telegraph, The Canberra Times, The Courier-Mail, The Daily 
Mirror, The Herald, The Mercury, The Sun, The Sydney Morning Herald, The West 
Australian.  See Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, no. 1, JCPML acc. no. 
00297/1, 4-9 October 1941. 
  During the anxious days leading to 
the Pacific war, Curtin used this crisis as an opportunity to implement fully his media 
2 Clem Lloyd, Profession: Journalist, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1985, pp. 165-167; Lloyd 
Ross, John Curtin: A Biography, The Macmillan Company of Australia, South Melbourne, 
1977, p. 77. 
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initiatives, including his comprehensive news conference briefings, off-the-record 
interviews and the use of Australia’s first designated full-time prime ministerial press 
secretary.  By applying these strategies, he alerted the journalists to top-secret 
military developments, signalling an imminent Japanese attack.  At his request, 
Canberra political correspondents passed on this information to their media 
organisations’ editors.  Through a combination of mostly friendly, informal, two-way 
discussions with reporters and the use of wartime censorship, he secured their willing 
cooperation to protect national security and they mainly refrained from publishing 
confidential information.3  They respected Curtin for providing news tips and 
background information; since they wanted to maintain this relationship with the 
prime minister, they produced mostly prominent, favourable media coverage of his 
leadership during Australia’s entry in the Pacific war.  Soon afterwards, US 
journalists reported on Roosevelt’s decision to open a direct radio telegraph circuit 
between Australia and the US, not only to “facilitate the more rapid exchange of 
communications”, but also to “serve notice on the Axis powers that the free peoples 
of this world are leaving nothing undone”.4  As Curtin increased Australian prime 
ministerial communications to Allied countries, the news correspondents served, 
following Ericson et al, as “knowledge linkers” and “information brokers” to 
interpret his media messages to public audiences.5
                                                            
3 For example, Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Alexander 
interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np; Harold 
Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Cox interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 01060/1, 6 April 1973, transcript np; Frank Davidson, interviewed by Isla Macphail 
[hereafter “Davidson interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00127/1, 24 January 
1996, transcript np. 
  This study found that no other 
Australian leader had given so many, nor such comprehensive news briefings as 
Curtin did during his prime ministership.  He generally conducted twice-daily media 
conferences, where he discussed war secrets and engaged in a dialogue with 
journalists, whom he treated as colleagues. 
4 Cited in Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Letter to John Curtin”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00266/2, 25 December 1941, pp. 43-44.  Also see (Anon.), “Roosevelt Opens Direct 
Wireless Link to Australia”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 26 December 1941, p. 
19. 
5 Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A 
Study of News Organizations [hereafter Visualizing deviance], Open University Press, 
Milton Keynes, 1987, p. 11; Stephen Brent Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality: Image 
Campaigns and News Routines in the Western Australian Media [hereafter, Visualising 
Aboriginality], PhD thesis, Murdoch University, Murdoch, 1996, p. 20. 
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Through his positive press relations, therefore, he generated mainly 
favourable news coverage about his foreign policies.  That such news executives as 
Keith Murdoch and the ABC’s Charles Moses were politically conservative6 did not 
hinder Curtin from initiating and maintaining a friendly, informal correspondence 
with them.7  Moreover, he appointed many media managers to government, war-
related positions, which assisted him to develop fairly harmonious relationships with 
them.8  As a result, his foreign policy messages were repeated and accentuated in 
mainstream, metropolitan dailies.  This thesis has demonstrated that journalists 
cooperated with him to produce positive, morale-boosting media messages on 
Australia’s wartime achievements.  The study shows that a selected sample of 11 
Curtin addresses received mainly positive news coverage in The Age, The Canberra 
Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian.9  At least 12 wartime 
journalists held him in high esteem;10 they recalled he was a “superb wartime leader” 
because of his ability to deliver emotional speeches to “hold the Parliament [and] 
have them absolutely breathless”;11 his determination “that whatever he did was done 
for Australia without any personal cheers at all”;12 his candid press talks that 
revealed “he was a man of very sensitive feelings”, who cared deeply about the 
Australians fighting in the war;13 his aptitude for discussing literature with 
journalists,14 showing “he was a tremendously well-read man”; and his “trust” in 
reporters that “was justified to an extraordinary extent” as they honoured his 
confidences.15
                                                            
6 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Neville Petersen, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, 
& Politics 1932-1947 [hereafter News not views], Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1993, pp. 116, 
130. 
  According to these oral histories, Curtin communicated well in the 
7 John Curtin to Charles Moses, National Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], Canberra, 
CA 12, M1415, 237, 22 January 1943, p. 77; Charles Moses, interviewed for the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation [hereafter “Moses interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00408/3, 27 May 1982, transcript np; Keith Murdoch to Curtin, NAA, Canberra, CA 12, 
M1415, 237, 1943, pp. 141-142. 
8 Refer to Chapter 3. 
9 See Appendix 14.   
10 See Appendix 13.  
11 John Commins, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01092/1, 22-
26 May 1971, transcript np. 
12 Davidson, “Davidson interview”. 
13 Alan D. Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Reid interview”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00501, 4 October 1972 and 28 February 1973, transcript np. 
14 Edgar George Holt, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Holt interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01059, 23 May 1978, transcript np. 
15 Reid, “Reid interview”. 
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parliament and press gallery by giving intelligent, compassionate speeches that 
focused on national, rather than imperial, concerns and by conversing with 
journalists in a straightforward, egalitarian manner about topics in which they shared 
mutual interests. 
 
Along with his informal and official news briefings, Curtin transformed 
prime ministerial communications to public audiences, as examined in Chapters 6 to 
9.  After broadcasting Australia’s first independent declaration of war, when 
announcing the war against Japan on 8 December 1941, he expanded the fledgling 
radio services to talk frequently and directly to millions of people - audiences who 
were unprecedented in their size and extensive global locations.  For example, since 
he had recognised the power of radio in 1935, soon after becoming the ALP leader, 
he was the first Australian prime minister to broadcast a radio talk directly to US 
audiences and his words were transmitted by more than 700 American stations 
during the peak listening hour as well as reaching Canada, South America, Britain 
and Europe.16  As he used the radio to make direct announcements to listeners, rather 
than relying on the press, he influenced other Australian leaders to use innovative 
media technology to reach and interact with mass audiences.17  Moreover in 1943, he 
delivered the first national policy speech through a radio hook-up from Canberra; 
due to his personal popularity, he helped the ALP to achieve its greatest federal 
election victory at the time.18
                                                            
16 (Anon.), “Pledge To U.S.A.”, The West Australian, Perth, 16 March 1942, p. 5; John 
Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime Minister” [hereafter “National broadcast”], Digest of 
Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. 
John Curtin) [hereafter DDA], no. 10, 8 December 1941, pp. 19-22; John Curtin, “Radio 
broadcast to the United States” [hereafter “US radio broadcast”], 14 March 1942, DDA, no. 
22, pp. 9-13; Ian Ward, “The early use of radio for political communication in Australia and 
Canada: John Henry Austral, Mr Sage and the Man from Mars”, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, p. 322. 
  In sum, his public media communications as a two-
17 (Anon.), “A Lesson To Be Learnt”, The Sun, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, JCPML 
acc. no. 00297/2, 20 March 1942; Allan Fraser, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Fraser 
interview”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00550, August 1972–January 1973, transcript 
np; Robert Menzies, “The Forgotten People”, Menzies Virtual Museum, East Melbourne, 22 
May 1942, retrieved on 18 May 2009 at 
<http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/ForgottenCont.html>. 
18 David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings [hereafter In 
his own words], Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 226; Bobbie Oliver, 
Unity is Strength: A History of the Australian Labor Party and the Trades and Labor 
Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999, API Network, Bentley, 2003, p. 167. 
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term prime minister contributed to his party’s popularity.  Most significantly for this 
study, Curtin’s distinctive role, therefore, was one of expanding the Australian public 
sphere as a space of national and critical deliberation, and cementing journalism’s 
governmental function as its organising agency. 
 
His widespread appeal can be partly attributed to his astute use of popular 
culture that attracted ALP supporters and traditionally anti-Labor voters, as we saw 
in Chapters 6 and 7.  One of his significant media legacies was to sponsor a modern, 
first-class Australian film industry.  Although Curtin’s predecessors, Menzies and 
Fadden, had supported the Department of Information (DOI), established in 1939 to 
produce patriotic films, archival research revealed they did not make an extensive 
use of newsreels to communicate directly to cinema audiences.  In contrast, Curtin 
appeared in a “vast” number of moving images and research suggested they were 
screened in other Allied countries.19  Semiotic analysis from Chapters 6 to 9 found 
that he projected an image of being both a forceful, democratic leader and a common 
man of the people in his newsreels.  Nonetheless, the apparent effortless and 
spontaneous motion pictures were the result of meticulous rehearsals.  After Curtin 
practised different gestures, postures and words, the film teams edited series of eye-
level close-ups and medium shots to convey an intimate, personal relationship 
between the prime minister and cinema audiences.20  Through this cinematic 
depiction, film teams accomplished what Foucault has since described as masking 
national power.21
                                                            
19 British Movietone Digital Archive, Surry Hills, 1939-1945, retrieved on 21 January 2011 
at <http://www.movietone.com>; Carol Fallows, War: Australian Memories in Black and 
White, Murdoch Books, Sydney, 2005; National Film and Sound Archive, “Australian Prime 
Ministers” (fact sheets on John Joseph Curtin, Sir Arthur William Fadden and Sir Robert 
Gordon Menzies), Acton, 2008, retrieved on 31 July 2010 at 
<http://www.nfsa.gov.au/the_collection/collection_spotlights/apms>. 
  As the cameras focused on such scenes as the harmonious 
combination of commonwealth flags displayed together, as well as Curtin conferring 
with powerful democratic leaders and signing a treaty on the same table used by 
20 For example, ScreenSound Australia, Parliament in Session (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00876/4, 1944. 
21 Teresa Bergman, “Can Patriotism Be Carved In Stone?: A Critical Analysis of Mt. 
Rushmore’s Orientation Films”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 1, spring 2008, p. 96; 
Michel Foucault, “Film and Popular Memory: An Interview with Michel Foucault”, trans. 
Martin Jordan, Radical Philosophy, vol. 11, summer 1975, pp. 25, 27. 
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Queen Victoria to give her assent to the Australian federation, the films evoked his 
commitment to British political ideals and disguised the occasional tensions among 
the Allies.22
 
 
Although short films had been unpopular prior to the war, Curtin’s strategy 
had been to increase production of these types of pictures for cinema audiences.  
Since 1939 the nation’s filmmakers had created “several thousand shorts”.23  This 
policy included the 1945 foundation of the National Film Board, which was 
responsible for training Australian film technicians and preparing for an increased 
production of documentaries.24  Moreover, his administration created a national films 
laboratory to process footage, along with transferring the Australian National 
Publicity Association to New York to maximise promotional opportunities.25  During 
his terms, Curtin supported the creation of films including the short documentaries, 
Kokoda Front Line! (1942),26 South-west Pacific (1943)27 and Jungle Patrol 
(1944);28 as well as the full-length movie, The Rats of Tobruk (1944), which was 
released under the title, The Fighting Rats of Tobruk (1945), in the US.29
                                                            
22 For example, ScreenSound Australia, “Anzac Agreement Signed At Canberra”, in John 
Joseph Curtin 1885 – 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 1944. 
  The 
government-sponsored team of Kokoda Front Line! won the nation’s first Academy 
Award.  All of these films emphasised distinctively Australian characters and 
targeted a wide Allied audience; this was a breakthrough considering that in the mid-
23 Alan Osbiston, “Australian Films Overseas” [hereafter “Australian films”], The Sydney 
Morning Herald, Sydney, 18 July 1944, p. 2. 
24 Arthur Calwell, “Appointments”, DDA, no. 101, 1 May 1945, pp. 35-36; Arthur Calwell, 
“First Meeting”, DDA, no. 104, 26 June 1945, p. 33. 
25 (Anon.), “Publicity: Relations with America: Australia Expands”, The Canberra Times, 
Canberra, 31 October 1941, p. 4. 
26 Ken G. Hall (producer), Kokoda Front Line! (newsreel), The Australian News & 
Information Bureau, Australia, 1942. 
27 Ken G. Hall (director and producer), South-west Pacific (newsreel), Cinesound 
Productions, Australia, 1943. 
28 Tom Gurr (director), Jack. S. Allan (producer), Jungle Patrol (newsreel), Commonwealth 
Government of Australia, Ministry of Information, Australia, 1944. 
29 Charles Chauvel (director and producer), The Rats of Tobruk (movie), Chamun 
Productions, Australia, 1944; Charles Chauvel (director), Charles Chauvel and Charles 
Munro (producers), The Fighting Rats of Tobruk (movie), America and Canada, 1945. 
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1930s, Hollywood movie publicists considered Australia to be too obscure for US 
cinema fans.30
 
 
Furthermore, Curtin distanced himself from Menzies’ “dyed-in-the-wool 
British” outlook by promoting a national identity in other areas of the media and the 
arts.31  He expanded the ABC’s Australian-oriented programs, for instance.32  As 
part of his vision, Curtin directed the ABC general manager, Charles Moses, to 
broadcast more Australian voices, rather than the previously predominant, 
exaggerated English accents, as well as to devote more airtime to locally produced 
theatre, music and entertainment content.  The Sydney Morning Herald general 
manager, Rupert Henderson, recalled Curtin advised him that “he wanted a great 
national news service that would be objective, impartial and free”.33  Therefore he 
demanded that Moses create more Australian alternatives to the US radio programs 
provided by Hollywood entertainers such as Bob Hope.34  Moreover, Curtin 
announced his subsidy for the creation of a national theatre, opera and cultural 
development on 19 March 1945.35
 
  Consequently he instituted an independent 
Australian arts and cultural sector. 
Curtin initiated a number of other groundbreaking strategies to promote 
Australia to worldwide audiences.  He transformed the News and Information  
  
                                                            
30 Mark McGinness, “Biography: The Swashbuckler from Hobart”, Quadrant online, vol. 53, 
no. 6, June 2009, retrieved on 10 June 2010 at 
<http://www.quadrant.org.au/magazine/issue/2009/6/the-swashbuckler-from-hobart>. 
31 Robert Menzies, “Our American Allies”, Menzies Virtual Museum, East Melbourne, 23 
January 1942, transcript np, retrieved on 18 May 2009 at 
<http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/Forgotten14.html>. 
32 David Pyvis, “When the AIR BEER CEER pushed the Aussie twang”, Issues in 
Educational Research, vol. 3, no. 1, 1993, p. 4. 
33 Cited in Petersen, News not views, p. 233. 
34 Moses, “Moses interview”; Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John 
Curtin’s war [hereafter Backroom briefings], National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], 
Canberra, 1997, p. 235. 
35 John Curtin, “National Theatre”, DDA, no. 98, 19 March 1945, pp. 13-14. 
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Bureau into an active publicity department based in the US,36 which by 1944 was 
directly promoting Australia’s role in the war to other Allied nations through the use 
of films and other media.37  Similarly he increased the RAAF’s public relations team, 
arranged with the United Kingdom Ministry of Information to produce a film about 
the Australian air force activities in Britain38 and directed his nation’s army public 
relations unit to issue “supplementary information” about local troops to add a new 
dimension to General MacArthur’s US-oriented communiqués.39  His post-war 
planning included new strategies for the DOI to promote Australian trade and 
tourism opportunities in media releases in a bid to attract more migrants.40  His 
professional journalism background might have influenced his decision to instigate 
public relations strategies; in this way, he resembled US President Roosevelt, the 
former Harvard Crimson student president and managing editor, whose investments 
in “opinion management” methods helped to create the mood of a “national 
consensus” on the US entry in the war on 8 December 1941.41
 
 
Likewise, Curtin facilitated a growing number of international exchanges 
among journalists.  He sponsored three Australian correspondents to visit Canada in 
1944;42
                                                            
36 R.G. Casey to H.S. Foll, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Barton, vol. 4, 24 February 1941, retrieved on 18 February 2010 at 
<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/[LookupVolNoNumber]/4~319>; 
Bridget Griffen-Foley, “‘The Kangaroo Is Coming Into Its Own’: R. G. Casey, Earl Newsom 
And Public Relations In The 1940s”, Australasian Journal Of American Studies, vol. 23, no. 
2, December 2004, pp.1-20. 
 also he supported at least an additional five newsmen to travel abroad 
37 (Anon.), “Our Role In Pacific Overlooked”, The Argus, Melbourne, 5 August 1944, p. 3; 
Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 200; Osbiston, “Australian films”, p. 2. 
38 “Advisory War Council minutes”, National Archives of Australia [hereafter NAA], 
Canberra, series no. A5954, control symbol 815/1, 14 October 1943, p. 3. 
39 (Anon.), “A.I.F. Activities Endorsed: Mr. Curtin Says Hazards Reduced”, The Canberra 
Times, Canberra, 23 January 1945, p. 2; (Anon.), “Army Equipment Superior and 
Adequate”, The Canberra Times, Canberra, 6 April 1945, p. 2; Department of External 
Affairs, “Binder of Cables outward from Australian Delegation, San Francisco (and 
London)”, NAA, Canberra, series no. A4764,7, 1 May 1945, p. 287; DDA, no. 99, 5 April 
1945, p. 13. 
40 Arthur Calwell, “Future Activities–Post-War”, DDA, no. 91, 26 October 1944, p. 48. 
41 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989, p. 192. 
42 The three Australian correspondents visiting Canada in 1944 were Allen Dawes of The 
Herald, Fred Smith of the Australian United Press, and Don Whitington of The Daily 
Telegraph.  See Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography [hereafter 
Strive to be fair], Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 92. 
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including Murdoch, who met Curtin in London on 12 May.43  The first Voice of 
America radio commentator, William Winter, received a positive welcome in 
Australia during the same year.44  In early 1945, he helped at least four Australian 
journalists to report on the United Nations (UN) meeting in San Francisco.45  
Australia’s delegation played a significant role in drafting the UN Charter.46  Curtin 
explained his reason for instigating these types of correspondent exchange programs, 
when he reportedly informed “the Circus” that he wanted “a reasonably good press 
delegate” to help promote “a proper pageant of Australia”, as well as to “educate the 
other delegates” and “focus attention on the Pacific war”.47
 
  As a result, Australian 
journalists developed more professional relationships with Allied correspondents. 
 
Cross-national affinities, 1941-1945 
This study suggests that Curtin devoted more time to cultivate positive relationships 
with journalists than did Churchill, Canada’s Mackenzie King and Roosevelt, whose 
media strategies were discussed in Chapter 4.  While all four Allied leaders used 
their journalism skills and media experiences to further their political careers, once 
they became national leaders, their press interactions varied remarkably.  Of the four 
men, Curtin held significantly more news conferences because of his commitment to 
                                                            
43 Along with Murdoch, Curtin supported these editors and managers to travel overseas: 
William Dunstan and John Williams of The Herald; Rupert Henderson of The Sydney 
Morning Herald; Brian Penton of The Daily Telegraph; Wynne of the Australian Associated 
Press.  See Heather Campbell, “Diary of Labour Man” for 12 May 1944 [hereafter “Diary”], 
JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1944.html>; Harold Cox, “Typescript reports, 
1944-1964” [hereafter “Typescript reports”], NLA, Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA 
MS acc. no. 4554, 3 July 1944, transcript np; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 209. 
44 (Anon.), “William Winter.  Coming to Australia”, The West Australian, Perth, 9 May 
1944, p. 2; Fitzpatrick to Evatt, JCPML, JCPML acc. no. 269/3, 5 October 1944, pp. 53-54. 
45 The four journalists covering the 1945 United Nations conference in San Francisco were 
Allan Carmichael of the ABC, Harold Cox of The Sun News-Pictorial, George McGann of 
Australian Associated Press, and Virginia Young of The Daily Mirror.  See Department of 
External Affairs, “Binder of Cables inward from Australian Delegation, San Francisco (and 
London)”, NAA, Canberra, series no. A4764,6, 16 June 1945, pp. 126-127. 
46 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “United Nations: Our 
historical involvement”, Canberra, 2008, retrieved on 21 January 2010 at 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/australia_and_un.html>. 
47 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 16-17 February 1945. 
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twice-daily briefings on a regular basis.  In contrast, Roosevelt generally conducted 
twice-weekly interviews with the White House press corps while Churchill and King 
did not hold regular media conferences.  No other democratic wartime leader 
provided as much confidential information to journalists as did Curtin, who rarely 
travelled with a bodyguard and often walked in Canberra alone or with only one 
secretary.48  While King and Churchill discouraged impromptu questions, Roosevelt 
cautiously answered correspondents’ queries, but would not discuss war secrets with 
them.49  During his briefings in Australia, Curtin discussed secret cables and shared 
Advisory War Council information with journalists and also provided news tips to 
them about an imminent Japanese attack.50  When he travelled to Canada, England 
and the US in 1944, he interacted with the media twice as frequently as Menzies did 
during his 1941 prime ministerial trip to these countries (see Appendices 10-11).51  
As demonstrated in Chapter 8, journalists from these Allied nations appreciated 
Curtin’s informative, candid interviews.  For instance, Columbia Broadcasting 
System commentator, William Winter, said Curtin’s San Francisco press conference 
in 1944 “was the most comprehensive ever held” in the city because his answers 
“were the frankest we [US journalists] have ever had”.52
                                                            
48 (Anon.), “John Curtin gets ready for London trip”, The Australian Women’s Weekly, 
Sydney, 1 April 1944, p. 9; Frederick McLaughlin, “Prime Minister’s visit to England via 
USA, Itinerary and engagements 1944” [hereafter “Travel itinerary”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00129/1, pp. 3-4; Alan Reid, “Plain John Curtin Who Led Australia 
Through Darkest Days”, The Sun, Sydney, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/165, 5 
July 1945. 
  After his talk with 
Canadian correspondents, they remarked it was “one of the most useful conferences 
49 (Anon.), “Canada At War”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01222/15, 
12 June 1944, p. 16; C.J. Lloyd, Parliament And The Press: The Federal Parliamentary 
Press Gallery 1901-88 [hereafter Parliament and the press], Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton, 1988, p. 126; Richard M. Perloff, Political Communication: Politics, Press, and 
Public in America, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey and London, 1998, p. 39; 
Donald Kilgour Rodgers, interviewed by Mel Pratt [hereafter “Rodgers interview”], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00497, 29 April 1971, transcript np. 
50 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Cox, “Typescript reports”. 
51 Curtin’s overseas journalism contacts were recorded in Campbell, “Diary” for 1944.  
Menzies’ international media interviews were described in: A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy 
(eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 Diary [hereafter Dark and hurrying days], 
NLA, Canberra, 1993, particularly pp. 60-132. 
52 Theo Moody, “Triumph For Mr Curtin At Press Talk” [hereafter “Triumph for Curtin”], 
The Argus, Melbourne, 21 April 1944, p. 1. 
Chapter 11   Conclusion: John Curtin’s legacy for the Australian mass media, 1941-2011 
 
 
466 
 
ever held in the Ottawa [Press] Gallery”.53  In London, newspaper journalists praised 
Curtin’s ability to establish “excellent personal relations” with Churchill; his 
“incisive presentation of the facts”; and his “fresh mind and language” during his 
radio broadcast to Britons on 8 May 1944.54  Thus Curtin’s interviews were well-
known among Allied correspondents as being the most comprehensive in giving war 
information and the most extensive in the time allocated to answer journalists’ 
questions.  As a result, he generated favourable news coverage in The New York 
Times,55 The Washington Post56 and Time magazine.57
 
 
Moreover, Curtin communicated more frequently to radio listeners than did 
FDR, who was recognised for his ready acceptance and use of relatively new media 
technology.  This study compared Curtin’s major radio talks with those given by 
Roosevelt as the US president.  The full texts of 37 of Curtin’s radio broadcasts have 
been lodged at the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library.58  In addition, this study 
identified nine other broadcasts given by Curtin during this same period between 7 
October 1941 and 5 July 1945 (see Appendix 12).59
                                                            
53 Department of External Affairs, “Visit of Mr. Curtin to USA & UK in connection with 
Prime Ministers’ Conference London” [hereafter “Curtin’s visit”], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00768/2, May 1944, pp. 10-22. 
  Therefore this thesis has 
calculated that he made about 12 significant prime ministerial radio addresses each 
year.  In contrast, Roosevelt delivered his 110 presidential radio speeches from 4 
54 Cited in (Anon.), “Australia Has British Mandate In The Pacific”, The Canberra Times, 
Canberra, 9 May 1944, p. 2; (Anon.), “Press Comment: ‘Need Have No Doubt’”, The West 
Australian, Perth, 9 May 1944, p. 3. 
55 The New York Times, 5, 20, 22, 24-27 April 1944; 5, 19, 22, 31 May 1944; 1, 2, 8 June 
1944. 
56 The Washington Post, 26 December 1941; 6, 25 April 1944; 12, 15 May 1944; 18 July 
1944. 
57 Time, 13 October 1941; 5, 12 January 1942; 2, 23 March 1942; 12 October 1942; 23, 30 
August 1943; 31 January 1944; 17 April 1944; 12 June 1944. 
58 JCPML, “Index to John Curtin’s speeches in the Digest of Decisions and Announcements 
and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister, 1941-1945” [hereafter “Index to John 
Curtin’s speeches”], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01148/1, 2007. 
59 See Australian Commonwealth Government, “Prime Minister’s Itinerary” [hereafter 
“Election speech itinerary”], NAA, Canberra, CA12, A461, R4/1/12, p. 117; Australian 
Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s visit”, pp.10-22; British Movietone (producer), 
“Commonwealth Premiers Honoured”, in Newsreels of Curtin, 1942-1945 (newsreel), 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 1944; Campbell, “Diary”, 19 and 30 April, 7 
May, 26 June 1944; William Lyon Mackenzie King, “The Diaries of William Lyon 
Mackenzie King”, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 30 May-1 June 1944, retrieved on 
11 February 2010 at <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html>. 
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March 1933 until 12 April 1945.60  Thus Roosevelt made about nine radio talks each 
year during his presidential terms.  This calculation illustrated a significant finding: 
even though Curtin was often away during his last two years, he delivered more 
national broadcasts than did FDR, who was credited as being a highly successful 
radio communicator.61  As Australian public opinion polling was new, records were 
not available to find out exactly what people thought of each one of Curtin’s radio 
speeches.62  Yet the frequency of his broadcasts, the largely positive reception 
towards them in the selected newspapers, the mass audiences of devoted wartime 
listeners and two national polls suggested he used radio skilfully.63
 
 
To help explain the success of his rhetoric, this study examined the 
accessibility and reading ease of a selected sample of 11 Curtin addresses.  Ideally an 
accessible public document should have a Flesch Reading Ease score that is between 
60 and 70, with a lower number indicating more complicated language.  Based on 
this measurement, the Curtin addresses had an average Flesch Reading Ease score of 
50.76, which meant it was more complicated than the ideal level (see Appendix 15).  
Five of these selected addresses were detailed parliamentary speeches, which 
contributed to the overall complexity of Curtin’s language.64
                                                            
60 Elvin T. Lim, “The Lion and the Lamb: De-mythologising Franklin Roosevelt’s Fireside 
Chats” [hereafter “Fireside chats”], Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, p. 441. 
  In this sample, his four 
61 Thomas Bonner, Our Recent Past, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1963, p. 213; 
Arthur S. Link, American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890’s, Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1955, p. 383; Daniel Scroop, “The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen 
T. Early, America’s First Modern Press Secretary”, Times Higher Education, London, 21 
November 2008, retrieved on 10 December 2008 at 
<http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=402574&sectioncode=26>. 
62 As discussed in Chapter 5, Roy Morgan Research was founded in 1941.  Michele Levine 
and Gary Morgan, “The Power of Newspaper Editorial & Advertising”, Country Press 
Association 106th Annual Conference, Sydney, 2006, retrieved on 20 June 2009 at 
<www.roymorgan.com>. 
63 (Anon.), “Curtin and Poll”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01222/11, 
23 August 1943, p. 34; (Anon.),“Mr. Curtin’s Job Pleases People”, The Courier-Mail, 
Brisbane, 14 August 1942, p. 4; Lloyd, Parliament and the press, p. 140; Petersen, News not 
views, p. 170. 
64 The five selected Curtin parliamentary speeches were: John Curtin, “Attack On Darwin”, 
DDA, no. 19, 19 February 1942, p. 9; “Naval Engagement – Coral Sea” [hereafter “Coral 
Sea speech”], DDA, no. 28, 8 May 1942, pp. 4-5; “State Of The War”, DDA, no. 47, 10 
December 1942, pp. 17-24; Commonwealth of Australia: Parliamentary Debates [hereafter 
CPD], vol. 173, 11 February 1943, pp. 592-596; “Meeting of Prime Ministers – Australian 
Prime Minister’s Report” [hereafter “Prime ministers’ meeting”], DDA, no. 84, 17 July 1944, 
pp. 28-44. 
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radio broadcasts were slightly more accessible to public audiences and registered a 
score of 54.375 (a higher number meant a simpler document).65  These Curtin 
speeches were somewhat more difficult than Roosevelt’s “fireside chats”, registered 
to be an average of 57.5.66  Moreover, this study calculated the Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade, indicating a school grade level.  On average, Curtin’s selected addresses, 
including his parliamentary speeches, were suitable for eleventh-grade students.  His 
four radio talks were slightly simpler because they were generally appropriate for 
tenth-grade listeners.  Although the prescribed standard was for a public document to 
be targeted to an eighth-grade student, it appeared that he still aimed major radio 
broadcasts to a predominantly lower secondary school level.67  Due to the 
unavailability of many recorded speeches, this study was able to calculate Curtin’s 
speech rate in only three broadcasts from the selected sample.68  He spoke an average 
139.46 words a minute, faster than the recommended levels of 100 to 125 words.69  
According to different scholarly estimates, FDR’s average pace was between 105 
and 117 words per minute in his “fireside chats”.70
                                                            
65 The four selected Curtin radio talks were: Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from 
London” [hereafter “London broadcast”], DDA, 8 May 1944, no. 81, pp. 53-56; “General 
Election ALP Policy Statement” [hereafter “Election policy statement”], JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np; “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22; “US 
radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
  As this sample of Curtin’s radio 
talks showed that they were generally aimed at a lower secondary school level, the 
evidence indicates that they were not beyond the comprehension of working-class 
listeners.  In 1941 the statutory school leaving age was 14 years old (or year nine) in 
66 Lim, “Fireside chats”, pp. 445-446. 
67 Trevor Day, “Twelve Writing Tips for Administrative Staff”, University of Bath, Bath, 
2008, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<www.bath.ac.uk/learningandteaching/resources/TwelveWritingTipsRevisedTD.pdf>. 
68 See Appendix 15.  The three recorded radio talks were: Curtin, “Election policy 
statement”; “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22; “US radio broadcast”, pp. 9-13. 
69 Peter Kenny, A Handbook of Public Speaking for Scientists & Engineers, IOP Publishing 
Ltd [Institute of Physics Publishing], London, 1988, p. 20; Lim, “Fireside chats”, pp. 446, 
458 endnote 42; Cynthia J. Pasquale, “Talking at the speed of confound”, The Denver Post, 
Denver, 29 June 2006, retrieved on 10 September 2009 at 
<http://www.denverpost.com/ci_3991442?source=rss>; Public Broadcasting Service, “All 
About Public Speaking”, Falls Church, 2009, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<http://www.pbs.org/standarddeviantstv/transcript_public.html>. 
70 Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. Braden, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt” [hereafter 
“Roosevelt”], in Marie Kathryn Hochmuth (ed.), History and Criticism of American Public 
Address, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, vol. 3, 1958, pp. 520, 522; Lim, “Fireside 
chats”, p. 446. 
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each Australian state.71  Australians born before 1930 achieved 9.3 years of 
education on average.72  According to The Age editorial writer, Australian radio 
listeners enjoyed his “periodical talks to the nation” because they liked to “hear his 
voice, weigh his words and generally maintain that personal contact with the head of 
the Government which is eminently desirable”.73  His use of diction and quoting of 
poetry have been somewhat at odds with his media image as a “man of the people” 
and therefore it is useful to consider other reasons to explain the popularity of his 
radio talks.74
 
 
At the beginning of Curtin’s broadcasts, it was clear that he was talking to 
“the people” – rather than to other politicians and Allied leaders – and he frequently 
used “we”, “us,” and “our” that conveyed his inclusive tone (see Chapters 6 to 9).75  
This strategy resembled the approach taken by Roosevelt in his declaration of war on 
Japan and in his “fireside chats”, which always began with some variant of a greeting 
to “My Friends”.76  Also Curtin appeared to take care to make impersonal references 
to “Japan”, “the enemy” and the war, consistent with US official policy.77
                                                            
71 S.R. Carver, Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1941, Canberra, 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, no. 34, 1942. 
  He 
appealed to a sense of unity when he affirmed, “the common cause of preserving for 
free men and free women not only their inheritance, but every hope they have of 
decency and dignity and liberty”.  Throughout his prime ministership, he balanced 
his crisis war rhetoric with invocations of “freedom”, “liberty” and “democracy”.  
72 Jonathan Kelley and M.D.R. Evans, “Trends In Educational Attainment In Australia”, 
WwA: Worldwide Attitudes, 26 August 1996, pp. 1-8, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<http://www.international-survey.org/wwa_pub/articles/hst-ed5.htm>. 
73 (Anon.), “The Steersman Returns To The Helm”, The Age, Melbourne, cited in 
Scrapbooks, no. 4, JCPML acc. no. 00297/4, 22 January 1945. 
74 20th Century Fox-Movietone News (producer), Nation Mourns John Curtin (newsreel), 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00033/1, 1945; ScreenSound Australia, “A Great 
Australian Passes …”, in John Joseph Curtin 1885 – 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00238/1, 1945. 
75 For example, Curtin, “National broadcast”, pp. 19-22. 
76 Lim, “Fireside chats”, p. 453; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Joint Address to Congress Leading 
to a Declaration of War Against Japan”, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and 
Museum, Hyde Park, 8 December 1941, retrieved on 1 August 2010 at 
<http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/oddec7.html>. 
77 Hal Brands, “Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and Policy in the American Debate over the 
Japanese Emperor during World War II”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 8, no. 3, 2005, p. 
434. 
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These ideals could be attained only through the practice of “duty”, “responsibility” 
and “sacrifice”, as he told public audiences.78  By 1944, his tone became more 
optimistic as he invited Australian people to share his vision of a hopeful future, 
international cooperation and establishing a national “purpose” in the “new world 
order”.79
 
  This analysis of keywords suggested that Curtin managed to strike the right 
chord with national audiences, appealing to the wartime mood of social unity and 
civic duty, as well as inspiring Australians to work together and forge the same 
“purpose”. 
In other ways, the Churchill, King and Roosevelt news management systems 
might have influenced Curtin to adopt some journalism and media strategies.  For 
example, after FDR appointed the first US full-time presidential press secretary, 
Stephen T. Early, in 1933, Curtin perhaps heard about the success of this initiative, 
which possibly encouraged him to employ Rodgers as Australia’s first designated 
prime ministerial press secretary in 1941.80  Similarly the extensive wartime 
newsreels about Churchill, King and FDR might have helped persuade Curtin to 
rehearse carefully for his appearances in short films, as well as to expand Australian 
movie production for international audiences.81
                                                            
78 Curtin, “Coral Sea speech”, pp. 4-5; “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56; “National broadcast”, 
pp. 19-22. 
  His parliamentary rhetoric, 
including his use of the loaded pause, a cleverly timed comeback and gestures such 
as striking the desk in front of him, resembled Churchill’s style of debating 
opposition MPs.  It is likely that Curtin developed these persuasive techniques when 
he trained himself to be an orator in front of large audiences at street corners, town 
halls and beachside gatherings.   
79 Curtin, “London broadcast”, pp. 53-56; “Prime ministers’ meeting”, pp. 28-44. 
80 Diana Knott Martinelli and Jeff Mucciarone, “New deal public relations: A glimpse into 
FDR press secretary Stephen Early’s work”, Public Relations Review, vol. 33, no. 1, March 
2007, pp. 49-57; Rodgers, “Rodgers interview”. 
81 Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, “Audio/Visual Collections at the 
Library”, Hyde Park, 2010, retrieved on 1 August 2010 at 
<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/collections/avcollections.html#motion>; Library 
and Archives Canada, “Mackenzie King on the Air Waves and the Silver Screen”, Ottawa, 
2002, retrieved on 1 August 2010 at <http://www.lac-bac.gc.ca/king/023011-1070.09-
e.html>; Jonathan Sikorsky, “From British Cassandra to American Hero: The Churchill 
Legend in the World War II American Media” [hereafter “Churchill”], Finest Hour, The 
Churchill Centre, no. 108, autumn 2000, pp. 30-36. 
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Yet differing from the aristocratic style of the other three leaders, he 
cultivated the image of a down-to-earth Australian, who “like any other man ... reads 
a few of the better type wild-Western stories for relaxation”,82 enjoyed watching 
movies83 and had “never been a fancy dresser”.84  Allied audiences responded 
positively to these messages and US magazine companies used his image in their 
advertisements including New York subway car posters.85  Curtin, like his three 
Allied colleagues, was greatly assisted by his wartime censorship system.  
Mackenzie King in Canada and Churchill in London had learned that journalists 
worked better with censors who were from similar professional backgrounds.86  Also 
Roosevelt made sure that the US Office of Censorship’s director was a long-time 
newsman, Byron Price, who would be sympathetic to the principle of a free press.87  
In Australia, Menzies’ 1940 appointment of Murdoch as the director-general of 
information was not a success due to the hostility of rival press proprietors.88
  
  
Careful to avoid repeating this mistake, Curtin gave the director-general’s position to 
the news editor, Edmund Bonney, in 1941 and used his news conferences to build 
relationships of trust with journalists, who generally agreed to cooperate with the  
                                                            
82 (Anon.), “Slick U.S. Magazines Use Curtin To Boost Sales” [hereafter “Slick US 
magazines”], The Daily Mirror, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 2, 9 October 1942. 
83 (Anon.), “John Curtin gets ready for London trip”, The Australian Women’s Weekly, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/111, 1 April 1944; Arthur Augustus Calwell, 
“Biographical notes re John Curtin”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00652/3/2, 1944. 
84 (Anon.), “Clothes would not worry Curtin”, The Sunday Sun, Sydney, 14 June 1942, 
retrieved on 26 September 2009 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/behindthescenes/pms/text/curtin.html>. 
85 (Anon.), “Slick US magazines”. 
86 George D. Kerr, “Skirting the Minefield: Press Censorship, Politics and French Canada, 
1940”, Canadian Journal of Communication, vol. 8, no. 2, 1982, pp. 47-48; Charles Edward 
Lysaght, “Brendan Bracken: ‘The Fantasist Whose Dreams Came True’”, Finest Hour, The 
Churchill Centre, no. 113, winter 2001-2002, p. 18; The National Archives, “The Art of 
War”, Surrey, 2005, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/theartofwar/inf3.htm>. 
87 William H. Hammond, “Book review: Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and 
the US Press and Radio in World War II” (Michael S. Sweeney), The Journal of Military 
History, vol. 65, no. 3, 2001, pp. 840-841. 
88 Bridget Griffen-Foley, “Political opinion polling and the professionalization of public 
relations: Keith Murdoch, Robert Menzies, and the Liberal Party of Australia”, Australian 
Journalism Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2002, p. 43; Geoffrey Serle, “Murdoch, Sir Keith Arthur 
(1885 – 1952)” [hereafter “Keith Murdoch”], Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 10, 1986, pp. 622-627, retrieved on 22 January 2008 at 
<http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A100610b.htm>. 
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“voluntary self-censorship”.89
 
  Thus Curtin did not directly copy the other Allied 
leaders’ media policies, but he developed initiatives that reflected his deep 
commitment to journalists, his egalitarian, labour-oriented philosophy and his aim to 
promote Australia to the world. 
He also oversaw the inclusion of more women in the public sphere.  Differing 
from the Churchill administration’s policy, Curtin did not object to women war 
correspondents and consequently more female newspaper and radio journalists 
worked in Australian newsrooms than ever before.90  In 1943 his election policy 
speech was directly targeted towards female voters; during his campaign, he gave a 
talk to 300 women in South Perth, answering their questions.  This was a landmark 
election for bringing the first female politician to each House of the Federal 
Parliament.91  Moreover, Elsie Curtin pioneered direct relationships between an 
Australian prime minister’s wife and correspondents and this was probably inspired 
by Eleanor Roosevelt’s achievements.  She held question-and-answer interviews in 
Australia and the US, where she generated positive news coverage in The New York 
Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers.92
                                                            
89 Alexander, “Alexander interview”; J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957”, NLA, 
Manuscript Collections, Canberra, NLA acc. no. MS 2389, particularly 5-8 December 1941, 
transcript np; Cox, “Cox interview”; Cox, “Typescript reports”, 1944-1945; John Hilvert, 
“Bonney, Edmund Garnet (1883 – 1959)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
  During her Washington DC 
meetings, she was supported by Eleanor Roosevelt, who conducted a record 350 
Melbourne 
University Press, vol. 13, 1993, p. 215, retrieved on 31 July 2010 at 
<http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A130247b.htm>. 
90 Australian Women’s Archives Project, “The Women’s Pages: Australian Women and 
Journalism since 1850”, Nowra, 2008, retrieved on 28 December 2008 at 
<http://www.womenaustraliainfo/exhibit/cal/intro.html>; Audrey Tate, Fair Comment: The 
life of Pat Jarrett 1911-1990, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1996, p. 79. 
91 Labor’s Dorothy Tangney of WA became Australia’s first woman senator and Enid Lyons 
won the Tasmanian seat of Darwin.  See Black, In his own words, p. 228; Oliver, Unity is 
strength, p. 168. 
92 Positive US press statements appeared in: (Anon.), “Australian Leader’s Wife Real 
Person”, Republican, Waterbury, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/124, 5 May 1944; 
(Anon.), “Impression of U.S.A.: Mrs Curtin Interviewed”, The West Australian, Perth, 
JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/119, 28 April 1944; (Anon.), “Mrs. Curtin Buys 
Gloves, No Nylons; Prime Minister’s Wife Compares Shopping Conditions Here and in 
Australia”, The New York Times, New York, 26 April 1944, p. 20; (Anon.), “Mrs. Curtin 
Honor Guest At Luncheons”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 12 May 1944, p. 12; 
(Anon.), “Shepherdstown AAWU Hears Mrs. Curtin and Lady Dixon”, The Washington 
Post, Washington DC, 15 May 1944, p. 3; (Anon.), “Not Like Movies”, Valley News, 
Tarentum, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/127, 6 May 1944. 
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women-only press conferences during her residence in the White House.93  In 
Australia, male and female newspaper readers wrote letters to the editor as, in 
Hartley’s terms, “citizens of media”94 because they rejected conservative views in 
some press editorials and shared their reasons for supporting Curtin.95  These 
examples showed the letters to the editor section could be a distinctive site, “where 
the governed are invited to take a governmental posture towards society”,96 and that 
newspaper readers were not “mice” because they did not unquestioningly accept 
media owners’ opinions.97  By substantially increasing the prime minister’s 
communication of policy decisions to public audiences and working to break down 
the male gender exclusivity of journalism, Curtin expanded the very concept of the 
public sphere to include the democratic, liberating function of active, astute citizens 
of the popular media.  As a result of Curtin’s media strategies, previously 
conservative, Canberra-based journalists and other Australians changed their 
allegiances by voting for Labor for the first time and they continued to support the 
prime minister after the 1943 election.98
 
  With the use of media tactics, including his 
frequent discussions with journalists and his broadcasts that signified he was directly 
talking with “the people”, Curtin managed to persuade these journalists to support his 
leadership and promote mainly favourable news coverage of his foreign policies. 
 
                                                            
93 Maurine H. Beasley, “Eleanor Roosevelt’s Press Conferences: Case Study in Class, 
Gender, and Race”, The Social Science Journal, vol. 37, no. 4, October 2000, pp. 517-528; 
Eleanor Roosevelt to Elsie Curtin, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00330/1, 17 April 
1944, p. 24; US Library of Congress, “Women Come to the Front: Journalists, 
Photographers, and Broadcasters During World War II”, Washington DC, 2006, retrieved on 
21 January 2009 at <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/wcf/wcf0002.html>. 
94 John Hartley, Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity, Popular Culture [hereafter 
Popular reality], Arnold, London and New York, 1996, pp. 71, 72, 234. 
95 A.C. Button, “Australia & Britain”, The Age, Melbourne, 16 March 1942, p. 2; Ena 
Creelman, “Reply To Sir Keith Murdoch”, Camperdown Chronicle, Camperdown, 20 
August 1943, p. 2; J.J. Mulligan to John Curtin and to The Sydney Morning Herald editor 
[hereafter “Letter to The Sydney Morning Herald”], NAA, Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 237, 31 
December 1942-1 January 1943, pp. 102-103; Mark Talpley, “Tribute From An Elector” 
[hereafter “Letter to The Age”], The Age, Melbourne, 11 December 1942, p. 4. 
96 Mickler, Visualising Aboriginality, p. 28. 
97 Hartley, Popular reality, pp. 71, 72, 234. 
98 See Alexander, “Alexander interview”; Cox, “Cox interview”; Holt, “Holt interview”; 
Mulligan, “Letter to The Sydney Morning Herald”; Talpley, “Letter to The Age”; 
Whitington, Strive to be fair, pp. 55, 59, 82, 84. 
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Present-day perspectives 
Curtin established productive relationships with journalists, initiated creative mass 
communication strategies and expanded media technology to communicate to more 
international audiences.  This study aimed to ascertain the extent of his legacy for the 
modern Canberra Parliamentary Press Gallery and wider government-media 
relationships.  For this purpose, contemporary journalists were asked to share their 
views about Curtin’s influence, particularly for the press gallery. Of the political 
journalists participating in this survey, only a small minority of senior editors knew 
about Curtin’s extraordinarily frank press conferences and none of the respondents 
was aware of his expanded use of radio and film.99  Yet information about this prime 
minister is readily available in the public sphere.  Televised films have portrayed him 
as a tough, self-assured war leader while wartime journalists have written 
commentaries and provided oral histories on his mass communication strategies.100  
The contemporary press gallery’s general sense of indifference towards a dominant, 
historic leader in politics, journalism and the media was consistent with previously 
published research suggesting that some educated, professional Australian reporters 
were unable to identify some of their nation’s previous prime ministers.101
                                                            
99 For the survey methodology, see Appendix 8.  As discussed in Chapter 10, the few senior 
editors who spoke about Curtin’s journalism legacy were: Editor B, confidential personal 
communication, 24 March 2010; Shane Wright, personal communication, 27 December 
2009; Bob Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 2009. 
  Taken 
together, these findings reveal serious gaps in some journalists’ knowledge 
(journalists who we would reasonably expect to be knowledgeable) and also indicate 
a lack of desire to find out about the nation’s political history.  This apathetic mood 
has pervaded some mainstream Australian journalists’ news values, or in other 
words, what they deem to be an important event deserving the public’s attention.  For 
example in July 2010, Channel Ten and Seven executives forced a change in the 
traditional timeslot of the federal election debate, involving Prime Minister Julia 
100 These televised films include: Apollo Films (producer), Curtin (telemovie for Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation), Australia, 2007; ScreenSound Australia, John Curtin, Memoirs 
(documentary), JCPML, JCPML acc. no. 00791/1, Bentley, 1965.  These wartime journalists 
wrote about Curtin’s relationships with journalists: Tom Mead, Breaking The News: The 
events which changed life in Australia through the eyes of a man who worked at the front 
line of journalism and politics, Dolphin Books, Sydney, 1998; Whitington, Strive to be fair.  
See Appendix 13 for the oral histories. 
101 Margaret Van Heekeren, “Who’s Gough Whitlam? What journalism graduates don’t 
know about the past and what news editors want them to know”, Australian Journalism 
Review, vol. 27, no. 1, 2005, pp. 209-218. 
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Gillard and Liberal opposition leader Tony Abbott, because it interfered with popular 
cooking and dance competition shows.102  In Perth newspapers, debate reports were 
overshadowed by large, colourful, pictorial, front-page advertisements of the 
MasterChef television final.103
 
  Yet an understanding of Australia’s current and past 
political leaders gives significant insights into how to resolve today’s challenges.  
Curtin, for instance, provided relevant lessons on how to communicate honestly, 
informatively and regularly with journalists to gain their support for Australia’s role 
in a global war.  Moreover, he showed the value of using radio, film and other 
available popular culture media to communicate frankly with public audiences.  
While the survey findings indicated many reporters were unaware of Curtin’s 
achievements, it is argued that they also revealed Australian journalism’s lack of 
knowledge about itself. 
This ignorance about Curtin’s legacy contrasted with journalists’ knowledge 
of the legacies of Churchill, FDR and Mackenzie King.  In the US, contemporary 
reporters praised Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” and often likened his communication 
strategies with those of President Barack Obama.  Since FDR was presented as an 
important leader in the mainstream media, public opinion polling indicated 
Americans respected him as a wartime president.  Likewise, Churchill’s fighting 
rhetoric, forceful newsreel appearances and press articles were idealised in the 
British media.104  London journalists deplored the results of a 2008 survey that 
indicated some British teenagers thought Churchill was a mythical figure.105
                                                            
102 Amanda Meade and Sally Jackson, “Worm returns as MasterChef cooks up a heated 
debate”, The Australian, 22 July 2010, retrieved on 2 August 2010 at 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/worm-returns-as-masterchef-cooks-up-a-
heated-debate/story-fn59niix-1225895503476>. 
  The 
103 The West Australian, Perth, 24 and 26 July 2010, p. 1; The Sunday Times, Perth, 25 July 
2010, p. 1. 
104 Acorn Media (producer), Churchill’s Bodyguard (documentary), 2006. 
105 Robert Hardman, “Winston Churchill’s extraordinary relationship with the founding 
fathers of the Mail”, Daily Mail, London, 8 February 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 
at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-512982/Winston-Churchills-extraordinary-
relationship-founding-fathers-Mail.html>; Aislinn Simpson, “Winston Churchill didn’t really 
exist, say teens”, The Telegraph, London, 4 February 2008, retrieved on 11 December 2008 
at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1577511/Winston-Churchill-didn%27t-really-
exist%2C-say-teens.html>; David Wooding, “Two-finger salute to Churchill”, The Sun 
Online, London, 13 July 2007, retrieved on 11 December 2008 at 
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1865231/posts>. 
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wartime media often portrayed Churchill and Roosevelt as being celebrities and 
heroes; the nations’ memories of these two leaders were not irretrievably damaged 
by private notes they left behind and they did not preserve a diary.  While Canada’s 
King became an honorary member of the Ottawa Press Gallery in 1944, later 
journalists analysed his diary notes that became publicly available after his death.  In 
1978, the former wartime Ottawa Journal reporter, Richard Jackson, explained on a 
Canadian public television program that: “The press gave the prime minister a lot 
more respect than it does now.”  Jackson added: “Now, they go after him [the prime 
minister) like a pack of howling dogs.”106
 
  King was also an innovative 
communicator; for example, when Britain declared war against Germany on 3 
September 1939, he delivered a radio talk to the largest worldwide audience listening 
to a Canadian broadcast at the time.  Yet as Curtin did not keep a secret diary and 
most contemporary reporters did not publicise his achievements, his legacy seems to 
have been largely forgotten by the Australian journalists who have benefited from his 
media strategies.  While a prime ministerial library and museum are devoted to his 
memory, it appears that many journalists have yet to inform themselves about his 
leadership of Australia during World War II. 
Nonetheless Curtin’s legacy is significant because his journalism and media 
precedents have become accepted practices today.  His system of interactive, 
question-and-answer media conferences has been used by his prime ministerial 
successors.107
Politicians used to be able to make a statement one day and then think they 
didn’t have to deal with an issue for the rest of the day ... There is a much 
  As a result of this initiative, contemporary journalists expect 
politicians to be responsive to their enquiries.  As ABC Television political 
journalist, Peter Kennedy, said: 
                                                            
106 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (producer), Front Page Challenge (television 
broadcast), Toronto, 27 March 1978, retrieved on 10 December 2008 at 
<http://archives.cbc.ca/version_print.asp?page=1&IDLan=1&ID.C.lip=7244&IDDossier=0
&IDCat=335&ID.C.atPa=260>. 
107 For example, ABC Television (producer), National Press Club Address – Julia Gillard 
(Prime Minister) (television program), Canberra, 15 July 2010. 
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faster flow of information [now], particularly during election campaigns in 
regard to the control of the news flow.108
Also Curtin instituted the practice of giving confidential information to reporters and 
today’s journalists still abide by this type of off-the-record agreement.  The Daily 
Telegraph chief political reporter, Malcolm Farr, explained this procedure: “if he [a 
politician] has told something to you in confidence, then you keep the confidence.  
You don’t exaggerate …. You accept responsibility for whatever you’ve written”.
 
109  
While different politicians have shown varying degrees of commitment towards 
giving confidential interviews and media conferences, these practices have become a 
part of current institutional news processes.  The modern press secretary role created 
by Curtin has flourished under his successors, who have greatly expanded the 
number of media advisers.110  Many Australian leaders have adopted the use of new 
technologies to enable what Foucault describes as an “immense diffusion and 
consumption” of government information and to establish their power in political 
institutions, practices and rules.111  Curtin’s enthusiastic use of the relatively new 
media of radio and wartime newsreels is similar to the use of expanded online 
communications by Prime Ministers Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard.112  His innovative 
broadcasts influenced more Australian politicians to give radio talks, to expand the 
media coverage of parliamentary debates, to engage with television and online 
audiences, as discussed in Chapter 10.  Sky News political editor, David Speers, 
commented that John Howard and Rudd “are very sophisticated in their approach 
and they target the media with their messages”.113
                                                            
108 Peter Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009. 
  Also Curtin made a positive 
impact on other democratic nations’ media systems.  When government delegates 
109 Malcolm Farr, personal communication, 12 March 2010. 
110 Greg Barns, Selling the Australian Government: Politics And Propaganda From Whitlam 
To Howard, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2005, p. 10. 
111 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self”, in L.H. Martin, H. Gutman and P.H. Hutton 
(eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Tavistock Publications, 
London, 1988, p. 18; Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power”, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo 
Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper in C. Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980, p. 131. 
112 For a discussion of the Rudd and Gillard prime ministerial online communications, see 
Gwyneth Howell and Bruce Da Silva, “New media, first time voters and the 2007 Australian 
federal election”, Public Communication Review, vol. 1, 2010, pp. 27-33; Courtney 
Trenwith, “Social networking spills the beans”, brisbanetimes.com.au, Brisbane, 25 June 
2010, retrieved on 30 July 2010 at <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/technology/social-
networking-spills-the-beans-20100624-z2v0.html>. 
113 David Speers, personal communication, 30 March 2010. 
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held news briefings for journalists at the 1945 UN meeting in San Francisco, they 
were so successful in promoting Australia’s views that US officials were influenced 
to adopt the same type of background media conferences.114  North American 
wartime correspondents portrayed Curtin’s open, informative talks as a model for 
other leaders to emulate;115
 
 his press, radio and film strategies remained relevant for 
prime ministerial-journalism relations. 
Thus Curtin’s media strategies have led to positive changes in the ways that 
politicians communicate to journalists and public audiences.  Since Curtin’s prime 
ministership, political leaders have recognised the need to generate evermore news 
coverage of their activities and therefore, to adopt the latest available technology to 
inform journalists and communicate with the public.  Indeed the interactive nature of 
the media has broadened dramatically from the 1940s newspaper letter columns, 
which used to be the only formal vehicle for readers to express their opinions, and 
there are more opportunities for voters to relate to their elected representatives.  
While some senior journalists have remarked on a massive expansion in the amount 
of information that is released by politicians,116 survey respondents also have 
commented that parliamentarians now seem more distant from the press gallery.117  
While a few survey respondents praised Curtin’s briefings for their frequency and 
their openness, however none of the journalists wanted to return to the voluntary 
self-censorship system that press gallery members practised during the war.118
                                                            
114 Joseph E. Johnson, “Oral History Interview with Joseph E. Johnson”, interviewed by 
Richard D. McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Independence, 29 June 1973, 
retrieved on 16 February 2010 at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/johnsonje.htm>. 
  Even 
as the nation moved away from the unified atmosphere that Curtin helped to produce 
115 (Anon.), “Canada At War”, Time, New York, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01222/15, 12 June 1944, p. 16; Moody, “Triumph for Curtin”, p. 1. 
116 Tony Eastley, personal communication, 9 December 2009; Farr, personal communication, 
12 March 2010; Kennedy, personal communication, 18 December 2009; Speers, personal 
communication, 30 March 2010. 
117 Michael Cavanagh, personal communication, 27 January 2010; Correspondent A, 
confidential personal communication, 30 March 2010; Editor B, confidential personal 
communication, 24 March 2010; Glenn Milne, personal communication, 17 November 2009. 
118 Editor B, confidential personal communication, 24 March 2010; Shane Wright, personal 
communication, 27 December 2009; Bob Wurth, personal communication, 24 November 
2009. 
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and more Australians engaged in bitter, divisive politics,119
 
 successive prime 
ministers have generally understood the need to be responsive to the press gallery, 
develop positive relationships with journalists and continuously provide information 
through the channels of government media offices. 
In mobilising the conservative media machine for his war objectives, Curtin 
demonstrated the success of his journalism strategies.  He contributed in a singular 
way to the expansion of the Australian public sphere with an important result that the 
public henceforth came to expect that political leaders would be regularly accessible 
to the media and comment on any matters that arise about society.  In sum, therefore, 
he extended the public sphere through the use of democratic mass communication 
strategies including: broadcasting and film technologies; the regular personal 
engagement with and appearance before the media; the inclusion of more women and 
female journalists; and the involvement of more working-class citizens.  He achieved 
this not only in an era that was dominated by several conservative media proprietors, 
but during wartime constraints and censorship pressures.  Curtin understood the 
governmental function of news in an administered society by adopting formal and 
informal institutional changes that made the backroom of politics and governance a 
more accessible, engaging sphere for journalists (and therefore the mass public). 
 
 
                                                            
119 Editor B, confidential personal communication, 24 March 2010; Oliver, Unity is strength, 
pp. 152, 219-221, 239. 
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Appendix 1 
Wartime military service 
 
 
Australia 
About one out of every seven Australians participated in military service.  More than 
993,000 Australians were enlisted in the war services comprising the Australian 
Military Forces, the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal Australian Navy.1  At 
this time, the nation’s population was about seven million people.2
 
 
 
Great Britain 
About one in every ten Britons was involved in military service.  About 4.5 million 
Britishers (including English, Scottish and Welsh people) fought in the war.  In 1941, 
the population of England, Scotland and Wales was 46,908 million people.3
                                                            
1 National Archives of Australia, “Boer War to Vietnam”, Canberra, 2010, retrieved on 6 
June 2010 at <http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/defence/conflicts.aspx#section3>; 
Parliamentary Library, “Anzac Day 2010”, Canberra, 1 April 2010, retrieved on 29 May 
2010 at <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/anzac/stats.htm>; Roland Wilson, Official Year 
Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1944 and 1945 (hereafter Year book 1944-45), 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, no. 36, 1947, p. 1034, retrieved 
on 16 January 2010 at 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/1301.01944-
45?OpenDocument>. 
  Ireland 
was not included in this analysis because this small nation did not fight in the war as 
part of a policy of neutrality brought about and enforced by Prime Minister Éamon 
de Valera. 
2 John Curtin, “Prime Minister’s Review, May, 1944”, Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
(hereafter DDA), no. 81, 4 May 1944, p. 30. 
3 Joe Hicks and Grahame Allen, “A Century of Change: Trends in UK statistics since 1900”, 
research paper 99/111, House of Commons Library, London, 21 December 2009, pp. 6, 16, 
retrieved on 27 July 2010 at <www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-
111.pdf>. 
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Canada 
About one out of every 12 Canadians was in military service.  More than one million 
Canadians and Newfoundlanders served in the war.4  Canada had a national 
population of 11,946,000 in 1944.5
 
 
 
United States 
Similarly to Canada, about one in every 12 US citizens fought in the war.  About 12 
million US men and women enlisted for military service.6  The US population 
numbered 139,928,165 people by July 1945.7
 
 
 
                                                            
4 Veteran Affairs Canada, “Canada and the Second World War 1939-1945”, Ottawa, 1998, 
retrieved on 6 June 2010 at <http://www.vac-
acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=history/secondwar/canada2/intro>. 
5 Newfoundland’s population was not included in the Canadian census until 1949.  Statistics 
Canada, “Estimated population of Canada, 1605 to present”, Ottawa, 2009, retrieved on 6 
June 2010 at <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/98-187-x/4151287-eng.htm#table2>. 
6 Kenneth Paul O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons, “Introduction: The Home-Front War”, in 
Kenneth Paul O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons (eds), The Home-Front War: World War II 
and American Society, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1995, p. 4. 
7 U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 
1999”, Washington DC, 28 June 2000, retrieved on 29 May 2010 at 
<www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt>. 
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Appendix 2 
 
This study will analyse the wartime news coverage of Curtin’s statements, as listed 
below. 
 
Dates News coverage of major events during 
Curtin’s prime ministership 
Publication1
8 December 
1941 
 
Announcing Australia’s declaration of 
war on Japan, Curtin broadcasts a 
nationwide speech on the ABC radio. 
Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and 
Important Speeches by the 
Prime Minister (Right Hon. 
John Curtin) (hereafter 
DDA), no. 10, pp. 19-22. 
27 December 
1941 
The prime minister’s New Year 
message on “Australia looks to 
America”.  
The Herald newspaper, 
Melbourne, p. 1, cited in 
David Black (ed.), In his 
own words: John Curtin’s 
speeches and writings, 
Paradigm Books Curtin 
University, Bentley, 1995, 
pp. 193-196.  
19 February 
1942 
Parliamentary speech to announce the 
Japanese attack on Darwin. 
DDA, no. 19, p. 9. 
14 March 
1942 
Curtin’s radio broadcast to the United 
States. 
DDA, no. 22, pp. 9-13. 
  
                                                            
1 This study has used both the hard copy and digitised versions of Curtin’s statements that 
are lodged at the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library.  The digitised versions are exact 
duplicates of the bound volume references. 
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Dates News coverage of major events during 
Curtin’s prime ministership 
Publication 
8 May 1942 His parliamentary announcement of the 
Battle of the Coral Sea.  
DDA, no. 28, pp. 4-5. 
10 December 
1942 
The prime minister’s public statements 
on the Kokoda campaign. 
DDA, no. 47, pp. 17-24. 
11 February 
1943 
Parliamentary speech in support of the 
Defence (Citizen Military Forces) Bill 
on conscription. 
Commonwealth of Australia: 
Parliamentary Debates, vol. 
173, pp. 592-596. 
26 July 1943 Curtin’s general election policy 
statement. 
John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, JCPML 
acc. no. 00421/2. 
14 December 
1943 
The prime minister’s speech to the 
Australian Labor Party federal 
conference. 
DDA, no. 70, pp. 31-36. 
8 May 1944 Curtin’s radio broadcast in Britain. DDA, no. 81, pp. 53-56. 
17 July 1944 His parliamentary speech on war 
conduct.  
DDA, no. 84, pp. 28-44. 
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Since Curtin was frequently away from office in 1945 due to illness, this study will 
examine news coverage of the following two events: 
 
Dates News coverage of major events during 
Curtin’s prime ministership 
Publication 
23 January 
1945 
His return to office after his absence of 
nearly two months. 
 
5 July 1945 His death in office, announced by the 
Acting Prime Minister Francis Forde. 
DDA, no. 104, p. 19. 
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Appendix 31
 
 
Content analysis coding schedule:   
John Curtin’s media communications 
 
 
1. Identify the source of John Curtin’s media communications: 
 
a. Parliamentary speech 
b. Press statement 
c. Press interview 
d. Newspaper article 
e. Radio speech 
f. Film appearance 
 
2. What is the subject matter(s) of the article/report within the broader 
context of the war? 
 
a. Foreign policy (e.g. Overseas battle) 
b. National news (e.g. Election) 
c. Economy 
d. Other 
 
3. Date-month-year      
      
      
 
4. Headline/title (copy verbatim if applicable) 
 
  
                                                 
1 David L. Altheide, Qualitative media analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996. 
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5. If this is a press text, identify the article length (number of words) 
    
 
6. If this is a radio text, identify the duration of the radio text about John 
Curtin (in minutes) 
    
 
7. If this is a film text, identify the duration of film text about John Curtin 
(in minutes) 
    
 
8. Number of times each keyword appears in the text: 
 
i. Australia, country, nationhood 
 
ii. “We”/“us”/“our”/“the people” 
 
iii. Freedom, liberty, independence, democracy 
 
iv. Hope, future, vision, unity 
 
v. War, defence, security 
 
vi. Economy, jobs 
 
vii. “They”/“them”/“enemy”/Japan/Germany 
 
viii. Civilise/civilisation 
 
ix. Old country, mother country 
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x. New world order 
 
xi. Britain, United Kingdom 
 
xii. America, United States 
 
 
 
9. Identify which keyword appears in the following (if applicable): 
 
 The headline/ title 
 
 
 The opening sentence 
 
 
10. Miscellaneous:  Include relevant key phrases (about one to three 
sentences) that help with identifying keywords. 
 
11. What is the Flesch Reading Ease score for this text (if applicable)? 
 
 
12. What is the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for this text (if applicable)? 
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Appendix 41
 
 
Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions 
 
 
Signifier (Shot) Definition Signified (Meaning) 
Close-up  Face only Intimacy 
Medium shot Most of body Personal relationship 
Long shot Setting and characters Context, scope,  
 public distance 
Full shot Full body of person Social relationship 
 
 
Signifier (Film)  Definition Signified (Meaning) 
Low angle Camera looks up Power, authority 
High angle Camera looks down  Small, weak 
Zoom in  Camera moves in  Observation, focus 
Fade in Image appears on  Beginning 
 Blank screen 
Fade out Image screen goes Ending 
 blank 
Cut  Switch from one image to  Simultaneity, excitement 
 another image 
Wipe Image wiped from the Imposed conclusion 
 screen 
 
                                                 
1 David L. Altheide, Qualitative media analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996; 
Arthur Asa Berger, Media Analysis Techniques, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London 
and New Delhi, 1982, pp. 38-39; Daniel Chandler, “The ‘Grammar’ of Television and Film”, 
Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, 1994, retrieved on 27 December 2010 at 
<http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/short/gramtv.html>; Anders Hansen, Simon 
Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris Newbold, Mass Communication Research Methods, 
Macmillan Press, Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1998, pp. 119, 207. 
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Appendix 51
 
 
Content analysis coding schedule: 
Film coverage of John Curtin 
 
 
1. Identify the film company: 
 
i. Cinesound 
ii. Movietone 
iii. Another national company 
iv. International company 
 
2. Date-month-year 
      
      
 
3. Title (copy verbatim) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
4. Producer/director/narrator/camera operator (copy names and positions) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
  
                                                 
1 David L. Altheide, Qualitative media analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996; 
Arthur Asa Berger, Media Analysis Techniques, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London 
and New Delhi, 1982, pp. 38-39; Anders Hansen, Simon Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris 
Newbold, Mass Communication Research Methods, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1998, pp. 119, 207. 
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5. Length of film text about John Curtin (number of minutes) 
    
 
6. Type of article/item 
 
i. Feature length documentary 
ii. Newsreels 
iii. Interview (in above) 
iv. Government announcement or prime ministerial address 
v. Dramatic feature film 
 
7. What is the subject matter(s) of article/report within the broader context 
of the war? 
 
a. Foreign policy (e.g. overseas battle) 
b. National political news (e.g. election) 
c. Economy 
d. Other 
 
8. Who is the principal source? 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
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x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank governor 
xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
 
9. Is the prime minister setting the news agenda (for example, making an 
announcement and initiating a news story)?  Identify the agenda setter. 
 
 Is the prime minister reacting to criticism from the opposition, media or others?  
Identify the source of criticism. 
 
10. Who are the sources being directly quoted? 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
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xiii. Federal Reserve Bank Governor 
xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
 
11. Who are the sources being cited or quoted indirectly? 
 
i. The Prime Minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Public servant 
xi. Military official 
xii. Business and industry 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank Governor 
xiv. Union official 
xv. Police including intelligence agents 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
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12. Identify keywords. 
 
13. Number of times each keyword appears in the text: 
 
i. Australia, country, nationhood 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
ii. “We”/“us”/“our”/“the people” 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
iii. Freedom, liberty, independence, democracy 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
iv. Hope, future, vision, unity 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
v. War, defence, security 
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 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
vi. Economy, jobs 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
vii.  “They”/“them”/“enemy”/Japan/Germany 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
viii. Civilise/civilisation 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral response 
 
ix. Old country, mother country 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
x. New world order 
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 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
xi. Britain, United Kingdom 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
xii. America, United States 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
14. Identify if a keyword appears in the following: 
 
 The headline/title 
 
 The opening scene/narration 
 
 
15. Miscellaneous:  Include key phrases (about one to three sentences) that 
help with identifying reports. 
 
16. Is this a “follow-up” story related to an earlier article?  Yes/ No 
 
17. Was this story “spiked” and “killed” quickly?   Yes/ No 
 
18. Was this story re-reportable?     Yes/ No 
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19. Using Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions, does John Curtin appear as 
a strong leader in the film?  Refer to Appendix 4 for Asa Berger’s semiotic 
film conventions. Yes/No/Neutral Response 
 
20. What is the Flesch Reading Ease score for this text? (if applicable) 
 
 
21. What is the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for this text? (if applicable) 
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Appendix 61
 
 
Content analysis coding schedule:   
Press coverage of John Curtin 
 
 
1. Identify the newspaper: 
 
i. The Advertiser (Adelaide) 
ii. The Age (Melbourne) 
iii. The Canberra Times (Canberra) 
iv. The Courier-Mail (Brisbane) 
v. The Daily Mirror (Sydney) 
vi. The Daily Telegraph (Sydney) 
vii. The Herald (Melbourne) 
viii. The Sun (Sydney) 
ix. The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 
x. The West Australian (Perth) 
xi. The Sunday Times (Perth) 
xii. Other newspaper (refer to masthead) 
 
2. Date-month-year 
      
      
  
3. Headline (copy verbatim) and type size 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
                                                 
1 David L. Altheide, Qualitative media analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996; 
Anders Hansen, Simon Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris Newbold, Mass Communication 
Research Methods, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 
1998, pp. 119, 207. 
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4. Reporter/author by-line (copy name and position e.g. Canberra 
correspondent) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
5. Article length, page number and section 
    
 
6. Type of article/item 
 
i. Straight/hard news story 
ii. World news section 
iii. Editorial/ opinion  
iv. Feature article 
v. Letter to the editor 
vi. Social news item 
vii. “Insider” news item 
viii. Special wraparound 
ix. Special liftout 
x. Editorial cartoon 
xi. Other 
 
7. What is the subject matter(s) of article/report within the broader context 
of the war? 
 
i. Foreign policy (e.g. overseas battle) 
ii. National political news (e.g. election) 
iii. Economy 
iv. Other (identify topic) 
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8. Who is the principal source? 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank governor 
xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
 
9. Is the prime minister setting the news agenda (for example, making an 
announcement and initiating a news story)?  Identify the agenda setter. 
 
10. Is the prime minister reacting to criticism from the opposition, media or 
others?  Identify the source of criticism. 
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11. Who are the sources being directly quoted? Write the(ir) names. 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank governor 
xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
 
12. Who are the sources being cited or quoted indirectly? Write the(ir) names. 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
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viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank governor 
xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
 
13. Identify keywords. 
 
14. Number of times each keyword appears in the text: 
 
i. Australia, country, nationhood 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
ii. “We”/“us”/“our”/“the people” (in terms of Australia) 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
iii. Freedom, liberty, independence, democracy 
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 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
iv. Hope, future, vision, unity 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
v. War, defence, security 
 
 
vi. Economy, jobs 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
vii. “They”/“them”/“enemy”/Japan/Germany 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
viii. Civilise/civilisation 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ no /neutral response 
 
ix. Old country, mother country 
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 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
x. New world order 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
xi. Britain, United Kingdom 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
xii. America, United States 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes / No / Neutral Response 
 
15. Identify if a keyword appears in the following: 
 
The kicker and headlines (including banners, deck heads and cross heads) 
 
The lead sentence 
 
The lead paragraph 
 
Sidebar story 
 
Breakaway and “pull-out quotes” 
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Miscellaneous: Include relevant key phrases (about one to three sentences) that 
help with identifying reports. 
 
16. Is this a “follow-up” story related to an earlier article?  Yes/ No 
 
17. Was this story “spiked” and “killed” quickly?   Yes/ No 
 
18. Was this story re-reportable?     Yes/ No 
 
19. Does the article include a photograph or related political cartoon? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
20. Using Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions, does John Curtin appear as 
a strong leader in the related photograph/editorial cartoon?  Refer to 
Appendix 4 to find a summary of Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions. 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Neutral 
 
 
21. What is the Flesch Reading Ease score for this text?    
 
22. What is the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for this text? 
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Appendix 71
 
 
Content analysis coding schedule:  
Radio coverage of John Curtin 
 
 
1. Identify the radio station: 
 
i. ABC National 
ii. Local ABC station (identify the location) 
iii. Local commercial station (identify the location) 
 
2. Date-month-year 
      
      
  
3. Headline (copy verbatim) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
4. Reporter/author (copy name and position e.g. Canberra correspondent) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
5. Length of radio text about John Curtin (number of minutes) 
    
 
  
                                                 
1 David L. Altheide, Qualitative media analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1996; 
Anders Hansen, Simon Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris Newbold, Mass Communication 
Research Methods, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 
1998, p. 119. 
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6. Type of article/item  
 
i. News report 
ii. Editorial statement 
iii. Opinion piece 
iv. Current affairs reports and features 
v. Interview 
vi. Prime ministerial address 
 
7. What is the subject matter(s) of article/report within the broader context 
of the war? 
 
i. Foreign policy (e.g. overseas battle) 
ii. National political news (e.g. election) 
iii. Economy 
iv. His prime ministership in general 
v. Other 
 
8. Who is the principal source? 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank governor 
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xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
 
9. Is the prime minister setting the news agenda (for example, making an 
announcement and initiating a news story)?  Identify the agenda setter 
 
 Is the prime minister reacting to criticism from the opposition, media or others?  
 
 Identify the source of criticism. 
 
10. Who are the sources being directly quoted? 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank governor 
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xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
 
11. Who are the sources being cited or quoted indirectly? 
 
i. The prime minister 
ii. The political leader of another nation 
iii. Government spokesperson 
iv. Government politician 
v. Opposition leader 
vi. Another opposition parliamentarian 
vii. Other politician  
viii. Judiciary 
ix. Legal groups 
x. Civil service 
xi. Military official 
xii. Industry/business 
xiii. Federal Reserve Bank governor 
xiv. Union official 
xv. Police (including intelligence) 
xvi. Academic 
xvii. Clergy 
xviii. News editor/ editorial writer (the media) 
xix. Citizens 
xx. Another principal source (identify name and position) 
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12. Identify the keywords: 
 
 
13. Number of times each keyword appears in the text: 
 
i. Australia, country, nationhood 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
ii. “We”/“us”/“our”/“the people” 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
iii. Freedom, liberty, independence, democracy 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
iv. Hope, future, vision, unity 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
v. War, defence, security 
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 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
vi. Economy, jobs 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
vii. “They”/“them”/“enemy”/Japan/Germany 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
viii. Civilise/civilisation 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
ix. Old country, mother country 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
x. New world order 
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 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
xi. Britain, United Kingdom 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
xii. America, United States 
 
 
 This keyword was used to support Curtin’s statement and to portray him as a 
strong leader     Yes/ No/ Neutral Response 
 
 
14. Identify if a keyword appears in the following: 
 
 The headline/title 
 
 
 The opening sentence 
 
 
 Miscellaneous: Include key phrases (about one to three sentences) that help 
with identifying reports. 
 
15. Is this a “follow-up” story related to an earlier article?  Yes/ no 
 
16. Was this story “spiked” and “killed” quickly?   Yes/ no 
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17. Was this story “re-reportable”?     Yes/ no 
 
18. What is the Flesch Reading Ease score for this text? (if applicable) 
 
 
19. What is the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level for this text? (if applicable) 
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Appendix 8A 
 
Survey methodology 
 
 
A questionnaire was posted to 32 senior Australian political journalists and news 
editors in November 2009.  An attached cover sheet included a brief statement to 
explain that one of the research aims in this doctorate project would be to ascertain 
John Curtin’s legacy to political journalism in the present day.  Each journalist was 
invited to participate in the survey by sharing his or her views about past and present 
Australian Prime Ministers’ mass media strategies and their relationships with news 
reporters.  The recipients of the cover letter were informed that some of the survey 
questions would focus on John Curtin as Australia’s Prime Minister from 1941 to 
1945 and his leadership during World War II.  Also they were assured that their 
answers would be confidential if they wished to be quoted anonymously in this 
thesis.  Thus the survey complied with Curtin University’s ethics protocol. 
 
Twenty-one journalists responded to the questionnaire, either by agreeing to talk 
about their views of Curtin or by giving reasons for declining to participate in the 
survey.  Only five respondents answered at least one of the historical questions about 
Curtin.  Of this small group, three journalists returned a completed questionnaire1
  
 
and the other two respondents talked about their views of Curtin during telephone  
                                                            
1 They were: Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio Australia correspondent Michael 
Cavanagh, The West Australian economics editor Shane Wright, and another journalist, 
Correspondent A, who asked not to be named. 
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interviews.2  In addition, I conducted follow-up telephone interviews with nine 
senior news reporters and editors.3
 
   
During these discussions, the nine respondents answered my questions about prime 
ministerial media strategies and other politicians’ journalism relations.  When I 
spoke to reporters, I slightly rephrased my questions to ascertain their views about 
the media strategies of other politicians beyond the federal level.  In sum, most of 
these journalists agreed to talk “on the record”; only one news reporter and two 
political editors required confidentiality. 
 
Among the people who did not complete my survey, six journalists said they knew 
little about Curtin.  Responses included the following:  “Unfortunately I don’t know 
enough about John Curtin to respond in any meaningful sense to the questions you 
have posed.”4  “I know I’m no spring chicken, but I was not around in Curtin’s day.  
Nor have I made a study of Curtin’s relations with the media.”5  Another journalist 
said she did not want to talk about John Curtin, but did not give a reason for this.6  
Although World War II press gallery correspondents emphasised Curtin’s greatness 
as a prime minister in their oral histories,7
  
 there does not appear to have been a 
tradition among Australian parliamentary reporters of passing these stories to their 
younger colleagues.  As Steve Mickler and Niall Lucy have stated, an understanding 
                                                            
2 They were: the author and former Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio news editor 
Bob Wurth, and another journalist, Editor B, who also requested confidentiality. 
3 The other nine survey respondents were: Andrew Bolt (Herald Sun); Paul Bongiorno 
(Network Ten); Tony Eastley (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio); Malcolm Farr 
(The Daily Telegraph); Peter Kennedy (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Television); 
Glenn Milne (The Australian); David Speers (Sky News); Les Welsh (Curtin FM); and 
another journalist, Chief of Staff C, who requested confidentiality. 
4 Personal communication, 11 November 2009. 
5 Personal communication, 14 December 2009. 
6 Personal communication, 11 November 2009. 
7 E.g. Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library 
[hereafter JCPML], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np; Irvine 
Douglas, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01061/1, 15-19 June 
1972, transcript np; Edgar George Holt, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 01059/1, 23 May 1978, transcript np. 
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of the nation’s past is essential for Australians to make progress in the future.  
“History, in short, matters,” they wrote.8  The seeming lack of knowledge about John 
Curtin and his wartime journalism strategies, as indicated by my questionnaire 
results, contrasts with contemporary British and US media images of Winston 
Churchill’s famous wartime newsreels and patriotic broadcast speeches, along with 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s popular radio “fireside chats”.9
 
  The following sections 
show the questionnaire, cover letter and consent form that were sent to the 
journalists. 
                                                            
8 Niall Lucy and Steve Mickler, The War on Democracy: Conservative Opinion in the 
Australian Press, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, 2006, p. 147. 
9 Caryn Coatney, “John Curtin and Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Cross-National Case Study 
of Media Agenda Setting in the U.S.-Australian Alliance, 1941-1945”, Midwest Political 
Science Association: 68th Annual National Conference, Chicago, 22 April 2010, retrieved on 
15 May 2010 at 
<http://conference.mpsanet.org/Online/Search.aspx?section=27&session=21>. 
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Appendix 8B 
 
Sample cover letter 
This letter was printed on Curtin University letterhead and sent to 32 senior political 
journalists at Australian news organisations 
 
 
Dear (journalist’s name) 
 
My name is Caryn Coatney and I am studying for a Doctorate in Journalism Studies 
at Curtin University.  My topic focuses on the Australian news media during World 
War II.  An aspect of my research is ascertaining John Curtin’s legacy to political 
journalism in the present day. 
 
As a highly regarded journalist, you are invited to complete the enclosed 
questionnaire related to my PhD research at Curtin University in Bentley, Western 
Australia.  I would be honoured if you would share your views about past and 
present Australian prime ministers’ mass media strategies and their relationships 
with news reporters.  Some of the attached questions focus on John Curtin as 
Australia’s prime minister from 1941 to 1945 and his leadership during World War 
II. 
 
If you decide to complete the questionnaire and consent form, you may post them to 
me in the enclosed stamped, self-addressed envelope by 20 November 2009.  Please 
let me know in the consent form if there is an opportunity to discuss your answers in 
a taped, telephone interview.  Afterwards I will send the relevant transcript to you.   
 
Along with my PhD research, I am a Journalism and Media Law Tutor at Curtin 
University.  Also I have been a staff writer and sub-editor for The Christian Science 
Monitor, The West Australian Newspaper Group, as well as working in a number of 
other journalism positions. 
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If you require confidentiality, I would be happy to withhold publication of your name 
and news organisation.  Otherwise I will assume that you have allowed me to use the 
information in my research and any resulting publications. 
 
In accordance with university policy, the interview tapes and transcript will be kept 
in a locked cabinet for five years before being destroyed.  If you would like more 
information about this survey, please contact me by: 
 
 Telephone:  (08) 9266 2126 (Business) 
  (08) 9316 4404 (Home) 
 Email:  c.coatney@curtin.edu.au 
 
This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Approval Number MCCA 17/2009). If needed, verification of approval 
can be obtained by contacting: 
 
 Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee 
 c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin University  
 GPO Box U1987 
 Perth, Western Australia 6845 
 Telephone: (08) 9266 2784 
 Email: hrec@curtin.edu.au  
 
Thank you very much for your time and for considering the enclosed survey 
questions. 
 
 
Yours sincerely  
 
Caryn Coatney  
Caryn Coatney 
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Appendix 8C 
 
Sample consent form (attached to cover letter,  
as shown in Appendix 8B) 
 
 
 
I have read the information in the attached letter.  Any questions I have asked have 
been answered to my satisfaction.  I agree for my questionnaire answers to be 
recorded and if there is a telephone interview, the discussion will be taped.  The 
research gathered for this study may be included in a PhD thesis and any resulting 
publication.  I understand that my name and news organisation will be used unless I 
request confidentiality in the box below.  In accordance with university policy, all 
information will be securely stored for five years before being destroyed. 
 
Name, position and news organisation:__________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature:_______________________________ 
 
Date:___________________________________ 
 
I require my name and news organisation to be kept confidential: NO  
 YES  
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I can be contacted for a taped telephone interview on 
(Ph)_______________________________and will be available at these 
times:_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Caryn Coatney 
Caryn Coatney 
 
 
Please return this consent form and your questionnaire answers in the stamped 
self-addressed envelope by Friday, 20 November 2009. 
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Appendix 8D 
 
Sample questionnaire 
 
This was printed on Curtin university letterhead and attached to the cover letter and 
consent form, as shown in Appendices 8B and 8C 
 
 
1. In your opinion, what has been John Curtin’s legacy for the Australian 
public? 
 
 
2. What has been John Curtin’s legacy for Australian journalists and the 
news media profession? 
 
a. Although Curtin did not need to consider television interviews, can you 
make any comparisons between his use of newsreels and other films 
with the current prime minister’s strategies on relating to the visual 
media? 
 
b. What did Curtin set in place (including press and radio relations) that 
has been the forerunner of prime ministerial media strategies today? 
 
c. For example, were you aware that Curtin was the first prime minister to 
employ a full-time press secretary? 
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3. How would you compare the current prime minister’s press gallery 
relationships with those of John Curtin in terms of his associations with 
the 1941-45 press gallery? 
 
a. If there have been any changes, what is the reason for these variations 
(e.g. the size of the press corps, the people involved or differing levels 
of trust)? 
 
b. Do you think the present prime minister’s relationship with the press 
gallery is similarly positive?  Why or why not? 
 
4. Outside of the Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery, how would you 
describe journalists’ relationships with the present prime minister in 
comparison with those of John Curtin? 
 
5. Since your entry in political news reporting, have you found that your 
professional relationship with the prime minister and his media advisers 
has improved, deteriorated or remained about the same? 
 
Improved:         
Deteriorated:          
About the same:         
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You are invited to write further comments below. 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Please indicate whether you are satisfied with the following (in terms of 
the timing and overall quality): 
 
a) General media access to the prime minister:  
YES    NO   NEUTRAL  
Comments: 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
b) Prime minister’s media conferences:  
YES    NO   NEUTRAL  
 Comments: 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
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c) Confidential briefings by the prime minister and/or his media advisers:  
YES    NO   NEUTRAL  
 Comments: 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
d) Prime minister’s media statements:  
YES    NO   NEUTRAL  
 Comments: 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Would you like to make any further comments about the current and 
former Australian prime ministers’ media strategies and their relations 
with journalists? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer this questionnaire. 
Please post your answers and the consent form in the enclosed stamped, self-
addressed envelope by Friday, 20 November 2009. 
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Appendix 9 
 
Press circulation, 19411
Newspaper 
 
Circulation (Number of Copies Sold) 
The Advertiser 110,931 
The Age 99,400 
The Argus 108,370 
The Courier-Mail 85,426 
Daily News 34,409 
The Daily Telegraph 212,606 
The Herald 232,131 
The Mercury 23,915 
The Daily Mirror 160,000 
The Sydney Morning Herald 225,000 
The Sun 188,319 
The Sun News-Pictorial 258,959 
The West Australian 77,613 
 
  
                                                            
1 Henry Mayer, The Press in Australia, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1968, p. 40. Although 
researchers did not publish The Canberra Times circulation statistics, the newspaper was 
distributed in the Australian Capital Territory, with an estimated population of 14,599 people 
in 1944.  See Roland Wilson, Official Year Book Of The Commonwealth Of Australia, 1944 
and 1945, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, no. 36, 1947, p. 461. 
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Relative share of population and circulation by Australian States, 19412
(Showing each figure as a percentage of the Australian total) 
 
P = Population.  M = Morning newspapers, circulation.  E = Evening newspapers, 
circulation.  D = All dailies, circulation. 
 
New South Wales 
P. 38.8 
M. 37.3 
E. 39.8 
D. 38.4 
 
Victoria 
P. 28.2 
M. 34.1 
E. 43.8 
D. 38.2 
 
Queensland 
P. 14.1 
M. 7.4 
E. 7.7 
D. 7.5 
                                                            
2 Source: Henry Mayer, The press, p. 43. 
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South Australia 
P. 9.0 
M. 11.3 
E. 6.0 
D. 9.1 
 
Western Australia 
P. 6.6 
M. 7.8 
E. 2.7 
D. 5.6 
 
Tasmania 
P. 3.3 
M. 2.1 
E. --- 
D. 1.2 
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Appendix 10 
 
 
The following list is a record of Prime Minister Menzies’ direct associations with 
journalists during his visits to Britain, Canada and the US between 20 February 1941 
and 17 May 1941.  He directly interacted with media representatives 15 times during 
a period of 87 days.  On average, he interacted with the media slightly less than once 
every six days.  The information was based on Menzies’ 1941 diary, edited by  
Allan Martin and Patsy Hardy. 
 
1) After arriving in England, Menzies was interviewed by film, radio and press 
journalists on 20 February 1941.1
 
 
2) He conducted a “special interview” with the Daily Herald on 28 February 
1941.2
 
 
3) At a luncheon on 3 March 1941, Menzies spoke to the Foreign Press 
Association.3
 
 
4) British and Australian press reporters interviewed him on 5 March 1941.4
 
 
5) Menzies lunched with “Empire press correspondents” on 6 March 1941.5
 
 
6) He visited the “Press Club” on 7 March 1941.6
  
 
                                                            
1 A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 
Diary (hereafter Dark and hurrying days), National Library of Australia, Canberra, 
1993, p. 60. 
2 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 69. 
3 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 71. 
4 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 82. 
5 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 83. 
6 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 83. 
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7) On 15 March 1941, he delivered “a broadcast for America”.7
 
 
8) Another broadcast was made from “a battered BBC House” in London on 10 
April 1941.8
 
 
9) With characteristic haste, Menzies wrote a diary note, “Dine the press-men”, 
on 28 April 1941.9
 
 
10) After arriving in Ottawa, he conducted “press interviews” on 7 May 1941.10
 
 
11) Another press interview was held in Washington DC on 9 May 1941.11
 
 
12) Menzies noted his “[l]ong talk with leading columnists, especially Walter 
Lippman of N.Y. [New York] Times” on 10 May 1941. 12
 
 
13) He spoke to “the Press Club” in Washington DC, as he recorded in a diary 
note dated 11-12 May 1941.13
 
 
14) In New York, he delivered a radio broadcast, as he wrote in a note dated 13-
14 May 1941.14
 
 
15) In the same note, he wrote of his Chicago radio talk.15
                                                            
7 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 89. 
 
8 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 110.  Menzies also made a press 
statement and broadcast for Australia on 22 April 1941.  Furthermore he made an 
Anzac Day address, published in The Times on 26 April 1941.  In this calculation, I 
did not include Menzies’ and Curtin’s speeches, nor their communications to 
journalists in Australia.  See Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, pp. 116, 118. 
9 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 120. 
10 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 123. 
11 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 125. 
12 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 126. 
13 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 126. 
14 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 126. 
15 Martin and Hardy, Dark and hurrying days, p. 126. 
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Appendix 11 
 
 
The following list is a record of Prime Minister Curtin’s direct media associations 
with journalists during his visits to Britain, Canada and the US between 19 April 
1944 and 11 June 1944.  He directly interacted with the mass news media at least 17 
times during a period of 54 days.  Therefore, on average, he communicated with 
media representatives slightly more than once every three days during his trip; this 
was twice as much as Menzies’ media interactions during his Prime Ministerial visit 
to these countries in 1941.  The information was based on Heather Campbell’s 
“Diary of a Labour Man”, published by the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library.  
Other sources were Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s diaries, newspapers, 
newsreels and John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library archives. 
 
1) On 19 April 1944, Curtin arrived in San Francisco at 10am and held a press 
conference at the Fairmont Hotel at 12 noon.1
 
 
2) After travelling to Washington DC, he held a press conference for 80 leading 
journalists at Blair House on 24 April 1944.2
 
 
3) From the prime minister’s suite at Blair House, he delivered a radio broadcast 
on 26 April 1944.3
                                                            
1 Heather Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man”, 19 April 1944, (hereafter “Diary”), John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 11 
February 2010 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1944.html>; Great Britain 
Foreign Office, “Political situation: consular reports”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00779/13, 28 April 1944, pp. 1-3. 
 
2 (Anon.), “Curtin Puts Aside Questions Of Bases; Reciprocal Matter Best Left to Peace 
Conference, Says Australian Premier”, The New York Times, New York, 25 April 1944, p. 5; 
(Anon.), “Curtin Wants Yank Settlers in Australia”, The Washington Post, Washington DC, 
25 April 1944, p. 2; Campbell, “Diary”, 24 April 1944. 
3 (Anon.), “He And President Agree, Says Curtin; Australian Finds Full Harmony on Pacific 
Strategy and Post-War Problems”, The New York Times, New York, 27 April 1944, p. 4; 
Campbell, “Diary”, 26 April 1944; John Curtin, “Broadcast in America”, Digest of Decisions 
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4) Arriving at Croydon aerodrome, south of London, Curtin was interviewed by 
reporters on 29 April 1944.4
 
 
5) He met the Australian press at the Savoy Hotel in London on 1 May 1944.5
 
 
6) At the Ministry of Information in London, he held a “general press 
conference” on 4 May 1944.6
 
 
7) Curtin broadcast “the postscript to the news bulletin” over the BBC and ABC 
in London on 7 May 1944.7
 
 
8) He made another broadcast from London on 8 May 1944.8
 
 
9) Media representatives covered his visit to the Boomerang Club at Australia 
House, London, to meet RAAF personnel on 8 May 1944.9
 
 
10) He spoke into a movie microphone and was filmed when receiving the 
“Freedom of City of London” at Guildhall on 10 May 1944.10
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
[hereafter DDA], 26 April 1944, no. 81, pp. 49-52. 
4 British Movietone (producer), “Empire Premiers Assemble”, in Newsreels of Curtin, 1942-
1945 (newsreel) [hereafter Newsreels of Curtin], JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 
1944; Campbell, “Diary”, 29 April 1944. 
5 Campbell, “Diary”, 1 May 1944. 
6 Campbell, “Diary”, 4 May 1944. 
7 Campbell, “Diary”, 7 May 1944. 
8 John Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London”, DDA, 8 May 1944, no. 81, 
pp. 53-56. 
9  (Anon.), “Curtin Defends RAAF: Australian Fliers in Atlantic Zone Resent Tag of ‘Jap 
Dodgers’”, The New York Times, New York, 22 May 1944, p. 10; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin 
Farewells Bombers”, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks compiled by 
the Prime Minister's Office [hereafter Scrapbooks], no. 4, JCPML acc. no. 0297/4, 20 June 
1944; (Anon.), “Mr. Curtin Told Grievances: Airmen Resent Term ‘Jap-dodgers”, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, cited in Scrapbooks, no. 4, 22 May 1944. 
10 British Movietone (producer), “Commonwealth Premiers Honoured”, in Newsreels of 
Curtin, 1944; Campbell, “Diary”, 10 May 1944. 
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11) Sir Keith Murdoch met Curtin in London on 12 May 1944.11
 
 
12) Curtin attended the “Press Club” in London on 17 May 1944.12
 
 
13) Another “Empire broadcast” was delivered by Curtin in London on 24 May 
1944.13
 
 
14) At Lords cricket ground, British Movietone filmed Curtin on 27 May 1944.14
 
 
15) After arriving at the Ottawa train station on 30 May 1944, he was interviewed 
by journalists and spoke into a movie microphone.15
 
 
16) In Ottawa on 31 May 1944, he held a press conference at the House of 
Commons.16
 
 
17) Curtin gave a speech to the National Press Club at a luncheon in Washington 
DC on 5 June 1944.17
                                                            
11 Campbell, “Diary”, 12 May 1944. 
 
12 Campbell, “Diary”, 17 May 1944. 
13 Campbell, “Diary”, 24 May 1944; John Curtin, “Text of broadcast from London on 
Empire Day”, DDA, JCPML, Bentley, no. 81, JCPML acc. no. 00110/86, 24 May 1944, pp. 
74-75. 
14 British Movietone (producer), “Lord’s”, in Newsreels of Curtin, 1944; Campbell, “Diary”, 
27 May 1944. 
15 Australian Department of External Affairs, “Visit of Mr. Curtin to USA & UK in 
connection with Prime Ministers’ Conference London” [hereafter “Curtin’s visit], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00768/2, May 1944, pp. 10-22; Campbell, “Diary”, 30 May 1944; 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, “The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King”, Library 
and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 30 May 1944, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html>; ScreenSound Australia, 
Prime Minister Welcomed In Canada (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01052/1, 1944. 
16 Australian Department of External Affairs, “Curtin’s visit”; Campbell, “Diary”, 31 May 
1944. 
17 Campbell, “Diary”, 5 June 1944; John Curtin, “Speech to National Press Club, 
Washington”, 5 June 1944, DDA, no. 73, pp. 84-91. 
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Appendix 12 
 
 
The following section is a list of John Curtin’s major radio broadcasts during his 
prime ministerial terms from 7 October 1941 to 5 July 1945.1
 
 
1) “Text of broadcast summary of the 1941-42 budget statement”, 29 October 
1941. 
 
2) “Text of broadcast (by radio-telephone) over the British Broadcasting 
Corporation network, introducing Australia’s new Labor Government and 
messages of support for the British people”, 31 October 1941. 
 
3) “Text of national broadcast on recruiting campaign”, 19 November 1941. 
 
4) “Text of national broadcast on the war with Japan”, 8 December 1941. 
 
5)  “Text of national broadcast on the new war situation”, 26 December 1941. 
 
6) “Text of national broadcast for Australia Day”, 24 January 1942. 
 
7) “Text of broadcast to America”, 14 March 1942. 
 
8) “Text of national broadcast promoting the National Savings Campaign”,  
15 April 1942. 
  
                                                            
1 The following 37 speeches were cited from: John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library 
[hereafter JCPML], “Index to John Curtin’s speeches in the Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister, 1941-1945 [hereafter “Index 
to John Curtin’s speeches]”, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01148/1, 2007. 
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9) “Text of broadcast over the BBC in Britain, on possible invasion of Australia, 
and Australia as part of the British Empire”, 29 April 1942. 
 
10) “Text of broadcast on national radio on consumer rationing”, 8 May 1942. 
 
11) “Text of national broadcast to promote subscriptions to the Second Liberty 
Loan”, 17 June 1942. 
 
12) “Text of national broadcast launching Austerity Campaign”, 3 September 
1942. 
 
13) “Text of national austerity loan broadcast”, 4 October 1942. 
 
14) “National broadcast marking the eve of Armistice Day”, 10 November 1942. 
 
15) “Text of broadcast over national network. Review of the past year of war and 
involvement required for the second year of war with Japan”, 6 December 
1942. 
 
16) “Broadcast for Australia Day over Australian national and commercial stations 
and USA stations”, 26 January 1943.  Also this broadcast was made available 
to the BBC. 
 
17) “Text of broadcast over the national network on the Third Liberty Loan”,  
 11 April 1943. 
 
18) “Broadcast over the national network on Australia’s current war position, the 
future, and seeking support”, 18 April 1943. 
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19) “Text of broadcast on victory and the North African campaign”, 16 May 1943. 
 
20) “Text of radio broadcast to people of America”, 5 July 1943. 
 
21) “Text of Prime Minister’s election policy speech”, 26 July 1943.2
 
 
22) “Text of broadcast over national network on the Fourth Liberty Loan”, 24 
October 1943. 
 
23) “Text of national broadcast to promote subscriptions to the Fourth Liberty 
Loan”, 3 November 1943. 
 
24) “Text of broadcast arranged through United States Office of War Information 
to mark the second anniversary of the arrival in Australia of General 
MacArthur”, 17 March 1944. 
 
25) “Broadcast launching the First Victory Loan”, 27 March 1944. 
 
26) “Text of broadcast from Washington”, 26 April 1944. 
 
27) “Text of broadcast from London”, 8 May 1944. 
 
28) “Text of broadcast from London on Empire Day”, 24 May 1944. 
 
29) “Text of broadcast over the national network on the Constitutional 
Referendum”, 25 July 1944. 
 
30) “Text of broadcast on the national network on the Constitutional Referendum”, 
9 August 1944. 
  
                                                            
2 David Black (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s speeches and writings, Paradigm 
Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 226. 
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31) “Text of broadcast on the national network on the Constitutional Referendum”, 
16 August 1944. 
 
32) “Text of broadcast over the national network opening the Second Victory 
Loan”, 25 September 1944. 
 
33) “Text of broadcast over the national network promoting the Second Victory 
Loan”, 25 October 1944. 
 
34) “Text of joint broadcast with Mr Menzies and Mr Fadden, over the national 
network, promoting the Second Victory Loan”, 29 October 1944. 
 
35) “Text of radio broadcast on the national network on the Third Victory Loan”, 
12 March 1945. 
 
36) “Text of radio broadcast over national and commercial stations canvassing 
support for the Third Victory Loan”, 22 April 1945. 
 
37) “Text of broadcast in Britain (a recorded message) on the occasion of Empire 
Day”, 24 May 1945. 
 
In addition, this study identified more John Curtin radio talks: 
 
38) A one-hour national radio broadcast at Melbourne Town Hall from 8pm to 9pm 
on 6 August 1943.3
 
 
39) A second election radio broadcast at Fremantle Town Hall from 7.15pm to 
8.15pm on 18 August 1943.4
  
 
                                                            
3 Australian Commonwealth Government, “The Prime Minister’s Itinerary”, [hereafter 
“Election speech itinerary”], National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CA12, A461, 
R4/1/12, 1943, p. 117. 
4 Australian Commonwealth Government, “Election speech itinerary”. 
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Although copies of some speeches were not preserved, John Curtin probably 
delivered broadcasts at the following locations: 
• Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, 19 April 1944.5
• BBC interview, England, 30 April 1944.
 
6
• London, BBC and ABC “postscript to the news bulletin” broadcast, 7 May 
1944.
 
7
• Guildhall, London, on 10 May 1944.
 
8
• The central train station in Ottawa, Canada, 30 May 1944.
 
9
• Both Houses of the Canadian Parliament on 1 June 1944.
 
10
• Brisbane, Australia, 26 June 1944.
 
11
 
 
 
                                                            
5 Heather Campbell, “Diary of a Labour Man for 19 April 1944” (hereafter “Diary”), 
JCPML, Bentley, 2008, retrieved on 11 February 2010 at 
<http://john.curtin.edu.au/diary/primeminister/1944.html>; John Curtin, Digest of Decisions 
and Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
(hereafter DDA), no. 81, 19 April 1944, p. 18; Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political 
situation: consular reports”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00779/13, 28 April 1944, pp. 
1-3. 
6 Campbell, “Diary”, 30 April 1944. 
7 Campbell, “Diary”, 7 May 1944. 
8 British Movietone (producer), “Commonwealth Premiers Honoured”, in Newsreels of 
Curtin, 1942-1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 1944; Campbell, 
“Diary”, 10 May 1944. 
9 Australian Department of External Affairs, “Visit of Mr. Curtin to USA & UK in 
connection with Prime Ministers’ Conference London” [hereafter “Curtin’s visit], JCPML, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00768/2, May 1944, pp.10-22; Campbell, “Diary”, 30 May 1944; 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, “The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King”, Library 
and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 30 May 1944, retrieved on 8 December 2008 at 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/index-e.html>; ScreenSound Australia, 
Prime Minister Welcomed In Canada (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
01052/1, 1944. 
10 Australian Department of External Affairs “Curtin’s visit”; Campbell, “Diary”, 1 June 
1944. 
11 Campbell, “Diary”, 26 June 1944.  The following newsreel appeared to include an excerpt 
from Curtin’s Brisbane media conference: ScreenSound Australia, “A Great Australian 
Passes”, in John Joseph Curtin 1885 – 1945 (newsreel), JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00238/1, 1944. 
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Appendix 13 
 
The following Australian wartime journalists, including reporters and editors, praised 
Curtin’s leadership in their oral histories.  They are: 
 
 
1. The Herald Canberra bureau head, Joseph Alexander.1
 
 
2. The Courier-Mail editor, Theodor Charles Bray.2
 
 
3. The Sun News-Pictorial federal political journalist, Frank Chamberlain.3
 
 
4. Australian Broadcasting Commission federal political journalist,  
John Commins.4
 
 
5. The Sun News-Pictorial Canberra representative, Harold Cox.5
 
 
6. Frank Davidson, The Mirror editor (1935-1941), officer in charge of the 
Department of Information in Western Australia (1941-1944), editor-in-chief 
of the Western Press (including The Sunday Times, The Mirror and The Call 
newspapers, 1944-1957).6
  
 
                                                            
1 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library 
[hereafter JCPML], Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np. 
2 Theodor Charles Bray, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00512, 
5 March 1971, transcript np. 
3 Frank Chamberlain, interviewed by Mel Pratt, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00552, August 
1972-January 1973, transcript np. 
4 John Commins, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01092/1, 22-
26 May 1971, transcript np. 
5 Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01060/1, 6 April 
1973, transcript np. 
6 Frank Davidson, interviewed by Isla Macphail, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00127/1, 
24 January 1996, transcript np. 
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7. Australian Associated Press London-based deputy editor, Irvine Douglas.  He 
was also the United Australia Party’s Commonwealth Government publicity 
officer from 1934 to 1938 and Prime Minister Joseph Lyon’s private secretary 
from 1936 to 1938.7
 
 
8. The West Australian journalist, Peter Ewing.8
 
 
9. The Daily Mirror Canberra chief political correspondent, Allan Fraser.  He was 
the Labor Member of the Federal House of Representatives for Eden-Monaro, 
New South Wales, from 1943 to 1966 and from 1969 to 1972.9
 
 
10. The Daily Telegraph Canberra political journalist, Edgar Holt.  Later Holt was 
the Liberal Party’s director of public relations and senior political adviser.10
 
 
11. The Sun Canberra bureau chief, Alan Reid.11
 
 
12. The Daily Telegraph Canberra bureau head, Don Whitington.12
 
 
 
                                                            
7 Irvine Douglas, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01061/1, 15-
19 June 1972, transcript np. 
8 Peter Ewing, interviewed by Bill Bunbury, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00492/2, 15 
December 1999, transcript np. 
9 Allan Fraser, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00550, August 
1972–January 1973, transcript np. 
10 Edgar George Holt, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01059, 
23 May 1978, transcript np. 
11 Alan D. Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00501, 4 
October 1972 and 28 February 1973, transcript np. 
12 Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1977, p. 82. 
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Appendix 14 
 
Evaluation of news reports and press opinion on  
John Curtin1
 
 
1) Newspaper coverage of Curtin’s declaration of war on Japan (radio broadcast), 
8 December 19412
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
2) The prime minister’s press article on “Australia looks to America”, published 
in The Herald on 27 December 1941.3
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Negative (later this 
changed to a positive 
editorial tone) 
Positive 
 
                                                            
1 This was based on the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism formula 
that a news article was deemed “positive” if two-thirds of the statements appeared to support 
a national leader.  Other research methods included an analysis of Curtin’s keywords, and 
the repetition of these terms in newspapers, as examined in Chapters 6 to 9.  See Pew 
Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Winning The Media Campaign: 
Methodology”, Journalism.org, 2008, retrieved on 26 September 2009 at 
<http://www.journalism.org/node/13314>; Public Broadcasting Service (producer), The 
Online NewsHour (television program – transcript),Washington DC, 24 June 2009, transcript 
np, retrieved on 26 September 2009 at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-
june09/obama_06-24.html>. 
2 John Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime Minister”, Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
[hereafter DDA], no. 10, 8 December 1941, pp. 19-22. 
3 John Curtin, “The Task Ahead”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, 27 December 1941, retrieved on 25 January 
2011 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/pmportal/text/00468.html>. 
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3) His parliamentary speech to announce the Japanese attack on Darwin on  
19 February 19424
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
4) Curtin’s radio broadcast to the United States, March 19425
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
5) His parliamentary announcement of the Battle of the Coral Sea on 8 May 
19426
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
6) The prime minister’s public statements on the Kokoda campaign on 10 
December 19427
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Negative (this later 
changed to a positive 
tone) 
Positive Positive 
  
                                                            
4 John Curtin, “Attack On Darwin”, DDA, no. 19, 19 February 1942, pp.8-9. 
5 John Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United States”, 14 March 1942, DDA, no. 22, pp. 9-
13. 
6 John Curtin, “Naval Engagement – Coral Sea”, DDA, no. 28, 8 May 1942, pp. 4-5.  This 
study considered two separate announcements made by Curtin in the parliament on 8 May 
1942.  In the transcripts of the same date, the DDA also included texts of two communiqués, 
which were not included in this analysis. 
7 John Curtin, “State Of The War”, DDA, no. 47, 10 December 1942, pp. 17-24. 
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7) Curtin’s parliamentary speech in support of the Defence (Citizen Military 
Forces) Bill on conscription on 11 February 19438
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
8) The prime minister’s general election Australian Labor Party (ALP) policy 
statement (a radio speech), 26 July 19439
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
9) Curtin’s speech to the ALP federal conference on 14 December 194310
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
10) Curtin’s radio broadcast in Britain, 8 May 194411
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
  
                                                            
8 John Curtin, Commonwealth of Australia: Parliamentary Debates, vol. 173, 11 February 
1943, pp. 592-596. 
9 John Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np. 
10 John Curtin, “State Of The War”, DDA, no. 70, 14 December 1943, pp. 31-36.   
11 John Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London”, DDA, no. 81, 8 May 1944, 
pp. 53-56. 
542 
 
11) Curtin’s parliamentary speech on 17 July 194412
The Age 
 
The Canberra Times The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
12) Newspaper coverage on 23 January 1945 that reported on Curtin’s return to the 
parliament after his absence of nearly two months due to illness 
The Age The Canberra Times The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
The West 
Australian 
Positive Positive Neutral, leaning 
towards positive 
Positive 
 
13) Newspaper coverage on 5-6 July 1945 after Curtin’s death 
The Age 
(Melbourne) 
The Canberra Times 
(Canberra) 
The Sydney 
Morning Herald 
(Sydney) 
The West 
Australian 
(Perth) 
Positive Positive Positive Positive 
 
 
                                                            
12 John Curtin, “Meeting of Prime Ministers – Australian Prime Minister’s Report”, DDA, 
no. 84, 17 July 1944, pp. 28-44. 
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Appendix 15 
 
Readability and speech rate statistics for  
Curtin’s selected addresses 
 
 
1 Curtin’s declaration of war on Japan (radio broadcast), 8 December 19411
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
57.4 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade 9 
Speaking rate 119.4  words a minute 
 
2 The prime minister’s press article on “Australia looks to America”, 
published in The Herald on 27 December 1941.2
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
46.8 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  11.2 
 
  
                                                            
1 John Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime Minister”, Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) 
[hereafter DDA], no. 10, 8 December 1941, pp. 19-22. 
2 John Curtin, “The Task Ahead”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library [hereafter JCPML], Bentley, 27 December 1941, retrieved on 25 January 
2011 at <http://john.curtin.edu.au/pmportal/text/00468.html>. 
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3 His parliamentary speech to announce the Japanese attack on Darwin on 
19 February 19423
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
58.8 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  9.2 
Speaking rate Unavailable 
 
4 Curtin’s radio broadcast to the United States, 14 March 19424
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
69.4 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  7.4 
Speaking rate 150 words a minute 
 
5 His parliamentary announcement of the Battle of the Coral Sea on  
8 May 19425
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
54.8 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  11.1 
Speaking rate Unavailable 
 
6 The prime minister’s public statements on the Kokoda campaign on  
10 December 19426
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
45.3 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  12.6 
Speaking rate Unavailable 
 
  
                                                            
3 John Curtin, “Attack On Darwin”, DDA, no. 19, 19 February 1942, pp. 8-9. 
4 John Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United States”, DDA, no. 22, 14 March 1942, pp. 9-
13. 
5 John Curtin, “Naval Engagement – Coral Sea”, DDA, no. 28, 8 May 1942, pp. 4-5.  This 
study considered two separate announcements made by Curtin in the parliament on 8 May 
1942.  In the transcripts of the same date, the DDA also included texts of two communiqués, 
which were not included in this analysis. 
6 John Curtin, “State Of The War”, DDA, no. 47, 10 December 1942, pp. 17-24. 
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7 Curtin’s parliamentary speech in support of the Defence (Citizen Military 
Forces) Bill on conscription on 11 February 19437
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
55.5 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  11.1 
Speaking rate Unavailable 
 
8 The prime minister’s general election Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
policy statement (a radio speech), July 19438
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
40.3 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  12.9 
Speaking rate 149 words a minute 
 
9 Curtin’s speech to the ALP federal conference on 14 December 19439
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
36.9 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  13.7 
Speaking rate Unavailable 
 
10 Curtin’s radio broadcast in Britain, 8 May 194410
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
50.4 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  11.4 
Speaking rate Unavailable 
 
  
                                                            
7 John Curtin, Commonwealth of Australia: Parliamentary Debates, vol. 173, 11 February 
1943, pp. 592-596. 
8 John Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”, JCPML, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00421/2, 26 July 1943, transcript np. 
9 John Curtin, “State Of The War”, DDA, no. 70, 14 December 1943, pp. 31-36. 
10 John Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London”, DDA, no. 81, 8 May 1944, 
pp. 53-56. 
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11 Curtin’s parliamentary speech on 17 July 194411
Flesch Reading Ease score 
 
42.8 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade  13.7 
Speaking rate Unavailable 
 
Average Flesch Reading Ease Scores 
John Curtin’s average Flesch Reading Ease 
score for all 11 addresses 
50.76 
Average Flesch Reading Ease score for 
John Curtin’s four radio broadcasts 
54.375 
Recommended standard12 60-70 (a higher number indicates 
a simpler text) 
 
Average Flesch Reading Ease score for  
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s radio “fireside 
chats” 
57.5 
Average Flesch Reading Ease score for  
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s other public 
addresses 
59.4   
Average Flesch Reading Ease score for  
Harry S. Truman’s radio talks 
63.8 
 
  
                                                            
11 John Curtin, “Meeting of Prime Ministers – Australian Prime Minister’s Report”, DDA, 
no. 84, 17 July 1944, pp. 28-44. 
12 The recommended standard, as well as the statistics relating to Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Harry S. Truman, were cited in Elvin T. Lim, “The Lion and the Lamb: De-mythologising 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats” [hereafter “Fireside chats”], Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 
vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 445-446. 
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Average Flesch-Kincaid Grades 
John Curtin’s average Flesch-Kincaid Grade 
for all 11 addresses 
11, meaning the addresses were  
suitable for an eleventh-grade  
reading level on average 
Average Flesch-Kincaid grade for John 
Curtin’s four radio broadcasts 
10.175, about a tenth-grade 
reading level 
Recommended standard13 8, or an eighth-grade level  
Average educational attainment for 
Australian people born before 193014
9.3, or about the ninth grade 
   
 
Average speaking rates 
Average speaking rate in the three selected, 
available radio broadcasts by John Curtin 
139.46 words a minute 
Recommended standards15 100-125 words a minute  
Average speaking rate in Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s radio talks16
105-117 words a minute 
 
 
                                                            
13 Trevor Day, “Twelve Writing Tips for Administrative Staff”, University of Bath, Bath, 
2008, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<www.bath.ac.uk/learningandteaching/resources/TwelveWritingTipsRevisedTD.pdf>. 
14 Jonathan Kelley and M.D.R. Evans, “Trends In Educational Attainment In Australia”, 
WwA: Worldwide Attitudes, 26 August 1996, pp. 1-8, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<http://www.international-survey.org/wwa_pub/articles/hst-ed5.htm>. 
15 Peter Kenny, A Handbook of Public Speaking for Scientists & Engineers, IOP Publishing 
Ltd (Institute of Physics Publishing), London, 1988, p. 20; Lim, “Fireside chats”, pp. 446, 
458, endnote 42; Cynthia J. Pasquale, “Talking at the speed of confound”, The Denver Post, 
Denver, 29 June 2006, retrieved on 10 September 2009 at 
<http://www.denverpost.com/ci_3991442?source=rss>; Public Broadcasting Service, “All 
About Public Speaking”, Falls Church, Virginia, 2009, retrieved on 27 September 2009 at 
<http://www.pbs.org/standarddeviantstv/transcript_public.html>. 
16 According to Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. Braden, Roosevelt had a mean speaking 
rate of 105 words to 110 words in his radio broadcasts.  Lim wrote that Roosevelt spoke an 
average 117 words a minute in his “fireside chats”.  See Earnest Bradenburg and Waldo W. 
Braden, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt”, in Marie Kathryn Hochmuth (ed.), History and 
Criticism of American Public Address, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, vol. 3, 1958, 
pp. 520, 522; Lim, “Roosevelt’s fireside chats”, p. 446. 
548 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY – WORKS CITED 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES1
 
 
 
20th Century Fox-Movietone News (producer), Nation Mourns John Curtin 
(newsreel), John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00033/1, 1945. 
ABC Television (producer), National Press Club Address – Julia Gillard (Prime 
Minister) (television program), Canberra, 15 July 2010. 
Achilles, Theodore, “Oral History Interview with Theodore Achilles”, interviewed 
by Richard D. McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Independence,  
13 November and 18 December 1972. 
Alexander, J.A., “Papers 1833–1957”, National Library of Australia, Manuscript 
Collections, Canberra, NLA acc. no. MS 2389. 
Alexander, Joseph A., interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00551, 2 March 1971. 
Apollo Films (producer), Curtin (telemovie for Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation), Australia, 2007. 
Australia, Advisory War Council, “Discussions with General MacArthur”, National 
Archives of Australia, Canberra, CA495, A2684, 967, 26 March-17 June 1942. 
——  “Minutes of Advisory War Council Meetings”, National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, series no. A5954, 815/1, 16 June 1943-11 May 1944. 
                                                            
1 Anonymous sources (such as newspaper articles that lacked bylines) were included in 
relevant footnotes, but not in the final bibliography.  For online sources, the specific Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) was cited in the relevant footnotes in earlier chapters, but not 
repeated in the bibliography. 
549 
 
——  “Records of the Advisory War Council”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00641/1, 1942. 
Australia, Department of External Affairs, “Binder of cables inward from Australian 
Delegation, San Francisco (and London)”, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 
A4764,6, 20 March 1945-29 June 1945, pp. 1-296. 
——  “Binder of cables outward from Australian Delegation, San Francisco (and 
London)”, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, A4764,7, 20 March 
1945-5 July 1945, pp. 1-303. 
——  “Visit of Mr. Curtin to USA & UK in connection with Prime Ministers’ 
Conference London”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00768/2, 9 June 1944. 
Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, “Advisory War Council Minutes”, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/10, 12 January- 
3 June 1943. 
——  “Australia – international implications of election campaign, 1943”, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00869/57, 1943. 
Australia, Prime Minister’s Department, “Personal Papers of Prime Minister Curtin – 
Correspondence ‘M’”, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CA 12, M1415, 
237, 1942-1943. 
——  “Prime Minister – Rt. Hon. J. Curtin”, National Archives of Australia, 
Canberra, CA12, A461, R4/1/12, 1941-1945, pp. 1-257. 
Australian Broadcasting Commission (producer), “Scripts of Talks Broadcast by the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) Brisbane - War Time Recordings 1939 
to 1945 - Interview with Lt W N Swan by N B Graves on HMAS Westralia”, 
National Archives of Australia, Canberra, BP257/1, 73/2, 14 March 1945, pp. 1-7. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Federal Election 1943”, National Archives of 
Australia, Canberra, CA251, SP286/16, 5, 1937-1943. 
550 
 
Australian Commonwealth Government, “Prime Minister’s Itinerary”, National 
Archives of Australia, Canberra, CA12, A461, R4/1/12, 1943, p. 117. 
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Historical 
Publications: Documents on Australian Foreign Policy”, Barton, vols 4-8,  
1940-1945. 
Australian Government Department of Information, Cinesound Productions, 
Cinesound Review, Department of Information, Movietone and U.S. Army Signal 
Corps (Producers), At The Front: 1939-1945: Australia’s WWII Newsreels 
(newsreels), John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00441/2, 1939-1945. 
Australian Labor Party (producer), The Man of the Hour (newsreel), Australia, 1943. 
Bray, Theodor Charles, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00512, 5 March 1971. 
Bridgman, W. J., interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00499, 17 November 1976. 
Brigden, J.B., “Australia’s Economic Future”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3, 
September 1944, pp. 325-329. 
British Pathé, Third Reich Parade (newsreel), London, circa 1933-1945. 
British Movietone Digital Archive, Surry Hills, 1939-1945. 
British Movietone News (producer), Australia Faced the Same Problem (newsreel), 
Australia, 20 August 1930. 
——   Australia is Led by New Prime Minister (newsreel), Australia, 25 February 
1932. 
——  Australian Prime Minister Arrives for Conference (newsreel), London, 29 
September 1930. 
551 
 
——  Movietone News Celebrates Its 35th (newsreel), Australia, 10 October 1966. 
——  Mr. Menzies On Eve of Sailing Reviews War Situation (newsreel), England, 
8 May 1941. 
——  Newsreels of Curtin, 1942-1945 (newsreels), John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00734/1, 1942-1945. 
——  The Hon. James H. Scullin (newsreel), Australia, 30 December 1929. 
Bush, George W., “President Bush discusses importance of democracy in Middle 
East”, The White House, Washington DC, 4 February 2004. 
——  “President discusses European trip:  Remarks by the president in acceptance 
of bust of Winston Churchill”, The White House, Washington DC, 16 July 
2001. 
Calwell, Arthur Augustus, “Biographical notes re John Curtin”, John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00652/3/2, 1944. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (producer), Front Page Challenge (television 
broadcast), Toronto, 27 March 1978. 
Carver, S.R., Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, nos 33-35, 1940-1943. 
Casey, Maie, Tides and Eddies, Michael Joseph, London, 1966. 
Chamberlain, Frank, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00552, August 1972-January 1973. 
Chauvel, Charles (director and producer), The Rats of Tobruk (movie), Chamun 
Productions, Australia, 1944. 
——  (director), Charles Chauvel and Charles Munro (producers), The Fighting 
Rats of Tobruk (movie), America and Canada, 1945. 
Cheney, Richard, “Remarks by the Vice President at Westminster College”, The 
White House, Washington DC, 26 April 2004. 
552 
 
Churchill, Winston S., “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat”, The Churchill Centre, 
Chicago, 13 May 1940. 
——  Cable to John Curtin, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, A816, 
52/302/142, 20 February 1942, p. 285. 
——   “War and International Situation”, Hansard, London, 22 February 1944. 
Cinesound Productions (producer), Bismarck Convey Smashed! (newsreel), 
Australia, 1943. 
——  From Palestine to Bengazi With The Prime Minister (newsreel), Australia, 
1941. 
—— War in Pacific! (newsreel), John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 01021/1, 1941. 
Cinesound Productions and Cinesound Review (producer), Compiled speeches of 
John Curtin, 1941 – 1945 (newsreels), John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00130/1, 1941-1945. 
Cinesound Review and Movietone News (producers), John Joseph Curtin 1885-1945 
(newsreels), John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 
00238/1, 1941-1945. 
Commins, John, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01092/1, 22-26 May 1971. 
Commonwealth Government: Digest of Decisions and Announcements and Important 
Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin), John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, nos 001-104, JCPML acc. no. 00110/109, 1941-1945. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, vols 166-183, JCPML acc. no. 
00653/73/4-00653/94/3, 1941-1945. 
Commonwealth of Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australian 
Treaty Series: Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944”, Canberra, 1944. 
553 
 
Communist Party of Australia (producer), “Everything for the Victory of 
Democracy” (newsreel), John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML 
acc. no. 00242/1, 1943. 
Cox, Harold, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01060/1, 6 April 1973. 
—— “Typescript reports, 1944-1964”, National Library of Australia, Manuscript 
Collections, Canberra, NLA MS acc. no. 4554, 1944-1964. 
Creelman, Ena, “Reply To Sir Keith Murdoch”, Camperdown Chronicle, 
Camperdown, 20 August 1943, p. 2. 
Curtin, Elsie, “Press Statement by Mrs Curtin”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00652/1/3, 26 April 1944. 
Curtin, John, “Australia Keeps the Pact.  Everything Britain has Asked Voluntarism 
Has Accomplished”, The Westralian Worker, Perth, cited in John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00302/40, 30 November 1917. 
——  Cable to Churchill, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, A816, 
52/302/142, 22 February 1942, pp. 279-280. 
——  “General Election ALP Policy Statement”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00421/2, 26 July 1943. 
——  “Relations with America” (radio broadcast), John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00434/1, 14 March 1942. 
—— “The Task Ahead”, The Herald, Melbourne, cited in John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, 27 December 1941. 
  “The Editor Writes A Message”, The Westralian Worker, Perth, 17 March 
1922, cited in John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley. 
Daly, Fred, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00494/1, 26 August-25 November 1976. 
554 
 
Davidson, Frank, interviewed by Isla Macphail, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00127/1, 24 January 1996. 
Douglas, Irvine, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01061/1, 15-19 June 1972. 
Eden, Anthony, Another World, 1897-1917, Allen Lane, London, 1976. 
——  Facing the Dictators:  The Eden Memoirs, Cassell, London, 1962. 
——  Full Circle:  The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, Cassell, London, 1960. 
Encyclopædia Britannica Educational Corporation (producer), “The Second World 
War:  Allied Victory” (newsreel), 1963, Encyclopædia Britannica 2009 Deluxe 
Edition, Chicago, 2009. 
Ewing, Peter, interviewed by Bill Bunbury, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00492/2, 15 December 1999. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, “Audio/Visual Collections 
at the Library”, Hyde Park, 2010. 
——  “Great Britain Diplomatic Files”, Hyde Park, 1940-1945. 
——  “Safe Files – Marshall, George C., Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army 
including army air forces, 1941 – 4/14/42 Index”, Hyde Park, box 3, 10 
March 1941-13 April 1942. 
——  “Safe Files – Australia Index”, Hyde Park, box 2, 1 June 1941-9 June 1942. 
——  “Safe Files – New Zealand Index”, Hyde Park, box 4, 11-17 February 1942. 
Fraser, Allan, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00550, August 1972-January 1973. 
Frith, John, interviewed by Shirley McKechnie, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01064/1, 30 April-1 May 1994. 
Gollan, Ross, “Mr. Curtin-A New Phase or a Fixed Policy?”  The Sydney Morning 
Herald, Sydney, 23 January 1945, p. 2. 
555 
 
Granada Media (producer), Roosevelt:  Men of Our Time (documentary), John Curtin 
Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00813/1, 1990. 
Great Britain Foreign Office, “Political situation:  consular reports, 1944”, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00779/13, 1944. 
Greenwood, Irene, “Proposed Script of ABC Broadcast by Irene Greenwood,  
‘Mrs John Curtin – a personal sketch’”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00398/74, 27 July 1945. 
Gurr, Tom (director), Jack S. Allan (producer), Jungle Patrol (newsreel), 
Commonwealth Government of Australia, Ministry of Information, Australia, 1944. 
Hall, Ken G. (producer), Kokoda Front Line! (newsreel), The Australian News & 
Information Bureau, Australia, 1942. 
——  (director and producer), South-west Pacific (newsreel), Cinesound 
Productions, Australia, 1943. 
Holt, Edgar George, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01059, 23 May 1978. 
Howard, John, “John Howard Public Lecture – Politics and the Media: the Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly”, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 10 August 2009. 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, “Correspondence regarding 
media/newspapers”, Bentley, N/C. acc.no. 001-014, 7 October 1941–20 December 
1943. 
——  “Correspondence regarding religious individuals and organisations”, 
Bentley, R. acc. no. 001–040, 17 November 1941-22 September 1944. 
——  “Index to John Curtin’s speeches in the Digest of Decisions and 
Announcements and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister,  
1941-1945”, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01148/1, 2007. 
——  “Political Bodies/Governments State” (correspondence), Bentley, POL/S 
acc. no. 001-027, 6 March 1941–18 December 1943. 
556 
 
Johnson, Joseph E., “Oral History Interview with Joseph E. Johnson”, interviewed by 
Richard D. McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Independence, 29 June 
1973. 
King, William Lyon Mackenzie, “The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King”, 
Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, 1893-1950. 
——  “Speech”, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, IDCISN: 74651 and 
IDCISN: 82447, 3 September 1939 and 24 April 1942.   
Library and Archives Canada, “Premier King Visits Armoured Troops, 1945”, 
Ottawa, 1945. 
——  “Highlights from the Parliamentary Life of the Right Honourable William 
Lyon Mackenzie King, 1948”, Ottawa, 1948.  
Lloyd, Clem and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s war, 
National Library of Australia, Canberra, 1997. 
Martin, A.W. and Patsy Hardy (eds), Dark and Hurrying Days: Menzies’ 1941 
Diary, National Library of Australia, Canberra, 1993. 
Maxwell, Wendy, interviewed by James Holland, James Holland’s Second World 
War Forum, 2003. 
McLaughlin, Frederick, “Prime Minister’s Visit to England via USA, Itinerary and 
Engagements 1944”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. 
no. 00129/1, pp. 1-27. 
Mead, Tom, Breaking the News: The events which changed life in Australia through 
the eyes of a man who worked at the front line of journalism and politics, Dolphin 
Books, Sydney, 1998. 
Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Australian Journalists’ Association, “Ethics 
Review Committee Final Report”, November 1996. 
557 
 
Menzies, Robert, Menzies’ 1941 Diary, Museum of Australian Democracy at Old 
Parliament House, Canberra, 1941. 
——  Radio transcripts, Menzies Virtual Museum, East Melbourne, 1939-1942. 
——  “Transcript of Press Conference Film”, Menzies Virtual Museum, East 
Melbourne, 1941. 
Moses, Charles, interviewed for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00408/3, 27 May 1982. 
Movietone News (producer), Australia’s Premier on First Visit to Great Britain 
(newsreel), England, 28 March 1935. 
——  Departures: Curtin and Blamey for America (newsreel), John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01051/1/7, 1944. 
——  Mr. Menzies in New York (newsreel), New York, 19 May 1941. 
——  Personalities Living at the Federal Capital (newsreel), John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, JCPML acc. no. 00876/2, Bentley, 1941. 
——  Prime Minister Tells House of Evatt’s Mission (newsreel), John Curtin 
Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00236, 1943. 
Murdoch, Keith, “Some Facts Behind Our Overseas Policies”, Camperdown 
Chronicle, Camperdown, 13 August 1943, p. 1. 
Office of Legislative Drafting, Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act (The Constitution), Canberra, Section 51, 1 July 2001. 
Online Archive of California, “Guide to the San Francisco News-Call Bulletin 
Newspaper Photograph Archive”, 1944. 
Perkins, Frances, The Roosevelt I Knew, The Viking Press, New York, 1946. 
Reid, Alan, “Plain John Curtin Who Led Australia Through Darkest Days”, The Sun, 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00964/165, 5 July 
1945. 
558 
 
Reid, Alan D., interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00501, 4 October 1972-28 February 1973. 
Rice, Norm, “Look, Bert; and no Yanks about!”, The Bulletin, John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, 23 December 1942. 
Rodgers, Donald Kilgour, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00497, 29 April 1971. 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., “Australia, 3 April 1944 - 12 March 1945”, John Curtin 
Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00269/3, 3 April 1944 -  
12 March 1945. 
——  “Dinner, Prime Minister of Australia John Curtin, 25 April 1944”, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00330/1, 30 
March-25 April 1944, pp. 1-78. 
——  “Diplomatic  Australia, 28 November 1939 - 25 August 1942”, John Curtin 
Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00266/2, 28 November 
1939-25 August 1942. 
——  “Extracts from the Press Conference”, and “Fireside chats”, in John T. 
Woolley and Gerhard Peters (eds), The American Presidency Project, Santa 
Barbara, 1941-1945. 
——  “Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against 
Japan”, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde 
Park, 8 December 1941. 
——  Letter to Winston Churchill, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 
JCPML acc. no. 00719/1/11, 22 March 1942. 
——  “Messages between Roosevelt & Churchill, August 1943 - February 1944”, 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00796/3, 
1943-1944. 
559 
 
Roosevelt, Franklin D. and Samuel Irving Rosenman, The Public Papers and 
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Russell and Russell, New York, 13 vols, 1969.   
Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s Office, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, nos 1-4, JCPML acc. no. 00297/1–00297/4, October 1941-July 
1945. 
ScreenSound Australia, John Curtin, Memoirs (documentary), John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, JCPML acc. no. 00791/1, Bentley, 1965.2
——  Mrs Roosevelt’s Visit To Canberra, 1943 (newsreel), John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01049/1, 1943. 
 
——  Parliament in Session (newsreel), John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 00876/4, 1944. 
——  Prime Minister Welcomed in Canada (newsreel), John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01052/1, 1944. 
——  Visit to England: Prime Minister John Curtin Goes Overseas (newsreel), 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, JCPML acc. no. 01023/1, 
1944. 
Shedden, Frederick Geoffrey, “Advisory War Council Minutes, Records of Frederick 
Shedden”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, vols 3-4, 7-8, JCPML acc. 
no. 00928/4-00928/5, 00928/8-00928/9, 6 August 1941-26 March 1942, 16 June 
1943-30 August 1945. 
Statistics Canada, “Estimated Population of Canada, 1605 to Present”, Ottawa, 2009. 
Stuart, Charles (ed.), The Reith Diaries, Collins, London, 1975.   
The Advertiser, Adelaide, 1941-1945. 
The Age, Melbourne, 1941-2010. 
The Argus, Melbourne, 1941-1945. 
The Army News, Darwin, 1941-2010. 
The Canberra Times, Canberra, 1941-2010. 
                                                            
2 Please note that the filmmakers’ names were not preserved in these newsreels.  These films were 
restored by ScreenSound Australia. 
560 
 
The Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, 1941-1945. 
The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 1941-1945. 
The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 1941-1945. 
The Mercury, Hobart, 1941-1945. 
The New York Times, New York, 1941-1945. 
The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 1941-2010. 
The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Teaching with 
Documents:  A Date Which Will Live in Infamy”, College Park, 2009. 
The Washington Post, Washington DC, 1941-1945. 
The West Australian, Perth, 1941-2010. 
Time, New York, 1941-2008. 
Truman, Harry S., “Extracts from the Press Conference”, in John T. Woolley and 
Gerhard Peters (eds), The American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, 1945. 
—— “Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Lend-Lease 
Act”, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Independence, 17 April 1945. 
Universal Studios (producer), Modern History:  Franklin D. Roosevelt – Six Fireside 
Chats, 1933-1938, (newsreels), Internet Archive, United States of America,  
1933-1938. 
U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical National Population Estimates:  July 1, 1900 to  
July 1, 1999”, Washington DC, 28 June 2000. 
Whitington, Don, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1977. 
Wilson, Roland, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, nos 32, 36, 1939, 1947. 
Wyler, William (director), Sidney Franklin (producer), Mrs Miniver (movie), Metro 
Goldwyn Mayer, USA, 1942. 
 
 
564 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY – WORKS CITED 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES1
 
 
 
ABC Radio National, “Louise Mack: Woman War Correspondent”, 2004. 
ABC Television (producer), National Press Club Address – Julia Gillard (Prime 
Minister) (television program), Canberra, 15 July 2010. 
About Canada Multimedia Study Guide Resources, “Conscription for Wartime 
Service”, Mount Allison University, 2001. 
Addison, Paul, Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005. 
Adorno, Theodor and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Verso, London, 
1944. 
Allen, Rae, “A history of local radio in Brisbane”, ABC Brisbane, Brisbane,  
18 February 2008. 
Altheide, David L., Qualitative media analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
1996. 
Arnold, Bruce, “Australasian Telecommunications: Beginnings (History)”, Caslon 
Analytics, Braddon, 2005. 
——  “Herald & Weekly Times: Overview”, Ketupa.net – A Media Industry 
Resource, 2007. 
                                                            
1 Anonymous sources (particularly pertaining to newspaper articles) were included in the 
relevant footnotes, but not in the final bibliography.  As previously mentioned, the place of 
publication was not always specified for a source (particularly website references).  For 
online sources, the specific Uniform Resource Locator (URL) was cited in the relevant 
footnotes in earlier chapters, but not repeated in the bibliography. 
565 
 
Arrowsmith, Robyn, “Travelling for Love: journeys of WWII war brides”, State 
Library of Queensland, South Brisbane, 2008. 
Afshari, Reza, “A Historic Moment in Iran”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 4, 
November 2009, pp. 839-855. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “Celebrating 100 years of Radio, 12th 
December 1901-2001”, 2008. 
——  (producer), Four Corners: The Men Who Saved Australia (television 
program – transcript), Sydney, 27 April 1998. 
Australian Government Department of Defence, “Australia’s Commitment in 
Afghanistan”, Canberra, October 2010. 
——  “History of Victoria Barracks,” Southbank, 2008. 
——  “Iraq Troop Numbers Clarified”, Canberra, 2010. 
——  “Operation Kruger”, Canberra, 2010. 
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “United Nations: 
Our historical involvement”, Canberra, 2008. 
Australian Government Department of Veterans’ Affairs, “Australians at War”, 
Canberra, 2001. 
Australian Newspaper History Group, Australian Newspaper History Group 
Newsletter, no. 3, January 2000. 
Australian Press Council, The State of the News Print Media in Australia Report 
2006, Sydney, 2006. 
——  The State of the News Print Media in Australia Report 2008, Sydney, 2008.  
Australian War Memorial, “Australia, Britain & Canada in the Second 
World War”, Canberra, 2005-2006. 
——  “Australian Military Units – Kokoda Track Campaign”, Canberra, 2009 
——  “Australians at war: casualties as a result of service with Australian units”, 
Canberra, 2010. 
566 
 
——  “Empire Air Training Scheme”, Canberra, 2010. 
——  “Guide to the Papers of Sir William Webb”, Canberra, collection no. 
3DRL/2481, 2004. 
——  “Korean War (1950-53)”, Canberra, 2010. 
——  “Malayan Emergency, 1950-60”, Canberra, 2010. 
——  “Siege of Tobruk”, Canberra, 2009. 
——  “This Month in Australian Military History”, Canberra, 2009. 
——  “Vietnam War (1962-75)”, Canberra, 2010. 
Australian Women’s Archives Project, “Women Journalists in Australian History”, 
Nowra, 2008. 
Baldoni, John, Great communication secrets of great leaders, McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 2003. 
Barker, Chris, Global Television: An Introduction, Blackwell Publishers, Malden and 
Oxford, 1997. 
Barnhurst, Kevin G. and John Nerone, “Journalism History”, in Karin Wahl-
Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (eds), The Handbook of Journalism Studies, 
Routledge, New York and Abingdon, 2009, pp. 17-28. 
Barns, Greg, Selling the Australian Government: Politics and Propaganda from 
Whitlam to Howard, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2005. 
Barthes, Roland, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers, Paladin Grafton, London, 1973. 
Bastien, Frédérick, “Beyond Sex and Saxophones: Interviewing Practices and 
Political Substance on Televised Talk Shows”, The Canadian Political Science 
Review, vol. 3, no. 2, June 2009, pp. 70-88. 
Battye, O.K., “Harper, Charles (1842 – 1912)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 4, 1972, pp. 348-349. 
Baudrillard, Jean, “The Implosion of Meaning in the Media and the Implosion of the 
Social in the Masses”, in Kathleen Woodward (ed.), The Myths of Information: 
Technology and Postindustrial Culture, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980, 
pp. 137-148. 
567 
 
Beasley, Maurine H., “Eleanor Roosevelt’s Press Conferences: Case Study in Class, 
Gender, and Race”, The Social Science Journal, vol. 37, no. 4, October 2000, pp. 
517-528. 
Beaverbrook, Maxwell Aitken, Men and Power, 1917-1918, Archon Books, London, 
1968. 
——  Politicians and the War, 1914-1916, Archon Books, London, 1969. 
Beazley, Kim C., “Curtin as Leader of the ALP”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, 1997. 
Bennett, W. Lance, News: The Politics of Illusion, Addison Wesley Longman, New 
York, 2003. 
Berger, Arthur Asa, Media Analysis Techniques, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 
London and New Delhi, 1982. 
Bergman, Teresa, “Can Patriotism Be Carved In Stone?: A Critical Analysis of Mt. 
Rushmore’s Orientation Films”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 1, spring 
2008, pp. 89-112. 
Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, London, 1969. 
——  Freedom and its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, Chatto & 
Windus, London, 2002. 
——  The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1997. 
Best, Geoffrey, Churchill and War, Hambledon and London, London, 2005. 
Black, David, “Assessments of the Curtin-MacArthur relationship”, John Curtin 
Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2006. 
——  “Australian Governments 1939-1945”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial 
Library, Bentley, 2006. 
——  “Biography of Elsie Curtin”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, 2008. 
568 
 
——  “Biography of John Curtin”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, 2009. 
——  “Curtin as an Election Leader”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, 2008. 
——  ‘Friendship is a Sheltering Tree’: John Curtin’s letters 1907 to 1945, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2001. 
——  (ed.), In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings, Paradigm 
Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995. 
——  “Menzies and Curtin in World War Two: A comparative essay”, John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2006. 
—— “The Art of the Possible: Creating an independent Australian foreign policy 
1941-1945”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2004. 
Black, Edwin, “Hitler’s Carmaker”, Jewish Virtual Library, 2010. 
Bolton, G. C., “Evatt, Herbert Vere (Bert) (1894 - 1965)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 14, 1996, pp. 108-114. 
Bongiorno, Frank, “Aboriginality and Historical Consciousness: Bernard O’Dowd 
and the Creation of an Australian National Imaginary”, Aboriginal History, vol. 24, 
2000, pp. 39-61. 
Bonner, Thomas, Our Recent Past, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1963. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, “The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic 
Field”, in Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (eds), Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field, 
Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, 2005, pp. 29-47. 
Bradenburg, Earnest and Waldo W. Braden, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt”, in Marie 
Kathryn Hochmuth (ed.), History and Criticism of American Public Address, 
Longmans, Green and Co., New York, vol. 3, 1958. 
Brands, Hal, “Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and Policy in the American Debate over the 
Japanese Emperor during World War II”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 8, no. 3, 
2005, pp. 431-451. 
569 
 
Brennan, Niall, Damien Parer: Cameraman, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 
1994. 
Bridge, Carl, “1932: A Hell of a Year by Gerald Stone” (Gerald Stone), Reviews in 
Australian Studies, vol. 1, no. 9, 2006, pp. 1-2. 
_____ (ed.), From Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the 
United States since the 1930s, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1991. 
Bridge, Carl and Kent Fedorowich, “Mapping the British world”, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 31, no. 2, 1 May 2003, pp. 1-15. 
Buhite, Russell D., “Book review” (John Toland and Gordon W. Prange),  
The American Historical Review, vol. 88, no. 2, April 1983, pp. 496–498. 
Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies In 
Governmentality: With Two Lectures By And An Interview With Michel Foucault, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991. 
Campbell, Heather, “Diary of a Labour Man”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 
Bentley, 2008. 
——  “Doing the best for the country: War Cabinet and Advisory War Council”, 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2004. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Digital Archives, “King diaries released”, 
Toronto, 2006. 
Canadian Communications Foundation, “Timeline: The History of Canadian 
Broadcasting”, Ontario, 2005. 
——  “Parliamentary Power”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 
2004. 
Case, Gordon C., “The Lessons of Munich: Mackenzie King’s Campaign to Prepare 
Canada for War”, Canadian Military Journal, vol. 5, no. 4, 2004-2005. 
570 
 
Casey, Steven, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, 
and the War Against Nazi Germany, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New 
York, 2001. 
Cawley, R. McGreggor and William Chaloupka, “American Governmentality: 
Michel Foucault and Public Administration”, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 41, 
no. 1, September 1997, pp. 28-42. 
Chandler, Daniel, Semiotics, Routledge, London and New York, 2002. 
—— “The ‘Grammar’ of Television and Film”, Aberystwyth University, 
Aberystwyth, 1994. 
Chantrill, Paul, “Social Policy Development in Australia and Canada: Historical and 
Comparative Approaches”, Australian-Canadian Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 1999,  
pp. 41-58. 
Charnock, David, “How Secure is the Coalition’s Majority?  Partisan Alignments at 
the 1996 Federal Election”, in G. Crowder et al (eds), Australian Political Studies 
1997, Flinders University Department of Politics, Adelaide, 1997, pp. 187-200. 
Charnock, David and Peter Ellis, “The Structure of the Australian Party System and 
its Strategic Consequences”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 38, no. 3, 
November 2003, pp. 423-443. 
Churchill at Chartwell: The World’s Only Winston Churchill Bookshop, New York, 
2008. 
Churchill, Randolph S. and Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Heinemann, 
London, 8 vols, 1966-1981. 
Churchill, Winston S., A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Cassell, London, 
4 vols, 1952-1956. 
——  The Second World War, 6 vols, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1948-1953.  
Cleary, Helen, Phil Edwards, Bruce Robinson and Victoria Cook, “WW2 
People’s War”, BBC History, London, 2003-2005. 
571 
 
Coatney, Caryn, Australian Media Coverage of Asia: The Need to Exist and to Have 
a Name, MA thesis, Journalism Department, Curtin University of Technology, 
Bentley, 1997. 
——  “Curtin is Doing a Splendid Job’: How a Wartime Labour Prime Minister 
Won Press Support”, in Bobbie Oliver (ed.) Labour History in the New 
Century, Black Swan Press, Perth, pp. 91-101. 
——  “John Curtin and Franklin Delano Roosevelt: A Cross-National Case Study 
of Media Agenda Setting in the U.S.-Australian Alliance, 1941-1945”, 
Midwest Political Science Association: 68th Annual National Conference, 
Chicago, 22 April 2010. 
Cockburn, S., “Dumas, Sir Frederick Lloyd (1891 – 1973)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 14, 1996, pp. 44-46. 
Cohen, Michael J., “The Churchill-Gilbert Symbiosis: Myth and Reality, Martin 
Gilbert, Churchill and the Jews”, Modern Judaism: A Journal of Jewish Ideas and 
Experience, vol. 28, no. 2, 2008, pp. 204-228. 
Coorey, Phillip, “Rudd’s Night in Election Debates”, Brisbane Times, Brisbane, 22 
October 2007. 
Cracraft, James, “A Berlin for Historians”, History and Theory, vol. 41, October 
2002, pp. 277-300. 
Craig, Geoffrey, The Media, Politics and Public Life, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 
2004. 
Crawford, Fiona, “Beyond the Bakelite Box: a history of commercial radio in 
Australia”, Macquarie University News, North Ryde, 2003. 
Crawford, Robert “An informed citizenry? Advertising and propaganda in wartime 
Australia”, in Sybil Nolan (ed.), When Journalism Meets History 2003, RMIT 
Publishing, Melbourne, 2004. 
—— “Modernising Menzies, Whitlam, and Australian Elections”, The Drawing 
Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3, March 2004, 
pp. 137-161. 
572 
 
Crisp, L.F., The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901-1951, Hale & Iremonger, 
Sydney, 1978. 
Crowder, George, “Pluralism, Relativism and Liberalism in Isaiah Berlin”, 
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, Hobart, 29 September– 
1 October 2003. 
——  Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
Cryle, Denis, “Australian newspaper industry: Intercolonial perspectives”, Australian 
Studies  in Journalism, no. 1, 1992, pp. 101-112. 
Cunneen, Chris, “Gloucester, first Duke of (1900 - 1974)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 14, 1996, pp. 281-282. 
Cunningham, Stuart and Graeme Turner (eds), The Media and Communications in 
Australia, Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, first and second editions, 2002 and 2006. 
Curran, James, “Rethinking the media as a public sphere”, in Peter Dahlgren and 
Colin Sparks (eds), Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public 
Sphere, Routledge, London and New York, 1997, pp. 27-57. 
——  The Power of Speech: Australian Prime Ministers Defining the National 
Image, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2004. 
Curthoys, Ann, “Introduction: Histories of Journalism”, in Ann Curthoys and 
Julianne Schulz (eds), Journalism: Print, Politics and Popular Culture, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1999, pp. 1-9. 
Curthoys, Ann, Julianne Schultz, and Paula Hamilton, “A history of Australian 
journalism, 1890 to the present: report on a research project”, Australian Studies in 
Journalism, no. 2, 1992, pp. 45-52. 
Curtis, Bruce, “Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible 
Discovery”, Canadian Journal of Sociology, vol. 27, no. 4, fall 2002, pp. 505-533. 
Davidson, Ron, “John Curtin: From Revolutionary Firebrand to Journalist in Spirit”, 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2000. 
573 
 
Day, David, “Curtin as Hero”, The Sydney Papers, vol. 12, no. 2, autumn 2000,  
pp. 60-67.  
——  John Curtin: A life, HarperCollinsPublishers, Sydney, 1999. 
——  “John Joseph Curtin”, in Michelle Grattan (ed.), Australian Prime Ministers, 
New Holland Publishers, Sydney, Auckland, London and Cape Town, 
revised edition, 2008, pp. 217-237. 
——  The great betrayal: Britain, Australia and the onset of the Pacific War, 
1939-42, Angus & Robertson, North Ryde and London, 1988. 
Day, Trevor, “Twelve Writing Tips for Administrative Staff”, University of Bath, 
Bath, 2008. 
Dayan, Daniel and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1992. 
Dear, I.C.B. and Foot, M.R.D., The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
Democratic Labor Party, “Our History”, Melbourne, 2010. 
Denemark, David, “Mass Media and Media Power in Australia”, in Shaun Wilson, 
Gabrielle Meagher, Rachel Gibson, David Denemark and Mark Western (eds), 
Australian Social Attitudes: The First Report, University of New South Wales Press, 
Sydney, 2005, pp. 220-239. 
de Saussure, Ferdinand, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris, Open 
Court, Chicago, 1995. 
de Souza, Poppy, “Road to Kokoda (1942)”, National Film and Sound Archive, 
Acton, 2009. 
D’Haenens, Leen, Nicholas Jankowski and Ard Heuvelman, “News in online and 
print newspapers: differences in reader consumption and recall”, New Media & 
Society, vol. 6, no. 3, 2004, pp. 363-382. 
574 
 
Druckman, James N., “The Power of Television Images: The First Kennedy-Nixon 
Debate Revisited”, The Journal of Politics, vol. 65, no. 2, May 2003, pp. 559-571. 
Dulles, Foster Rhea and Gerald E. Ridinger, “The Anti-Colonial Policies Of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 1, March 1955. 
Economou, Nick and Stephen Tanner, Media, Power and Politics, Pearson Education 
Australia, Frenchs Forest, 2008. 
Edmondson, Ray, “The Voice of Australia: Cinesound Review”, The Orphans III 
Conference, Columbia, September 2002. 
Elkin, P., Our Opinions and the National War Effort, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 
1941. 
Ericson, Richard V., “How Journalists Visualize Fact”, The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 560, November 1998, pp. 
83-95. 
Ericson, Richard V., Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Visualizing 
Deviance: A Study of News Organizations, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 
1987. 
Errington, Wayne and Narelle Miragliotta, “From the Gallery to the Parliament: 
Journalists in the House of Representatives and Senate, 1901-2007”, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 55, no. 4, 2009, pp. 530-543. 
Ester, Helen, “The media”, in Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison (eds), Silencing 
Dissent: How the Australian Government is controlling public opinion and stifling 
debate, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2007, pp. 101-123. 
—— “Who’s Been Watching the Watchers? Australian Political Journalism”, 
ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-7. 
Evans, Raymond and Jacqui Donegan, “The Battle of Brisbane”, Politics and 
Culture, no. 4, 2004. 
575 
 
Falasca-Zamponi, Simonetta, “The Aesthetics of Politics: Symbol, Power and 
Narrative in Mussolini’s Fascist Italy”, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 9, no. 4, 
November 1992, pp. 75-91. 
Fallows, Carol, War: Australian Memories in Black and White, Murdoch Books, 
Sydney, 2005. 
Farr, Malcolm, “Rudd beats Howard in federal election debate”, The Daily 
Telegraph, Sydney, 22 October 2007. 
Farrow, Fred, “Churchill and the General Strike”, International Churchill Societies 
1994-95, London, 1995. 
Feldman, Allen, “On Cultural Anesthesia: From Desert Storm to Rodney King”, in 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois (eds), Violence in War and Peace: An 
Anthology, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2003, pp. 207-216. 
—— “War and Media Theory” (syllabus), Department of Media, Culture and 
Communication, New York University, New York, 2009. 
Feldstein, Mark, “Watergate Revisited”, American Journalism Review, 
August/September 2004. 
Felski, Rita, Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
Fernandez, Joseph, Media Law Handbook, Network Books, Australia Research 
Institute, Perth, fifth edition, 2007. 
Ferns, Henry Stanley, The age of Mackenzie King: the rise of the leader, Heinemann, 
London, 1955. 
Ferris, Paul, The house of Northcliffe: A Biography of an Empire, The World 
Publishing Company, New York, 1972. 
Finch, Lynette, “The man in the street and Second World War propaganda”, Journal 
of Australian Studies, vol. 23, no. 60, 1999, pp. 96-105. 
576 
 
Fiske, John, Introduction to communication studies, Methuen, London, 1982. 
——  Reading the Popular, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1989. 
Fitzgerald, Scott, Corporations and Cultural Industries: Time Warner, Bertlesmann, 
and News Corporation, PhD thesis, Curtin University of Technology, Bentley, 2008. 
Fleischer, Richard and Akira Kurosawa (directors), Elmo Williams (producer), Tora! 
Tora! Tora! (movie), 20th Century Fox, United States of America, 1970. 
Flynn, John T., Country Squire in the White House, Doubleday, Doran and Company 
Inc., New York, 1940. 
—— The Roosevelt Myth, The Devin-Adair Co., New York, 1948.   
Foucault, Michel, Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison, trans. A. Sheridan, 
Allen Lane Penguin Books, London, 1977. 
——  “Film and Popular Memory: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” trans. 
Martin Jordin, Radical Philosophy, vol. 11, summer 1975, pp. 24-29. 
——  “Method”, in Louise Amoore (ed.), The Global Resistance Reader, 
Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 2005, pp. 86-91. 
——  “Orders of discourse”, trans. Rupert Swyer, Social Science Information, vol. 
10, no. 2, April 1971, pp. 7-30. 
——  Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, 
trans. David Macey in Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana and François 
Ewald (eds), Penguin Books, London, 2003. 
——  “Technologies of the Self”, in L.H. Martin, H. Gutman and P.H. Hutton 
(eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, Tavistock 
Publications, London, 1988. 
——  “Truth and Power”, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and 
Kate Soper in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings 1972-1977, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980, pp. 
109-133. 
Fowler, Roger, Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press, 
Routledge, London and New York, 1991. 
577 
 
Freudenberg, Graham, Churchill and Australia, Pan Macmillan Australia, Sydney, 
2008. 
Frow, John, Cultural Studies & Cultural Value, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1995. 
Gallagher, Hugh, “The Politics of Polio”, Social Education, vol. 60, no. 5, 1996, pp. 
264-266. 
Galston, William A., “Moral Pluralism and Liberal Democracy: Isaiah Berlin’s 
Heterodox Liberalism”, The Review of Politics, vol. 71, 2009, pp. 85-99. 
Galtung, Johan and Mari Ruge, “The structure of foreign news: the presentation of 
the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers”, Journal of 
International Peace Research, vol. 1, 1965, pp. 64-91. 
Garay, K.E., “Empires of the Mind? C.K. Ogden, Winston Churchill and Basic 
English”, Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers, vol. 23, no.1, 1988, 
pp. 280-291. 
Garcia, Maria M. and Guy J. Golan, “Not Enough Time to Cover all the News: An 
Analysis of International News Coverage in Time and Newsweek”, Journal of 
Global Mass Communication, vol. 1, nos 1-2, 2008, pp. 41-56. 
Gasher, Mike, “Researchers explore the geography of online news”, The Canadian 
Journalism Project, 18 June 2008. 
Gasher, Mike and Sandra Gabrielle, “Increasing circulation?  a comparative news-
flow study of the Montreal Gazette’s hard-copy and on-line editions”, Journalism 
Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 2004, pp. 311-23. 
Gibbney, H. J., “Shakespeare, Arthur Thomas (1897 – 1975)”, Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 573-574. 
578 
 
Gibson, Rachel K., Wainer Lusoli, Andrea Römmele and Stephen J. Ward, 
“Introduction: representative democracy and the Internet”, in Rachel K. Gibson, 
Andrea Römmele and Stephen J. Ward (eds), Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, 
organisation and participation via new ICTs, Routledge, London and New York, 
2004, pp. 1-16. 
Gilbert, Gregory P., “The British Pacific Fleet”, Navy, Canberra, 2011. 
Goldberg, Jonah, “Western Civilization and Other Fairy Tales”, National Review 
Online, New York, 6 February 2008. 
Murray Goot, “Rubensohn, Solomon (Sim) (1904 - 1979)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 16, Melbourne University Press, 2002, pp. 144-146. 
Government of South Australia, “SA Newspapers: Early History”, Adelaide, 2007. 
Graff, Henry F. (ed.), Presidents: A Reference History, Macmillan Publishing 
Company, London, 1997. 
Grant, Donald, “Smith, James MacCallum (1868 – 1939)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 651-652. 
Grattan, Michelle, “The Prime Minister and the Press: A Study in Intimacy”, in 
David Black (ed.), John Curtin’s Legacy: A series of public lectures from the John 
Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Perth, 
2000, pp. 38-48. 
Grier, Peter, “An Obama dog: for the kids and the country”, The Christian Science 
Monitor, Boston, 21 November 2008, p. 1. 
Green, F. C., “Davies, John (1813 – 1872)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 4, 1972, pp. 27-28. 
Grey, Jeffrey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Port 
Melbourne, third edition, 2008. 
579 
 
Griffen Foley, Bridget, “In Conversation with Bridget Griffen-Foley”, Global Media 
Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, 2009. 
——  “Packer, Sir Douglas Frank Hewson (1906 – 1974)”, Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 15, 2000, pp. 553-556. 
——  “Political opinion polling and the professionalization of public relations: 
Keith Murdoch, Robert Menzies, and the Liberal Party of Australia”, 
Australian Journalism Review, vol. 24, no. 1, 2002, pp. 41-59. 
——  “The Crumbs are Better than a Feast Elsewhere: Australian Journalists on 
Fleet Street”, Journalism History, vol. 28, no. 1, spring 2002, pp. 26-37. 
——  “The Fairfax, Murdoch and Packer Dynasties in Twentieth-Century 
Australia”, Media History, vol. 8, no. 1, 2002, pp. 89-102. 
——  The house of Packer: the making of a media empire, Allen & Unwin, St 
Leonards, 1999. 
——  “The Kangaroo is Coming Into Its Own’: R. G. Casey, Earl Newsom and 
Public Relations in The 1940s”, Australasian Journal Of American Studies, 
vol. 23, no. 2, December 2004, pp.1-20. 
Grimshaw, Patricia, Marilyn Lake, Ann McGrath and Marian Quartly, Creating a 
Nation 1788-2007, API Network, Perth, 2006. 
Grossberg, Lawrence, Ellen Wartella and D. Charles Whitney, Mediamaking: Mass 
Media in Popular Culture, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, first edition, 1998. 
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich, In 1926: Living At The Edge Of Time, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
Habermas, Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989. 
Hall, Richard, “Spin Doctor: the fine art of the parliamentary press secretary”, 
National Library of Australia News, February 1998, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 3-6. 
580 
 
Hall, Stuart, “Encoding/decoding”, in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe 
and Paul Willis (eds), Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural 
Studies 1972-79, Hutchinson, London, 1980, pp. 128-138. 
—— “The determinations of news photographs”, in Stanley Cohen and Jock 
Young (eds), The manufacture of news: social problems, deviance and the 
mass media, Constable and Co, London, 1973. 
Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing 
the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order, The Macmillan Press, London 
and Basingstoke, 1981. 
Hallahan, K.W.L., “Mackenzie King: Rockefeller’s ‘other’ public relations 
counsellor in Colorado”, Public Relations Review, vol. 29, no. 4, November 2003, 
pp. 401-414. 
Hammond, William H., “Book review: Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship 
and the US Press and Radio in World War II” (Michael S. Sweeney), The Journal of 
Military History, vol. 65, no. 3, 2001, pp. 840-841. 
Hansen, Anders, Simon Cottle, Ralph Negrine and Chris Newbold, Mass 
Communication Research Methods, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire and London, 1998. 
Hanusch, Folker and Levi Olibjiofor, “Toward a More Holistic Analysis of 
International News Flows”, Journal of Global Mass Communication, vol. 1, nos 1-2, 
2008, pp. 9-21. 
Harcup, Tony and Deidre O’Neill, “What is News?  Galtung and Ruge Revisited”, 
Journalism Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 2001, pp. 261-280. 
Hardman, Robert, “Winston Churchill’s extraordinary relationship with the founding 
fathers of the Mail”, Daily Mail, London, 8 February 2008. 
Harvey, Claire, “Looking Back Over 70 Years at The Sunday Telegraph”, The Daily 
Telegraph, Sydney, 20 November 2009. 
581 
 
Harris, Carol “Women Under Fire in World War Two”, British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2009. 
Harrison, Shirley and Kevin Moloney, “Comparing two public relations pioneers: 
American Ivy Lee and British John Elliot”, Public Relations Review, vol. 30, 2004, 
pp. 205-215. 
Hartley, John, Communication, Cultural and Media Studies: The Key Concepts, 
Routledge, London, 2002.  
——  Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity, Popular Culture, Arnold, London 
and New York, 1996. 
——  The Politics of Pictures: The Creation Of The Public In The Age Of Popular 
Media, Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 1992. 
——  Understanding News, Metheun & Co., London and New York, 1982. 
Hasluck, Paul, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra, vols 1-2, 1952-1970. 
Haugen, Brenda, Winston Churchill: British Soldier, Writer, Statesman, Compass 
Point Books, Minneapolis, 2006. 
Hazlehurst, Cameron, Sally Whitehead and Christina Woodland, A Guide to the 
Papers of British Cabinet Ministers 1900-1964, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996. 
Hays, Leigh, Criena Fitzgerald and Andrew MacDonald, “Western Australia and 
Federation: Frederick Vosper”, State Library of Western Australia, Perth, 2000. 
Hearn, Mark, “Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège 
de France, 1975-76” (Michel Foucault), Labour History, no. 86, May 2004,  
pp. 218-220. 
Heilbronner, Oded, “From a Culture for Youth to a Culture of Youth: Trends in the 
Historiography of Western Youth Cultures”, Contemporary European History, vol. 
17, no. 4, 2008, pp. 575-591. 
582 
 
Henningham, John, “Journalists’ perception of bias”, Australian Journalism Review, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 1995, pp. 28-31. 
——  “Political Journalists’ Political Preferences and Professional Values”, The 
Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no. 2, 1995, pp. 321-334. 
Hicks, Joe and Grahame Allen, “A Century of Change: Trends in UK statistics since 
1900”, research paper 99/111, House of Commons Library, London, 21 December 
2009, pp. 1-33. 
Hildson, Anne-Marie, “What the Papers Say: Representing Violence Against 
Overseas Contract Workers”, Violence Against Women, vol. 9, no. 6, June 2003,  
pp. 698-722. 
Hilvert, John, Blue Pencil Warriors: Censorship and Propaganda in World War II, 
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1984. 
——  “Bonney, Edmund Garnet (1883 - 1959)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 13, 1993, p. 215. 
Hirst, John, Looking for Australia, Black Inc., Melbourne, 2010. 
History Group of the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, “Yankee boys, 
Kiwi girls - US forces in New Zealand”, Wellington, 2010. 
Hobson, Harold, Phillip Knightley and Leonard Russell, The Pearl of Days: An 
Intimate Memoir of The Sunday Times, 1822-1972, Hamilton, London, 1972. 
Holden, W. Sprague, Australia Goes To Press, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1961. 
Holt, Richard, “Bradman and the British”, ESPNcricinfo, London, 2002. 
Horner, David, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of 
Australian Defence Policy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2000. 
Houchin, Betty, FDR and the News Media, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 
1990. 
583 
 
Howell, Gwyneth and Bruce Da Silva, “New media, first time voters and the 2007 
Australian federal election”, Public Communication Review, vol. 1, 2010, pp. 27-36. 
Hubbard, Chris, An Australian introduction to international relations, Pearson 
Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, 2008. 
——  Australian and US military cooperation: fighting common enemies, 
Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, 2005. 
Hubbert, Julie, “‘Whatever Happened to Great Movie Music?’  Cinéma Vérité and 
Hollywood Film Music of the Early 1970s”, American Music, vol. 21, no. 2, summer 
2003, pp. 180-213. 
Huckfeldt, Robert, Jeffrey Levine, William Morgan and John Sprague, “Accessibility 
and the Political Utility of Partisan and Ideological Orientations”, American Journal 
of Political Science, vol. 43, no. 3, July 1999, pp. 888-911. 
Hudson, W.J., “Book review” (Henry Mayer), The Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 1, no. 2, September 1965, p. 138. 
——  “Casey, Richard Gavin Gardiner [Baron Casey] (1890 - 1976)”, Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, vol. 13, Melbourne University Press, 1993,  
pp. 381-385. 
Hunt, Lyall, “Hackett, Sir John Winthrop (1848 – 1916)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 9, 1983, pp. 150-53. 
——  “Simons, John Joseph (Jack) (1882 – 1948)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 608-609. 
Huurdeman, Anton A., The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, John Wiley 
& Sons, Hoboken, 2003. 
Inglis, K.S., This is the ABC: The Australian Broadcasting Commission 1932-1983, 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1983. 
Inglis, Ken, “Parliamentary Speech”, Papers on Parliament, no. 28, November 1996, 
pp. 45-60. 
584 
 
Isaacs, Victor and Rod Kirkpatrick, Two hundred years of Sydney Newspapers: A 
short history, Rural Press, North Richmond, 2003. 
Jackson, Ashley, “Churchill: Warrior and Writer”, The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, vol. 96, no. 389, 2007, pp. 193-199. 
Jackson, Sally, “Glossies to play a key part in Gillard crusade”, The Australian, 
Surry Hills, 5 July 2010. 
James, Barbara, “Historical Introduction to Northern Territory Newspapers”, 
Northern Territory Library, Darwin, 2007. 
Jerit, Jennifer and Jason Barabas, “Surveillance Knowledge and the Mass Media”, 
Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 
2005, pp. 1-36. 
John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, “John Curtin: Fairest & Best: Man on the 
Tram”, Bentley, 2006. 
——  “John Curtin’s Legacy: Leading Australia from War to Peace”, Bentley, 
2005. 
Johnston, Derek Lukin, “Winston Churchill: Master of the English Language”, 
Finest Hour, The Churchill Centre, no. 46, winter 1984-85, pp. 6-11. 
Johnston, Mark, “The Hinge of Fate: Australians and Turning Points of World War 
II”, Tasmanian Historical Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2001, pp. 28-41. 
Josephi, Beate, “Federation: The West Australian between Empire and Nation”, 
ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-17. 
——  “Reluctant consent: The West Australian’s slow embrace of a sense of 
nationhood”, in Denis Cryle and Jean Hillier (eds), Consent and Consensus: 
Politics, Media and Governance in 20th century Australia, API Network, 
Perth, 2005, pp. 41-58. 
Kang, Michael S., “From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge 
for Campaign Finance Law”, George Washington Law Review, vol. 73, no. 5/6, 
2005, pp. 1070-1095. 
585 
 
Kelley, Jonathan and M.D.R. Evans, “Trends In Educational Attainment in 
Australia”, WwA: Worldwide Attitudes, 26 August 1996, pp. 1-8. 
Kenny, Peter, A Handbook of Public Speaking for Scientists & Engineers, IOP 
Publishing Ltd (Institute of Physics Publishing), London, 1988. 
Kerr, George D., “Skirting the Minefield: Press Censorship, Politics and French 
Canada, 1940”, Canadian Journal of Communication, vol. 8, no. 2, 1982, pp. 46-64. 
Kesler, Charles R., “How will Obama’s liberalism shape America?”  The Christian 
Science Monitor, Boston, 11 February 2009. 
Kirkpatrick, Rod, “Select chronology of significant Australian press events from 
1851 – 1900”, National Library of Australia, Canberra, September 2006. 
——  “War and lasting change: The battle for survival on the provincial 
newspaper front”, ejournalist, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-12. 
Kluge, Alexander, Thomas Y. Levin and Miriam B. Hansen, “On Film and the 
Public Sphere”, New German Critique, no. 24/25, autumn 1981-winter 1982,  
pp. 206-220. 
Kuduk, Stephanie, “A Sword of a Song”: Swinburne’s Republican Aesthetics in 
Songs Before Sunrise”, Victorian Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, 2001, pp. 253-278. 
Landers, James, The weekly war: newsmagazines and Vietnam, University of 
Missouri Press, Columbia, 2004. 
Lang, Marjory, Women Who Made the News: Female Journalists in Canada, 1880-
1945, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Kingston, 1999. 
Langworth, Richard M. (ed.), Churchill by Himself, Ebury Press, St Ives, 2008. 
Lawson, Valerie, “Norton, Ezra (1897 – 1967)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 15, 2000, pp. 495-497. 
Lee, Norman E., John Curtin: Saviour of Australia, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
1983. 
586 
 
LeMahieu, D.L., A Culture for Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. 
Levin, Linda Lotridge, The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. Early, 
America’s First Modern Press Secretary, Prometheus Books, New York, 2008. 
Levine, Michele and Gary Morgan, “The Power of Newspaper Editorial & 
Advertising”, Country Press Association 106th Annual Conference, Sydney, 2006. 
Library and Archives Canada, “A Real Companion and Friend: The diary of William 
Lyon Mackenzie King”, Ottawa, 2002. 
——  “Highlights from the Parliamentary Life of the Right Honourable William 
Lyon Mackenzie King, 1948”, Ottawa, 2002. 
——  “Mackenzie King on the Airwaves and the Silver Screen”, Ottawa, 2002. 
—— “Saving a National Treasure: The Archival History of the Diary”, Ottawa, 
2002.  
—— “The Political Man of Letters: Mackenzie King as Writer and Bookman”, 
Ottawa, 2002. 
Liebman, Stuart, “On New German Cinema, Art, Enlightenment, and the Public 
Sphere: An Interview with Alexander Kluge”, October, vol. 46, autumn 1988,  
pp. 23-59. 
Lim, Elvin T., “The Lion and the Lamb: De-mythologising Franklin Roosevelt’s 
Fireside Chats”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 437-464. 
Link, Arthur S., American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890’s, 
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1955. 
Lloyd, Ann and David Robinson (eds), Movies of the Forties, Orbis Publishing, 
London, 1982. 
Lloyd, C. J., “Fraser, Allan Duncan (1902 – 1977)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 14, 1996, pp. 214-216. 
——  Parliament and the Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery  
1901-88, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988. 
587 
 
Lloyd, Clem, Profession: Journalist, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1985. 
Love, Peter, Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour Populism 1890-1950, 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984. 
—— “The Boy – His Relation to Industry’: George Swinburne on Technical 
Education and Nation Building”, in Bobbie Oliver (ed.), Labour History in 
the New Century, Black Swan Press, Perth, 2009, pp. 5-29. 
Lucy, Niall and Steve Mickler, The War on Democracy: Conservative Opinion in the 
Australian Press, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, 2006. 
Lysaght, Charles Edward, “Brendan Bracken: ‘The Fantasist Whose Dreams Came 
True’”, Finest Hour, The Churchill Centre, no. 113, 2001-2002, pp. 14-19. 
Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, transl. Peter Bondanella, Mark Musa, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998. 
Mackinnon, Rebecca, “Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civil 
discourse in China”, Public Choice, vol. 134, 2008, pp. 31-46. 
Mallon, Thomas, “Dear Cat, Dear Pig”, The New York Times, New York, 9 May 
1999. 
Marlière, Philippe, “The Rules of the Journalistic Field: Pierre Bourdieu’s 
Contribution to the Sociology of the Media”, European Journal of Communication, 
vol. 13, no. 2, 1998, pp. 219-234. 
Marsh, David, “Sports Reporting in Western Australia During the Two World 
Wars”, in Denis Cryle and Jean Hillier (eds), Consent and Consensus: Politics, 
Media and Governance in 20th century Australia, API Network, Perth, 2005,  
pp. 77-95. 
Martinelli, Diana Knott and Jeff Mucciarone, “New deal public relations: a glimpse 
into FDR press secretary Stephen Early’s work”, Public Relations Review, vol. 33, 
no. 1, March 2007, pp. 49-57. 
588 
 
Mayer, Henry, The Press in Australia, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1968. 
McCrum, Robert, “Dishing the dirt—about time too”, The Observer, London,  
23 October 2005.  
McCulloch, David, Truman, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992. 
McDonald, Neil, “Damien Parer’s Kokoda Front Line”, The National Centre for 
History Education, Australian Government Department of Education, Science and 
Training, 2002. 
——  “Getting it Right – Damien Parer, Osmar White and Chester Wilmot on the 
Kokoda Track”, The Sydney Papers, vol. 14, no. 2, 2002, pp. 96-109. 
——  “Parer, Damien Peter (1912 – 1944)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 15, 2000, pp. 566-567. 
——  “The Making of Cinesound’s ‘Assault on Salamaua’”, Murdoch University, 
Murdoch, 1987. 
McGinness, Mark, “Biography: The Swashbuckler from Hobart”, Quadrant online, 
vol. 53, no. 6, June 2009. 
McKnight, David, “Book Review: Bridget Griffen-Foley, Sir Frank Packer,  
The Young Master” (Bridget Griffen-Foley), Labour History, no. 82, November 
2002, p. 235. 
McLeod, Douglas M. and James K. Hertog, “The Manufacture of ‘Public Opinion’ 
by Reporters: Informal Cues for Public Perceptions of Protest Groups”, Discourse & 
Society, vol. 3, no. 3, July 1992, pp. 259-275. 
McMullan, John L., “News, Truth, and the Recognition of Corporate Crime”, 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, vol. 48, no. 6, October 
2006, pp. 905-939. 
McMullan, John L. and Melissa McClung, “The Media, the Politics of Truth, and the 
Coverage of Corporate Violence: The Westray Disaster and the Public Inquiry”, 
Critical Criminology, vol. 14, 2006, pp. 67-86. 
589 
 
McQuail, Denis, Mass Communication Theory, Sage Publications, London, 
Thousand Oakes and New Delhi, 1994. 
Meade, Amanda and Sally Jackson, “Worm returns as MasterChef cooks up a heated 
debate”, The Australian, Surry Hills, 22 July 2010. 
Meaney, Neville, “Britishness and Australia: Some reflections”, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 31, no. 2, 1 May 2003,  pp. 121-135.  
Melbourne Observer, “The 3AW Story – Part 1”, Melbourne, 2005. 
Mercer, Peter, “Getting the News”, Mercury Newspapers in Education, Hobart, 
2009. 
—— “The History of The Mercury”, Mercury Print Museum, Hobart, 2007. 
Mickler, Stephen Brent, Visualising Aboriginality: Image Campaigns and News 
Routines in the Western Australian Media”, PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 
Murdoch, 1996. 
Mickler, Steve, Gambling on the First Race: A Comment on Racism and Talk-back 
Radio – 6PR, the TAB, and the WA Government, The Louis St John Johnson 
Memorial Trust Fund, 1996. 
——  “Talkback Radio, Anti-elitism And Moral Decline: A Fatal Paradox?”, 
Southern Review: Communication, Politics & Culture, vol. 37, no. 3, 2005, 
pp. 29-45. 
——  The Myth of Privilege: Aboriginal Status, Media Visions, Public Ideas, 
Fremantle Arts Centre Press, South Fremantle, 1998. 
——  “The ‘Robespierre’ of the air: talkback radio, globalisation and indigenous 
issues”, Continuum, vol. 11, no. 3, 1997, pp. 23-36. 
Mickler, Steve and Alec McHoul, “Sourcing the Wave: Crime Reporting, Aboriginal 
Youth and The WA Press”, Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and 
Policy, no. 86, February 1998, pp. 122-52. 
Millar, T.B., “The Defense of Australia”, Daedalus, vol. 114, no. 1, winter 1985,  
pp. 259-279. 
590 
 
Miller, K.S., “U.S. Public Relations History: Knowledge and Limitations”, in M. E. 
Roloff (ed.), Communication Yearbook 23, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 2000, 
pp. 381-420. 
Milner, Andrew, Literature, culture and society, Routledge, London and New York, 
2004. 
Moran, Joe, Interdisciplinarity, Routledge, London and New York, 2002. 
Moreman, Tim, “Remembering the War in New Guinea”, Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra, 2010. 
Moss, Richard, “Curtain goes up on new £6 million Churchill museum”, Culture 24, 
Brighton, 9 February 2005. 
National Archives of Australia, “Australia’s Prime Ministers”, Canberra, 2008-2010. 
—— “Boer War to Vietnam”, Canberra, 2010. 
—— “Fact sheet 78 – Sir Robert Gordon Menzies”, Canberra, March 2000. 
—— “Fact sheet 88 – Australia and the United Nations”, Canberra, November 2007. 
—— “Fact sheet 127 – War Cabinet records”, Canberra, 2000. 
—— “Fact sheet 181 – Civil Constructional Corps records held in Perth”, Canberra,  
 2010. 
National Film and Sound Archive, “Australians in the First World War”, Acton, 
2008. 
——  “Australian Prime Ministers”, Acton, 2008. 
——  “Cinesound Review”, Acton, 2001. 
——  “Key Event Timeline: 1930s”, Research and Academic Outreach, 
Education, Acton, 7 January 2002. 
——  “The 1930s Golden Era of Australian Movies: A Tribute to Ken G. Hall AO 
OBE”, Acton, 1988. 
591 
 
Nicholas, Siân, “All the News that’s Fit to Broadcast”: the Popular Press versus the 
BBC, 1922-45”, in Peter Catterall, Colin Seymore-Ure and Adrian Smith (eds), 
Northcliffe’s legacy: aspects of the British popular press, 1896-1996, St Martin’s 
Press, London, Macmillan and New York, 2000, pp. 121-147. 
——  “War Report (BBC 1944-5) and the Birth of the BBC War Correspondent”, 
in Mark Connelly and David Welch (eds), War and the Media: Reportage 
and Propaganda, 1900-2003, I.B. Tauris and Co, London and New York, 
2005, pp. 139-161. 
Nichols, Robert, “The first kamikaze attack?”, Wartime, Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra, no. 28, 2004. 
Nolan, Sybil, “Half a Century of Obscurity: The Age, 1908-64”, ejournalist, vol. 1, 
no. 2, 2001, pp. 1-9. 
Northern Territory Government, “Northern Territory Newspapers”, 2007. 
Northey, R. E., “Dawson, Claude Charles (1902 - 1945)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 13, 1993, pp. 594-595. 
O’Brien, Kenneth Paul and Lynn Hudson Parsons (eds), The Home-Front War: 
World War II and American Society, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1995. 
O’Donnell, Vincent, “World War II: Film and History; The Media’s Australia [Book 
Review]” (John Whiteclay Chambers II, David Culbert and Hilary Ericksen), Metro 
Magazine: Media & Education Magazine, no. 113/114, 1998, pp. 126. 
Oliver, Bobbie, Peacemongers: Conscientious objectors to military service in 
Australia, 1911-1945, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, South Fremantle, 1997. 
——  “Fighting Labor’s Battles: Conscription, the Great Depression, and Party 
Unity”, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2010. 
——  “Rats’, ‘Scabs’, ‘Soolers’ and ‘Sinn Feiners’: A Re-assessment of the role of 
the Labour Movement in the Conscription Crisis in Western Australia, 
1916-17”, Labour History, no. 58, 1990, pp. 48-64. 
592 
 
——  “Shaping the Nation: John Curtin and Australia”, John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2001. 
——  Unity is Strength: A History of the Australian Labor Party and the Trades 
and Labour Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999, API Network, 
Bentley, 2003. 
Oliver, Myrna, “William Winter: Foreign Affairs Commentator”, Los Angeles Times, 
Los Angeles, 9 November 1999. 
O’Shaughnessy, Meghan, “The Hidden Campaign: FDR’s Health and the 1944 
Election (review)”, (Hugh E. Evans), Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 4, winter 
2003, pp. 792-794. 
Oswald, Franz, “Soft Balancing Between Friends: Transforming Transatlantic 
Relations”, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, vol. 14, 
no. 2, August 2006, pp. 145-160. 
Outram, Dorinda, “The Enlightenment Our Contemporary”, in William Clark, Jan 
Golinski and Simon Schaffer (eds), The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1999, pp. 32-40. 
Parliament of Australia, “Anzac Day 2010”, Parliamentary Library, Canberra,  
1 April 2010. 
—— “Federal election results 1901-2007”, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 
research paper no. 17, 2008-2009. 
Parliament of New South Wales, “1939 to 1965 – War and Post-War”, Sydney, 2008. 
Parliament of Victoria, “Celebrate 150 Years”, Melbourne, no. 8, February 2006. 
Parlicki, Prue Torney, Somewhere in Asia: War, Journalism and Australia’s 
Neighbours, 1941-75, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2000. 
Pasquale, Cynthia J., “Talking at the speed of confound”, The Denver Post, Denver, 
29 June 2006. 
593 
 
Paton, Graeme, “Conservative Part Conference: Schoolchildren ‘ignorant of the 
past’, says Gove”, The Telegraph, London, 5 October 2010. 
Pearson, Mark and Camille Galvin, “The Australian Parliament and press freedom in 
an international context”, Pacific Journalism Review, vol. 13, no. 2, 2007, pp. 139-
153. 
Pease, Allan, “TV debates: showbiz politics in action”, ABC News, 22 October 2007. 
Pelvin, Ric, “Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May 1942”, Australian War Memorial, 
Canberra, 2009. 
Perloff, Richard M., Political Communication: Politics, Press, and Public in 
America, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey and London, 1998. 
Persian, Jayne, “‘A National Nuisance’: The Banning of Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
Australia in 1941”, The Flinders Journal of History & Politics, vol. 25, 2008,  
pp. 4-16. 
Petersen, Neville, News Not Views: The ABC, the Press, & Politics 1932-1947, Hale 
& Iremonger, Sydney, 1993. 
Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Winning the Media 
Campaign: Methodology”, Journalism.org, Washington DC, 2008. 
Polan, Dana, “The Public’s Fear: Or, Media as Monster in Habermas, Negt, and 
Kluge”, in Bruce Robbins (ed.), The Phantom Public Sphere, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993, pp. 33-41. 
Potter, Simon J., “Strengthening the Bonds of the Commonwealth: The Imperial 
Relations Trust and Australian, New Zealand and Canadian broadcasting personnel 
in Britain, 1946-1952”, Media History, vol. 11, no. 3, December 2005, pp. 193-205. 
Powell, Graeme, “The First in the Field: Prime Ministers’ Papers in The National 
Library of Australia”, Australian Academic & Research Libraries, vol. 36, no.1, 
March 2005, pp. 54-64. 
594 
 
Prange, Gordon W., At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbour, 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1981. 
Prime Minister of Australia, “Media Centre”, Canberra, 2010-11. 
Public Broadcasting Service, “All About Public Speaking”, Falls Church, 2009. 
Public Broadcasting Service (producer), The Online News Hour (television programs 
– transcripts), Washington DC, 27 November 2008, 20 April and 24 June 2009. 
Public Broadcasting Service Online, “Eleanor Roosevelt’s tour of the South Pacific”, 
Washington DC, 1999. 
Pyvis, David, “When the AIR BEER CEER Pushed the Aussie Twang”, Issues in 
Educational Research, vol. 3, no. 1, 1993, pp. 1-15. 
Quinn, Ben, “British election: Nick Clegg wins UK’s first presidential-style TV 
debates”, The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 16 April 2010. 
Radio Heritage Foundation, “Australian Radio Dial 1931”, New Zealand, 2004-2008. 
Rahkonen, Juho, “Mapping Media and Communication Research”, Australian 
Communication Research Centre, Department of Communication, Helsingin 
Sanomat Foundation, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 2007. 
Reardon, Patrick T., “FDR books on Obama’s nightstand”, Chicago Tribune, 
Chicago, 18 November 2008. 
Redburn, H. Ashley, “Churchill and Menzies: Partners or Rivals?”, Finest Hour, The 
Churchill Centre, no. 59, spring 1988, pp. 10-12. 
Reid, Richard, “1942 – An Overview of the Battle for Australia”, Anzac Day 
Commemoration Committee of Queensland, Aspley, 1998. 
David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the 
International History of the 1940s, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 
2006. 
——  In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World 
War, Allen Lane, London, 2004. 
595 
 
Rice-Oxley, Mark, “British teach less Churchill, more global warming”, The 
Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 24 July 2007. 
Richardson, Nick, “Sir Keith Murdoch’s relationship with Prime Minister Joseph 
Lyons”, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 5 May 2006, pp. 1-11. 
Robbins, Ron Cynewulf, “Great Contemporaries: Reith of the BBC”, Finest Hour, 
The Churchill Centre, no. 82, first quarter 1994, pp. 20-24. 
Robins, Penny (executive producer), The Prime Ministers’ National Treasures: 
Robert Menzies’ Camera (television broadcast), Film Australia, Old Parliament 
House and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Canberra, 11 September 2007. 
Ross, Lloyd, John Curtin: A Biography, Macmillan Publishing Company, South 
Melbourne, 1977. 
Rothstein, Edward, “Churchill, Heroic Relic or Relevant Now?”, The New York 
Times, New York, 29 March 2003. 
——  “F.D.R. and the Stuff of His War”, The New York Times, New York, 6 
February 2006. 
Rutherford, Tony, “Voters could feel left right out in choice of lesser evil”, The West 
Australian, Perth, 3 September 2008, p. 21. 
Ryan, Peter, “Paton, Hugh (1871 - 1951)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 160-161. 
—— “Turnbull, Stanley Clive Perry (1906 - 1975)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, vol. 16, Melbourne University Press, 2002, pp. 422-423. 
Salter, David, “Who’s for Breakfast, Mr Jones?”, The Monthly, Collingwood, May 
2006. 
Santiago, Katherine, “Newark Mayor Cory Booker rapidly gains following on 
Twitter”, The Star-Ledger, New Jersey, 21 May 2009. 
596 
 
Sarantakes, Nicholas E., “The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet”, 
Joint Force Quarterly, no. 40, first quarter 2006, pp. 85-91. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet, Eyre Methuen, 
London, 1973. 
Saunders, Barry, “Fireside chats in the 21st century”, ABC News, 19 November 2008. 
Saunders, Kay and Helen Taylor, “The Reception of Black American Servicemen in 
Australia During World War II”, Journal of Black Studies, vol. 25, no. 3, January 
1995, pp. 331-348. 
Scates, Bruce, “Unemployment”, in Graeme Davison, John Hirst and Stuart 
Macintyre (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian History, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2001. 
Schatz, Thomas, Boom and Bust: American Cinema in the 1940s, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1999. 
Schoenherr, Steven, “History of the Newsreel”, University of San Diego, San Diego, 
2008. 
Schuler, Hannes (director), Hitler’s Museum: The Secret History of Art Theft During 
World War II (documentary), Kultur Video, United States and Canada, 2008. 
Schultz Julianne (ed.), Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability, and 
the Media, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
Scroop, Daniel, “The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. Early, America’s 
First Modern Press Secretary”, Times Higher Education, London, 21 November 
2008. 
Senior, Philip, “Reporting the Great Debate: Press Coverage of Australian Televised 
Leaders’ Debates”, Australian Political Science Association Conference, Melbourne, 
24-26 September 2007. 
597 
 
Serle, Geoffrey, For Australia and Labor: Prime Minister John Curtin, John Curtin 
Prime Ministerial Library, Bentley, 1998. 
——  “Murdoch, Sir Keith Arthur (1885 – 1952)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 10, 1986, pp. 622-627. 
——  “Syme, Sir Geoffrey (1873-1942)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Melbourne University Press, vol. 12, 1990, pp. 154-55. 
Seyranian, Vivianne and Michelle C. Bligh, “Presidential charismatic leadership: 
Exploring the rhetoric of social change”, The Leadership Quarterly, vol. 19, 2008, 
pp. 54-76. 
Sholl, Dianne, “John Curtin at the Westralian Worker 1917-1928”, BA (Hons) thesis, 
The University of Western Australia, Crawley, 1975. 
Sikorsky, Jonathan, “From British Cassandra to American Hero: The Churchill 
Legend in the World War II American Media”, Finest Hour, The Churchill Centre, 
no. 108, autumn 2000, pp. 30-36. 
Simons, Maarten and Jan Masschelein, “The Learning Society and Governmentality: 
An introduction”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, vol. 38, no. 4, 2006, pp. 417-
430. 
Simpson, Aislinn, “Winston Churchill didn’t really exist, say teens”, The Telegraph, 
London, 4 February 2008. 
Singleton, Gwynneth, Don Aitken, Brian Jinks and John Warhurst, Australian 
Political Institutions, Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, 2006. 
Sirico, Louis J., Jr, “Readability Studies: How Technocentrism Can Compromise 
Research and Legal Determinations”, Villanova University School of Law, School of 
Law Working Paper Series, The Berkeley Electronic Press, Berkeley, paper 104, 
2008, pp. 101-126. 
598 
 
Smith, Adrian, “The Fall and Fall of the Third Daily Herald”, in Peter Catterall, 
Colin Seymore-Ure and Adrian Smith (eds), Northcliffe’s legacy: aspects of the 
British popular press, 1896-1996, St Martin’s Press, London, Macmillan and New 
York, 2000, pp. 169-200. 
Smoller, Fredric T., The Six O’Clock Presidency: A Theory of Presidential Press 
Relations in the Age of Television, Praeger, New York, Westport and London, 1990. 
Souter, Gavin, Heralds and Angels: The House of Fairfax 1841-1990, Melbourne 
University Press, Carlton, 1991. 
Spearitt, Peter, Michele Helmrich and Ross Serle, “Defending the North: Queensland 
in the Pacific war”, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 2005. 
Spearritt, Peter and Michele Helmrich, “An enduring furphy”, Griffith Review, no. 9, 
2005. 
Stafford, David, Roosevelt and Churchill: men of secrets, Abascus, London, 1999.  
Stanley, Peter, “Remembering 1942 – The bombing of Darwin, 19 February 1942”, 
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2002. 
——  Tarakan: An Australian Tragedy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997.   
State Library of Western Australia, “Metropolitan Newspapers”, Perth, 2008.   
Steele, Richard W., “Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics”, Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 1, spring 1979, pp. 15-32. 
——  “News of the ‘Good War’: World II News Management”, Journalism 
Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4, winter 1985, pp. 707-16, 783. 
Stempel III, Guido H. and Jacqueline Nash Gifford, Historical dictionary of political 
communication in the United States, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 1999. 
Sterling, Christopher H., “Face-Off: Churchill, Reith and the BBC”, Finest Hour, 
The Churchill Centre, no. 128, 2005, pp. 26-29. 
Stitson, Roger, “Constructing Australia: Pipe Dreams”, Film Australia, 
Woolloomooloo, 2007. 
599 
 
Storer, Jackie, “Churchill’s bunker revealed”, BBC News Online, London, 8 April 
2003. 
Street, John, Mass Media, Politics and Democracy, Palgrave, Hampshire and New 
York, 2001. 
Strong, Cathy and Grant Hannis, “The visibility of female journalists at Australian 
and New Zealand Newspapers: the good news and the bad news”, Australian 
Journalism Review, vol. 29, no. 1, 2007, pp. 115-128. 
Swinburne, Algernon Charles, Songs Before Sunrise, William Heinemann, London, 
1917. 
Taggart-Speers, Elizabeth, “The Story of the Kelly Gang”, National Film and Sound 
Archive, Acton, 2009. 
Tahvanainen, K. V., “The innovative bakelite telephone”, The History of Ericsson: 
Centre for Business History, Stockholm, 2007. 
Tait, Simon, “A war leader’s love affair with the press”, The Times, London, 8 
March 2008, p. 80. 
Tate, Audrey, Fair Comment: The life of Pat Jarrett 1911-1990, Melbourne 
University Press, Carlton, 1996. 
Taylor, A.J.P., Beaverbook, Hamilton, London, 1972. 
Taylor, Philip M., “Book review” (John M. MacKenzie and John Hilvert), Journal of 
Modern History, vol. 58, no. 4, December 1996, pp. 923-926. 
The Battle for Australia Commemoration National Council, “Battle for Australia”, 
National Council Newsletter, Evatt, 2008. 
The Embassy of the United States of America, “History of the U.S. Embassy”, 
Yarralumla, 2010. 
The Herald & Weekly Times, Keith Murdoch: Journalist, The Herald & Weekly 
Times Ltd., Melbourne, 1952. 
600 
 
The National Archives, “The Art of War”, Surrey, 2005. 
The Westminster Collection, “‘Churchill and the Press’ and the re-launch of the 
Harmsworth Room at the Churchill Museum and Cabinet War Rooms”, 
Westminster, 2008. 
The White House Historical Association, “White House Pets”, Washington DC, 
2008. 
Thomas, Alan, “Cleary, William James (1885 - 1973)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 8, 1981, pp. 21-22. 
Thorndike, Edward L., The Teachers’ Word Book, Teachers College, Columbia 
University, New York, 1921. 
Tiffen, Rodney, News & Power, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Wellington, London and 
Boston, 1989. 
Toland, John, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, Doubleday, New York, 1982. 
Toto, Christian, ‘‘‘Legacy of Attack’ Brings Pearl Harbor to Life”, The Washington 
Times, Washington DC, 26 May 2001. 
Toye, Richard, “The Churchill Syndrome: Reputational Entrepreneurship and the 
Rhetoric of Foreign Policy Since 1945”, The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, vol. 10, no. 3, 2008, pp. 364-378. 
Trenwith, Courtney, “Social networking spills the beans”, brisbanetimes.com.au, 
Brisbane, 25 June 2010. 
Tunstall, Jeremy, Journalists at work, Constable, London, 1971. 
Turnbull, Sue, “Figuring the Audience”, in Stuart Cunningham and Graeme Turner 
(eds), The Australian TV Book, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2000, pp. 173-189. 
601 
 
Turner, Graeme, “The active audience: reception traditions”, in Stuart Cunningham 
and Graeme Turner (eds), The Media in Australia: Industries, Texts, Audiences, 
Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, second edition, 1997, pp. 381-393. 
Twomey, Christina, “Captive Women and Audiences: Internment in the Asia-Pacific 
in World War II”, Meanjin, vol. 58, no. 1, 1999, pp. 45-57. 
Usher, Jim (ed.), The Argus: Life & Death of a Newspaper, Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, North Melbourne, 2007. 
US Library of Congress, “Women Come to the Front: Journalists, Photographers, 
and Broadcasters During World War II”, Washington DC, 2006. 
Van Aelst, Peter, Kees Brants, Philip Van Praag, Claes De Vreese, “The Fourth 
Estate as Superpower? An Empirical Study on Perceptions of Media Power in 
Belgium and the Netherlands”, International Communication Association, Montreal, 
21 May 2008, pp. 1-22. 
Van Heekeren, Margaret, “Who’s Gough Whitlam? What journalism graduates don’t 
know about the past and what news editors want them to know”, Australian 
Journalism Review, vol. 27, no. 1, 2005, pp. 209-218. 
Vasterman, Peter, L.M. “Media-Hype: Self-Reinforcing News Waves, Journalistic 
Standards and the Construction of Social Problems”, European Journal of 
Communication, vol. 20, no. 4, 2005, pp. 508-530. 
Vaughn, Stephen L., Encyclopedia of American Journalism, Routledge, New York, 
2007. 
Veteran Affairs Canada, “Canada and the Second World War 1939-1945”, Ottawa, 
1998. 
Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin and Thomas Hanitzsch, “Introduction: On Why and How We 
Should Do Journalism Studies”, in Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch 
(eds), The Handbook of Journalism Studies, Routledge, New York and Abingdon, 
2009, pp. 3-16. 
602 
 
Ward, Ian, “The early use of radio for political communication in Australia and 
Canada: John Henry Austral, Mr Sage and the Man from Mars”, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, pp. 311-329. 
——  “The Press, Television and the Public Sphere”, in Ian Ward (ed.), Politics of 
the media, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1995, pp. 1-19. 
Warren, Christopher, “The Price Of Freedom: New Media Ownership Laws And A 
Free Australian Press”, University of New South Wales Law Journal, vol. 30, no. 1, 
2007, pp. 269-279. 
Welch, Reed L., “Polls, Polls, and More Polls: An Evaluation of How Public 
Opinion Polls are Reported in Newspapers”, The Harvard International Journal of 
Press/Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, 2002, pp. 102-114. 
White, Richard, “Packer, Robert Clyde (1879 - 1934)”, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Melbourne University Press, vol. 11, 1988, pp. 117-118. 
Williams, Raymond, “Mass and masses”, in T. O’Sullivan and Y. Jewkes (eds), The 
media studies reader, Arnold, London, 1977, pp. 18-27. 
Willis, William James and Jim Willis, The Media Effect: How the News Influences 
Politics and Government, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 2007. 
Willows Theatre Company, “Willows Theatre Company stages Tony award-winning 
drama about President Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 5 – June 1, 2008”, Martinez, 
April 2008. 
Willson, Michele, Technically Together: Rethinking Community within Techno-
Society, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2006. 
Wooding, David, “Two-finger salute to Churchill”, The Sun Online, London, 13 July 
2007. 
Wrigley, Chris, Winston Churchill: A Biographical Companion, ABC-CLIO, Santa 
Barbara, 2002. 
603 
 
Wurth, Bob, “Menzies, Fadden, Curtin and the Japanese Envoy”, John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2009. 
——  “Saving Australia & the growing danger of revisionism”, John Curtin Prime 
Ministerial Library, Bentley, 2006. 
——  Saving Australia: Curtin’s secret peace with Japan, Lothian Books, South 
Melbourne, 2006. 
Yeager, Elizabeth Anne, Stuart J. Foster and Jennifer Greer, “How Eight Graders in 
England and the United States View Historical Significance”, The Elementary School 
Journal, vol. 103, no. 2, 2002, pp. 199-219. 
Young, Sally, “Political discourse in the age of the soundbite: the election campaign 
soundbite on Australian television news”, Australian Political Studies Association 
Conference, Brisbane, 6-9 July 2008, pp. 1-23. 
Younger, R.M., Keith Murdoch: Founder of a Media Empire, 
HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2003. 
 
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright 
material.  I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been 
omitted or incorrectly acknowledged. 
 
 
